The recent unfortunate loss of the USS LaMoure County (LST-1194) on the desolate rocks off Chile moves our dwindling LST fleet one step closer to the history books. As the U.S. Navy amphibious force has dwindled to some 36 ships, the 12 amphibious ready groups (ARGs) have dropped to a usual composition of three ships each: an LHA or LHD flagship, an LPD, and an LSD. While the "square and cube" stowage totals will be met eventually through the new San Antonio (LPD17) class ships, the reduction in hulls in our tactical amphibious groups represents a loss in flexibility that goes beyond simple numbers.
Accordingly, the Navy should consider rounding out the amphibious fleet with a modest new ship that gives our "gator" force not only enhanced lift capability but increased tactical flexibility as well. I propose a new class of small amphibious ship designed specifically to meet several key mission requirements. It should be capable of supporting a landing force large enough to tactically complement the air and surface assault platforms the amphibious forces will rely on in the future. It also should be capable of independent operations, and have relatively "long legs," yet be sized to operate in unimproved ports and harbors. This new breed of gator would:
Be capable of embarking and supporting a company-sized raid force that can operate independently from the main amphibious force. This would include the means for ship-to-shore movement of troops and their gear, plus the "cube and square" necessary to sustain them.
Add the versatility to lift additional vehicles, troops, and cargo. While the numbers may work out on paper, Navy and Marine planners know that the three-ship ARG is a tight fit for the Marine expeditionary unit (special operations capable). Specific missions or extended deployments can stretch the landing force table of allowance beyond the lifelines of the three ships, making an additional ship a necessity. More important, amphibious commanders often have been forced to split the ARG into discrete tactical subsets to deal with crisis situations. This can be done properly only with a larger base of four ships.
Serve as a naval presence, operating independently in underdeveloped littoral countries where the "Forward ... from the Sea" strategy is rooted. It is clear that reductions in the fleet's size will require the use of individual ships to show the flag. A modestly sized gator would be well suited to this task because of its ability to embark a small landing force for operations ashore.
Be useful for conduct of humanitarian assistance operations. Amphibious ships routinely have been called on to deliver aid to underdeveloped areas as well as to support disaster relief operations. This new ship would be capable of supporting this mission both as part of a larger force and independently.
Act as a training platform for small Marine Corps and Navy units, such as rifle companies, assault amphibian vehicles (AAVs), and landing craft. Valuable individualized, shipboard training will become increasingly difficult for these units as amphibious shipping decreases. A new small ship will ease the setting of training priorities.
Translating these mission requirements into specific capabilities, a picture of what this ship should look like emerges:
The company-sized landing force provides the baseline for this new ship's lift capability and equates to a capacity of 250-300 embarked troops. The vehicle requirements for this size force must be predicated on the needs of a reinforced rifle company as the Marine Corps sees it today. This would include up to 15 AAVs or an equivalent number of advanced AAVs. Variations on this notional cargo and vehicle storage should accommodate embarkation of an light armored vehicle company or an artillery battery.
The ship must be compatible with the ship-to-shore tactics to be used in future amphibious operations. The AAV requirement outlined will require vehicle stowage with a stem ramp for underway launch. Today's over-the-horizon surface assault is built around the landing craft, air cushion (LCAC), so any new amphibious ship must be able to embark this craft. However, as the unique capabilities of the LCAC do not require a fully flooding well deck, this ship could be equipped with an LCAC "bay," accessible via a stern gate at the ship's normal navigational draft. The LCAC bay need only be large enough to take on one LCAC at a time. Air assault requirements would dictate a single helicopter spot certified for the CH-46 and the MV-22.
The trend in providing gators minimal self-defense armament should be continued with this ship. The close-in weapon system, small caliber machine guns, and perhaps a small missile system should be sufficient. Similar logic applies to the command-and-control suite, with two exceptions: Owing to the need to support independent operations, communications equipment should have a joint operational tactical system and the global information exchange system capability; and the design should include a small intelligence center to be activated during independent operations.
Such an austere ship should cost between 150 and 200 million dollars each. Low technological risk and minimal capabilities will hold the price to this level. Assuming a requirement for 12 ships (one per ARG), the total price tag of this new ship classless life cycle and personnel costsshould come to a relatively affordable 2.5 billion dollars.
While this conceptual ship is a radical departure from the current plan to build large multipurpose amphibious ships, its pedigree is solid. During World War II, the need to quickly move small raiding forces around contested islands resulted in the APD-class ship, a troop-carrying destroyer. The venerable, but soon to vanish, Newport (LST-1179)-class ship usually draw those sort of assignments, and they are still called for: embarking mobile units for the amphibious missions discussed above.
Although proposing a new amphibious ship in the current funding environment is an unwelcome move, the demands of our strategy of forward presence and engagement require a strong, flexible amphibious force. Maintaining our amphibious capability for the future will require a fresh look at both tactics and systems. A modest gator, designed to supplement the investment we have made in the higher cost ships, is an overlooked option that could strengthen U.S. amphibious potential at a reasonable price.