In the maritime war on drugs, one question haunts the Coast Guard: How can we stop the go-fast? These high-speed vessels, ranging from 30- to 50-feet long and boasting two or more powerful outboard engines, have been the prime means for smuggling drugs and illegal migrants in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific for the past half-dozen years. Go-fasts easily outrun most of the Coast Guard’s larger cutters and merely sneer when intercepted on the high seas by unarmed HH-65 and HH-60 helicopters. Finding a counter to the go-fast threat has been a top priority for Coast Guard operational planners.
The answer emerging from Washington has been two-fold: employing armed Coast Guard helicopters and developing a high-speed small-boat capability. In operational tests the armed helicopters have been a dramatic success, but programmatic slowdowns and funding issues will limit the number of aircraft on patrol for the foreseeable future. At sea, a new generation of “over-the-horizon” rigid hull inflatable boats (OTH-RHIB), deployed from medium- and high-endurance cutters, and more capable deployable pursuit boats (DPB) stationed on board ex-Navy TAGOS oceanographic vessels, are being introduced. On the water the Coast Guard is going small, hoping to match the smugglers in speed, stealth, and capability. Unfortunately, small will not work.
The Coast Guard tried small before: that program failed, and there is no reason to believe this iteration will fare differently. Rather than a realistic counter to the go-fast, going small will create frustration, yield few operational successes, cost valuable dollars, and potentially embarrass the service before Congress and the new administration. The Coast Guard should cut its losses, retool its strategy, and vigorously pursue a fleet of larger vessels that can move quickly, operate in marginal sea conditions, and carry the multitude of sensors, weapons, and nonlethal devices needed to stop the go-fasts. Simply put, the Coast Guard needs speed—big speed.
The Small-Boat Problem
Go-fasts are remarkable vessels, visionary in their simplicity. Built of solid fiberglass, wide of beam, and with a deep “v” hull form, the typical go-fast carries a ton or more of illicit cargo, several fuel drums, a handheld global positioning system or cell phone, and a small crew. With throaty 250-plus horsepower engines, they travel at top speeds of 35-50 knots, slowing little in light chop and still maintaining 25 or more knots in the average five- to seven- foot Caribbean seas. They are heavy enough to cut through higher waves, although at a slower pace. With no metallic appendages, go-fasts rarely paint on radar except in a flat calm or when close aboard a patrolling cutter: they are stealthy, seaworthy, fast, and very effective.
The Coast Guard’s DPB and OTH-RHIB are both shorter, flimsier, and lighter than the average go-fast. They are crammed with sensitive electronics, radios, weapons, and—most important—a few brave Coast Guardsmen. The laws of physics demand that in choppy seas the smaller, lighter, and more delicate vessel will cut less through the waves, pound its crew harder, and go slower. Only in a flat calm or a light chop does the DPB or OTH-RHIB have a chance of keeping pace with a typical go-fast. Great for demonstrations on rivers and in bays, these Coast Guard boats can’t do the job in the real world except in brief weather windows when Mother Nature calms the seas or when chasing a smuggler in sheltered waters. This is not to argue that the OTH-RHIB program is ill advised; it should be continued because it gives larger cutters a more capable multimission small boat.
History shows the folly of using small, high-speed vessels to intercept drug runners on the open ocean. In the late 1980s, the Coast Guard, seeking to stem the flood of cocaine from the Bahamas into southeastern Florida, introduced the “fast coastal interceptor,” a 43-foot high-performance boat similar to the speedy “cigarette” vessels used by many smugglers. In its years of service, the interceptor fleet had virtually no operational successes and was plagued by engineering casualties. The program failed as a result of limited sensors, a punishing ride, high maintenance costs, and the ability to keep up with but not outperform the smugglers’ vessels. In sum, the interceptors were too complex and too small for the mission.
Much of the high-speed smuggling activity in the Florida Straits, however, has been stemmed, for many reasons. First is the closer cooperation between the Coast Guard, local agencies, and U.S. Customs (whose fleet of extremely fast “Blue Thunder” vessels has been successfully operating close to U.S. shores—not in the deep blue). The success of Operation Bahamas Turks and Caicos (OPBAT), a U.S.-Bahamian counterdrug operation, has also helped. Perhaps most important, the Coast Guard and Navy began to operate large, high-speed vessels in the straits. The Navy’s 50-knot Pegasus (PHM-1)-class hydrofoils (PHMs), which occasionally were used for counterdrug efforts off South Florida until their decommissioning a decade ago, were extremely successful in thwarting go-fasts. Starting in 1986, the Coast Guard began introducing a large fleet of 110-foot patrol boats into Miami and Key West; these cutters spend the majority of their time in the Straits. The 110s, with their 30-knot sprint speed, have intercepted hundreds of go-fasts over the past 15 years, and even when unable to stop them, have been able to lay chase until helicopters from Miami or OPBAT arrived on scene to execute an end-game close to shore.
A recent drug seizure illuminates the need for big speed. On 10 January 2001, a surface action group of three Coast Guard 110-foot patrol boats, a 270-foot medium-endurance cutter, and two DPBs deployed from the USNS Persistent (T-AGOS-6) entered into pursuit of a go-fast vessel off the eastern tip of Cuba. Sea conditions during the chase built from flat calm at the start to four- to six-foot seas six hours later. The smuggler tucked inside Cuban waters, occasionally sprinting north in an attempt to reach the Bahamas; each time the go-fast reached international waters, a 110-footer intercepted it and fired warning shots across its bow. On the third attempt, the USCGC Padre (WPB-1328) was able to dash in at 30 knots and maneuver close enough to employ disabling fire from its M16 rifle, and subsequently seized the vessel and its cargo of marijuana and hashish oil.
But what of the DPBs? They were essentially useless, able to make only 12-15 knots into the choppy but typical Caribbean head seas. After less than three hours in the water, both DPBs suffered structural damage and one swamped as it headed back to the Persistent, requiring an hour-long rescue and assistance effort. While the 110s were basking in the glow of their latest drug seizure, the shaken DPB crews were throwing their sodden uniforms into the dryer.
The go-fast made 35 knots in four- to six-foot seas. Three 110s easily steamed at 30 knots. The 270-foot cutter, albeit cranking out a miserly 18 knots, actually passed the struggling pursuit boats during the chase. Only the DPBs were unable to negotiate the moderate seas; an OTH-RHIB would have fared no better.
To be successful against a go-fast, the interdicting vessel must be fast, of equal or near-equal speed to the smuggler. The ship also must be stable and ride comfortably in choppy sea conditions, without excessively fatiguing its crew, and allow accurate employment of nonlethal weapons, warning shots, and disabling fire. It must have the sensors, weapons, and communications gear required to locate, track, intercept, and stop the smuggler, and enough crew to man this equipment. Finally, it must have sufficient endurance to challenge the go-fast for hours on end, outlasting it if necessary.
There is no small speedboat in the world that has these capabilities. Just to fit necessary equipment and personnel, ensure a smooth ride, and provide suitable endurance mandates a cutter, not a boat. This all boils down to a basic truth: high-speed patrol boats or larger sized cutters are needed to safely and consistently stop the go-fast. Anything smaller will be unreliable, difficult to maintain, and potentially dangerous for its crew. Big and fast means busted.
Getting Bigger
A high-speed capability among the Coast Guard’s larger cutters has natural applications across a wide variety of missions. High speed allows a cutter to reposition quickly in response to changing intelligence for counterdrug, alien migrant interdiction, or fisheries enforcement operations. High speed allows better employment of deceptive tactics, where a cutter patrols visibly near shore during the day, only to sprint through the night to a new location. High speed means more lives will be saved in the deepwater environment during urgent search-and-rescue cases. For national security missions, speed allows a cutter to keep pace with U.S. and foreign naval vessels, a capability increasingly important as the Coast Guard provides cutters for European Command deployments, UNITAS training cruises, and Persian Gulf maritime interception operations. The National Fleet concept essentially mandates that the next generation of cutters be able to operate fully with the U.S. Navy, speed being a critical factor.
There are many platforms available among the world’s naval forces that would fit the speed and size requirements of the Coast Guard. A cursory look through Combat Fleets finds several classes of 150- to 250-foot fast-attack missile craft in service in nations as far-flung as Germany, Ecuador, and Bahrain. Many of these ships are powered by gas turbines and capable of speeds of 40-45 knots. For those powered solely by diesels, speeds of 30-40 knots are not uncommon. Stripped of their missiles and with a towing bit bolted on, most of these ships would perform admirably as multimission cutters, although they are typically too small to carry a helicopter. The next step up is the 250- to 350-foot corvette-sized vessel, and several 30-knot diesel or gas turbine-powered models are in service worldwide, most with robust flight deck arrangements.
Closer to home, an excellent fit for the Coast Guard’s counterdrug mission are the U.S. Navy’s 170-foot coastal patrol boats (PCs). Fitted with four Paxman engines and four shafts, they cruise easily at 35 knots and have seakeeping and endurance capabilities much greater than the 110-foot Island-class patrol boats. The PCs have proved themselves in real-world go-fast interdictions; a squadron of Coast Guard PCs operating from Guantanamo Bay or Roosevelt Roads could put a serious pinch on go-fast operations in the Caribbean. The Coast Guard owns one of the PCs, the former USS Cyclone (PC-1), and is slated to receive six more in the next five years. Sadly, a lack of funding has prevented the Coast Guard from operating the Cyclone and today it sits idle, collecting dust and rust rather than keeping drugs off America’s streets.
Other excellent ships potentially available to the Coast Guard are the Navy’s Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)-class guided missile frigates, many of which are being decommissioned and transferred to other nations. The Navy recently offered several frigates to the Coast Guard but the cash- and manpower-strapped service could not operate them, and the offer was declined. The frigates, with their 29-knot speeds and capability of sheltering two helicopters, would be especially useful in the drug war. A single frigate could house two of the Coast Guard’s armed helicopters, which work in pairs, and use its multitude of advanced sensors to detect and monitor go-fasts.
The ultimate answer to providing requisite speed to the Coast Guard’s larger cutters lies with the ongoing Integrated Deepwater System project, a multidecade effort to recapitalize the service’s aging assets. The Deepwater project has identified speed as an important capability and requires that cutters developed for replacement possess speeds close to 30 knots. Further, because of the National Fleet initiative, new Deepwater cutters and Navy ships will be able to operate together even more effectively than today, providing a more capable naval force for both the counterdrug effort and other missions.
Unfortunately, big speed is on the distant horizon, hull down. It will be years before the Coast Guard starts cutting steel to build the next generation of offshore cutters, and a decade or more before new, higher speed ships comprise the bulk of the fleet.
A short-term solution is needed. There are many possibilities, but in the absence of unexpected congressional generosity, all require freeing up existing money and people to man whatever higher speed ships can be obtained. Terminating the DPB project and mothballing the TAGOS motherships could save millions each year. Another possibility is to decommission a number of obsolete 210- and 378-foot cutters, and use their funding base and manpower to stand up crews on board available frigates and PCs. While not perfect solutions, either scenario is better than the current state of affairs, where slow, old, and increasingly unreliable cutters engage in a frustrating cat-and-mouse game with highly sophisticated smugglers.
Until maritime counterdrug forces have the capabilities to firmly challenge the smugglers, the go-fasts will continue running their illicit cargo across the Caribbean and eastern Pacific, and their drugs will continue to flood U.S. shores. To turn the tables on the smugglers, the Coast Guard needs big speed—and soon.
Commander Howe is attending the Marine Corps War College after serving 11 years at sea during his 21-year career. He most recently served as commanding officer in the USCGC Tampa (WMEC-902).