The 2018 war is over. As the Marine Corps recovers from the disaster and looks to the future, it needs to reevaluate doctrine and structure. And the first action to come out of that assessment should be reintroduction of tactical jet aviation into the Marine Corps. To understand why, a review of how the Corps lost the most potent weapon in its history is in order.
The financial millstone that the MV-22 Osprey became, combined with the fiscal neglect of the Clinton era, was the perfect medium for the growth of a cancer that ultimately emasculated Marine Corps aviation. Starting in 2001, following an introduction marred by mishaps and fatalities, the MV-22 gradually yet fitfully replaced the badly aging CH-46 helicopter fleet. It was intended to be a cornerstone of the operational maneuver from the sea concept: a technological marvel with the speed, range, and insertion capabilities that would enable Marines to confound enemies at every turn. It came at a staggering cost. Overruns far exceeded the predictions of even its harshest critics. Production delays and contractor shortfalls drove the price per unit through the roof. Further, operating expenses grew by magnitudes of order beyond the original plans. And sadly, the Osprey's readiness rate was—and still is—the lowest of any aircraft in the U.S. armed forces. Something had to give.
What gave first was the AV-8B Harrier. Having been beset by a number of its own problems since inception, the Harrier was mired in its third multimonth grounding in as many years when the Marine Corps finally pulled the plug in 2002. Many believed the loss would not be sorely felt as the AV-8B only had contributed marginally to operations, and its vertical takeoff and landing capability added more to air show pizzazz than warfighting punch. When Marine leaders looked to the ground side for savings, their eyes fell on the advanced amphibious assault vehicle. Overweight and over budget, the Corps' brightest hope for upgrading the amphibious assault capability joined the Harrier in the dustbin.
Soon it was aviation's turn again. The F/A-18 Hornet was the most effective aircraft the Marine Corps had ever owned; but it was starting to age. Parts were expensive and the cost per flight hour had begun to soar. Serviceability began to suffer and, in turn, so did retention of aircrew. By 2005, the Marine Hornet community was barely a ghost of the potent force it had been in the heady days leading up to and immediately following the 1991 Gulf War. The Hornet's problems were not unusual for an aging aircraft. However, its replacement was having problems as well. Despite promises that the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) would be delivered on time and within budget, the program slid and cost overruns became endemic.
The financial noose tightened. How could the Marine Corps pay for the JSF if it could not afford the MV-22? Inevitably, the unthinkable became thinkable. If Hornet squadrons were disestablished and the Marine version of the JSF canceled, resources would be available to support the Osprey. Critics in and outside the Corps screamed that without a fixed-wing tactical air arm, the Marine Corps would lose validity and be nothing more than a better disciplined, better dressed variant of the Army. Proponents of the move countered that, regardless of weapons and equipment, the Corps' mission would remain credible. They argued that in a world of growing "jointness," it was not only possible, but in fact better, to rely on Navy and Air Force fixed-- wing support.
Cornered and left with no good choice, the Commandant of the Marine Corps recommended to the Secretary of the Navy in late 2010 that Marine Hornets be stood down and Marine procurement of the JSF be canceled. "I fear that I may be precipitating the dissolution of our Marine Corps," he said. "But to do otherwise will no doubt surely bankrupt us out of existence."
The rest is history—recent history. While the conflict with China, India, and Iraq left the United States and its allies more or less as victors, Marine Corps participation was limited to a crushing defeat on the island of Taiwan. The Corps that owns the glory of Belleau Wood and Iwo Jima has taken on the ignominy of Keelung, the greatest wartime disaster ever suffered by the nation.
No one argues that air support probably would have saved the day. But there was practically none. The Air Force was tied down in Malaysia and the Persian Gulf. With the Army facing disaster in Singapore, the Air Force had moved the bulk of its Taiwan-based units south to beef up forces on the Malay Peninsula. One F-16 squadron was left behind in case of a Chinese invasion that few believed would come. But it came nonetheless. During the first days of the battle, the F-16s supported the Marines with 84 sorties before being ordered south to the Malay Peninsula. Denial of bases in Unified Korea and Japan by their respective governments was crippling, and the Nationalist Air Force, cowed by threats from the mainland, refused to fly. In contrast, their army brethren put up fierce resistance alongside the Marines.
In trying to reinforce the beleaguered forces on Taiwan, the Navy paid the butcher's bill: Two of its eight precious carriers were sunk. Loss of the Nimitz and the Harry S. Truman to Chinese submarines less than a day's sail from Taiwan, and the near simultaneous crippling of the Ronald Reagan by an air-delivered cruise missile, forced the task force commander to retreat for fear of losing the Reagan and the as yet undamaged Vinson. Other than the limited F-16 support, there was little to stop the Chinese landing. Using a huge fleet of merchant and military vessels covered by their air forces, they put ashore more than 100,000 troops on the first day. The flood of enemy forces was overwhelming. Marine casualties, which still are being ascertained, have reached more than 42,000 killed and wounded. Outnumbered ten-to-one, under continuous bombardment, and with no hope of reinforcement, they fought well and defended to the last.
Fortunately, rather than assigning blame for the defeat at Keelung, the nation is helping the Corps to rebuild. A stunned and embarrassed Congress has authorized a military budget unprecedented since World War II. Although rebuilding will take herculean efforts, the nation—and the Corps—cannot abide another failure. We can never again put all our procurement eggs in one basket. The Marine Corps needs tactical jet aircraft.
Lieutenant Colonel Stout, an F/A-18 pilot with 20 years of service, is coauthor of The First Hellcat Ace (Pacifica Press, 2001) and author of Hornets Over Kuwait (Naval Institute Press, 1997). He is assigned to the staff of Marine Aircraft Group 11 at Miramar, California.