The U.S. Navy is facing its most critical period since the end of the Cold War more than a decade ago. The coalescence of the Bush administration's transformation effort, the congressionally mandated Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), and the reevaluation of U.S. military capabilities after the terrorist attacks of 11 September have led to virtually all U.S. military programs being put under a microscope.
For the Navy, this means that high-visibility programs—such as the Zumwalt (DD-21)-class destroyer, follow-on nuclear carriers, San Antonio (LPD- 17)-class amphibious ship, Trident missile submarine conversions, and Joint Strike Fighter—are being scrutinized to a greater degree than ever before. In addition, there is major support for an expanded Navy within some quarters of the Department of Defense.
In a recent letter to the Secretary of the Navy, E. C. (Pete) Aldridge Jr., the Under Secretary of Defense for Technology and Logistics, identified three options for the fleet of 2025:
- A fleet of 260 ships, the number that would result from the current ship construction rate
- A force of 316 ships (the current fleet size), which would require a slight increase in the shipbuilding rate
- A 340-ship fleet, which would require a further increase in the shipbuilding rate
The last is the fleet preferred by Aldridge, and although short of the Navy's wishful 360-plus-ship QDR fleet, it would require an increase from the current building rate of 8-9 ships per year to an annual build rate of more than 11. Its composition, however, could be significantly different from today's Navy. Aldridge envisions new platforms for:
- Gaining access to a defended littoral
- Very-high-speed, long-range transport
- Offloading personnel and materiel at underdeveloped sites
- Support of the land battle
These efforts are proposed in the context of increased emphasis on the Pacific Ocean (as opposed to Atlantic-European areas) and the requirement to transport an Army division's weapons, equipment, munitions, and provisions anywhere in the world within 96 hours. That would require a force of 100-knot cargo ships capable of offloading their materiel rapidly in less-developed harbors and in the stream in rough weather.
All three options for the fleet of 2025 retain 12 aircraft carriers, but the makeup of the rest if the fleet is less clear. The report of the QDR, published on 30 September, does not call for significant changes in military force structure at this time, but it does contain recommendations that could have considerable impact on the Navy. For example, it directs that the Secretary of the Navy will
increase aircraft carrier battle group presence in the Western Pacific and will explore options for homeporting an additional three or four surface combatants, and guided missile submarines (SSGNs), in the area [and] . . . develop new concepts of maritime prepositioning, high-speed sealift, and new amphibious capabilities for the Marine Corps.
But before one reads these passages as a boost for Navy carrier and amphibious forces, consider that two Bush administration studies take different tacks. The Transformation Study, headed by General James McCarthy, U.S. Air Force (Retired), and the Conventional Forces Study, headed by David C. Gompert, president of RAND Europe, recommended specific programs for priority investments based on their potential contribution to military transformation.
Both panels favored the enhancement of rapid, long-range power projection capabilities from the continental United States, and both deemphasized the future role of forward deployed forces in initial responses to potential conflicts. Significantly, both also listed restarting production of an upgraded B-2 stealth bomber in the highest priority category, and both put the DD-21 in the lowest priority category.
(The Transformation panel proposed acquisition of 29 B-2C long-range bombers and the upgrade of the 21 existing B-2A aircraft to the B-2C configuration, for a total force of 50 aircraft. This would cost an estimated $36-$40 billion.)
Based in part on the two studies, there is an increasing attitude within the Office of the Secretary of Defense that the Zumwalt (DD-21)-class guided missile destroyer does not meet "transitional" criteria. This is a remarkable appraisal in view of the ship's highly innovative hull design, the introduction of electric drive, its clearly defined land-attack mission, and the ingenious plan to reduce manning.
Pentagon planners have cited the ship's multiple new systems and the attendant technology risks, unclear cost estimates, large ship size, lack of Aegis-type air defense system, and other issues. But, in fact, virtually all experts agree when asked about specific systems that there is low technology risk, although total integration will be a challenge (not a risk). Similarly, the Navy and industry have a far more realistic database on surface ship construction costs than are available, for example, on submarines or aircraft costs, in large part because of the ongoing Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) construction program.
The DD-21's large size—estimated to be 15,000 tons full-load displacement—also has been criticized. The ship's size is based on several advanced features, such as electric propulsion and survivability, as well as on the large missile magazines and two major gun systems. On a ton-per-weapon basis, it rates as a highly effective warship.
Although the DD-21 will have significant self-defense systems, active and passive, it will not have an Aegis-type area defense system. This was a conscious decision by the Navy based on the ship's primary role of land-attack/fire support and the availability of a large number of cruisers and destroyers fitted with Aegis. By 2010, the Navy should have more than 80 Aegis ships at sea. A possible derivative of DD-21, now referred to as a "missile cruiser," would embody an upgraded Aegis or the follow-on antiair/antimissile system.
Beyond the Zumwalt, several other U.S. warship classes are undergoing intense scrutiny. Also "in trouble" is the LPD-17. The San Antonio was laid down on 9 December 2000 at the Avondale Industries yard in New Orleans. She is reported to be two years behind schedule and more than 50% over budget, a remarkable situation for a ship in that stage of construction. The ship's design also has been criticized heavily.
At this time the most rational approach to the problem may be to halt all work on these ships. The negative appraisals of the design demand that the LPD-17 program be reevaluated, because, as one Navy officer stated, "a 21st-century amphibious warship—designed to operate as part of a still-shrinking fleet in littoral regions characterized by increasingly lethal antiaccess weapons—needs more firepower and versatility.
Perhaps the first two ships should be redesigned and completed as joint command ships, a high-priority requirement for future forward military operations. The LPD-17, at 24,900 tons full-load displacement and 684 feet long, will be significantly larger than the existing U.S. major command ships Blue Ridge (LCC-19) and Mount Whitney (LCC-20). Replacing the LPD's planned docking well with accommodations and command-and-control facilities, coupled with the large helicopter hangar and flight deck, could make such ships highly capable in the joint command ship role.
The issue of "small combatants" also is being addressed at the highest levels of defense procurement. The planned near-term disposal of the 13 coastal patrol craft of the Cyclone (PC-1) class would shift virtually all coastal patrol and interdiction activities to the Coast Guard, which already is hard-pressed to meet its national security, antidrug, law enforcement, and safety assignments within its budget. The Navy's giving up the PCs undoubtedly will affect future congressional consideration of funding for special operations craft, and may have an impact on the support for a "streetfighter" or littoral warfare ship.
Returning to the transformation and QDR issues, submarines appear to have an "up check" under both reviews. Under Secretary of Defense Aldridge noted that a 340-ship Navy calls for an increase in the attack submarine (SSN) force and converting four Trident strategic missile submarines to cruise missile and special operations (SSGN) roles. The QDR also cites the SSGNs, with the possibility of their being forward based in the Western Pacific (most likely Guam).
Both submarine programs, however, are wrapped in controversy. The Virginia (SSN-774) program has begun to experience significant cost increases, and the lead ship, launched in 1999, is not scheduled for completion until at least mid-2004. Following the long construction and fitting out periods of the previous Seawolf (SSN-21) class, it seems unlikely that there will be acceleration of the Virginia production rate—currently one boat per year—but the submarine community is arguing for an increase to at least two per year.
At the same time, there is some concern on Capitol Hill over the current joint SSN construction by Newport News and General Dynamics/Electric Boat. This sharing of work has caused problems and additional costs. When the submarine community crafted the arrangement to avoid competition between the two yards and preempt congressional direction on submarine designs, it was acknowledged that the initial submarines would be more costly but that there would be savings in later units. Now the initial costs are higher than expected and there seems to be little likelihood of savings in the later ships.
The Trident conversions also are complicated. Funds have been provided for planning the first two of four proposed SSGNs, but the conversion cost estimates are going up rapidly, and whether the SSGNs must be compliant with U.S.-Russian arms agreements is not yet clear. If they are to be compliant, which means the Trident missile section would be cut out and a new hull section installed, the costs would be higher still.
Other questions center on mission. Is there a requirement for the clandestine launch of perhaps 150 cruise missiles? Or would 16 or so from a single attack submarine be the maximum? Similarly, the compatibility of the cruise missile and special operations roles has not been discussed publicly, nor has the "requirement" for large numbers of SEALs or other special operations forces to be carried. The converted Tridents normally would embark 50 or more SEALs, but, reportedly, the United States has not put more than a dozen people ashore in a clandestine submarine operation in the past 50 years. Similarly, how close to the beach will the submarines—the largest ever built by the United States—come, and how many men could be delivered over what time period by the one or two swimmer delivery vehicles that would be carried?
Funding is the major concern as these and other Navy issues are being discussed in the Pentagon. The ongoing Navy and Marine Corps programs are severely underfunded in the fiscal year 2001 budget. Supplemental defense funding is being approved, but the list of high-priority programs to be funded is long. Emphasis will be on pay and benefits, counterterrorist efforts, the development and production of new weapons (primarily air launched), national missile defense, space-based systems, and transformation.
How well will Navy-Marine Corps programs fit into these new budget categories? Will the development and procurement of a flotilla of 100-knot cargo carriers be paid for from Navy budgets? Can the SSN build rate be increased at the cost of $2 billion per submarine? Can the DD-21 and Trident SSGN programs survive an objective cost analysis? And, most important, can Navy leaders convince DoD that Navy programs are "transformational"?
Shortly after the Cold War ended, the Navy garnered support for its transition from blue-water to littoral operations, which was well articulated in the white paper ". . . From the Sea." Subsequent Navy efforts to explain its role have been lacking in salesmanship, and lackluster leadership during the late 1990s contributed to the failure to "sell" the Navy. Hopefully, the Navy's current leaders can articulate the Navy's role as we enter the 21st century.