Marine Corps' expeditionary maneuver warfare concept includes use of sea bases to facilitate various operational functions as well as logistic support. The sea base will be composed of both the amphibious task force (ATF) and the future maritime prepositioning force (MPF[F]). While the Marine Corps has started to employ the enhanced force (MPF[E]), this program does not meet all the required capabilities set forth in the Corps' warfighting concepts for the 21st century. Development of a sea base to support the tenets of operational maneuver from the sea requires a thorough review of current naval architecture that will have far-reaching doctrinal, organizational, and fiscal implications. The integrated ATF-MPF sea base will be the essential lynchpin for future littoral operations.
For the past two years, the MPF 2010 concept paper published in December 1997 has been followed by the MPF(F) effort. A naval expeditionary working group composed of Navy and Marine Corps personnel drafted the mission need statement (MNS) for MPF(F). It is based on the MPF 2010 concept paper and reflects the same pillars: force closure; amphibious task force interoperability; sustainment; and reconstitution and redeployment. The MNS has been validated by the Joint Requirement Oversight Committee and was signed by the Chief of Naval Operations in June 2001. An analysis of alternatives can begin to determine feasibility, design, and cost. This process requires establishment of certain operational parameters and can take several years. Although the MPF(F) mission need statement was built on the pillars of the 2010 concept paper, it is broad enough to allow for many interpretations—and to sustain the progress of the MPF(F), the naval service must refine and clarify these interpretations.
Planning Considerations
Before discussing ship capabilities, it is important to understand that future U.S. naval forces will be required to execute a wide range of missions. Given such varied scenarios and foes, MPF(F) planners must look well beyond current operational requirements:
Forces. At-sea ATF-MPF interoperability capabilities support a Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB) with 30 days of sustainment. Efforts are ongoing to redefine the size of the future MEB, but traditionally it has been a notional force of between 14,000 and 17,000 Marines and sailors. Like the current force, the MPF(F) will be sized to accommodate a MEB's equipment.
Force Closure. The MPF(F) will remain prepositioned to enhance force closure and support the operational requirements of regional commanders-in-chief (CinCs). The MPF squadrons are stationed at three separate locations around the globe, within a few sailing days of numerous possible trouble spots. The MPF(F) will be stationed similarly; however, enhanced capabilities, such as ship-to-shore interface, will accelerate force closure and simplify subsequent tactical employment of the MEB. Current notional force closure time is 17 days (7 days sailing and 10 days for offloading). Through improved MPF(F) stowage and ship-to-shore capabilities, the number of days required can be reduced appreciably.
Reception, Staging, and Onward Integration (RSOI). These administrative functions expedite force closure and tactical employment of deploying Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs). To accomplish them, the MPF and MPF(E) programs require host-nation support in the form of ports and airfields. It is best to assume that future U.S. naval forces are unlikely to have as many friendly foreign ports and airfields at their disposal. The MPF has proved its worth in many contingencies—nonetheless, reliance on ports, airfields, and host-nation infrastructure is a growing weakness. Nations able to support MPF operations often are reluctant to do so for political and economic reasons. For example, during Operation Allied Force in 1998, Greece denied the Marine Corps use of a port for an MPF operation because the facility it requested handled one-third of Greek international trade. Thus, sea basing of expeditionary assets and functions becomes a required capability. To accelerate force closure, the MPF(F) will be capable of conducting RSOI in port, in stream, and over the horizon. It will retain current MPF RSOI functions and be capable of carrying them out from more than 25 nautical miles at sea.
Operational Modes
The MPF(F) will allow MAGTFs to conduct a wider variety of missions with a degree of flexibility that is not resident in MPF ships or the amphibious force. Although missions will be performed in all conditions, from permissive to non-permissive, the MPF(F) will be employed primarily in these operational modes:
ATF Reinforcement. Reinforcement of an ATF engaged in an amphibious operation is a new capability. The MPF traditionally has operated independent of the ATF in a secure, permissive environment. With its ability to interoperate with the ATF at sea, the MPF(F) concept adds a new dimension to amphibious power projection. The MPF(F) squadron would deploy from its prepositioned site to the designated area of operations (AO). Once on station, it would operate with ATF ships and assist in launching amphibious assault vehicles, landing craft, and lighters for the amphibious assault—a capability now limited to Navy amphibious ships. It is important to note that, with the MPF(F), launching air and surface assault waves will be a combined task that will complement amphibious capabilities, not supplant them. The MPF(F) ships will need protection in non-permissive zones of the AO because, while they will be built to high survivability standards, they will have no self-defense features.
Independent Operations. In a permissive environment, the MPF(F) will conduct in-port or in-stream evolutions in support of MAGTF operations that do not require forcible entry. In supporting humanitarian, nation-building, and disaster-relief operations, it is expected that the MPF(F) will operate in a permissive environment and need not integrate with an ATF. Only in a permissive environment can the MPF(F) operate without the protective umbrella of an ATF and other naval forces. The MPF(F) will not have a forcible entry capability and will not be able to conduct independent combat operations.
Operational Pillars
The MPF(F) mission need statement was based on the MPF 2010 concept paper and it incorporates the same pillars. (See Figure I for comparisons of MPF and MPF[F].) The pillars outline a variety of capabilities that have important implications for ship design and MPF(F) squadron configuration and that are essential to the conduct of expeditionary maneuver warfare:
Force Closure. This is the process of marrying Marines with their equipment and supplies. It is done by flying Marines—the fly-in echelon (FIE)—to the AO and landing them at a host-nation airport. In the meantime, the assigned MPF squadron steams to designated ports or shore facilities and prepares to offload equipment and supplies. Marines in the FIE carry weapons and selected items of equipment critical to mission accomplishment. Lead components of the FIE include Marines to prepare equipment on MPF ships for offloading and prepare facilities ashore for receiving it. Once in the AO, the remaining FIE units join with their assigned equipment. The marriage is a series of complex administrative functions that requires both time and "acreage" for establishing the MEB ashore.
In addition to the foregoing MPF scenario, the MPF(F) will be able to accelerate force closure by using two time-saving evolutions. The first involves steaming the MPF(F) squadron to an en-route rendezvous point near the AO, where the FIE can land and there are port facilities. With its enhanced berthing space, the squadron then would embark selected elements of the FIE and steam to the AO. In a matter of days, the regional CinC would have a forward-deployed MAGTF ready for subsequent operations. The other evolution would occur entirely at sea, with the MPF(F) squadron steaming toward the AO and marrying with the FIE element while en route. It would require an airfield for the FIE, but no port facilities. The FIE would move from the airfield to MPF(F) ships in naval air and surface craft of the task force. Using the "fast ferry" concept being studied by the Center for Naval Analyses, this method of force closure is the most expedient way of marrying the FIE with the MPF(F) squadron. In any case, constituting a seabased MEB will require detailed planning and the closest coordination.
ATF-MPF Interoperability. The MPF(F) mission need statement prescribes both air and surface interface points so that personnel, supplies, and equipment can be loaded on board MPF(F) ships at sea. These interface points will permit various conveyances to distribute equipment and supplies from the MPF(F) to the ATF and other ships in the sea base or directly to shore facilities. The MPF(F) squadron should have wet- and dry-well capabilities to permit loading and launching of surface craft—such as advanced amphibious assault vehicles, air cushioned landing craft, and lighters—and should be able to recover and launch all U.S. vertical takeoff and landing aircraft. The MPF often is viewed in a purely logistical context. While continuing to provide essential logistic services, the future MPF will have greater operational and tactical relevance. It will serve as the bridge between the ATF and the assault follow-on echelon, which provides most of the supplies for sustained operations ashore.
Sustainment. The MPF carries 30 days of supply for a deployed MEB. This considerable "staying power" will be provided by the MPF(F), but its sources and means of employment will be different. An MPF(F) squadron will sustain a MEB without the requirement to stockpile supplies and materiel on board MPF(F) ships alone. It will be able to interface with Navy combat logistics force ships and commercial ships that replenish the task force, thus reducing the MPF(F) space needed for supplies and making it available for other items. Replenishment interface will enable MPF(F) ships to serve as transportation and throughput facilities for other sea-based naval forces as well as the MEB. Because of its capability to receive, access, and distribute supplies while at sea, the MPF(F) will need to stockpile only those supplies that the MEB will require until sufficient supplies can be moved to the AO. If sustained land operations ensue, the sea-based capability can be moved to service support areas ashore. Because commercial shipping cannot support Navy underway replenishment, the MPF(F) will need commercial ship-compatible interface in its design, and every ship must be capable of handling both containerized and break-bulk cargo.
The MPF(F) will be the lynchpin for MAGTF logistics in the AO. While its ships will be the conduit for supplies and equipment, they also can provide substantial facilities and deck space for the execution of combat service support (CSS) functions, including maintenance services and medical support. It will be physically and technologically impossible to embark in the MPF(F) the CSS facility normally established ashore. Thus, the Marine Corps will have to review logistic functions and revolutionize applicable CSS methods. Improved information systems, efficient supply chain management, streamlined maintenance procedures, and total asset visibility are essential to the establishment of an effective sea-based logistics capability.
Reconstitution and Redeployment. This capability enables the MEB to "recock" at sea by recovering its Marines and equipment, and heading to a another location for successive operations. Reconstitution of an MPF squadron is a maintenance and "real-estate-intensive" move that can take weeks. The MPF(F) should be designed so as to accomplish this evolution with greater speed and efficiency. Sustainment upgrades will require redesign of MPF logistic functions—and fortunately, advances in that area will have direct application to reconstitution and redeployment.
Conclusions
The form and functions of MPF(F) differ substantially from the current force. Their focus on sea-basing requirements will provide a marked increase in operational flexibility. By working in concert with the ATF and other surface combatants, the MPF(F) will give regional CinCs a more logistically capable—and far more tactically versatile—naval capability.
At the same time, the ability to operate independently in permissive environments will be an economy of force measure that ensures naval forces are better able to meet concurrent contingencies if necessary.
Major Curatola, a logistics officer, is attending the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He was assigned previously as the Maritime Prepositioned Force (Future) requirements officer at the Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Lieutenant Commander Bovey was a surface warfare officer. He is a senior analyst for Northrop Grumman Information Technology in the Washington, D.C., area.