Satellites are vital enablers of naval power, lifting the masthead and periscope to heights unimaginable only a few decades ago—and forever changing the way naval power is applied. Today, as information technology and space-enabled connectivity spawn a new revolution in strategy and tactics, naval forces must determine what they want from space and position themselves to get it.
The naval services are in the midst of a revolution in strategy and tactics enabled by concurrent advances in information technology, precision navigation, and precision weapons and the developing doctrines of effects-based warfare and network-centric operations. What is different about this revolution is that it is not about improvements to individual platforms, weapons, or sensors. It is about the power gained by connecting platforms, weapons, sensors, and decision makers and the benefits of being able to exchange timely, accurate, and relevant information—of having a common operational picture. This new revolution depends not just on numbers, but on speed of command and effects enabled by speed-of-light communications.
And more than ever before, this revolution depends on space—both the space beyond the earth's atmosphere, which one might call extraterrestrial space, and the "intangible, information place" called cyberspace.
Space Connects, Empowers the Naval War Fighter
Information superiority, one of the key enablers of "Joint Vision 2020," is dependent on the high ground and connective power of space systems. Nowhere is this more evident than in precision strike operations, as Vice Admiral Lyle Bien, former Deputy Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Space Command, pointed out following the 1998 Tomahawk land-attack missile (TLAM) strike into Afghanistan: "Of the seven 'moving parts' of the operation—intelligence preparation of the battle area, target location and identification, strike command and control, weather, TLAM launch, navigation, and battle damage assessment—only one, the actual launching of the TLAM itself, was conventional; the rest depended on space systems." More and more, this is how future operations will be conducted.
Barely 40 years after the first satellites catapulted the nation into the space age, the Navy and Marine Corps use a host of powerful, dependable spacecraft to communicate, navigate, and extend the eyes and ears of the battle group to watch the movements of potential adversaries, enable targeting of precision weapons, find downed pilots, track the weather, and reconnoiter landing areas. In addition, new space-enabled applications are emerging, such as blue-force tracking, in-flight weapon guidance, and telemedicine. Space systems also have become an important morale booster, providing a lifeline to sailors' families and access to the Internet, video images, and up-to-date news from back home.
Naval space technologists continue to develop new tools that will connect forces for future missions—laser communications, long-haul high-data-rate communications, and reliable wireless communications for urban as well as jungle warfare. Hyperspectral applications for surveillance and battlespace characterization, and spaceborne moving target indicators will improve sensing and tracking capabilities, making it more difficult for enemies to hide their forces. Vast interactive databases, artificial intelligence, and virtual reality tools will help transform data into knowledge. New applications of space technology, it seems, will be limited only by our imaginations.
Extracting Maximum Advantage
With our future naval strategy linked irrevocably to a medium that still is unfamiliar to many sailors, what set of policy, resource, acquisition, recruitment, training, and operational strategies will ensure the naval services' future dominant advantage?
Former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral James Watkins, on whose watch the Naval Space Command was established in 1983, said, "To maintain freedom of the seas, it is necessary for the Navy to maintain a stake in space." We have learned that a "stake" in space means having the knowledge and fluency in space policy and technology to be able to develop a coherent strategy and to frame naval operational needs. It also means having the competence in research and development, acquisition, and operations to ensure that we are smart buyers—that we get the specialized capabilities to support a forward deployed, sea-based force—and that we have the tools and the expertise to use space effectively.
In the Department of the Navy (DoN) Space Policy, then-Secretary of the Navy John Dalton laid the foundation for a naval role in space: "Space provides a warfighting capability that must be thoroughly understood and integrated into all naval operations." The policy charges the naval services with developing a cadre of personnel with specialized expertise in space, maintaining a strong space science and technology base, and developing and acquiring, either alone or jointly, space systems that will satisfy the unique requirements of naval operations and the maritime environment. The policy stresses the need to "leverage non-DoN systems to the greatest extent possible, and to broaden our participation in their development and operation."
Building on the impressive heritage of DoN's space technology establishment, the Navy and Marine Corps in the main have succeeded in carrying out these policy objectives. In fact, DoN leadership in developing the tactical applications of national reconnaissance systems paid off handsomely in Desert Storm—sometimes referred to as the "first space war"—and in other joint and coalition operations of the past decade, such as Desert Fox (December 1998 strike against Iraq), Northern Watch (northern no-fly zone over Iraq), and Allied Force (NATO air strikes on Yugoslavia). Those applications include the various tactical receivers, tactical broadcasts, direct downlinks, and automated tracking and display devices now used routinely by the air, sea, and ground forces of all the services. Many of the applications can be traced to a small team of naval space personnel assigned to the national programs and supported by Navy and Marine Corps intelligence and cryptology staffs and tactical exploitation of national capabilities (TENCap) offices.
Although most of the military satellite systems that support naval operations today are acquired by the Air Force, the Navy continues to play an important role. The clock technology, for example, that enables the global positioning system to fulfill Navy-unique navigation requirements was developed by Navy. In the case of tactical communications, the satellite systems (Fleet Satellite Communications and UHF Follow-on) are acquired by Navy programs. Currently, the Navy is studying alternalives for acquisition of a new Mobile User Objective System/Advanced Narrowband System that will serve the tactical ultra-high frequency communications needs of all of the services. These alternatives recognize the growing capabilities of commercial space providers.
What Should Be Done Now?
For the most part, our space strategy has been one of leverage—focusing on enabling technologies and on ensuring the tactical utility of systems that are developed and acquired by non-naval organizations. This strategy needs to be reexamined in light of our growing reliance on space systems.
To make the most effective use of space, naval leaders—including every flag and general officer and senior civilian executive—must have a keen awareness of the operational benefits, costs, and opportunities offered by space technology. At a policy level, this should translate into departmental support for a strong technology base, for retaining Title X authority for acquisition, and for maintaining a naval component in space operations. Enough resources also must be invested to give visibility to space issues in the decision process. The following areas should have senior leadership attention:
Space Cadre. We must continue to develop and maintain a cadre of space technology, acquisition, and operations personnel, both military and civilian, in grades through flag and Senior Executive Service, who understand naval operations as well as space systems. This begins with recruiting, training, promoting, and retaining space-skilled people in the unrestricted line, aerospace engineering duty, engineering duty, cryptology, meteorology and oceanography, Naval Reserve, and related civilian communities. A strong graduate education program in space systems engineering and operations must be maintained, with increased quotas. Without this trained resource, we lack the ability to leverage non-naval programs, to develop naval-unique capabilities, and to integrate space into naval combat systems, tactics, and doctrine.
Technology. We must maintain the naval space technology base that for the past half-century has provided the science and engineering behind many of the space tools used by the fleet today. Complementing the work of other government organizations and private industry, the naval space technology program must be able to develop and demonstrate (including on-orbit demonstrations) promising technologies, going beyond established requirements to anticipate future operational needs, and proposing innovative and cost-effective solutions to operational problems. To do this requires a sustained level of space-related science and technology funding. We currently spend less than 1% of our naval budget on space, 50% of which is on user terminals, and over the next several years the allocation is projected to decrease. This trend should be reversed.
Acquisition. We must maintain an effective naval space acquisition base that can help DoN partner with national and DoD space providers, or acquire capabilities on our own should that be necessary. Some argue that if we do a good job stating requirements, any service or agency can build the system. But the record shows that without naval involvement, critical space capabilities either would not exist or would have been developed in forms not optimized for naval warfighting needs. Naval space requirements—from ocean surveillance to maritime navigation and communications—are different, and it is essential we have direct naval participation in systems development and acquisition, as well as in the requirements process. This includes the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), which builds and operates multipurpose systems to meet both national and military operational needs. When naval requirements are the primary driver for a space capability, e.g., for UHF communications or monitoring of sea surface wind speed and wave height, it might be appropriate for DoN to develop and acquire the systems, or if capabilities are available commercially, to buy turn-key systems. In either case, expertise in systems acquisition is a prerequisite. The recent consolidation of naval space acquisition programs and the naval element of the NRO under an acquisition-qualified flag officer is an important step in getting maximum return on the DoN's acquisition resources.
Operations. We must maintain an operations component that contributes to space operations, space control, and information operations missions; that provides training assistance to fleet units and to fleet schools, the Naval War College, and warfare development commands; and that brings operational space knowledge to war games and fleet exercises. We also must ensure that naval intelligence and cryptologic specialists are available to provide naval expertise in information operations and in ground processing, analysis, and reporting activities of space intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems.
Combat Systems Integration. We must make space an integral part of naval combat systems. Although we have been successful in influencing the applications of space systems, we have missed opportunities, mostly because we have been unable to influence naval program planning. We need a better process for synchronizing naval programming with that of other organizations such as the NRO. Improving the planning process may require restructuring naval space and information elements, allowing for closer relationships between requirements sponsors, system developers, and operators. We also must develop an integrated command-and-control architecture that includes space and other key data sources, and we must strive for interoperability, while balancing the need to innovate and to keep up with advancing technology.
Assured Availability. We must increase naval war fighters' confidence in the reliability and availability of space during combat operations. In addition to greater command awareness and expertise in using space products, this means using space assets creatively in war games, fleet exercises, and fleet battle experiments. It means insisting that national intelligence agencies avoid unnecessary compartmentation, improving tasking procedures, including creating tasking-free systems where feasible, and ensuring that space systems are robust and can be protected against enemy deception, interference, or attack.
Freedom of Space
Space, like the high seas, is a medium over which nations inevitably will attempt to assert their authority. The United States needs to ensure free access to space in furtherance of its national interests, and to be capable of denying others the use of space against the interests of the United States and its allies. "Space control" is the term used to describe the functions of assurance and denial.
The Navy's mobile, forward-deployed platforms are ideal candidates for certain kinds of space-control functions, complementing other services and national organizations. It also might be appropriate to use in-theater naval platforms as ground segments (typically the most vulnerable part of space systems) to perform satellite and mission control, to process downlink transmissions, and to conduct theater injection of broadcasts.
Our naval mission historically has been to maintain freedom of the seas; now, threats to freedom of navigation in space offer new challenges and missions. We have a special interest in this issue, not only because of our dependence on space, but also because of our vulnerability in forward operating areas to the spaceborne intelligence and surveillance systems of potential adversaries.
Playing the "Face Cards"
Vice Admiral Art Cebrowski, recent past president of the Naval War College, has compared space navigation, communication, environmental sensing, and ISR to the high-value face cards in a bridge game. To these four we might add a wild card, space control. Having recognized their value, the challenge is to play our cards with skill.
To begin, the Navy and Marine Corps should reexamine their goals—determining what they want from space and how space can help shape the missions, operating concepts, and doctrine of the future. We must ensure decision makers have the necessary information about space to allow them to make informed choices, to take advantage of opportunities to improve warfighting effectiveness.
At present, there is much discussion about space roles and missions. Some advocate forming a single space service to train and equip the forces for all military space missions; others would make space an area of responsibility under a single unified commander-in-chief. The naval services have no interest in "owning" space, but the Navy and Marine Corps, which operate in the broad continuum of subsurface, surface, and air, and which are so dependent on space to sustain and optimize their terrestrial missions, cannot afford to relinquish their roles in space.
Admiral Fisher is Director, Communications Directorate, National Reconnaissance Office; Director, Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SpaWar)/Commander, SpaWar Space Field Activity; and Program Director, Naval Fires Network/Time Critical Strike. Captain Pelot headed the Navy TENCap Office during the mid-1980s and subsequently served in the Naval Space Technology Program. He currently is a senior associate with CSC-Welkin in Chantilly, Virginia.