As the discourse on transforming defense strategy reaches its peak in the new administration, three trends in criticism are apparent: The Department of Defense (DoD) is accused of having a strategy too rigid for the current security environment; junior officers and enlisted personnel have lost faith in the senior leadership and are voting with their feet; and procurement of Cold War-era weapon systems, neutered by the lowest common denominator approach of "jointness," is out of date.
Despite this confluence of growing discontent and a decade of downsizing, the Pentagon's decision-making apparatus has remained essentially unchallenged and unchanged. The number of staff officers has decreased in recent years, but the number of staffs has not. These are the symptoms of a bureaucracy gone adrift. DoD is staffed and structured to support forces around the globe in the bipolar confrontation of the Cold War. However, the structure credited with spending the Soviet Union into the grave may not be the right one for the next 50 years. The creation of a more dynamic and responsive system should be the first priority of the defense establishment.
The implications of a transformed DoD are far-reaching, especially for the naval service. The Navy-Marine Corps team continues to provide flexible expeditionary forces that will become increasingly important in the coming decades. In addition, the fleet continues to demonstrate readiness and efficiency, as evidenced during the 78-day Kosovo conflict. After carrying a disproportionate burden in the air war, the on-station carrier battle group rotated to the Arabian Gulf and conducted further offensive action, all in the course of a regular deployment. In contrast, the U.S. Air Force units involved returned to the United States for refitting. Yet the budget for the services is divided roughly into thirds by military department and not based directly on threats or efficiency. It is time for the people of the United States to get their money's worth in defense.
Disjointed
The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 sought to coalesce the four DoD services into a more cohesive joint fighting force. In the context of the Cold War, this was a logical step to ensure interoperability among the services. But today's military forces are facing new missions of increased scope. The Goldwater-Nichols model is outdated and incapable of transforming itself for the new international security arena.
The services are organized for failure by a system that makes them compete with one another for resources, rather than stimulating them to develop creative solutions to strategic requirements. They must produce competing strategies and requirements, and argue for their funding. Theoretically, the Joint Staff and DoD supervise the process to ensure national military strategy can be executed and the services act jointly; but often this results in each service receiving a "fair share" of the action.
Security Today
Today's low capital threat environment is complicated by the "high presence" requirements of an evolving international system. The benefits of a huge, multilayered administrative staff—redundancy, and checks and balances—no longer are needed. What is needed are streamlined decision-making processes, real debate, and greater flexibility in an uncertain world. Now is the time for real defense transformation: change that starts in the Pentagon at the top. Immediate restructuring of DoD could reduce the number of administrative staffs as well as change the nature of defense decision-making. Competition should be forced to the cabinet level. Congress should provide funding based on perceived threats and realistic solutions.
U.S. national security requirements can be broken into two fundamental components: garrison forces and expeditionary forces. Imagine a "Secretary of Homeland Defense" and a "Secretary of Expeditionary Forces"; or, if you like, a return to the days of a Secretary of War and a Secretary of the Navy. These two secretariats, hybrid military and civilian staffs, would replace much of the existing departmental staff and be directly in charge of the unified commands. Supported by the four services, they would retain all strategy and policy functions, leaving only force training and readiness to the military staffs. Defense strategy arguments should be on the table for Congress and the nation to decide and not for the services to work out among themselves through compromise and politics. Let's leave politics to the politicians.
For example, in the debate over national missile defense, the homeland defense component argues for a land-based system using infrared launch-detection satellites and an interceptor missile still in development at a cost of $60 billion. The expeditionary component's counterargument is for continued development of the Linebacker upgrade to the Aegis system and pursuit of an intercept strategy that may not require a change to the ABM Treaty and land-based sites from our skittish allies. Such cabinet-level debate would relieve the military of much political infighting and get substantive issues on the table.
Having these debates at the cabinet level is a sure win for the Navy. The Cold War is over and there is clear need for a strong Navy and Marine Corps. Of course, the service secretaries and Joint Staff would steadfastly resist any restructuring initiative. But there is a great opportunity to make the armed forces more forthright in leadership, more flexible in strategy making, and more responsive in procurement.
Lieutenant Callaway, U.S. Navy, is attending the department head course at Surface Warfare Officers School. His previous assignment was with the Director, Politico-Military Affairs (N52), on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations.