In a recent article in Logistic Spectrum, Under Secretary of Defense Jacques S. Gansler (Acquisitions, Technology, Logistics) [USD (A,T&L)] said, before listing some improvements in our logistic system, "We have achieved dramatic improvements in our logistics operations over the last three years.... The fact that these dramatic improvements were realized while continuing to support the high operational tempo of U.S. forces, is most rewarding."
Despite such pronouncements, logistics still takes a backseat to new procurement until someone wants to send our aircraft, ships, and troops into harm's way—and then we struggle mightily, and fall short, as seen in Desert Storm, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. The first DoD-wide Logistic Strategic Plan was requested by Lawrence Korb in 1984, when he was an Assistant Secretary of Defense. Interestingly, the current strategic plan quoted by USD (A,T&L) has a remarkable similarity to the one drafted almost 16 years ago, and is little changed from the update in 1994 and in the 1996-1997 fiscal-year edition. Implementation of these plans has been sporadic at best. After all these years, any progress we made is based primarily on initiatives begun long before the incumbent USD (A,T,&L) took office in November 1997, and improvement targets were set well before November 1997. We have not had dramatic improvements in logistics operations over the past three years, have not supported well the high-tempo operations by U.S. forces, and we are not meeting the operational requirements of today's warfighters.
Of particular concern was one of the key elements of the current strategic plan, Reengineering Product Support. As GAO Report NSIAD-00-89 concluded, ". . . planning and reengineering process implementation weaknesses put the success of this effort at risk." The response: "The Department concurs with the report and agrees that significant steps remain to be taken to reengineer our logistics processes." In a more recent GAO report, logistic transformation was put in the same category as acquisition reform and financial-management reform as initiatives that will require many years to fully implement. Specifically, there are hundreds of individual efforts under way to reform logistic practices. Implementation of the strategic plan is a patchwork quilt of initiatives, with as many uncoordinated programs as Joseph's multicolored cloak had colors. We are a long way from home—as we have been for more than 15 years.
We have not developed a lean, agile, logistic delivery system that meets the warfighter's requirements at lower cost. On the contrary, we are taking from procurement accounts to try to support our forces in harm's way, thus mortgaging our future. In addition, a relatively hollow force has been created at home, as parts and equipment are siphoned off from U.S.-based forces for overseas support. Between the failure of the procurement system truly to shorten lead times for repair parts for ships, aircraft, vehicles, and weapons and the failure truly to shorten the logistic-system response time, we have created a severe problem for our armed forces.
We never seem to learn from past experience. What happened to Integrated Logistic Support (ILS) and what happened to the effort to apply systems engineering to the logistics system? It would almost seem that we are inventing the wheel again; but this time it is square.
In the stated interest of integration, control of the logistic system has migrated to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, with limited authority left with the services. Thus, the individual or unit with the need at the bottom of the pile essentially is removed from the system. Couple this with aging systems—that problem easily was forecast, but not adequately budgeted for—increased steaming hours, more troops overseas on "temporary" deployments, budget shortfalls, and we have today's serious logistic support problems, which are unrelated to new logistic systems designed for the new generation of weapon systems some time in the future.
The Navy's mission-capable aviation goal is 73%, which was reached in fiscal year 1995. The figure in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 1999 was 69%. The mean flight hours between failure average has been lowered from 1.25 in fiscal year 1995 to almost .95 in fiscal year 1999, a 22% increase in failure rates. Average direct maintenance manhours/flight hour have gone from approximately 26.5 to almost 30 hours, an increase of 16%. The fully mission-capable aircraft (deployed) rate has dropped from 69.8% in 1995 to 60.2 in 1999. Even of more concern is that fully-mission-capable aircraft at home have dropped from a 62.9% level to 55.4%. The average waiting time for parts is 17 days for deployed aircraft, and 19 days for non-deployment aircraft. Can you imagine any commercial customer accepting this kind of result from suppliers: Computers down for three weeks? Turbine out of order for three weeks? Electrical machinery and appliances down awaiting parts for three weeks?
The statistic that is the most serious indication of the degradation in readiness is the cannibalization rate per 100 hours, which for deployed aircraft has gone from 8.2% in fiscal year 1995 to 12.2% in fiscal year 1999. For non-deployed aircraft the figure has shown slight improvement at 10%, but still remains too high. These figures are not likely to improve anytime soon. Discussions with representatives from other warfare specialties and the other services indicate similar types of problems.
The tragedy in this is that we are losing good people because of this problem. Long deployments on doubtful missions are bad enough for retention, but a logistic system that is not responsive when equipment breaks, or needs repair, makes anyone's tentative decision to leave a real one.
What most people do not recognize is that the services have been in combat for ten years without a declaration of war that allows for some kind of industrial mobilization. Thus, we have been using up our base without replenishment. We are consuming our combat capability at an alarming rate, and we may not have the time we had in Desert Storm to get ready or try—albeit unsuccessfully—to get well afterwards.
We were to have just-in-time inventory management by contractors by now, but something happened on the way to the forum—lack of funds, over-centralization of logistics management, and an excessive interest in a low-cost logistic system. You get what you pay for—and we have a system that may be lower cost, but does not work.
Retired from the U.S. Navy in 1979, Rear Admiral Freeman is currently working as a private strategic planning and computerized logistics consultant.