Most concepts being proposed for a new littoral combatant include several common platform characteristics—stealth, automation, semisubmersibility, and modularity, to name a few. All these capabilities will be in the Virginia (SSN-774)-class submarine.
Our Navy is grappling with the "hows" of fighting ("Forward . . . from the Sea." A recent hot topic has been the realization that gaining access to littoral regions may be both difficult and bloody. Writing for the Naval War College Review, Captain Wayne Hughes emphasized just how dangerous an enemy coastline can be: "Ever since the introduction of numerous torpedo boats, submarines, and minefields, congested coastal waters have been taboo for capital ships." He later observed, "The classic way to secure control (of the sea) is to defeat the enemy's means to contest that control, his main force or 'fleet.' Today the potential is greater for tactical interaction between land and sea elements, including aircraft, missile, and long-range sensors."
The list of possible obstacles makes the task of initially accessing an enemy's littoral appear daunting indeed. If we are unable to approach an enemy's coastline without prohibitive loss, we will have difficulty launching carrierbased aircraft, and we could be prevented from landing Marines. A tenacious enemy with modern weapons conceivably could thwart our ability to affect events ashore.
So, how do we "kick in the door" to a contested littoral? Much discussion in professional forums has focused on developing a new class or classes of vessels designed specifically to gain and maintain access to an enemy's littoral. Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski and Captain Hughes describe the Streetfighter—a new family of combatants—as an answer to the dilemma. Lieutenant Commander Dave Weeks offers a Guerilla Warfare Ship designed for littoral domination. Lieutenant Richard C. Arthur writes that U.S. Navy patrol craft are the key to littoral sea control, stating, "it is time to get serious about building and supporting a platform that is capable of controlling the shallows. And in Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat, Captain Hughes describes a fictional littoral battle in which two new surface ships, the Cushing and Phantom classes, are key to victory. He sums up his position thus: "I believe to reduce casualties the U.S. Fleet must have numbers of small fighting ships that can be lost in combat without aborting the mission along a treacherous coast."
The concept of a littoral combatant still is developing, but most of the ideas now being floated contain several common characteristics: the craft should be small, stealthy, highly automated, and semisubmersible, with offensive firepower and modular adaptability. Interestingly, these are the same capabilities that have been funded and are being built in the new Virginia (SSN-774)-class nuclear attack submarine. Before we invest in duplicate capabilities, it seems only proper to compare the two platforms, to see which will give the U.S. Navy the maximum combat power over the life of the ship.
The Constants
Naval scholar Frank Uhlig observes that throughout history, regardless of era or location, navies repeatedly have been called on to carry out five primary tasks. They are strategic movement of troops; acquisition of advance bases as close as possible to the scene of action; landing of armies on a hostile shore and their support then and thereafter through fire and logistics; blockade; and mastery of the seas. Which platform is more capable of carrying out these tasks?
Strategic movement of troops. Neither the littoral combatant nor the Virginia will be optimal, but the Virginia's torpedo room is reconfigurable—allowing both the center weapons and their stowage structures to be removed—and so could accommodate a greater number of special forces troops. Equipped with a nine-man lock-in/lock-out chamber, the Virginia could conduct covert launch and recovery of an entire special operations forces team in a single evolution, and she will have mating surfaces compatible with either the Advanced Seal Delivery System or the more conventional Dry Deck Shelter.
Acquisition of advance bases. Again, neither platform will be optimal, but the special operations forces delivered by the Virginia could pave the way for Marines to capture bases.
The landing of armies. Landing armies on a hostile shore and supporting them by means of fire and logistics would not be strengths for a littoral combatant or a submarine. The Virginia, however, will have the ability to launch up to 16 Tomahawk land-attack missiles, to support troops already ashore. In addition, the Virginia's vertical-launch system will permit the installation of a navalized version of the 160-mile Army Tactical Missile System or similar weapons, when they are acquired.
Blockade. Denying the enemy's use of the sea can be accomplished by threat or by deed. The deeds speak for themselves: World War II U.S. submariners sank more than five and a half million tons of Japanese shipping—more than was sunk by all other means combined. During the 1982 Falklands Conflict, a British SSN sank the Argentine cruiser Belgrano, resulting in the Argentine fleet's hasty retreat to homeport for the duration of the war." And just the threat of submarine action can slow or stop sea traffic. As noted by Admiral Frank L. Bowman, "In addition to aerial mining of the (Haiphong) Harbor, a few of our submarines made their presence known, then `disappeared.' Using their speed, they approached all the ships moving toward the port, and word quickly spread about the dozen or so submarines surrounding Haiphong. The merchant traffic abruptly stopped—mission accomplished." Even if available in large numbers, a littoral combatant would have a hard time matching a submarine's effectiveness.
Mastery of the seas. Mastery of the seas must be taken from enemy forces operating in the air, on the surface, and beneath the sea. With a strong capability in numerous warfare areas and a huge advantage in stealth, the Virginia would seem to be the platform most suited to tip the balance in favor of U.S. forces struggling for mastery of the littoral seas.
The Missions
Table 1 compares the performance of the Virginia and the imaginary Cushing-class combatant in several mission areas. This comparison is very rough and ready and, admittedly, uses some arbitrary values. Although we do not know the exact weapon or sensor suite of the littoral combatant, we do know that the craft is intended to be small, and because it is small it will have a small payload, likely much smaller than that of the Virginia. In the table, 4=strong capability, 3=good capability, 2=some capability, 1=limited capability, and 0=no capability.
The Three Ss
Any platform operating in an unpacified littoral will be vulnerable. In such a case, stealth, survivability, and sustainability are prerequisites to success. Whatever an opponent's capability to deny access to or to preempt U.S. military presence, it can use area denial weapons only in limited ways against submarines. Coastal cruise missiles, tactical ballistic missiles, and weapons of mass destruction pose little or no threat to a well-operated nuclear submarine. The sub's stealth translates to survivability. The same cannot be said for new littoral combatants—at least not to the same degree.
As for sustainability, submarines require no replenishment-at-sea logistics train and no protective escorts. They provide pure offensive firepower at next to no cost in logistics ships or support infrastructure ashore in foreign countries. In contrast, Captain Hughes estimates that an additional ten newly constructed support ships would be required for every 100 Streetfighter combatants."
Perhaps the point of seeking a Streetfighter or Guerilla Warfare Ship is that a force of many small combatants—each with just a fraction of the total force's combat capability—can suffer some losses and still retain strong warfighting capabilities. If that is the reason, this point must be made clearly, persuasively, and repeatedly when asking for new construction funding.
But if the argument centers on forcing access into contested littorals during the early phases of all-out hostilities, then the Virginia is the more effective platform. Indeed, five to eight submarines, with their ability to lay mines, land special operations forces, sink surface craft, and strike coastal targets, can by themselves ensure littoral superiority (not supremacy). Following achievement of littoral superiority, our capital ships can enter the littoral escorted by existing frigates, patrol craft, and mine hunters and minesweepers.
If we are concerned about accessing the littorals during the initial stages of a conflict, we should spend our shipbuilding dollars on the platforms most able to fight forward from the sea—the Virginias.
Lieutenant Parry is a limited-duty officer with more than 20 years of naval service. He is assigned to the Fleet Training Center San Diego Tomahawk Training Unit as Tomahawk Training Director.