Acquisition reform. It sounds good—something the tax-paying public should get behind. But is it?
Acquisition reform dictates that the government must offer "minimized guidance" to development contractors instead of requirements. That guidance usually is stated in the form of mission-success metrics. The government is not supposed to specify sensors or weapons; all we can do is state the broad guidance in such a way that there may be no other sensor system capable of supporting the goal. A writer of solicitations to industry then must become an expert in legalistic terminology rather than a warfighting expert.
The theory behind this approach is that we should not constrain contractors or inhibit their abilities to apply technology, innovate, or invent. The net result, however, has a number of undesirable side effects:
- The Navy labs are inhibited from the development of materials, processes, and hardware or software, since there is no guarantee or requirement that the contractors will choose that approach to filling the broad mission statement. Research-and-development (R&D) expenditures by a Navy lab could end up being wasted.
- Protestations to the contrary, the contractors are motivated by profit. In fact, the law requires it. A corporation must, under SEC regulations, do its utmost to turn maximum profit for the shareholders. This means that the Navy often will get the minimum capability that satisfies the mission statement.
- Acquisition reform tends to favor large corporations or consortia since the amount of in-house research required to interpret the broad guidance and prepare a proposal often is beyond the means of a smaller entity. Acquisition reform promotes mergers; that may be good for the stock market, but not for competition.
At one time, the Navy labs were level funded by appropriation and they fulfilled their respective missions with single-minded purpose. They developed and tested technology directed at solving warfighting requirements established by the Pentagon. They were the proving grounds for new sensors and weapons, and, as a result, their opinions and recommendations were universally respected. Their respective missions were clear. For example, the Navy Sound Lab (later the Naval Undersea Warfare Center) in New London, Connecticut, developed sonar and studied hydroacoustic phenomena, and the Navy Gun Laboratory at Dahlgren, Virginia (later the Naval Surface Warfare Center), developed and tested guns.
One often hears the argument that there was a degree of waste and a lack of accountability associated with that sort of large and complicated organization. I don't buy it. Accountability was felt in the pride with which new technology was delivered to the fleet to counter emerging threats. During the Vietnam War, North Vietnam regularly wheeled out new surface-to-air missile system derivatives. In response, the labs went to work and within a couple of weeks countermeasures would be in place and operating effectively. A more recent example is the sonar modifications developed by NUWC to counter mines in the Persian Gulf. Try that by relying on some corporate behemoth!
Under acquisition reform, the innovation business has been abandoned to a very few contractor consortia and most of the Navy lab business now seems to be administration of contracts and lifecycle maintenance. That is not the way it used to be, and it is not the way it should be. Why has the Navy moved from fielding revolutionary systems to fielding evolutionary systems? I do not know anyone in the naval R&D or acquisition communities who, in casual conversation, supports acquisition reform concepts. More often than not, acquisition reform increases costs instead of offering savings.
The acquisition program managers in OpNav and systems commands are charged with bringing a system to the fleet within budget and on time. What they do not want to hear is a voice that says that a system is overpriced, or not technologically feasible within time and budget, or—worse yet—something we don't need. Such voices can come only from a so-called "honest broker"—the Navy lab. The warfare center management structure, however, appears to have lost the will to stand up against the acquisition reformers for the good of the fleet.
Mr. Stevens has been a research-and-development project manager at both the Naval Surface Warfare Center and the Naval Undersea Warfare Center.