Physicist Edward Teller is one of the most brilliant men of our times. He participated in the Manhattan Project that developed the atomic bomb, is credited with being the father of the hydrogen bomb, and was director of the esteemed Lawrence Livermore laboratory.
After World War II, Teller declared that instead of dropping atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the United States should have detonated a nuclear weapon as a "demonstration"—to convince the Japanese leadership that a new and terrible weapon could be unleashed on the Japanese home islands.
Several scientists at Los Alamos, New Mexico, where the first atomic bombs were designed and built, had raised the issue of a demonstration even as they were developing the bomb, and the concept was discussed by the national leaders who had knowledge of the project. Shortly after he took office in April 1945, President Harry S. Truman approved a civilian "Interim Committee" that would be appointed by Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson to give advice on atomic matters, including the use of the atomic bomb. On 16 June 1945, the science panel of the Interim Committee discussed a proposal for a demonstration explosion of an atomic bomb to intimidate the Japanese with its awesome power.
But such a demonstration was impractical. There was some concern, albeit minor, that the bomb would not function properly. More significant was the possibility that if a suitable, uninhabited site could be found in the Japanese home islands, the Japanese would move Allied prisoners of war there. A test at a remote Pacific island would have been difficult to set up and time-consuming to arrange. The Japanese government would have had to agree to the plan, select qualified observers, and then transport them to the test site—and such willing Japanese participation was highly unlikely. There was, after all, a war going on, with brutal fighting on Okinawa and in the Philippines in the summer of 1945.
An attempt at an atomic bomb demonstration witnessed by the Japanese also would have required a level of U.S.-Japanese communication that was inconceivable in wartime. Successful negotiations—through the Red Cross—to permit the safe transit of Japanese merchant ships carrying supplies to Allied prisoners of war in bypassed areas came to naught when, on I April 1945, the U.S. submarine Queenfish (SS-393) sank the merchant ship Awa Maru. To the Japanese, any subsequent negotiations with the United States would have been suspect at best.
Even if the Japanese leaders had agreed to witness an atomic bomb demonstration and it had occurred, they might have spent weeks or months debating what they had seen. Finally, if the Japanese had known the time and location of the test, they could have attempted to shoot down the B-29 carrying the bomb.
The Interim Committee's recommendation on the use of the atomic bomb said, "we recognize our obligation to the nation to use the weapons to help save American lives in the Japanese war.... we can propose no technical demonstration likely to bring an end to the war; we see no acceptable alternative to direct military use."
Consequently, the Little Boy (uranium) bomb was dropped on Hiroshima on 6 August 1945, and the Fat Man (plutonium) bomb was dropped on Nagasaki on 9 August. Five days later the Japanese government announced acceptance of Allied surrender terms.
For the next 50 years Dr. Edward Teller continued to believe that an atomic bomb demonstration would have been preferable to bombing Japan, and could have coerced the Japanese government into surrender. (At the time, the "government" consisted of six men—the prime minister, foreign minister, war minister, Navy minister, chief of Army staff, and chief of Navy staff, the war and Navy ministers were military officers.) In particular, Teller had wanted a nuclear detonation over Tokyo Bay, where the blast and mushroom cloud would be demonstrated dramatically for the capital city, government leaders, and the emperor.
But Dr. Teller changed his mind on 19 March 1995.
I had first met Dr. Teller on 14 November 1986. On that day, at a small lunch meeting with several senior nuclear weapons specialists from the Department of Energy, I was to give a presentation on my views of tactical/theater nuclear conflict at sea. Teller attended unexpectedly, and we talked during the lunch, mainly about our ethnic roots. When I gave my presentation he asked several perceptive questions. Soon he was standing at the podium with me, commenting on my vu-graphs. Finally, I just sat down and let him complete the presentation (which he did quite well).
We met a few times after that, once sharing the stage at a Navy League conference. And on 18-19 March 1995, we both were on the schedule to speak at a conference in San Antonio, Texas, on the atomic bomb and the end of World War 11.1 Teller, speaking on the morning of the 19th, again mentioned his preference for a demonstration of an atomic bomb in August 1945 rather than the use of the weapon against Japanese targets.
That afternoon, prior to a panel discussion by the day's speakers, Teller and I were chatting. "Dr. Teller," I interjected, I think you're wrong."
Not exactly the way to raise an issue with him. Still, he graciously invited me to continue. "About what do you think I am wrong?"
With a deep breath, and asking him for two uninterrupted minutes, I began. I asked if he recalled the B-29 Superfortress fire-bomb raid on Tokyo on the night of 9-10 March 1945. (On that night, 279 bombers dropped 1,665 tons of petroleum-based incendiaries on Tokyo. Fierce fires took hold and, fanned by high winds, precipitated a firestorm. Almost 16 square miles were burned out and, according to Japanese records, 83,783 people were killed and more than 100,000 injured.)
Teller said that he recalled the attack and its devastating consequences. I asked Teller what the reaction of the Japanese government was to that devastation ... and quickly answered myself, "Nothing."
Teller agreed.
Now the coup de grace: If that devastating raid had no effect on the Japanese government's decision to continue the war, what could possibly have been the consequences of a atomic detonation over Tokyo Bay? "What would be the impact of a bright flash, a loud bang, a blast of heat, and a tidal wave?" I asked
Teller was quiet. After a minute or two of looking up at the ceiling, he leaned over toward me and said, "You are right."
That afternoon, in the panel discussion, he stated quite clearly that he had changed his mind about the atomic bomb demonstration. I have discussed the matter with a colleague and I have changed my view," he said, nodding toward me.
Thus, in 1995—the 50th anniversary of the atomic bombing of Japan—Dr. Edward Teller joined the ranks of those who understand that dropping the atomic bombs on Japan was the only realistic option for the United States.