With declining defense budgets, how can small coastal states maintain a capable submarine force? Cooperation is the key.
Conventional submarines are important assets for a coastal state, as the mere possibility of their presence creates an element of uncertainty that can tie up a lot of enemy resources. In a time when defense budgets are limited, however, many smaller navies are finding it difficult to maintain the needed size and improve the capabilities of their submarine forces. National development is expensive, and acquiring used submarines or existing designs could prove unsatisfactory, especially with respect to the unique requirements imposed by new operating concepts.
For these reasons, five years ago the Scandinavian countries began to explore cooperative development. Results from the recently completed feasibility phase indicate that Denmark, Norway, and Sweden can get affordable modern conventional submarines through a joint procurement program, based on a common set of requirements.
A Continuing Need
At a conference on littoral warfare in London last spring it was noted that submarines "have a special importance for the coastal state as they are able to operate without air superiority." Decreased defense budgets and an exponential increase in prices for defense materiel, however, have reduced smaller coastal states' ability to renew their aging forces. Most nations operating conventional submarines are not able to carry out costly developments such as the Australian Collins or German 212 programs, especially when other important elements in the national defense also must be replaced. Some have decided to reduce the size of their conventional submarine fleets, and others are considering abolishing them altogether.
Norway, for example, began in the 1960s to replace most of its World War II legacy units. As a part of this renewal program, it acquired from Germany 15 submarines of the 500-ton Kobben class. In the mid-1970s a new submarine program was initiated to replace the Kobbens with 12 modern boats, but as with many procurement programs, there was a mismatch between operational requirements and available funds. During the definition phase the number of units was reduced, first to 10 and later to 6, with an option for 2 more. Facing the possibility of having to half its submarine force, the Norwegian authorities decided to procure six new boats of the 1000-ton Ula class and to use the rest of the available funds to modernize six of the Kobbens. In 1999, Norway decided to reduce the structure by two submarines, and if funds cannot be made available in the future for a new submarine program, the force could be reduced further. Over a 15-year period, then, the Norwegian submarine force could be cut by more than half.
And what will happen in 15 to 20 years, when the Ulas should be replaced? Defense budgets likely will not increase, and competition for funds probably will be worse. There is a risk that the submarine force will be cut more, both in Norway and in other comparable countries.
With the end of the Cold War the need for a large submarine force is lessened dramatically. Still, it takes considerable time to build up a submarine force, and there is a critical mass, below which it would be difficult—if not impossible—to produce a warfighting capability should the need arise. In a new operating environment there also are new and important missions, which require that submarines be included in the force structure of a coastal state with international obligations.
Procurement of new classes of submarines is still a need for many small states. The question is how the needed submarine force can be maintained and how new capabilities can be acquired at the lowest possible cost.
Options
Excluding expensive national development programs, there are three options that should be appraised by nations with the objectives of preserving the size and improving the capabilities of their submarine fleets:
Buy used submarines. Several smaller nations have leased or bought obsolete submarines from other countries. In the 1970s the United States transferred units of its 30-year-old Guppy class to countries such as Taiwan and Turkey; Denmark got 20-year-old refurbished Kobbens from Norway in the 1980s; and recently the British sold Upholder-class boats to Canada. This option is useful in efforts to preserve a certain size fleet, but generally it will not meet a nation's requirement for an improvement in submarine capabilities (the Upholder deal is an exception, as these were unused modern submarines). In a short while these old submarines will have to be modernized or again replaced, as they approach the end of their service lives. Operating costs for an old submarine also could be high. Nevertheless, for a state that is new to submarining, used boats could be a good way to bring a force up to an acceptable level in a short time. Singapore's procurement of the Sea-serpent class from the Swedish Navy is such an example.
Contract submarines from an existing production line. The German 209, French Agosta, or Swedish Vastergotland/Gotland design, could form a base for a future submarine program, and all are on offer to possible customers. But these designs are 10-30 years old, and often they are not suited to the requirements of the modern operational environment. The 209 class produced today, for example, is considered modern in terms of technology. Still, the first unit was laid down in the 1960s, and it may not be the right boat for a future procurement program—especially with respect to signature requirements.
Another important issue is that the customer often will have to tailor his requirements to the submarine design, not vice versa. This could lead to a customer obtaining boats that—although affordable—are inadequate for specific missions.
Cooperate with other nations in the design and production of a new submarine class. This could be the way ahead. The Scandinavian submarine program Viking has capitalized on the benefits of cooperation through harmonized requirements and modular technical solutions.
The Viking Project
The framework for the Viking project is an agreement between the ministers of defense of Finland, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden on cooperation in matters concerning defense materiel, with the aim of reducing procurement and life-cycle costs for participating nations and supporting and optimizing the Nordic defense industry. This agreement was signed in December 1994, and several prefeasibility studies were initiated shortly thereafter, one of which concerned a possible common submarine program. After two years of studies, a permanent project group comprised of officers and engineers from Denmark, Norway, and Sweden was established, tasked to carry out a feasibility phase to harmonize national requirements for new submarines. The project group also was charged to develop models for cost-reducing collaboration throughout the submarines' life cycle and to study the possibilities for participation from the national industry in future submarine development and production. None of the three nations—Finland is an observer—has decided to procure new submarines, but each appreciates the benefits of common procurement and is willing to cooperate in the definition of such a program.
Reports from the two-year feasibility phase were handed over to national authorities last spring. From an operator's point of view, the most important one probably is the "Nordic requirement document" derived from the three nations' operational profiles and main submarine missions. Although Denmark, Norway, and Sweden are neighbors and historically closely related, there are differences in their national requirements. Operating areas are very dissimilar, especially with regard to water depths and area coverage; each country's relation to NATO and the European Union differs and their submarine legacies—German versus Swedish design—vary. The expected national budgets for submarine acquisition also are different, and low price has been a driver. Nevertheless, almost all of the requirements have been harmonized.
The most important agreement probably is the common diving depth, which allows for a single pressure hull and hence one common base for a submarine concept. The only remaining significant division is the Norwegian requirement for longer endurance and higher speed—and adding an extra module for energy storage and conversion to the common concept can solve this. If during definition and design some requirements cannot be met within a nation's economic limits, the modular design concept makes excluding specific options a possibility. Similarly, if a nation wishes to add a noncompulsory requirement, an extra option might be able to be introduced.
Another important report is the "Total Project document," which outlines the consequences of a collective procurement based on the common requirement document, assuming four submarines to Denmark, two to Sweden, and four to Norway. The document shows that the three nations can save on the order of 20% in procurement costs by sharing the development and producing a larger series of similar submarines than any one nation could do by itself. In addition, there are potential large savings to be gained through common training programs, maintenance, and spare parts.
An additional benefit of common procurement is the opportunity it presents to maintain needed competence in the national defense industry. A report by The Royal Institute of Technology in Stockholm concludes that a defense program of this magnitude will give more back in the form of labor and expertise than the nations involved actually are investing. Spillover to other areas of industry also will be noticeable. So far, Kockums Naval Systems of Sweden has been the main contractor for feasibility studies. It is prepared to form a new company with Odense Stalskibsverft of Denmark and Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace of Norway. This company will propose a production taking into consideration requirements for cost share/work share and offset. The modular design and modern information technology will allow distributed design and production of the submarines.
The Concept Submarine
A new submarine needs improved capabilities in several areas, to counter improved antisubmarine warfare (ASW) technology but also to meet the demands of new mission profiles. Important requirements for the Viking submarine are:
- Ability to stay submerged and hidden over several weeks
- Reduced signatures, including optical, thermal, and noise
- Improved sensor ranges
- Improved capability to communicate and exchange data with command headquarters at sea or ashore and with other units with minimal risk of discovery
- Ability to carry long-range weapons such as surface- and land-attack missiles, in addition to modern heavyweight torpedoes
- Improved ability to carry well-equipped Special Forces
- Self-defense against torpedoes and ASW helicopters
The feasibility studies based on these requirements have resulted in a conceptual but rather detailed description of a future Viking submarine. The concept, nicknamed K9, is a two-compartment submarine with a smaller crew than found in today's medium-sized submarines. The Danish/Swedish variant will, if produced, probably be the world's first true air-independent propulsion (AIP) submarine. At this stage, the Norwegian variant has an extra section containing diesel generators and batteries for better endurance and higher maximum speed. The AIP system is based on a new Stirling engine that allows deeper diving and has better power density and improved reliability compared to the engines on the Swedish Gotland class. The project group also is looking into the possibility of developing a fuel-cell system with methanol reformers, based on commercially available fuel cells. Such a system might lead to a submarine design that satisfies the Norwegian requirements for endurance, powered only by AIP.
Better sensor performance is important to improve the submarine's range. It is difficult to upgrade or replace hull-mounted sonar antennas on a submarine, so the project group has focused on the positioning and size of sonar antennas in the feasibility studies. The Viking concept has a large conformal array in the bow and a flank array of similar height covering most of the length of the pressure hull. In addition there is an option for a towed array, to allow for longer detection ranges and classification in the lower frequency bands. The sonar system also will include an intercept sonar and a high-frequency active sonar for navigational aid, mine reconnaissance, and obstacle avoidance. Other important sensors are ESM and optronic mast. For now, the periscope still is part of the concept. The future will show whether other assets can meet requirements for safe navigation and operation at night, in high traffic density and confined waters in peacetime.
The sensor system is an integrated part of the new open architecture combat system, together with the combat-management, weapon, navigation, and communication systems.
All three nations' existing and future submarine torpedoes can be handled by the proposed Viking weapon system, and storage facilities will allow the submarine to carry a rather large number of torpedoes, relative to the size of the platform. For now, the system is not intended to be fitted with missiles, but it allows a retrofit of surface-tosurface and land-attack missiles should such a requirement occur, for example as a consequence of new national operating concepts for maritime forces. A system to counter aggressive sonars and attacking torpedoes is included, and we have looked into the possibility of incorporating a missile for self-defense against helicopters. This weapon also could be used against surface targets in peace-support operations and low-intensity conflicts.
For coastal submariners operating in the Baltic and the North Sea, the term confined waters could be used to describe the fjords, narrow straits, and very irregular bottom profiles they encounter. Submerged operations over long periods in these waters will require very accurate navigation systems. We therefore have studied terrain navigation as an option to more traditional inertial systems.
Long-range sensors and weapons will allow the Viking to remain a "lone wolf." We do appreciate, however, that the new operational concepts—and international operations in particular—will require a different communication system from what an old radio-silenced submariner used during the Cold War. The Viking submarine is intended to be an integrated part of the new force structures and will be able to transfer data to and from headquarters and other units in a task force. To meet these requirements we will have to find a balance between the need for information exchange and the ability to remain undetected.
The Future
Based on the documentation forwarded after the feasibility phase, the participating nations will decide whether to continue into project definition. Denmark and Sweden have political approval to continue to prepare for a submarine project, and the chief of defense in Norway has recommended continuing participation in the Viking program. The plan is to start the definition phase early 2000, with a decision on further cooperation in 2002, after parliamentary settlements in Norway and Sweden on their future military force structures. The objective is to start production in 2005, after a corresponding settlement in Denmark.
One could ask why this project should be successful when other international programs have been so troubled. Among many reasons, three factors argue for success: The Scandinavian countries historically are closely related partners with similar languages; we have similar requirements for submarines and a common understanding of the objectives after many years of cooperation in this area; and our defense industries are complementary rather than competing in the most important areas.
In the end, available funding still is the most important factor. None of the three nations has decided to procure submarines, and their future force structures are under evaluation. Participation in the common definition phase, however, will give them the freedom to choose the way ahead when these strategic decisions have been made.
Captain Jacobsen is program manager for the Scandinavian submarine program Viking. He has served as commanding officer of small, conventional submarines, as captain of a submarine squadron, and in different positions in the Royal Norwegian Naval Materiel Command.