Arabian Gulf, 2002 . . . Under increased international pressure, the United Nations has lifted sanctions against Iraq. The United States has relaxed its operational presence in the Arabian Gulf, and a carrier now is required only to be within ten steaming days of the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian-U.S. relations, however, have deteriorated, and Iran has positioned military aircraft armed with the latest airto-surface missiles near the Strait of Hormuz.
7 February 2002 . . . Within the past 48 hours, Iran has flown aggressive attack-type profiles on merchant vessels and U.S. combatants in the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian aircraft have failed to heed warnings from U.S. combatants. In the most recent incident, a U.S. guided-missile destroyer was within seconds of firing on Iranian aircraft. In response, the United States has ordered the USS George Washington, a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, and three of her escorts from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Arabian Gulf in hopes of calming the situation. Figuring best speed, the George Washington can arrive in six days.
8 February 2002 . . . Iran is cued to U.S. intentions and the movement of the George Washington by Cable News Network footage of the carrier transiting the Suez Canal. Iranian coverage incites riots at Iranian universities and at the TLS. embassy in Tehran.
9 February 2002 . . . Further riots and burnings of the American flag occur throughout Iran, and the U.S. State Department calls for the immediate evacuation of all nonessential personnel from the country. The USS Kearsarge, with the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit embarked, departs Kuwait en route to rendezvous with the George Washington just inside the Strait of Hormuz.
10 February 2002 . . . U.S. Marines fire tear gas into the crowd of rioters at the embassy, dispersing them. The government of Iran no longer guarantees the safety of U.S. citizens in Iran.
11 February 2002 . . . The U.S. embassy at Tehran is overrun. The ambassador and 21 others are taken hostage. Two Marines and five Iranians are killed. Intelligence indicates a fractionalization of the military and civilian leadership in Iran. There is grave concern over future actions of the Iranian military, especially the naval and air forces near the Strait of Hormuz. All three Iranian Kilo submarines put to sea, loaded with mines, torpedoes, and Special Operations Forces. Commander-in-Chief, Central Command, appoints Commander Fifth Fleet as joint task force commander.
12 February 2002 . . . The Kearsarge is hit by a torpedo or mine as it approaches the Strait of Hormuz and must make way for repairs in Al Dubai. The Iranians have eliminated the near-term possibility of an amphibious assault.
13 February 2002 . . . The George Washington is ordered to maintain operations in the Gulf of Oman and not to transit the Strait of Hormuz.
With the capabilities of submarines expanding to ever more lethal levels, an adversary can employ a submarine in a number of missions to disrupt, delay, or deny the United States access to an area of conflict. To plan and execute a successful campaign, today's commanders-in-chief and joint forces commanders must consider the missions and capabilities of adversarial submarines and find means to counter their potency. Undersea warfare is no longer a solely Navy issue.
Submarine Capabilities and Effects
The U.S. Navy faces a more complex undersea warfare (USW) problem today than it did during the Cold War, when the main threat was the thousand-pound Soviet gorilla. More than 40 countries around the world-some of which have been hostile to the United States in the pastpossess hundreds of submarines, and Germany, France, and Russia continue to build more for export. In this market, buyers can get as much as they are willing to pay for, including state-of-the-art diesel boats that can fire a missile equivalent to the Exocet. Some purchase packages may even include maintenance and training, which invariably will reveal how the United States operates in the maritime environment.
This proliferation of submarines and associated technology and intelligence should cause great concern for those involved with USW, especially the joint forces commanders and regional commanders-in-chief. The Office of Naval Intelligence reported, for example, that the Sang-O-class North Korean minisubmarine that ran aground in South Korea on 17 September 1996 had been operating within South Korean waters for longer than 72 hours undetected. North Korea demonstrated the effectiveness of minisubmarines in missions supporting special forces insertion and retraction, mining, and antisubmarine warfare.2
Mini- and midget submarine and swimmer delivery vehicle (SDV) technologies are advancing quickly, complicating and expanding the threat. Midget submarines and shallow-water attack submarines are approximately 90% cheaper than their deep-water counterparts, and maintenance is significantly less expensive. Some are capable of carrying torpedoes, Exocet antiship missiles, SDVs, mines, or commandos.3 In addition, unmanned undersea vehicles are being developed that can perform Special Forces insertion or extraction, intelligence gathering, surveillance, reconnaissance, mining or mine countermeasures, antiterrorist operations, and possibly kamikaze operations. Other missions may include optical, electronic, acoustic, hydrographic, and geographic data gathering to support future operations.
Available on the open market, the Shkval submarinelaunched rocket torpedo is capable of speeds up to 200 knots, and a more deadly variant reportedly is under development that has an acoustic search speed of 60 knots followed by an attack speed of 300 knots.4 A torpedo traveling at 200-300 knots is any ship's nightmare. It may be only a matter of time until our adversaries develop the technology to support submarine-launched, extended-range missiles similar to the United States' Tomahawk. In fact, some nations already are seeking a submerged launched cruise missile capability. Pakistan and Israel have the U.S.made Harpoon missile, and the French have exported a variant of the Exocet that can be launched from a submerged submarines.
A submarine is most vulnerable when on the surface, and throughout history antisubmarine warfare (ASW) specialists have relied on the routine surfacing of submarines for detection and opportunities for attack. During the Cold War, Soviet Union command-and-control relationships were stringent and operating procedures for housekeeping and communications became predictable. Our search patterns and tactics took advantage of this predictability and came to rely on it. Today, the world is much less reliable. Our potential adversaries have a less sophisticatedperhaps even nonexistent-command-and-control architecture and infrastructure. A hostile submarine may put to sea with preauthorized firing orders to destroy merchant shipping or U.S. combatants, and that could well be the last communication it receives until it expends all of its weapons, returns to port, or is neutralized. These submarines may not be recallable when diplomatic relations prevail. Worse yet, a rogue commander may take it on himself to use the power and weapons under his control.
The shift in focus since the end of the Cold War has caused a decline in U.S. undersea warfare expertise, experience, and assets. The number of P-3C Orion aircraft, a premier ASW platform, for example, has decreased by approximately 50% from just ten years ago. At the same time, the switch from open-ocean to littoral operations has increased the challenges and threats to the hunter. The hunted submarine now is operating in home waters, with intimate knowledge of the local terrain. He is aware of reefs, currents, and tidal influences. The hunter, on the other hand, is in unfamiliar territory and within range of land-based aircraft and missiles, and any of the small craft and fishing vessels that crowd the littorals could harbor a hand-held surface-to-air missile threat.
In addition, the best ASW platform, the nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN), is severely handicapped and likely will be prohibited from operating in the littoral environment. Shallow water is extremely dangerous for an SSN, and potential problems include grounding, collision, salinity factors that relate to depth control, and counterdetection. Some claim that the littorals offer increased acoustic detection ranges similar to that of a surface duct, but even if detection is possible, our current ASW weapons have not demonstrated the ability to perform reliably in the littorals.
Counterarguments
Some argue that our potential submarine adversaries are not really much of a threat. They have smaller, less-capable submarines. Their crews are inexperienced, and what training they do receive is short and sporadic. Their maintenance facilities and contracts cannot support their fleets, and their submarines will face the same operational difficulties-groundings, merchant traffic, salinity-as the U.S. boats. Some even claim that these countries will not operate their submarines as submarines but will spend most of their time surfaced, exposing themselves to counterattack and warning U.S. forces.
All of these arguments are valid to some extent; however, adversarial nations may not employ their submarines in the same manner as the United States and Soviet Union did during the Cold War. A future adversary is likely to employ a submarine for coastal defense, territorial sea patrols, chokepoint intercept, special operations missions, intelligence gathering, mining, kamikaze attacks, and ambush. A submarine also could deliver weapons of mass destruction. This local employment scheme overcomes many disadvantages of smaller, less capable submarines. Breaking a paradigm, during the Falklands War, two of the three attacks made by the Argentinean submarine San Luis were made with sonar (vice periscope) firing solutions.6
Recent success in air independent propulsion (AIP) throws another variable into the equation. AIP allows submarines to operate for extended periods without surfacing to recharge their batteries. This negates the historical detection method of finding submarines on the surface. AIP technology also increases a sub's speed and range, making it more asset- and time-intensive to detect.
A single conventional submarine can have a disproportionate operational impact. In the Falklands War, the large, modern British fleet sailed into contested waters against a smaller, less sophisticated force. With an inexperienced crew, the San Luis, a lone Type 209 submarine, conducted attacks on two British surface ships and possibly one nuclear submarine. Although unsuccessful, the attacks wreaked extraordinary havoc. The British expended more than 200 ASW weapons against the San Luis without scoring a hit.7 After an attack on a British ASW carrier, the San Luis survived a 20-hour counterattack. The Brits never found the San Luis, even though she snorkeled and even surfaced one time for repairs.8
Operational Factors
> Space. Significant space elements that need to be discussed are denial, physical characteristics, base of operations, and lines of communication.9 Denial can be interpreted in at least two ways. First, the adversary may actively deny the United States access to an area through mine warfare, missile defense systems, or operational submarines. Second, by deploying a submarine an adversary may cause the United States to stay at arm's length. With today's sensitivity to casualties, the threat, or even the perceived threat, of a submarine attack may deter the United States from sending key combatants into the theater of operations. In the Falklands War, one British submarine-after sinking the General Belgrano-scared the Argentine Navy into withdrawing its naval forces into its territorial waters, hundreds of miles from the contested islands.
What if ground forces planned to rely on Navy theater ballistic missile defense (TBMD) assets until ground-based TBMD could be deployed in theater? If Navy TBMD platforms could not be moved into contested waters, ground forces would be vulnerable. Another complication of access denial is the potential thwarting of Marine Corps forced-entry operations. These are only two cases that could affect the time-space-forces interrelationships that a joint forces commander must consider. Had the Iraqis been able to deny access to the Arabian Gulf during the Gulf War, for example, all coalition forces and supplies would have had to land at Red Sea ports, shifting the lines of operations and sea lines of communications. This would have altered time-space-force issues and complicated that already complex wartime environment.
Physical characteristics of the littoral battlespace include complex and unique environmental conditions and hostile land-based sensors and weapons. Conventionally powered submarines that have quiet acoustic signatures, new weapon capabilities, and innovative tactics, including bottoming, complicate the ASW problem. False contacts from debris and low confidence contacts arising from the operating environment illustrate the complexity involved.' Magnifying the problem is the lack of littoral experience and training in the U.S. fleet.
Once in theater, the United States must establish a base of operations, and USW is a critical enabler. USW contributes to battlespace dominance, which allows force movement and subsequent warfare to be conducted with minimum risk to life and assets.11 Inability to establish a base of operations near the battlefield would handicap a joint forces commander's ability to conduct operations.
Another U.S. military vulnerability is its sea lines of communications (SLOCs). "When the United States goes to war, it goes overseas-and 95% of all its military cargo goes by sea." Adversarial submarine operations could block or severely restrict the United States' ability to deploy, maneuver, or resupply troops. A single submarine could disrupt SLOCs at the destination or at a decisive point. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been able to discount other nations' abilities to affect these precious sea lines of communications, but the proliferation of submarines should cause us pause. As the United States moves away from forward presence and toward home basing, SLOCs will become even more vital.
> Time. A hostile submarine drastically elongates the element of time. First, it will take longer to transit to the conflict area because convoys will have to be formed and USW efforts will have to ensure that the sea lanes are clear of submarines and mines. The first successful transit of a decisive point does not indicate that it is clear; rather, a submarine may just be waiting for a specific prey before it reveals itself. ASW efforts will have to be mounted around the clock, until all adversarial submarines are eliminated.
An unlocated, hostile submarine will complicate overall timing to the detriment of friendly forces. That is, the timing of specific actions will have to be very flexible if those actions involve any movement or maneuver using naval assets. The uncertainty of the hostile submarines' locations also might encourage naval forces to err on the side of safety, causing further delays and perhaps missed opportunities. The presence of a hostile submarine also will affect the time required to open hostilities, for maneuver, to commit reserves, to regenerate combat power, and to reconstitute forces. This could mean, for example, that convoys will have to be formed, escorts identified, and USW plans promulgated and executed-all of which would prolong the conflict.
> Force. "Joint Vision 2010" calls on the Navy to maintain sea control." This maritime dominance enables the other services to accomplish their missions and allows the United States to move, resupply, and defend its joint forces. Today, we and our allies enjoy a substantial advantage in this arena, but there is no guarantee that this superiority will ensure our success against asymmetric threats and high-leveraged weapons such as submarines, cruise missiles, and mines.
In any probable future conflict, sealift will be crucial. U.S. overseas bases have declined from 115 in 1956 to 27 in 1995"-and although initial U.S. manpower can be flown to an area of conflict, airlifting the equipment and supplies that these troops need for sustainment, protection, and firepower is a near impossibility. Prepositioned equipment and sufficient sealift guarantee U.S. forces the manpower and material they need to be successful. By 2002, five of the Army's ten divisions will have prepositioned equipment afloat. The Marine Corps maintains 13 prepositioning ships, and the Navy, Air Force, and Defense Logistics Agency maintain seven ships for prepositioning equipment and war reserves. These ships are prime targets for submarines. If an adversary could prevent or delay the arrival of equipment, he could greatly diminish the capacity of the troops waiting for it.
In addition, our allies and coalition partners depend on U.S. sea control for the safety of their own forces-to the extent that the loss of maritime dominance could mean the disruption of an alliance. One hostile submarine could upset this delicate balance, which could have a negative effect on force morale and discipline, public support, and ultimately, on combat readiness and the will to fight.
Recommendations
The proliferation of submarines and submarine technology is a serious problem. More than just a threat, a submarine is a force multiplier. During World War II, U.S. submarines employed 1.6% of the Navy's manpower but sank 54% of Japanese shipping. The impact of a submarine is not proportional to its cost, and as the U.S. moves toward more capabilities on fewer platforms, there is an increased risk of a "golden" torpedo or mine.
An adversarial submarine could delay, disrupt, or deny U.S. access to vital regions of the world. The United States needs to acknowledge the threat of conventional submarines and continue to emphasize the littoral environment through participation in exercises with foreign navy submarines. The United States must lean on its allies to stem further proliferation. Finally, the United States must use its diplomatic powers to persuade allies to deliver details of weapons, signatures, training, and capabilities that already have been exported to potential adversaries.