The Navy's fleet support officer community faces a stormy and uncertain future while a panel of senior community officers decides whether or not to send its members elsewhere. This study, scheduled to take six months, may merely be postponing the inevitable elimination of the 1700 community; but the Navy needs to think twice about what it may be getting rid of.
I have waited in vain for some type of coordinated, articulate senior fleet support officer (FSO) community response to Ms. Graham's article "Does the Navy Need the 1700 Community?" (February 1999 Proceedings, pp. 48-50). I had hoped that a community possessing several admirals, many captains, and a veritable plethora of commanders would speak up in response to some of the inarguably excellent points made in that article. The internal response so far is to wait and see what comes out of the fleet support officer study commissioned at the senior FSO conference held in July—but I am loathe to wait until its results are published sometime in spring 2000. Failing any senior 1700 response, are there no unrestricted line officers who see value in the community's continued existence and are willing to step up and pen a brief defense? What I see published in response to Ms. Graham's attack is an ensign's justifiable plea for guidance and a captain's sour grapes (T. D. Hall and D. J. Diekman, May 1999 Proceedings, p. 22) and a lieutenant's misguided redirection for the community (C. M. Rein, June 1999 Proceedings, p. 16). As a 1700 lieutenant with eight years in the Navy, I would like to offer Ensign Hall and her classmates some background and advice as they embark on their fleet support careers.
The Background
I believe there is a viable career path available now and in the future for FSOs. Unfortunately, this path lies along a rough road of resentment and misunderstanding. Resentment because, in spite of community efforts to advertise the unique expertise of FSOs, it seems that "war fighters" often perceive 1700 officers (and more tellingly, 1700s often perceive themselves) as permanent shore sailors, unwilling to go to sea and thus unfamiliar with the problems of the "real" Navy. Thus, although a FSO may be serving in a critical billet as a staff communications officer or a Military Sealift Command commanding officer, he or she is made to feel that his or her contribution to the Navy is of lesser value just because of a dearth of career sea-duty opportunities.
The FSO is caught in an eternal paradox. A sleek, pared down military looks to its infrastructure as a source of cost savings, but at the same time (whether the war fighters like it or not) the current technological and manpower/recruiting environment demands a considerable support tail for every "pointy tip" (i.e., war fighter or weapon in the field). The question for the Navy becomes: How can we get the most streamlined tail possible while still providing the best combination of service and support? The Navy's answer to this conundrum is technology.
The FSO community is caught between the devil and the deep blue sea. War fighters, misunderstanding what a FSO brings to the technology table, tend to see only that we do not (generally) go to sea. Indeed, with few billets at the "pointy end," FSOs tend to be part of the infrastructure (major command staffs, Pentagon directorates, and shore stations) targeted for "efficiencies." On the other hand, FSOs have developed—particularly at senior lieutenant commander and above levels—indispensable expertise in C4I, information management/warfare, manpower/personnel systems, programming and budgeting, recruiting, training initiatives, and shore installation management. These are the very skills necessary to help attain the types of efficiencies the Navy leadership seeks. Make no mistake, these are all intense learning curve and jargon-laden competencies that often require graduate-level study for full mastery.
Does it matter what the war fighters think of our community? The answer is, yes, it matters tremendously. In fact, our relationship with the fleet is our bread and butter. Like any other restricted line community, we exist to provide a service and a product to our primary customers—the fleet operators. If we are not providing the right tools at the right time, or communicating our capabilities properly, we are not doing our jobs.
The solutions FSOs with technological and planning skills bring to bear on real Navy problems are fundamental ones, near and dear to the war fighters' hearts. For example, FSOs often are involved intimately in getting local area network connectivity out to the battle group, managing end strength and manpower so the right person fills the right billet at the right time, recruiting the nation's pool of bright youngsters, and getting the right sea lift to the right place when needed. These projects are issues that require the skill set unique to the FSO. Because FSOs accomplish most of their efforts at the staff level, however, the results are not always evident. Working quietly, mostly behind the scenes, we suffer from underexposure. The transition from General Unrestricted Line (GenURL) to fleet support has necessitated a sea change in external and internal perceptions of the community, a point the senior 1700s have not recognized fully until recently.
FSOs do have a unique skill set and have the ability to bring much more to the table now than we did as GenURL officers. What other community can claim such a generalist background that eventually results in a specialist core competency? It is a definite plus that FSO junior officers start their careers in administrative officer, legal officer, personnel officer, protocol, flag aide, communications officer and, increasingly, surface warfare, submarine, and aviation junior officer billets. That broad range of experience at the junior level translates well into a "fleet perspective" as the FSO becomes more specialized and works successive jobs concentrating in one of the three core competencies. The bonus for FSOs is that these narrow, specialized billets (unlike for the URL communities) are career enhancing for us—allowing us leeway to even further improve our proficiency. Our focused specialization still begs the question: Can other communities, civilians, or even contractors do these jobs? Perhaps some of them, but definitely not all.
The Advice
The leadership, working within budgets and juggling priorities, may determine that the future of the fleet support community still is in jeopardy. Only the senior leadership knows for sure—and, as yet, they are not saying. My advice to you, Ensign Hall, is:
- Do not try to cram your entire career into the first five to eight years of your service. You have time to learn about being out of school and in the "real" Navy, and the time to learn what you are good at. Outstanding performance in any billet in the early years carries more weight than early specialization in a core competency.
- Lean toward technology. This is where the FSO has a unique opportunity. Learn everything you can about the information management and technical application side of your job.
- Take advantage of fully funded graduate education as soon as you can.
- Balance the advice of senior 1700s (commander and above) with that of other 1700s only a few years senior to you (at the most, ten years). Since our community has changed enormously in the last five years, the senior officers' career experience has not been the same as yours will be and, unfortunately, some seniors do not always offer positive advice. Ask your fellow 1700s questions about what they did, what worked, and what did not in terms of core competency choice, recent billets, and balancing personal interests with their careers.
- Seek overseas duty and (wherever possible) opportunities at sea.
- Finally, keep up with community developments through fleet support officers' associations (the Naval Postgraduate School has one, as does Hampton Roads) and the Navy Personnel Command FSO web site.
I implore the FSO leadership (and the Navy leadership in general) to stop hiding their hands—put the cards on the table; we can handle it. I am tired of the obfuscation and avoidance that have been recent practice. The following email from a FSO community manager is an excellent example of this: "The overabundance of speculation and wishful thinking based on what seems to be oversimplified conclusions drawn by some of our fellow officers who may or may not have correctly heard about the outcome of the 2 April meeting and the options discussed is unfortunate." Huh? None of us should be running for office here; we merely are seeking help in planning our careers and our lives as best we can.
Lieutenant Dilday is assigned to Commander, Undersea Surveillance at Dam Neck, Virginia.