The U.S. Marine Corps should abandon its vertical flight requirement for the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), buy a short takeoff version of the JSF that Lockheed Martin and Boeing are competing to build (Lockheed Martin's carrier variant below)—and then buy a new version of the F7F Tigercat (opposite) to operate from austere airstrips and big-deck 'Gators.
The Marine Corps needs to replace its AV-813 Harriers. Never having fulfilled the service's hopes as a potent close-air-support and ground-attack aircraft, the AV-8B is instead a dangerous, marginally effective, difficult-to-maintain drain of money, manpower, and morale—despite the superb professionalism of the Marines who fly and maintain it.
One has only to review the limited participation of the Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) AV8Bs during the recent air campaign over the former republic of Yugoslavia to validate its reputation as everyone's last choice in tactical jet aviation. Poor serviceability, limited capabilities, short range, and small payloads made its presence even more inconsequential.
The Marine Corps is in fact planning to replace its Harrier fleet with a Short Takeoff Vertical Landing (STOVL) version of the Joint Strike Fighter toward the end of the next decade. Unfortunately, the STOVL version of the JSF already is designed to have poorer performance and fewer capabilities when compared to the non-STOVL versions that the Navy and the Air Force plan to buy—even if it meets its design requirements. That it will do so is very far from certain. Regardless, it will be saddled with many of the same limitations that plague the AV8B, and will drain valuable resources from the Service's perennially strained budget.
I believe that the Marine Corps should stop development of the STOVL variant and join with the Navy and the Air Force to purchase a short takeoff variant of their more conventional designs.
Marine Corps aviation's pursuit of a vertical landing capability for tactical jets has cost it dearly over the last three decades. Given the potential short-field capability of modern-day fighters, with their powerful engines coupled to simple vectored nozzles, the marginal additional capabilities afforded by vertical landing aircraft do not justify their costs in dollars, performance, and developmental and operational risks.
To augment a more conventional JSF variant, and to operate from amphibious assault ships (LHAs/L14Ds) and the majority of the world's airfields that are too short for conventional fighters, I believe that the Marine Corps should abandon its plans to neck down to a single tactical aircraft and buy two.
My choice would be an already existing, simple, relatively inexpensive, radar equipped, twin-engine design capable of delivering 4,000 pounds of ordnance. It has a range of 1,200 miles, an on-station endurance of about five hours, and the capability to operate from an austere, rough field environment. It is carrier-capable, built by a firm long-associated with naval aviation and noted for its rugged airframes—and it first flew during World War II.
I'm talking about the Grumman F7F Tigercat, with its two big R-2800 radial engines, which first flew in 1943 and went on to provide exceptional service with the Navy and Marine Corps until it was displaced by sexier, more fashionable jet fighters in the early 1950s.
Of course, I'm not suggesting that the old F7F blueprints be dusted off in preparation for cranking out brand new airplanes. What I am proposing is that the F7F design, and other similar twin-engine designs—de Havilland's Mosquito and Sea Hornet aircraft, and the Lockheed P-38 Lightning, among others—be used as a point of departure to design and build a modem, survivable version of the same type. After all, what we're looking for is a tool appropriate for a given task. If the task hasn't changed dramatically, the tool that worked 50-plus years ago, remains appropriate today—notwithstanding advances in air defenses.
Improvements are in order. The heavy, maintenance-intensive radial engines could be replaced by lighter, more powerful, easier to maintain turboprop engines. A new radar, and improvements in engineering design and composite material technology should also yield significant improvements in performance and survivability over the original design.
Further, there is no reason why this aircraft could not carry the same avionics packages used by the latest fighters. Mounting AIM-120 advanced medium range air-to-air missiles (AMRAAMs) and AIM-9 Sidewinders should present no problems whatsoever—nor should the carriage of the latest family of air-to-ground ordnance, including a cannon.
With little modification to the ships themselves, this design also will be able to operate from the current fleet of amphibious assault ships. The ships will need a set of arresting gear, but nothing like the huge, expensive monsters mounted on the fleet's big carriers that must stop behemoths like the F-14. The new aircraft will be fully capable of deck launching with ordnance, and once an amphibious lodgement is secured, will have absolutely no problems operating from austere fields ashore. Further, with an inflight refueling capability, the type should be as responsive to an immediate order to deploy—except for its lower airspeed—as any current fighter.
Though probably not suited for strikes against the most sophisticated antiaircraft defenses (neither is the AV-8B), the updated F7F-type aircraft easily could perform any of the missions assigned to the AV-8B today—and do a better job. For instance, the typical ordnance load for an AV-8B during Operation Allied Force was two Mark 82, 500-pound bombs, a load easily matched by any single-engine, propeller-driven, fighter-bomber at the end of World War II, not to mention the twin-engine type we are discussing. In addition, the F7F-type design would far out-range the Harrier, and would have a time on station that should satisfy the most demanding ground commander and forward air controller (FAC).
Not only that, the updated F7F-type aircraft would be able to execute its missions with a smaller logistics footprint: no need for expeditionary matting or the unique equipment and supplies required for vertical landing aircraft. Also attractive is the limited susceptibility of its turboprop engines to foreign object damage (FOD) when compared to the jet engines of the AV-8B.
It takes little imagination to see how useful an aircraft of this type would be to the ground commander, regardless of whether he is fighting a three-block war or fighting along a classic, static front. With its range, endurance, weapons, and the ability to operate from amphibious shipping or austere settings, it will be a first choice.
Detractors will say that a turboprop aircraft of this type will be too slow and too vulnerable. Not so. Even the piston engine F7F was faster than today's A-10, an aircraft that was built to be survivable in modern combat, and that performed superbly during Desert Storm and, more recently, over Kosovo. Supersonic or near-supersonic flight is not a requirement for the great majority of future Marine Corps missions.
Other critics may say that the design and production of a completely new airframe is beyond what the Marine Corps (read: Navy) can afford. The technology and design elements involved, however, are mature. The F717 was designed by our grandfathers during the early 1940s using slide rules, pencils, and paper. In effect, the work has been done; it needs only refinement to derive further enhanced performance. This is affordable.
What is not affordable is the staggering amount that already has been spent on the vertical-flight-capable version of the JSF. This is particularly true when one considers that the model for the vertical-flight-capable version, the AV-813, has been a failure. Truly, the affordability and cost effectiveness of a new/old airframe should be obvious after only a very rudimentary review.
Consider the payload and time-on-station of a division of AV-813s (four) supporting a ground commander. Taking an example from recent experiences during Operation Allied Force over the former Yugoslavia, we can assume that the division will be on station for 45 minutes to an hour. Each aircraft will have a payload of two Mark 82 500-pound bombs, for a total of 4,000 pounds of ordnance for the entire division. Now, compare the expense of purchasing, maintaining, and operating this division of AV-813s with the same expenses for a single, updated F7F-type aircraft that can provide a nominal time-on-station of at least three hours carrying the same 4,000-pound ordnance load. Essentially, a single, updated F7Ftype airframe provides the same firepower as an entire division of AV-813s—and can remain on station more than three times as long.
If we assume further that the updated F7F-type airframes will be employed in the same numbers as the AV-813, it is obvious that the ground commander will realize a 300% gain in firepower. Moreover, one-for-one, the F7F-types would be the cheaper airframes. When its affordability is viewed in this light, it would seem that our ground commanders would want to make procurement of an updated F717-type airframe a priority.
Further enhancing its cost-effectiveness would be its suitability for various missions across the entire spectrum of modem combat. It is not far-fetched to assume that the Navy, Air Force, and perhaps even the Army, would become customers. In addition, it is obvious that the aircraft would generate significant overseas sales—driving down the cost-per-unit even more.
Some will counter that the performance comparisons discussed earlier ought to be made against the STOVL JSF rather than the AV-8B. Remember, however, that the STOVL JSF is a paper airplane that hasn't flown yet. Its future is no more assured than was the future of the Navy's abortive A-12 or the Air Force's troubled F-22 program. Further, consider that it took nearly 20 years for the MV-22 program to reach the point where it is about to become operational.
Even on paper, the STOVL JSF will not be capable of operating from an amphibious ship while carrying a payload that exceeds 4,000 pounds, nor will it be able to provide three hours of time-on-station. The F7F-type aircraft, however, dovetails ideally with the way the Marine Corps will fight in the future and bridges perfectly the gap between the conventional versions of the JSF and the MV-22. Designed and built correctly, it will be a force multiplier capable of performing air-to-air missions, helicopter/MV-22 escort (see "How Will We Escort the V-22?" this issue, pages 36-39), close air support, forward air controller (airborne), interdiction, and armed reconnaissance missions, among others.
Naturally, there will be those who will resist exploring what they perceive as a step backwards. But there are times when, in order to move ahead, we must took at where we have been. As a service, we in the Marine Corps often beat our collective chests about how progressive and forward-looking we are as an institution. It is now time to find the guts to progress beyond the mistake of vertical takeoff and landing jet aircraft, and instead marry the best of what has been with the promise of what can be to prevail in the battles that are sure to come.
Lieutenant Colonel Stout, an F/A-18 pilot, is serving with the Third Marine Aircraft Wing at Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, California. He wrote Hornets Over Kuwait, published by the Naval Institute Press.