Three decades of highly prescriptive programs and the inevitable inspections that result have placed an overwhelming burden on the sailors who must implement them. A new initiative from the Chief of Naval Operations to reduce workload by 25% will give commanding officers more discretionary time and sailors more time with their families.
Since September 1998 our Navy has seen many pronouncements of change labeled "interdeployment training cycle (IDTC) reductions." Initiated by Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jay Johnson and aimed primarily at the Navy's deployable forces, they are designed to relieve sailors' workload and restore trust in commanding officers. For these changes to take root, however, will take leadership at all levels of the Navy's chain of command. We must have a clear understanding of what caused these changes, as well as an appreciation for where they are meant to take the Navy.
Over the past three decades the Navy has implemented a myriad of highly prescriptive programs designed to standardize everything from how we operate nuclear power plants to how we route a leave chit. These programs were developed by intelligent, well-meaning people trying to solve real problems, and many have been critical in producing a safer, more professional, and more combat ready Navy. Unfortunately, many more have been less effective, or worse yet, have produced few tangible results. We meticulously inspected for compliance with a process, but too often we failed to define or measure the effectiveness of the process itself.
Programs, rather than solutions, have become the focus—and with every one there are costs, ranging from the bureaucracy of program managers at each level of the chain of command, to the inevitable inspections to ensure every unit is complying with the rules. The most significant cost, however, is the tremendous burden imposed on the sailors who must execute these programs. Unlike the budget process's "zero sum game," there are no checks and balances on sailors' workload. There is no process to ensure that program requirements are in balance with the manpower available. Left unchecked, the requirements levied by program owners have become an overwhelming burden. We have in effect adopted the adage that sailor time is free—this mind-set must change.
Recent manning shortfalls in the fleet have brought these problems to the forefront, and in response the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) established a Fleet Review Board (FRB) "to conduct a comprehensive review of all programs, inspections, instructions, and assist visits affecting operating forces." His objective is to reduce workload by 25%, "allowing commanding officers increased discretionary time and sailors more time at home with their families." This will be accomplished by "implant[ing] the responsibility, authority, and empowerment—trust—at the proper level . . that of the unit commanding officer." In other words, let leaders lead. Tell commanding officers what is expected of them, provide the tools for them to get the job done, and then allow them the discretion to use those tools when, where, and how they deem appropriate for their units.
This is a cultural change for many. The old "you get what you inspect," zero-defects philosophy must go. We cannot afford the estimated 10,000+ man days worth of inspections that a typical ship receives during the IDTC. In their place will be a process with increased but acceptable risk based on continuous self-assessment and a minimum number of external inspections. The new Engineering Qualification (E-Qual) process, which replaced the 1970s-era Engineering Certification, is an excellent example. Under E-Qual, the expertise formerly assigned to the conventional Propulsion Examining Board (PEB) has become part of the Afloat Training Group and is used to mentor shipboard engineers and assist commanding officers and immediate supervisors in command (ISICs) with assessments. With E-Qual, instead of PEB setting engineering standards through a rigid inspection process, former board inspectors form a partnership with the fleet. Emphasis now is on safe and effective engineering plant operations, not on how well a ship kept its training records. Other changes approved to date include:
- Labor-intensive programs overhauled: Hazardous materials, quality assurance, planned maintenance system, electrical safety, ordnance qualification and certification, heat stress, hearing conservation, and controlled equipage, to name a few
- Compliance-oriented inspections canceled, including command inspection, maintenance and material management (3M), and personnel qualification standards
- Duplicative inspections consolidated or eliminated
Fleet Review Board recommendations and CNO decisions not only have affected programs, they also have served as enablers for change. Expanded in-port duty sections, limiting to 28 the average number of nights away from home port per quarter between deployments, and making the 30-day postdeployment stand down time inviolate are a few of the changes that will allow sailors more time at home with their families.
There have been mixed reactions to the CNO's initiative. On the waterfront, sailors are enthusiastic but skeptical. Until the details are spelled out in revised instructions, the pronouncements ring hollow. Commanding officers applaud the changes that entrust them with mission readiness and increased control over their own schedules, but they too are skeptical that our risk-averse, zero-defects culture will allow full implementation. In addition, as long as commanding officers' fitness reports use inspection results as a primary performance metric instead of the things that matter—operational performance, retention, readiness, and sailors' quality of life—they will never be fully vested in IDTC reduction.
Waterfront skepticism can be overcome only by leaders—ISICs, commanding officers, wardrooms, ready rooms, and chiefs' messes—who believe in this new philosophy and are willing to support it with actions. Admiral Archie Clemins, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and Admiral Paul Reason, Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet, said it best in their message to commanders and commanding officers: "This approach will be a challenge for some since it represents a major departure from how we grew up in the Navy. Let's use the inspection mechanism for its original purpose—verifying deployment readiness."
Within the Pentagon, system commands, and operational staffs, there also are mixed reviews. Many program owners have embraced the CNO's direction and have used this opportunity to revamp long-outdated and ineffective programs. But others have been reluctant to have their "rice bowls" affected, oftentimes saying that their programs were "written in blood," and that to change them would risk spilling more. Unfortunately, these emotional responses seldom are supported by objective data. A prime example is the personal electrical safety check program.
For more than 30 years our sailors spent countless man hours safety checking all personal electric and electronic gear that came on board our ships (i.e., electric shavers, portable radios, etc.). Originally well-intentioned and designed to safeguard sailors from inferior consumer products, the program continued to grow, even though consumer equipment became much safer. In contrast, each year approximately four million people ride cruise ships safely, without having their personal belongings confiscated, safety checked, tagged, and returned. When hard data were examined as part of the FRB process, the Navy and the cruise ships were found to have similar safety records. Based on data and not emotion, the program owner realized there was an infinitesimal risk—but a tremendous burden lifted—by scrapping the entire personal electrical safety program.
The CNO's approach to IDTC reductions is to analyze data to justify program requirements, and to use a risk management approach to ensure that emphasis is placed on those areas that pose the greatest risk to combat readiness or personal safety. Many of the changes have deleted duplicative administrative requirements that have no bearing on a program's effectiveness but create a workload burden on fleet sailors. Letters of designation, shipboard instructions, paygrade criteria for collateral duties, and training requirements may make sense in the vacuum of an individual program, but when every program owner places that same administrative burden on a unit, the result is disastrous.
Instead of treating sailors as free labor, we must find labor savers by leveraging automation in our programs. Planned maintenance, tagouts, the Engineering Operational Sequencing System (EOSS), and logs are all examples of time consumers that can be streamlined through automation. The shift in culture brought about by IDTC reduction and the FRB process must take hold, or our sailors' skepticism will be founded and they will lose faith.
As the economy of the 1990s has boomed, attracting and retaining sailors and junior officers have become challenges. Part of the reason is family separation during the interdeployment period. But there are growing indications that a bigger reason for their departure is a leadership problem—a leadership by inspection and zero-defects mentality that has created a risk-averse working climate. They perceive a leadership that treats sailors and junior officers as a "free labor pool," lacking trust in its people and stifling initiative and growth—leadership that takes the fun out of being a sailor.
In his book, On Watch, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt spoke of changing the culture within the Navy: "Eliminating Mickey Mouse [policies], relieving some of the pressure naval service puts on family life, and creating new opportunities for fun and zest were deeds that were difficult to perform only in a bureaucratic sense. They required much prodding and tweaking of long-established regulations, routines, and mind-sets and constant monitoring of the system to make sure the prods and tweaks were having the intended effect, but they presented no attitudinal problems to a great majority of the men and women of the Navy."
Today we have an opportunity to relieve some of the pressures our service places on family life. Our sailors and junior officers want and expect this change—or we risk losing them. The CNO and senior Navy leaders have recognized this need and are using the Fleet Reserve Board to jump-start the process.
Changing the culture will take other forms as well. Secretary of the Navy Richard Danzig's Smart Work initiative is another way to relieve the burden on sailors through better working conditions and the use of technology. In his letter to the fleet, he noted: "The idea is simple . . . you are not draftees. Your labor is not free. Your skills are the skills of professionals. Accordingly, you should be given better tools, better working conditions, and automation where it can relieve you of time-consuming burdens.... Further [through Smart Work] it makes jobs more meaningful by giving more authority to fewer people and diminishing some of the drudgery you have properly told me you did not like."
Leaders throughout the Navy need to embrace the interdeployment training cycle reduction philosophy in their day-to-day business. This effort will succeed only if we remove the burdens on our sailors and change the culture that put those burdens there. The IDTC reduction initiative is about leadership and taking personal responsibility for keeping our Navy great.
Admiral Luecke is Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, and Admiral Fisher is Deputy and Chief of Staff, U.S. Pacific Fleet.