The campaign over Kosovo between March and June of this year was all about the projection of power through and from the air. But it was not all about air forces—a substantial amount of that power projection came from the sea. The major contribution by the U.S. Navy is well chronicled, but a proportional contribution also was made by European navies.
The French carrier Foch and her battle group, including an attack submarine, operated in the Adriatic until 3 June, flying a full range of land-attack sorties with Super Etendards and photo reconnaissance Etendards. Initially deployed to support French ground forces in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Kosovo Verification Mission and in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Foch was well placed at the start of the campaign to move to offensive operations and sustain them. A Royal Navy Type 23 frigate was integrated into the Foch battle group (including rules of engagement) throughout—a small but significant gain for a European defense capability.
The British carrier HMS Invincible, on the other hand, had been deployed in the Gulf for Desert Fox. She was not brought back early—although she could have been—and she arrived in the Mediterranean in late March, as the air campaign intensified. Operating mostly in the Ionian Sea and sharing space with the USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71), Invincible's AMRAAM-armed Sea Harriers F/A2 provided air defense over Kosovo, and with a look-down/shoot-down capability circumscribed support operations by Serbian Galeb aircraft.
For Britain, the big innovation was the operational use of submarine-launched Tomahawk land-attack missiles (TLAMs) from HMS Splendid. The Splendid's operational status was fast forwarded after one live test firing, and she did not have time to integrate fully with U.S. submarines in the Adriatic. Waterspace management was coordinated with Commander, Task Force 69, and targeting was coordinated with U.S. European Command and Commander, Air Forces South. The precise number of missiles fired is not available, but it seems likely that approaching one-third of Britain's total buy of 65 TLAMs was used. Certainly, the Splendid topped up twice with missiles in Augusta, Sicily. This raises the thorny question of maintaining missile stocks: what is procured for coercive use early in a conflict can be exhausted quickly in attrition, and the ability of industry to regenerate stocks quickly is questionable.
As preparations for Kosovo Force's (KFOR's) operations gathered pace, the sea lines of communication, mostly into Thessaloniki, became busier. Certainly, the Royal Navy's roll-on/rolloff ships, the Sea Centurion and Sea Crusader, backed by other fleet auxiliaries, were committed fully. Later, the Royal Fleet Auxiliary Argus was deployed as a helicopter forward operating base and as a prepositioned hospital ship.
Throughout the air campaign there were at least potential submarine and mining threats. The Yugoslav Navy had a few old Sava-class diesel-electric submarines that, if operated with determination, conceivably could have struck lucky in the difficult sonar conditions in the Adriatic. The Serbs also had mine stocks at Barr and Kator, which might have been laid covertly to cause widespread psychological and limited actual disruption. The primary defense against submarine attack would have been through the carrier battle groups, but for wider purposes including maritime surveillance, NATO's Standing Naval Force Atlantic and Standing Naval Force Mediterranean were deployed in the region, with units from the British, Canadian, Greek, Italian, Netherlands, Portuguese, Spanish, Turkish, and U.S. navies. Mine-countermeasures (MCM) capability was provided by NATO's MCM Force North and MCM Force Mediterranean, with Belgian, British, Danish, German, Italian, Netherlands, Spanish, and Turkish navies represented. The MCM forces continued after hostilities stopped, to find and destroy the 100 items of ordnance ditched by aircraft returning to their Italian bases. At writing, 93 had been found and 90 successfully countermined.
An operation that could have been conducted by navies other than the U.S. Navy was a sea embargo to restrict the import of oil and other material into Serbia and increase international isolation of Slobodan Milosevic. The practicality had been demonstrated in the Adriatic during 1994's Sharp Guard, but the legal backing in the form of U.N. Security Council resolutions linked to the humanitarian operations was not considered strong enough to support even the bland "visit and search" policy envisaged.
Maritime operations in support of the Kosovo air campaign contributed substantially and particularly: at various stages of bad weather or when accuracy had to be assured, the TLAMs of HMS Splendid were the only European systems that could be brought to bear. The British amphibious ready group including the helicopter carrier Ocean, the dock landing ship Fearless, and three Commando Brigade Royal Marines, although it played no part in the campaign, provided another option for commanders had circumstances changed. Finally, the Kosovo campaign underlined the difference between those European navies that retain ambitions to project power as part of an expeditionary strategy, albeit in concert with others, and those that contribute supporting functions. Only the British and French navies retain the expeditionary capabilities—and the way future defense budgets in Europe are shaping, this is unlikely to change.