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ERIK HILDEBRANT
Sensors linked to combat information center displays (here, on the USS Hopper [DDG-70], named for Rear Admiral Grace Hopper, credited with moving the U.S. Navy into the computer age) promise to pierce the fog of war and provide commanders with perfect knowledge--but the technology can give them a false sense of security: While everything on the screen probably is out there, everything out there may not be on the screen.
ERIK HILDEBRANT

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Reflections on "War as a Rational Business"

By T. A. Brooks
December 1998
Proceedings
Volume 124/12/1,150
Commentary
View Issue
Comments

I applaud Colonel Hammes's observation that "War Isn't A Rational Business" and cannot be won by applying "sound business planning models." [See Proceedings, July 1998, pages 22-25.]

Sadly, we appear to be hypnotizing ourselves into believing that we are so smart technologically that we can simply apply combinations of computerized systems and rational business planning and overwhelm any adversary—ideally, I suppose, by pushing buttons from our air-conditioned offices. Smart collection systems will provide error-free intelligence exactly when required; smart command-and-control systems will make infallible decisions; and 100%-reliable communications systems will order smart weapons (preferably unmanned) to destroy the enemy, who will then promptly capitulate. None of this messy business of casualties.

But war is, indeed, a messy business and history is replete with proof that there are no ultimate weapons, impregnable defenses, totally reliable systems in combat, cheap fixes, or magic bullets—technological superiority notwithstanding. Colonel Hammes correctly points to Somalia, the current stalemate in Iraq, and the Israeli inability to suppress intifadah as very obvious examples of situations where all the Joint Vision 2010 or network-centric warfare in the world would not allow us to prevail. He notes that we still don't know the location of Saddam Hussein's special weapons or, for that matter, even where he sleeps at night.

To believe that technology will dispel the fog of war and provide you perfect knowledge while denying knowledge to your enemy not only flies in the face of history and reason, but lacks believability when it is premised on a complex system-of-systems that must perform flawlessly even in the chaos and confusion of the battlefield. No system has ever delivered such performance. It borders on the irresponsible to assume that Joint Vision 2010 will be the magic bullet and to assume "total information dominance of the battlefield," as a key underpinning for strategy development and force planning.

In the final analysis, it always will be the Sailor, Soldier, Airman, or Marine who will win the war. He must be trained and equipped to fight and prevail at the most elemental, violent, and personal level—right down to hand-to-hand combat. If then the great "system of systems" works as planned and technology eliminates the need for American blood to be shed, that would be wonderful. But if the system fails to deliver and our forces are dependent upon it and unprepared to fight without it, that would be tragic.

All the technology envisioned as part of Joint Vision 2010 is admirable and desirable; also, much of it probably is attainable. But even in its most perfect combination and orchestration, it will not work in all scenarios and at all times. War always will remain a messy business and fog and friction will be with us as long as human beings are involved. Plan for it.

T. A. Brooks

Admiral Brooks is Government Markets Vice President for AT&T. He retired in 1991 as the Director of Naval Intelligence.

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Digital Proceedings content made possible by a gift from CAPT Roger Ekman, USN (Ret.)

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