British Choose Nimrod Over P-3
In July, the British finally announced their choice for a Nimrod replacement: BAe’s Nimrod 2000. Although BAe was teamed with Boeing for the airplane’s combat system, the British Ministry of Defence will demand that Nimrod 2000 be equipped with a British GEC-Marconi combat direction system, based on the Nautis surface ship system. The BAe/Boeing team beat out a Lockheed Martin/GEC team offering Orion 2000, a new-build P-3 equipped with the GEC Nautis system. The British choice offers some insights into the role of perception versus reality in current procurement.
The payload is reality; the airframe is perception—merely a platform supporting weapons, sensors, and a combat direction system. In a maritime patrol airplane, the combat direction system accounts for a large fraction of overall cost. Unfortunately, it is invisible, essentially—even the words combat direction system often make eyes glaze over. Much of the money goes for software which, if anything, is even less tangible than the system’s anonymous-looking computers. The system, however, is the cutting-edge-technology element, because patrol airframe design is unlikely to involve much radically new technology.
Orion 2000 offered the British a much better industrial deal than Nimrod 2000, because it gave the British a far more important portion of the airplane. The Orion consortium argued that because the U.S. Navy probably would buy the airframe, that service and its export customers might well be induced to adopt the British combat direction system.
Nimrod 2000 was a very different proposition. The British portion of the work would have been limited to remanufacturing existing airframes. It seems unlikely to attract export customers, since Nimrod itself failed to attract any when first offered years ago. But Nimrod 2000 offered a U.S. company, Boeing, a major opportunity to sell its new maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) system, which could have harmed British attempts to stay in the market.
Most maritime patrol operators use Orions, and U.S. companies are likely to dominate the Orion retrofit market. Nautis-MPA development is likely to be costly, because it may well be limited to the British Nimrod market. In contrast, Boeing already had invested heavily in its system, which is descended from that developed for the abortive U.S. P-3C Update IV.
BAe advertising for Nimrod 2000 stressed that it was a “British” solution, and national pride probably played a significant role. The British government has been criticized for appearing to favor U.S. systems, such as the Apache helicopter, over locally built or European-built counterparts, although the Royal Air Force already has suffered the embarrassment of the failure of another “buy British” choice—the decision to develop an airborne early warning version of the Nimrod instead of buying the U.S. E-3 airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft. The failure of the Nimrod version led to an AWACS purchase on terms substantially worse than those that would have been available earlier.
The RAF may fear that opening its procurement process to question will undermine support for the very costly EFA fighter (which it considers vital to its future). One wonders whether, several years from now, the Nimrod remanufacturing program will suffer the same fate as the Nimrod AEW program.
French Navy Restructures
Also in July, the French government announced its five-year defense procurement plan (1997-2002), a follow-up to earlier statements on drastic cuts in spending and radical changes in personnel policy. The bloated French defense industry will be restructured and Thomson-CSF will be privatized.
Procurement funds are divided roughly evenly among the three services, the French Navy receiving slightly more than the others—128.9 billion francs over five years. Much of this will go for strategic submarines. With the decision to stop nuclear testing in the Pacific, the substantial French Pacific naval force will be drawn down, so operating costs should fall. Of nuclear forces, the ground-based missiles are being withdrawn. Air force and navy aircraft will carry a follow-on supersonic cruise missile, to be developed for service in 2008.
The French defense situation is complicated by reliance on German cooperative funding—increasingly difficult to acquire.
The question for France is whether to continue the past policy of maintaining both an R&D and an industrial base for all aspects of defense. Yet another painful question is the appropriate balance between nuclear and conventional forces. During the Cold War, the French government relied heavily on its nuclear deterrent. The Gulf War, however, revealed that a nuclear deterrent has little relevance in some modern conflicts.
For the French Navy, the two key aircraft programs are the Rafale Marine and the NH90 (Lynx replacement) helicopter.
Both are in trouble. Rafale is about a decade behind schedule, due in part to stretch-outs and in part to difficulties with its active-array radar. Although the naval version is to be delivered first, the bulk of these aircraft are to be built for the French Air Force. Consequently, the aircraft’s fate depends largely on the air force buy. The new law, unfortunately, roughly halves air force procurement during the program period, and it does not guarantee future total numbers. Naval plans call for buying 60 rather than 86 Rafale Marine aircraft, and for bringing the first of them (lacking the planned air-to-ground capability) into service in 2002, a year late.
This means that the aircraft is likely to enter service about the same time as the British-German-Italian EFA fighter, with which it will compete. Rafale’s other problem results from continuing delays in developing its primary weapon, the MICA missile, a rough equivalent to the U.S. advanced medium-range air-to-air missile (AMRAAM).
Like the Rafale, the helicopter’s fate depends largely on another service, in this case the French Army. Again, the naval version is to be the first to enter service (II are to be ordered in 2000-2002; the army version is to complete development in 2002). NH90 is a pan-European program, and its fate is tied to other, sharply declining, budgets.
For the Rafale and the NH90, the key argument favoring production is the possibility of export sales. Without them, Dassault and Eurocopter may be in trouble. For the French government, Dassault is particularly important because of hopes that it can be merged with the government-owned Aerospatiale (which has lost considerable money over the past few years) to form a profitable entity worth privatizing.
The single new carrier, the nuclear-powered Charles De Gaulle, is running slightly behind schedule and will be commissioned in 2000. No formal decision has yet been taken on building a second ship, and it appears that any such ship will not be nuclear-powered. To maintain one operational carrier at all times, the elderly Foch is being modernized—to include a ski-jump—so that she can operate Rafales. She is to be placed in reserve and activated when the new carrier is overhauled. Her sister, the Clemenceau, is to be discarded.
The new carrier will commission with only Super Etendard strike aircraft; her 12-plane Rafale interceptor squadron will not join for about a year. The planned E-2C purchase has been cut from 4 to 3; a pair will be delivered in 1998 and the third ordered for delivery in 2003.
The program to build four Le Triomphant-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) is confirmed: the second and third are to be delivered in 1999 and 2002 (a year later than initially planned), and the fourth ordered in 2000. A proposed fifth unit will not be built. The projected M5 missile has been abandoned in favor of M51 (reportedly a modified M45 rather than a wholly new missile), to enter service in 2010.
All the diesel submarines, some of them recently refitted, are to be retired over the next few years. The first of a new generation of French nuclear-powered attack submarines is to be ordered in 2001. Reports suggest that they will be armed with land-attack missiles, possibly based on the stealthy Apache.
Two (rather than four) Project Horizon antiaircraft frigates are to be ordered (in 1998 and 2000). This British- French-Italian project is experiencing some difficulty, in part because project managers have no control over the missile system, including its fire control system. The British are less than enthusiastic over their limited share of the missile program, given their growing share of the frigate program (up to 12 British ships, compared to two French and three [rather than six] Italian).
The missile has yet to fly a complete mission using its seeker. Even so, the new plan calls for 120 missiles for the carrier and the frigate in 2000-2001. One might speculate that a new British government might pull out of Project Horizon on grounds that an all-British ship would provide far more jobs, particularly at the high-technology end.
Five rather than the planned six La Fayette-class frigates are to be built (the last three will be delivered in 1997, 1999, and 2002). Several existing surface warships will be discarded, probably including about half the A69-class “Avisos.” On the other hand, the amphibious warfare program is proceeding, with three Foudre-class LSDs due for commissioning—in 1998, 2004, and 2006 (the last two are being delayed).
Dr. Friedman is revising his World Naval Weapons Systems 1994 Update.