Sherman Baldwin. New York, NY: Morrow, 1996. 258 pp. Gloss. $23.50 ($21.15).
Reviewed by Vice Admiral Robert F. Dunn U.S. Navy (Retired)
This is a great read for anyone who wants to know, or would like to share with a friend, what it feels like to fly from an aircraft carrier in combat. Those who have been there will say, "He tells it like I always wished 1 could.” For those who have not been there it describes in eminently readable style the challenge, the thrill, and the moments of self-doubt—all with great accuracy and detail. It’s also a revelation for those fighter and attack people who may think they’re the only ones who ever see any excitement. The Prowlers airborne in the war zone, amid surface-to-air missiles and flak and bandit threats, “been there, done that,” too.
Baldwin joined his EA-6B Prowler squadron on board Midway (CV-41) just prior to the shooting phase of the Gulf War, and he carries through to the end of that war. The book derives its name. Iron- claw, from the call sign of his squadron. His chapters are skillfully arranged to avoid the tedium of diary-style writing. This is a well-written story of a “nugget” who is forced by the operational situation to adapt quickly to the realities of junior officer (JO) bunkroom life, fast- paced carrier operations—many of them at night—and the uncertainties of combat. This is more than a personal story, however. Many people touched Baldwin’s life as he went from brand new college graduate, through Aviation Officer Candidate School (AOCS), flight training, and into the squadron. He credits their influence and inserts vignettes about them throughout the work. The AOCS drill instructor, the particularly insightful and skillful Bight instructor, the senior naval flight officer who did much to ease his early shakiness in the squadron, the JO’s ringleader, and even a commanding officer who—despite early misgivings on the part of the JOs—turned out to have been the right medicine in combat.
Once or twice Baldwin drifts into Tom Clancy-ish style of techno-thriller-speak, and occasionally he overdramatizes. For example, writing about a night catapult launch: “The final safety check was done and the launch button was pushed. Our fate was sealed.” But, fortunately, exaggerations like that are few and the balance of his narrative is quite straightforward and outstandingly well written.
Experienced carrier people will have only a few quibbles with his terms. For example, in his description of "breaking the deck” he seems to have confused what the aircraft handler does from time-to- time with what a returning mission does to enter the pattern. But neither that usage nor any of a couple of other nits detracts in any important way from a good story.
Sherman Baldwin is now out of the Navy, engaged in other pursuits. But this book shows that he did indeed achieve his goal of flying jets for the Navy. “Sure, my friends might make more money, but I was convinced that many of them would give it all up in a heartbeat for the opportunity to fly jets off a carrier. None of them knew how incredible it was to feel the acceleration of the catapult shot, the G forces from turning hard at low altitude, the tug of the arresting gear upon landing, the thrill of landing on a carrier during the day, and the terror of landing at night.”
The Best of Gramps
Capt. Zip Rousa, USNR (Ret.), Ed. Falls Church. VA: Association of Naval Aviation, 1996. 112 pp. Ulus. $24.95. Apply directly to publisher, (703) 998- 7733.
Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Richard Seamon, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve (Retired)
GI veterans of World War II will tell you that a young cartoonist named Bill Mauldin knew what life in the infantry was really like. Naval aviators who flew in the same fight remember a pair of artists with equal affection. One drew with pen and ink, the other with words, and between them they not only brightened our lives, but surely saved many of them.
Captain Seth Warner, who claimed to have flown all types of planes and survived every imaginable accident, teamed up with an artist named Robert Osborne to offer the illustrated wit and wisdom of Grampaw Pettibone. Few aircraft accidents (and there were far too many) escaped Gramp’s cranky criticism. And lest anyone miss the point, Osborne’s skillful pen and biting humor made the message all too clear. The Navy, Osborne said. “Never told me how to do the job." No one in the Navy would have dared tell Gramps how to do his, either.
Gramps was as quick to praise exceptional performance as he was to call for tough punishment for stupid mistakes. His comments and Osborne’s cartoons first appeared in the BnAer News Letter, which later became Naval Aviation News. Since those two men began their crusade for aviation safety, twelve other naval officers have taken over for Gramps. and the continuation of his work has contributed greatly to a steadily decreasing rate of aviation accidents. Collected and published by the Association of Naval Aviation. The Best of Gramps is an eloquent tribute to as wise and caring an instructor as any pilot could wish for.
Colonel Seamon was a Marine aviator, and is a for- mer assistant managing editor of Time magazine.
War Beneath The Sea
Peter Padfield. New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, 1995. 479 pp. Appen. Abbrev. Bib. 111. Ind. Maps. Notes. Photos. $30.00 ($27.00).
Reviewed by Vice Admiral Janies F. Calvert, U.S. Navy (Retired)
In War Beneath the Sea, distinguished naval historian Peter Padfield has written a fascinating book covering the submarine operations of Great Britain, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United States during World War II.
Padfield, who is British, starts off by criticizing the senior leadership of both the Royal Navy and the U.S. Navy for their lack of vision in the development of submarine employment doctrine between the wars. He blames the failure of both navies on the adherence of their senior officers to Alfred Thayer Mahan’s theory that the superiority of battle fleets, not merchant raiding, would decide future wars. He observes that while it is true that Mahan wrote before the development of the submarine’s full capabilities, the near-success of the German U-Boats during World War I should have demonstrated the grave threat that a well-conducted guerre de course could pose for either Britain or Japan.
The author gives the most interesting and complete story of the U-Boats in World War II that I have yet seen. He provides clear descriptions of the capabilities of the Type VII and the Type IX boats, the two workhorses of the war for Germany. Padfield also makes clear the absolutely dominant role that Admiral Karl Donitz played in the shaping of U-Boat tactics in the war. From the beginning he was certain that wolfpacks, controlled by frequent radio transmissions between his headquarters ashore and the boats at sea, held the key to victory in the Atlantic. He more than once told Hitler that if he “had 300 U-Boats” he could achieve a “decisive success.” If they had been available in 1940 and 1941, perhaps he could have.
In reality, however, he had only 41 operational submarines at the start of the war, only about half of which were the truly seagoing Type VIIs or IXs. In addition, Hitler’s penchant for meddling in the affairs of operational commanders weakened the primary mission of destroying Britain’s sea communications. Thus the wolf-pack idea had to wait.
Despite these handicaps, the U-Boats had a near-field day for the first few months with aces like Gunther (the Bull of Scapa Flow) Prien, Joachim Schepke, and Otto Kretschmer totaling up hundreds of thousands of tons of sinkings. Significantly the U-Boats began almost immediately to use night surface attacks, and Padfield is correct in criticizing the slowness of the Americans to use this tactic— especially in view of the superiority of American radar and surface speed.
Padfield also gives a complete description of British submarine operations, particularly of the Malta-based 10th Flotilla commanded by the legendary “Shrimp" Simpson. All three of the great British aces, Wanklyn, Tomkinson, and Cayley, are brought to life very effectively. When we read of the loss of all three of these brave young men, it is with a real sense of sadness at the early death of such capable and promising officers.
We are given a chilling description of the U-Boat romp, aptly code-named Paukenschlag (drum beat) off the East Coast of the United States in the early months of 1942. The lack of preparedness on the part of the U.S. Navy, the failure to black out the East Coast, the failure to start wartime convoy procedures (despite British offers of help in this regard), all receive a heavy blast of criticism. Neither Admirals Ernest King nor Dolly Andrews (Commander Eastern Sea Frontier) escape this blast.
Code-breaking played a significant role for the submarines of all four major nations. How this thread was woven through the entire war is described in highly interesting detail. While his description of the U.S. submarine war in the Pacific is relatively brief, the author makes it clear that the combination of our superb fleet submarines, our superior radar, our torpedo fire control (the TDC), and the code- breaking advantage provided an edge the Japanese simply could not overcome. In fact, he criticizes the U.S. high command for not seeing that the war could have been won by isolating the Japanese home islands from any outside support, mainly through the use of submarines. There also is an implication that the use of the atomic weapon could have been avoided, but this is hindsight and, perhaps, not even 20/20 hindsight.
The most poignant impact of the book, somewhat surprisingly, was in the fate of the young men whom Donitz continued to send to sea in submarines that were not technologically capable of handling the Allied ASW effort. By 1945, Donitz was sending boats to sea that did not have even a 50-50 chance of survival. Before the Normandy invasion, the Allies blanketed the Channel and its approaches with a total ASW effort in which nothing but a nuclear submarine would have had any chance of survival. Given the fact that the submarines of those times absolutely had to reach the surface every 24 hours or so to charge batteries, they had no chance. Even the schnorchel-equipped boats were marginal for survival in this environment. Donitz’s messages to his U-Boats in the weeks before the Normandy landings were nothing short of hysterical. They contained such phrases as “attack without regard to . . . caution.”
On D-Day, he ordered all available boats, with or without snorkels, into the Channel area. He knew what he was doing. His war diary contained the entry: “For boats without snorkel this means the last operation.”
What is one to think of a high command that would order such an operation? Whatever our opinion of their political leadership—and surely, no group of brave men ever fought for a less worthy cause—one gets a sinking feeling on reflecting on how these young men must have felt. Despite the usual belief of youth that it, somehow, will be the exception and survive, these men must have known that their lives, so young and promising, were soon to end because a stubborn admiral and a fanatical dictator refused to accept reality.
Of the more than 40,000 officers and men who received training for the U-Boats, some 30,000 were killed and more than 5,000 were captured.
Peter Padfteld has written a superb history of a complex and controversial subject. It is a valuable addition to our body of history of World War II, and I recommend it highly.
Admiral Calvert completed seven war patrols during World War II, and is the author of Silent Running: My Years on a World War II Attack Submarine (New York: Wiley, 1995).
A Very Short War: The Mayaguez and the Battle of Koh Tang
John F. Guilmartin, Jr.; College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1996. 238 pp. Appen. Notes. $39.50 ($35.55).
Reviewed by Rear Admiral William J. Holland, U.S. Navy (Retired)
Sometimes one finds history combined with superb analysis, but hardly is it ever written with the flair and excitement of an adventure novel. Even those who know the outcome and the lessons of the Mayaguez incident will find this book hard to put down until finished. Succinct, clear, easy to read, it would make a great movie. Because it also teaches any number of vital lessons to policy makers, analysts, and warriors, it ought to be a natural for every war college or national security studies course. This is Clausewitz as written by Louis L’Amour!
While raising the reader’s visceral instincts with a thrilling tale of war and narrow escape, Professor Guilmartin brings technical knowledge and operational experience rarely found in historians and practically never found in novelists. The authenticity gained is reflected in the truths rarely discussed as well— and even more rarely appreciated—but which are fundamental to war, and are even more important for Operations Other Than War. For the Marines on Koh Tang, the helicopter crews who put them there and took them off, for the ships’ companies of the Henry B. Wilson (DDG-7) and Harold E. Holt (FF-1074), this was war in every respect. In this book, we see how it would have been a “last stand”—except for the skill, operational competence, élan, and bravery of those at the scene.
The book has a lesson on each page; few are new, but obviously from the story, most are not “lessons learned.” One must train the way one plans to fight regardless of the hazards. Intelligence undelivered is irrelevant. Plans made without reference to the enemy are invitations to disaster. Lack of practice compromises effective gunnery. Division of maintenance and operational responsibilities leads to less capable and less ready forces. All these and more are enunciated and illuminated.
For those in C4I, this was the first action in which direct satellite communication was available between various headquarters and units in the field. The review of this aspect is decidedly mixed. “More often than not, the key decisions that averted disaster were made in spite of, not because of, sophisticated command-and-control and communications systems. “The problem of friction is solvable by straightforward technological solutions only up to a point.”
“An appreciation of the capabilities possessed by the various headquarters in communicating with one another and with the National Command Authorities is necessary to understand the flow of events.”
“Perversely, the very excellence of electronic communications and the abundance of channels tying the higher echelons of command had become a major source of operational uncertainty ... indirectly created a flood of information and queries. . . . The flood of messages and queries for information from on high was brought to bear on a small number of combatants, potentially disturbing vitally important transmissions.”
Everyone involved in an action being closely monitored by a higher headquarters will recognize these characteristics. But this is not a drill or some analytical exercise to demonstrate human behavior. Guilmartin illuminates the effects of these characteristics in real-life crisis situations.
Though the errors in planning and command are discussed, this book is not a journalistic expose of nefarious behavior or cultural ineptitude. There are more heroes than villains and members of every service involved can share Guilmartin’s obvious pride in the performance of the disparate actors:
- Commander J. Michael Rodgers, commanding the Henry B. Wilson, who heard a BBC report on his personal cabin radio, put four boilers on line headed for the Gulf of Siam at 33 knots on his own initiative.
- Major Robert W. Undorf, U.S. Air Force, an OV-10 pilot who took charge of the trisected ground operation on his arrival, and Lieutenant Colonel Randy Austin, U.S. Marine Corps, on the island, “made a national policy decision” to extract the Marines from the jaws of death.
- The Air Force helicopter crews of the Special Operations and Aerospace Rescue Squadrons who flew into a valley of death to insert the Marines and again to bring them out, whose competence in managing their marginal fuel obscured the narrowness of the margin between success and failure.
- The cool bravery and absolute cohesion of the Marines—delivered in three isolated contingents where the leaders in each conducted themselves with textbook intelligence and élan.
- Captain James H. Davis and Gunnery Sergeant Leger A. McNemar, the only persons in the operational chain of command who did a worst-case assessment and insisted the Marines enter fully armed and equipped in spite of optimistic intelligence estimates.
- The cool radio voice from the Henry B. Wilson’s gig, standing off the beach picking up downed helicopter crews or providing machine gun fire support.
- The intervention of the AC-130 gun- ship which arrived like the cavalry in a Western movie, in the nick of time to prevent the Marines being overrun.
Guilmartin finds fault and lays blame as precisely as he can in the levels of command above the on-scene participants. But this book is not about making of policy; rather it is about the execution of policy. He excoriates “Those running the show, competent as they may have been in policy, strategic and operational terms, (who) were tactical babes in the woods and, with few exceptions, utterly unaware of it.”
All of this makes inspirational reading. The insights reinforce and illustrate lessons well understood by those who have been in similar—if not as harrowing—situations. The lessons for the nonwarriors are the most important; no person influential in making policy should be allowed into a situation room until digesting Guilmartin’s lessons. Finally, those making policy in areas of personnel assignments need to bear in mind Guilmartin’s bottom line, . . all the communications in the world cannot replace a competent on-scene commander.”
Admiral Holland served most of his active duty on submarines. He is now president of the Armed forces Communications & Electronics Association Education Foundation.
Books of Interest
By Lieutenant Commander Thomas J. Cutler, U.S. Navy (Retired)
Jane’s Underwater Warfare Systems, 1996-97
Anthony J. Watts, Editor. Detroit, MI: International Thomson Publishing, 1996. 487 pp. Append. Gloss. Illus. Ind. Photos. $290.00 ($275.50) hardcover, $795.00 ($757.50) CD-ROM.
Providing analysis of more than 600 submarine, antisubmarine, and mine warfare systems as well as their associated weapons, this eighth edition of an essential reference work reflects the latest technological developments in the field. The listings are by nation and manufacturer and are annotated with indicators that identify the listing as new, updated, or verified. The CD-ROM version will prove especially useful to some.
Convoy South
Philip McCutchan. New York, NY: St. Martin’s Griffin, 1996. 187 pp, $8.95 (paper).
The New York Times Book Review describes this novel as “a nautical war buff’s feast” and writes that McCutchan "keeps an authoritative hand on the wheel and his descriptions of battles at sea ring with laconic truth.” This latest novel in McCutchan’s convoy series takes Commodore John Mason Kemp into the south seas on a mission from Australia to the United States.
Undefeated: Old Ironsides in the War of 1812
Tyrone G. Martin. Chapel Hill, NC: Tryon Publishing, 1996. 75 pp. Append. Bib. Illus. $10.00 paper.
This monograph chronicles the USS Constitution's achievements during the so called “second war for American independence." The victories of “Old Ironsides” were of some strategic value but, more significantly, they raised the flagging spirits of the America people at a time when such a boost in morale was vitally needed. Commander Martin is a former captain of the ship, serving during her renovation for the nation’s bicentennial, and is the author of a “biography” of the great ship, entitled A Most Fortunate Ship. The included illustrations by Captain John Charles Roach are excellent and notably enhance the presentation.
Dictionary of American Naval Aviation Squadrons: Volume I
Roy A. Grossnick. Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, 1995. 575 pp. Append. Bib. Illus. Ind. Gloss. Photos. $46.00 ($43.70) hardcover, $18.00 ($17.10) CD-ROM.
This volume inaugurates a new series from the Naval Historical Center that summarizes the histories of U.S. naval aviation squadrons. This first volume covers the VA, VAH, VAK, VAL, VAP, and VFA squadrons. Included in the histories are major operational activities, lineage, insignia, nickname, home port assignments, major overseas deployments, commanding officers, unit awards, and various other data. An available CD-ROM version (at an amazingly affordable price) includes an effective search engine that will prove most helpful to researchers.
PT 105
Dick Keresey. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1996. 225 pp. Photos. $27.15 ($22.36).
Dick Keresey knew John F. Kennedy as "Shafty,” and was twice rescued by the future President. In this exciting memoir, Keresey recalls his service as skipper of PT 105, one of the diminutive motor torpedo craft that fought in World War II.
Keresey’s account is a great deal more than a bystander's view of a future President. It is a revealing depiction of the life of a PT boat sailor and of the important roles these small craft played in the U.S. Navy’s greatest victory at sea. Keresey contends that the PT boat "did more damage as gunboats in close-in firefights than they did as torpedo boats,” that “pound for pound [they] were the most heavily armed U.S. Navy vessels in World War II,” and they “saved hundreds from death or capture: downed fliers, sunk sailors, trapped Marines, coastwatchers, stranded nuns, and General Douglas MacArthur."
Collective Insecurity: U.S. Defense Policy and the New World Disorder
Stephen J. Cimbala. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996. 240 pp. Bib. Ind. Notes. Tables. $59.95 ($56.95).
Beginning with an enlightening overview of U.S. security policy during the Cold War, Cimbala then considers the significant changes in both U.S. and Russian defense postures and proposes new strategies for the future. He also considers some of the major problems associated with nuclear disarmament in an era when proliferation is an increasingly potential danger, and he proposes the alternatives for the implementation of military persuasion as a peacekeeping tool. This forward-looking book provides a great deal of stimulus for serious thought concerning U.S. defense policy.
The Biographical Dictionary of World War II Generals and Flag Officers: The U.S. Armed Forces
R. Manning Ancell with Christine M. Miller. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996. 720 pp. Append. Ind. $95.00 ($90.25).
Brief biographical sketches are provided for all of those American military officers who wore stars in World War II. Included are generals of the Army, National Guard, Army Air Force, and Marine Corps, and admirals of the Navy and Coast Guard, who served on active duty for any period from 7 December 1941 to 2 September 1945. Several interesting appendices round out this useful reference book by tabulating data on birthplaces, birth dates, and causes of death. The individual sketches include pre- and post-war assignments of significance.
Fundamentals of Sailing, Cruising, & Racing
Steve Colgate. New York, NY: W.W. Norton, 1996. 384 pp. Illus, Index. Photos. $35.00 ($31.50).
This is an updated and revised edition of a highly successful book that first appeared nearly 20 years ago. Colgate is founder and chief executive officer of the prestigious Offshore Sailing School and chairman of the national governing body of sailing. From the basics of day sailing to the more challenging techniques of cruising and racing, this highly informative book is both comprehensive and readable. Photographs and fine drawings enhance the presentation.
The Mariner's Pocket Companion: 1997 Edition
Wallace E. Tobin III. Annapolis. MD: Naval Institute Press, 1996. 210 pp. Bib. Gloss. Ulus. $13.95 ($11.16) paper.
A wealth of useful information can be carried in the thinking mariner’s pocket with this diminutive but powerful publication. In addition to a daily calendar with space suitable for recording ships’ schedules, meetings, birthdays and anniversaries, and other essential information, the reference pages provide useful mathematical formulae, first-aid information, survival techniques, a wind-chill table, the Morse Code, a summary of the nautical rules of the road, ship and aircraft designations, weather information, navigational short-cuts, and much more.
Memoirs of Service Afloat During the War Between the States
Admiral Raphael Semmes, CSN. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1996. 900 pp. Illus. Index. Notes. $19.95 ($17.95) paper.
Originally published in 1869, this Confederate naval officer’s memoir is now reissued in a professionally edited and indexed edition. Editor John M. Taylor, in his added preface notes that Semmes’s impressive accomplishments as a commerce raider would not be rivaled at sea until the advent of the submarine. Semmes’s service in CSS Sumter and CSS Alabama is recounted in detail. His account is at times humorous and his digressions into sociopolitical topics provide an enlightening glimpse of 19th-century thinking.
Seabirds: An Unofficial Encyclopedia of Naval Aviation
Hank Caruso. Charlottesville, VA: Howell Press, 1996. 98 pp. Illus. $17.95 ($17.05) paper.
Caruso’s unique aviation caricatures, known as Aerocatures have appeared in Naval Aviation News, Air & Space/Smithsonian, Approach, and Proceedings magazines. His images are colorful, evocative, humorous, and informative, capturing the personalities of Navy flyers, flight crews, and their aircraft. This tongue-in-cheek “encyclopedia” of naval aviation will bring humor and nostalgia to flyers and information to the uninitiated.