As the Russian Navy honors its 300-year history and looks to the future, emerging from upheaval, just as it has done several times in the past.
This year, we celebrate the 300th anniversary of the Russian Navy. Its history is bound closely with the economic, political, and cultural development of the Russian state and its struggle for integrity and independence.
The concept of creating a Russian Navy matured during wars over the Baltic and Black seas in the 16th and 17th centuries. The foundation of the Navy in the Baltic Sea and its successful engagement during the Northern War (1700-1721) changed Russia from a state striving toward the sea into a state that controlled the sea. The action of the Russian Baltic Fleet squadrons in the Mediterranean, the creation of the Black Sea Fleet, and dazzling victories during the war for superiority on the Black Sea and in the Eastern Mediterranean confirmed to the world that Russia was a great sea power.
One could see Russian battleships under the St. Andrew flag in all latitudes of the oceans and seas, sailing not only for military purposes, but also exploring unknown lands and penetrating polar ice for scientific research.
Thanks generally to correct state policy relating to the Navy, the understanding of a necessity for sea power in the Russian state took deep root in the minds of the country’s leadership and people. Even after heavy blows—the Crimean War of 1853-1856, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, and the Civil War of 1918-1920—the Russian Navy recovered and took its respectful position in the world fleet hierarchy, though it required time and effort by state and public forces and their resources.
The accumulation of positive experiences with the Russian school of shipbuilding became an important precondition for successful development of Soviet military shipbuilding. Through its efforts, Russia captured a leading position in a number of branches of the shipbuilding industry, weapons, and technology.
World War II left a mark upon the engagement of naval forces and upon improving the art of war at sea. From the first days of the war, the Russian Navy concentrated its efforts on assisting ground forces, which bore the main burden of protecting the country against enemy attacks and which eventually determined the outcome of the war. Meanwhile, the Navy proved itself to be a perfect striking force, capable of changing situations in coastal zones by destroying combat and supply ships in the coastal areas and those lying at anchor. This activity disrupted supply transportation and protected friendly coastal lines of communication.
After the war, the Navy embarked on a new stage in its development. It started large-scale operations to create a nuclear missile fleet. Operations included:
- Transfer of submarine and surface shipbuilding to nuclear power
- Introduction of nuclear weapons
- Creation of sea strategic nuclear missile systems
- Development of long-range aviation
- Introduction of ship aircraft
- Qualitative changes in antisubmarine warfare
- Introduction of diverse radio electronics
- Automation of forces, weapons, and fighting equipment
- Introduction of mathematical methods of research with computers
The main achievement of that time was the creation of sea strategic nuclear forces—the major deterrent against possible aggression and the main factor in strategic stability support around the world. To fight against big surface combat ships and also against supply and escort ships on the sea and across ocean lines of communication, Russia began building nuclear-powered submarine cruisers armed with cruise missiles. To fight against enemy missile submarines, to counteract surface and underwater forces, and to protect shipping and convoy traffic from submarine attack, Russia created its own attack submarines. Their combat capability increased as a result of improvements in missile-torpedo weapons, progress in the development of warning, target designation, communication, navigation systems, and information-control systems, and also by means of improved performance in speed, submerged depth, maneuverability, concealability, vulnerability, and reliability. As the fighting potential of nuclear-powered submarines increased, Russia shifted diesel-electric submarine activity to the shallow areas of internal and border seas.
The distinguishing features of surface-ship development in the 1970s and the 1980s were new missile cruisers with nuclear and gas-turbine power plants, antisubmarine and attack craft based on the principles of dynamic support, big tank landing ships capable of providing disembarkation both at sea and on the coastline, minesweepers with plastic hulls, and new mine warfare facilities.
The introduction of helicopters, vertical short take-off and landing (VSTOL) aircraft, and non-catapult launching of usual aerodynamic aircraft with missiles created for our Navy a new class of surface ship: the aircraft carrier.
The first ship of this type carried 24 aircraft, including antisubmarine helicopters and VSTOL. Later, the number of aircraft increased to 36. The last ship of the series, named Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union N. G. Kuznetsov, is capable of accommodating 50 different designations of combat aircraft.
To increase the striking force of the Navy surface fleet, to maximize the capacity to destroy a nuclear missile attack from the sea, to fight against other attacking ships, and to support ground troops and Marines in offensive coastal operations, missile gunships of different designations were created and commissioned, starting with heavy nuclear- powered cruisers and destroyers and ending with missile fast-attack craft.
The creation of an ocean-going Russian Navy-—capable of executing strategic tasks around the world—influenced world policy, achieved stability in many regions of the world, and eventually led to the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive and conventional weapons in Europe. This was evidence that our country was recognized as a powerful state, capable not only of protecting its security, but of supporting international stability.
The ability of the Navy to be present in the Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific oceans and in the Mediterranean was the guarantee of the effectiveness of state foreign-policy actions. As the geopolitical situation changed at the beginning of 1990s, a reformation in the Russian Navy began.
We consider the naval policy of the Russian Federation to be an integral part of the country’s national security concept and to be a system of standpoints, officially accepted in the state. The state accepts the Navy’s role and importance in support and protection of the country’s and its allies’ interests in the world oceans. It recognized the Navy’s role in keeping peace and stability in the adjacent seas and oceans, in preventing threats to the nation from the sea, and also in determining state responsibility for keeping the Navy in condition, corresponding to its tasks and Russian Federation prestige as a member of the United Nations Security Council, guarantor for military-strategic stability in the world. Our Navy already now is taking part in peacemaking actions under the UN aegis.
The importance of developing and maintaining the Russian Navy on a rather high level depends on many factors. The main factors are: military geographic location of Russia with 32,000 kilometers of coastline; the necessity to protect in peacetime the political interests of Russia in vital areas of the world; to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity, including territorial waters, economic zones, and air space; providing economic activity and people security in the World Ocean (trade, fishing, extraction of natural resources, and other on-the-sea activity); keeping military-political stability; collective security in the close and far regions by way of participation in the UN and regional organizations’ troops on the basis of UN mandate; providing personal security for Russian citizens in foreign coastal states in case of conflict situations; and a number of others. These tasks presently can be solved and are being solved only by the Navy.
The geographic location of Russia and the historical geopolitical tendencies in its development require the Navy to have four separate fleets—Northern, Pacific, Baltic, Black Sea—and a Caspian flotilla, which first should correspond with the necessity to maintain political and military stability in the theaters and to possess self-sufficient infrastructures of shipbuilding, repair, and stationing.
In the fleets we maintain all branches of forces (submarines, surface ships, naval aviation, and coastal troops) in proportions and quantities determined by the possible threat on the sea theaters and assigned tasks. Their state and technical equipment should correspond to the modem international level of weapons and fighting equipment.
Strategic nuclear forces form the core of the Russian Navy, and their importance in the country’s nuclear triad is increasing as underwater ballistic- missile carriers and their corresponding task forces are being decreased.
Under these modern conditions, the fleets’ combat task and organizational structures have changed. They are now maintained as operative-strategic groupings, and their composition is determined by the specifics of each theater and the possible tasks each may require. Thus, nuclear-powered submarines of different designation, missile, antisubmarine, and special designation craft, naval aviation, and coastal troops form the bases of the fleets in the North and Far East. The Pacific region requires reinforced development of mobile forces, including landing ships of special design, for operations in straits and around islands. Sharp changes in the base systems in the Baltic and Black Sea regions have shifted priority to the small attack ships, diesel submarines, attack aviation, mine sweepers, and boats.
Definitively, the current direction of the Russian Navy, with limited resources, requires implementation of a coordinated military-technical policy of the state, directed to create a balanced sea weapon system, to equip ships with new kinds of weapons and military equipment, and to research and widely use advanced technologies. This will require organization and fulfillment of scientific research and experimental design work, as well as providing a productive naval industrial base, capable of mobilization.
Presently, proceeding from real capabilities and resources, our efforts in Russian Navy development cover two projects: surface combat ship (destroyer, light cruiser) and patrol ship zones. Also included are three types of submarines—two of them nuclear-powered and one diesel, for the close sea zone.
The plan for naval aviation includes increased strike and support capabilities and widening the scope of its tasks. The development of coastal troops will be realized mainly by an increase in coastal missile-artillery and large marine units with increased fire and maneuver capabilities.
The budget for weapons and military equipment and for ship maintenance constrains the necessary pace, and correspondingly, decreases the number of new ships coming into commission. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to blame the current financial situation and budget cuts as the only reasons for the present state of the Navy. There were worse times in the history of the Russian Navy. Many things depend on the people, on their attitudes toward building the Russian Navy.
We understand that great powers are keeping powerful naval forces, not for war only. Navies are first of all for the prevention of war, for protection of political interests, and for providing economic growth. For Russia, this attitude toward its Navy should be stable.
Russia has a large concentration of powerful, intellectual, military, and scientific-technical potential and the tremendous experience necessary to build and develop the Navy. This potential is properly considered to be a national treasure of Russia, and it should, as always, serve the Fatherland.
Despite complicated economic conditions, the tendency is for the stabilization of the country's industry. Decisions have been made on the government level to preserve science-oriented industry branches. All this gives hope for the realization of our plans about creating the Russian Navy to modern requirements.
Under modem difficult conditions, seamen of all ranks have managed to preserve the combat core of the Navy, its spirit, and three centuries of tradition. Keeping in mind the precepts of predecessors, Russian seamen continue to maintain the combat readiness of all ships and units of the Navy, providing the Fatherland security from the sea. The Russian Navy is ready to cooperate with the naval forces of other countries in the name of peace and stability and in the strengthening of mutual understanding among our countries.
Fleet Admiral Gromov has been Commander-in-Chief, Russian Federation Navy, since August 1992. Among his many command positions, he has served as Chief of Staff of the Training Ship Division, Leningrad Naval Base, Chief of Staff and Commander of the Soviet Navy’s Indian Ocean Squadron, First Deputy Commander and Commander of the Northern Fleet, and First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy.