If torpedoes had performed properly in the submarine San Luis—here, with other ships of the Argentine Navy in 1982—the Falklands Conflict might have ended very differently.
Remember the Maine! and Remember Pearl Harbor! are familiar cries referring to naval events that accompanied this nation’s entry into war. More important, Remember the Lusitania! harks back to the ship sunk by a German submarine that propelled us to the brink of World War I. Perhaps it is fitting today, then, to “remember the San Luisl” as well. What? The San Luis was a submarine engaged in the conflict between Great Britain and Argentina in the brief war over ownership of the Falkland Islands in 1982.
Ongoing articles in Proceedings and subsequent comment and discussion regarding the pros and cons of various submarine types, including nuclear-powered versus nonnuclear-powered, have been healthy and valuable. As long as the U.S. Navy considers the submarine to be its best antisubmarine warfare (ASW) platform, we must explore every opportunity to ensure the attack submarines we build are the best we can afford. Increasingly, affordability will become a more heavily weighted factor in the procurement decision. But we cannot allow affordability to overwhelm other considerations, such as capability. It is also imperative that the naval community, our citizens, and particularly our elected and appointed Federal officials, are made aware that the submarine threat has not disappeared with the end of the Cold War, but has in fact become increasingly complex and widespread. Comments in the media regarding the purchase of a third Seawolf (SSN-21)-class submarine to preserve the industrial base, “despite the fact that we don't need it,” demonstrate the misperception prevalent today. The threat is not gone. Russia not only continues to build both nuclear-powered and nonnuclear-powered submarines, but it also strives to expand the list of countries to which it sells them. Meanwhile, a number of nonnuclear-powered, but unconventional, air-independent-propulsion submarines are under development by various European nations, including the Germans. Such submarines will further complicate the tasks of detection, localization, and classification by ASW forces.
With our nation as well as our allies engaged increasingly in world trade and dependent on imported petroleum, the opportunity for various unpredictable, antagonistic nations to disrupt the world economy and stability suddenly with a single torpedo fired into a tanker is alarming. Those with a proclivity for world terrorism, such as Iran with its Russian- built Kilo-class subs, Libya with its Fox- trot-class submarines, or even some less publicized Third World navy with, perhaps, one of the modem boats sold by the Germans to whomever has the money to spend, are in a position to wreak havoc at any time. It is therefore imperative that we not only keep abreast of these foreign submarine capabilities, but develop and build U.S. submarines (and other ASW assets) capable of coping with this expansion of submarine types and geographic operating areas.
Any references to the Falkland Islands conflict indicate that little is generally known about British ASW and Argentine submarine operations in that campaign. Fortunately, I had a unique opportunity to learn the facts and to pass them along to key U.S. Navy officials. What really took place, and what can we learn from those experiences?
A British nuclear-powered submarine, HMS Conqueror, initiated major action by sinking the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano with World War II-vintage steam torpedoes. The use of an old steam- driven weapon was a sensible decision: to conserve more capable torpedoes for more difficult situations. It also points out that a submarine need not be outfitted with the latest in technical weapons in order to accomplish a modem mission. In this case, the effective use of World War II torpedoes bottled up the Argentine surface navy in port or coastal waters for the duration of the war. In addition, the British submarine need not have been nuclear-powered to have achieved the same result, though being nuclear-powered, HMS Conqueror was able to transit at the high sustained speed appropriate for maximum strategic impact.
The British expended large quantities of munitions to protect their surface battle group from the Argentine submarine Navy, which was equipped with capable modern boats of German design among their four-boat nonnuclear-powered force. In fact, reports indicated that the U.S. Navy was called upon to provide ASW torpedoes and other weapons to the British because they were depleting their ASW weapon inventory so rapidly. The proper lesson here is probably the reaffirmation that the mere existence of a small submarine force can have a major impact on the conduct of war at sea.
Shortly after the conflict, I visited the German Navy torpedo station in Kiel on official business. While there, I took the opportunity to visit the Howaltswerke Deutsche Werft (HDW) shipyard nearby, where modern diesel boats were under construction for export. HDW was the builder of the two Type 209 submarines in the Argentine Navy during the war. Officials at HDW assigned the chief engineer of their submarine combat systems department to coordinate the visit. That individual and his counterpart from the Dutch Hollandse Signaal Apparaten (HSA) company had just returned from a visit to Argentina. HSA had provided the state-of-the-art combat system on board the HDW submarines sold to Argentina. The Argentine Navy had insisted on the visit by representatives of the two companies to explain why one of their submarines had performed unsatisfactorily during the recent sea war. The HDW Chief Combat Systems Engineer related the following:
The Argentines were perplexed that all of the torpedoes fired by their submarine, the San Luis, had failed to hit their targets, despite near-perfect attack opportunities. The visiting German and Dutch engineers first learned that, except for the first few days of the war, when the submarine Santa Fe was caught on the surface and put out of action while attempting to resupply Argentine forces on South Georgia Island, only the San Luis had seen action. It seems that the Santiago del Estero could not put to sea because she had been cannibalized to provide parts for her sister, the Santa Fe. (Both were former U.S. Navy Guppy submarines.) The Argentines said that they attempted to hide this fact by moving the Santiago del Estero about in port to make her appear seaworthy. Furthermore, when the conflict began, the other German-built boat, the Salta, had a depleted main propulsion battery. Although she was at sea when war broke out, she was sent almost immediately into a shipyard to undergo propulsion battery replacement and never saw action.
That these boats were in this condition at the outset of the conflict demonstrates how unprepared the Argentine Navy was for the rapid and decisive response by British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to their expropriation of the Falkland Islands. It also illuminates one limitation of a battery-powered submarine. One clear conclusion is that all of the intensive British ASW effort concentrated on only a single Argentine submarine at sea.
When the visiting engineers examined the San Luis, they found two principal deficiencies, of which all submariners should take note. First, because of synchro misalignment, incorrect bearing information was transmitted from the periscope to the fire-control console. In effect, when the commanding officer had the target in his cross hairs, the torpedo data computer thought it was somewhere else and (mis)directed the torpedoes accordingly. The submarines of the U.S. Navy avoid this type of common alignment problem by conducting fleet operational readiness accuracy check site (FORACS) operations, a simple evolution that reestablishes alignment of all sensors and combat system components. Lesson: do not neglect frequent FORACS checks.
The German and Dutch engineers were informed that all of the torpedoes “went haywire" after launch, running all over the place rather than settling down on any given course. Eventually, the Argentines had concluded correctly that six erratic runs by six different torpedoes was unlikely to be a torpedo problem. More probably, the problem was a submarine defect. Investigation revealed an interesting example of human error. It seems that the San Luis had a particularly conscientious fire-control leading petty officer. He performed system checks rigorously with on-board diagnostics. (This is one reason why the Argentines were so upset when their attacks failed. How could such well maintained and checked-out equipment fail? That also explains why they kept attacking repeatedly). When performing preventive maintenance, one of his practices was to ensure that the many wires and connectors made good contact. One by one, he or an assistant would remove a wire, clean its connector and the point where it was connected, then rejoin the two. One of those wires was a twin lead, which supplied warm-up power to torpedoes in the tubes.
In modem, electrically controlled systems, the torpedo is made ready to fire with DC power from the submarine, which spins up and erects the gyro, activates other components, and enables the weapon to receive such fire-control inputs as course and depth setting. When fired, the torpedo shifts to internal power, and the umbilical carrying fire-control signals and power from the submarine is cut. Someone had reconnected that twin lead DC power wire with its leads reversed. As a result, the polarity in the torpedo gyro, which had been erected on ship’s power in the tube, changed when it shifted to internal power upon launch. Of course, it reversed its rotation and tumbled, and the torpedo lost its orientation. This kind of problem, as well as many others, is detectable on a U.S. submarine. Weapon systems accuracy trials, or their equivalent, are essential in determining the true health and readiness of the entire weapon system. Diagnostic checks have their place, but only a thorough end-to-end test, including weapon firing, can prove complete system readiness. Hence, no matter how modern the submarine and its torpedoes, no matter how dedicated and conscientious its crew, and despite the incorporation of built-in diagnostic testing capabilities, all can be rendered useless by a single, small detail. There is no substitute for proper, periodic testing that includes actual weapon firing.
Another lesson to be learned here, perhaps the most important lesson of all, is that ASW is a difficult, challenging, and deadly game. Despite all the modem sensors (including, I presume, U.S. intelligence satellite information provided to the British during that conflict), detecting and locating submarines is a tough job. Acoustic conditions vary geographically, seasonally, and with the local weather. Shallow water and varying bottom conditions can complicate the task severely. Fixed surveillance systems are only of value where sited. It is evident that, for all the expertise and experience of the Royal Navy, (and I happen to consider them equal to or better than any navy in ASW), acoustic conditions simply rendered them helpless. The submarine San Luis reported making attacks upon three "capital ships,” each followed by withdrawal of the submarine to ponder the cause of its erratic weapons. Had the submarine not suffered problems and instead delivered accurately directed torpedoes, the Falklands war might have had a very different outcome.
The magnitude of the British ASW helplessness in the Falklands conflict is best illustrated by one of the final observations related to me by the HDW chief combat systems engineer. Having learned first-hand of the futile torpedo attacks, and having also been aware of the massive expenditure of ASW ordnance by the British, he asked the captain of the San Luis what it was like to have been under counterattack by the British after his abortive torpedo attacks. “Attack?” came the reply. “There was no effective counterattack. I don’t think they knew we were there until they heard our torpedoes running, and then the erratic nature of those weapons’ behavior apparently prevented them from tracing the torpedoes back to our position. We were never under direct attack.”
Apparently, the British made every ASW attack and weapon launch against a false target during that brief war. The San Luis was the only operational Argentine sub. While it may be prudent to use a “when in doubt, fire” approach to ASW in some cases, as the Allies did in launching depth charges during World War II, when your ASW weapons are expensive and therefore limited in number, as is the case today, your inventory can become depleted prematurely. What if the enemy then recognizes your predicament? Perhaps the lesson here is that a firmer target classification criterion should govern weapon launch. Certainly, the need for improved solutions to the challenging problem of target classification is evident.
We must educate our peers and our fellow citizens to the real difficulty of ASW, a challenge that will increase substantially with the introduction of unconventional, air-independent-propulsion submarines. We must also make them aware that the threat to the economy and stability of the free world posed by submarines, including those of Third World nations, is growing, not diminishing, while our mutual dependence upon shipborne commerce is intensifying. In consequence, we must develop and deploy fully capable, yet affordable ASW platforms, equipped with the best weapons and combat systems available. To do otherwise is to invite catastrophe, such as the situation England faced at the height of the German U-boat onslaught in 1942. Indeed, the threat of catastrophe remains. One need only recall the major disruption to world economies and our individual lives and fortunes when the Arab oil embargo was levied 20 years ago. Today, we are even more dependent upon imported oil, and thus more vulnerable. It would take only the sinking of a single tanker in the Strait of Hormuz to create panic in world markets.
We neglect ASW development and deployment only at our grave peril. We are an “island nation,” though few beyond the naval and merchant marine professions truly appreciate that fact. If submarines are, as many believe, our most effective ASW platforms, we must continue to encourage active debate regarding their design. Such dialogue will contribute to the most effective use of available resources by acquiring the best mix of submarines (and destroyers and patrol planes and helicopters and other ASW assets) possible. Let us hear more from the surface and aviation ASW communities regarding their needs. If a single diesel submarine could operate with impunity against the best of the Royal Navy in the South Atlantic, we cannot allow our nation to become complacent. Otherwise, “Remember the Lusitania!” may become a very real lament again, with the name of a modern supertanker (or cruiser?) in her place.
Captain Wilbur is retired and living in northern Virginia. From 1980 to 1985, he commanded the Naval Undersea Warfare Engineering Station at Keyport, Washington. He spent most of his 31-year Navy career in submarine and antisubmarine/undersea warfare. After serving at sea on board the Soley (DD-707) and the Grayback (SSG-574), and as engineer of Submarine Division 12, he attended the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and became an engineering duty officer. Captain Wilbur graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1957.