Book Reviews & Books of Interest

Sea Power & Indian Security

Rahul Roy-Chaudhury. London: Brasseys, 1995. 222 pp. Append. Ind. Notes. Maps. $58.00 ($52.20).

Reviewed Sam Bateman

At the beginning of his Introduction to Sea Power & Indian Security, Rahul Roy-Chaudhury asserts that “Sea Power is critical to the prosperity and security of India.” This claim is well justified. Of all modern nations, India is probably the one with the longest continuous history of maritime activity and of exploiting maritime power. In contemporary terms, as Roy-Chaudhury points out, maritime power encompasses the possession of a naval force, merchant marine, fishing and oceanographic fleets, port facilities, a shipbuilding industry and the systems of marine finance and insurance.

The Indian tradition of activities at sea can be traced back to the Vedic period of Indian history between 2000 and 500 B.C. Subsequently, from around the second century B.C. until the fourteenth century A.D., Indian history is full of the triumphs of Indian sea power. However, Indian sea power lost its dominance with the coming of the Europeans into the Indian Ocean at the end of the fifteenth century A.D., and the beginning of what the Indian historian and scholar, K.M. Panikkar, has termed the “Vasco Da Gama Epoch” when the rich cultures and commerce of Asia would be dominated by the Western maritime powers. Indians have a strong sense of history and the resurgence of the Indian Navy in recent decades, and the aspirations of Indian naval officers and strategic planners must be seen in the context of this long and diverse history of Indian sea power.

Sea Power is particularly useful because it succinctly covers the rise of Indian sea power over the nearly fifty years since India gained independence from Britain in August 1947. It examines the changes that have occurred in the Indian government’s perception of the utility of sea power, from a period of relative neglect in the years immediately after independence to the years of expansion in the 1980s. Roy-Chaudhury believes that current policies in India increasingly reflect the importance of the sea to Indian security.

Along with other contemporary Indian naval historians, Roy-Chaudhury expresses concern that British Royal Navy officers maintained influence over the Indian Navy as late as the 1960s. Not only did these “foreign nationals have total access to operational and planning secrets, but regularly sent reports of a sensitive nature to their superiors in London.” In April 1958, Vice Admiral R.D. Katari became the first Indian to assume the position of Chief of Naval Staff of the Indian Navy, although the British Admiralty continued its influence over force structure issues for some years after that.

Submarines were a particularly vexed issue in Indian-British naval relations in the 1960s. This began with a difference of opinion over the acquisition of target submarines for ASW training purposes but turned highly disruptive when it became apparent that Britain was reluctant to provide any support at all to Indian efforts to establish an operational submarine arm rather than a training one. India turned eventually to the Soviet Union in 1965 for the purchase of submarines. In effect, this marked the beginning of the wave of Soviet acquisitions which flooded the Indian Navy in subsequent decades and which now, with the increased costs and diminished reliability of Russian support, is a root cause of the budgetary difficulties faced by the Indian Navy in the 1990s.

The influence of Britain in Indian naval affairs was responsible for the emphasis on global war ASW in the first decades of the Indian Navy’s existence and the neglect of planning for limited conflict involving surface operations. The Navy took no part in the 1962 war with China and had little utility for the 1965 war with Pakistan. But accelerated by Indian concerns over Britain’s withdrawal from the Indian Ocean and the lack of multi-role naval capabilities for independent maritime operations, limited naval expansion commenced in the mid- to-late 1960s. As a consequence, the Indian Navy was somewhat better equipped to play a part in the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war.

The entry of a U.S. Navy task force, including the USS Enterprise (CVN-65) into the Bay of Bengal in December 1971 became a cause celebe for the Indian Navy that has had an impact on Indian perceptions of sea power and maritime security to the present day. As Roy-Chaudhury observes, this deployment sparked off much speculation as to its purpose. In Indian eyes, it was an anachronistic demonstration of gunboat diplomacy, to which the Indian Navy at the time had little ability to respond satisfactorily. The incident has been used regularly as justification for powerful Indian naval forces and as an argument in the evolution of Indian maritime strategy. Specifically it provided the justification for the acquisition of a nuclear attack submarine capability by India “to influence superpower perceptions regarding the political and military costs of potential intervention against India.”

Roy-Chaudhury describes how India’s naval construction and acquisition programs have not always proceeded smoothly. The building of German HDW submarines in India in the late 1980s and 1990s has been marked by deficient technical procedures and shocking delays. The three-year loan of a Russian Charlie-class submarine to India (commissioned as INS Chakra) was plagued by high maintenance costs, long unserviceable periods, and suspected radiation leaks. The Project-15 program for the construction of 6,500-ton destroyers is also believed to be experiencing delays and massive cost overruns because of India’s dependence on Russian design and equipment.

Indian naval strategy is now based on the defense of India’s growing maritime interests and its adoption of a strategy of regional sea control against regional naval threats—Pakistan and possibly, in the longer term, China. In peacetime or periods of tension, the Indian government has demonstrated with military operations in Sri Lanka (1987- 90) and the Maldives (1988) a preparedness and willingness to use military force, including naval forces, to attain regional political objectives.

Roy-Chaudhury supports the concept of close cooperation between the navies of India and the United States on the grounds, first, of the advantages of “a balanced mix of American and Indian warships ... for any joint operation in the Indian Ocean,” and second, for “the ability to acquire sophisticated weapon technology from the United States.” Nevertheless, like most Indians, he remains somewhat circumspect about the longer-term role of the U.S. Navy in the Indian Ocean, and its motives for cooperation with the Indian Navy. He comments that:

The United States is particularly eager to cooperate with the Indian Navy, for military and political reasons. While Indian naval capabilities do not present a potent threat to American warships, they could complicate American naval operations in the Indian Ocean (for example, in ensuring the security of maritime trade). The nuisance value of the Indian fleet, therefore needed to be neutralized.

Sea Power & Indian Security is very timely. After the recent progress towards cooperation and dialogue in the Pacific in both the security and economic arenas, 1995 has witnessed considerable activity directed towards translating Pacific experiences to cooperation in the Indian Ocean, including use of the tactical ploys of building blocks and second-track activities that have worked well in the Pacific. Building blocks involve starting the habit of cooperation and security dialogue on issues where common ground is more apparent and then moving on to the more difficult and contentious issues. Second track activities entail officials (acting in their private capacity), academics and others meeting to discuss economic, foreign policy or security issues with feedback provided to the respective governments.

In finding possible building blocks for the Indian Ocean, maritime interests offer a particularly fertile and rewarding ground for multilateral cooperation and dialogue. Maritime affairs were much discussed at the International Forum on the Indian Ocean Region (IFIOR), a second track meeting hosted by the Australian government in Perth, Western Australia, in June 1995. The Indian Ocean itself is the major common interest of all littoral and island countries of the Indian Ocean region. A large proportion of the world’s seaborne trade transits some part of the Indian Ocean and, despite its resource potential and environmental significance, the ocean remains relatively under-researched in oceanographic and meteorological terms.

The hope is that IFIOR will follow the success in the Pacific of the Pacific Economic Cooperation Committee (PECC), a second track forum that which laid the foundations for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Group (APEC). Also, there are the security models from the Pacific. Despite the initial setbacks with the establishment of multilateral security dialogue in the Asia Pacific region, this is now institutionalized with the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the associated second track meetings.

Renewed cooperation among Indian Ocean navies could become part of the process of maritime cooperation. Roy-Chaudhury describes some of the initiatives taken in recent years by the Indian Navy in arranging bilateral naval exercises with foreign navies and in advocating maritime cooperation among countries of the region.

Roy-Chaudhury concludes on an optimistic note, as far as the future of the Indian navy is concerned. He believes that the importance of sea power to Indian security is now well recognized by the Indian Government and this is reflected in the “healthy trend” in the naval budget since the 1980s with an increased emphasis on fleet expansion. In view of the enhanced role of the Navy in Indian security policy, expenditure on the service is expected to rise in the 1990s. The ability of the Navy to support foreign policy objectives is an important part of the rationale for this increase.

Sea Power & Indian Security is highly recommended reading for anyone interested in the defense policies of India and broader issues of maritime affairs in the Indian Ocean region. Because of the insight it provides into the origins of contemporary and prospective Indian naval policies, it is a particularly important text for the American naval community at a time when the U.S. Navy is seeking a closer relationship with the Indian Navy.

Commodore Bateman retired from the Royal Australian Navy in 1993 and currently is Executive Director of the new Centre for Maritime Policy at the University of Wollongong.

The Persian Excursion: The Canadian Navy In The Gulf War

Duncan E. Miller and Sharon Hobson. Clementsport, NS. The Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1995. 239 pp. Ind. Maps. Photos. Tables. $35.00 ($31.50).

Reviewed by Alexander Wooley

Well chronicled in Proceedings and elsewhere is the sense that navies lost the media—or public-relations—war to the other services in the Persian Gulf War. So perhaps the most superficial value of The Persian Excursion is that it gets the message out in clear, informative language what one small but highly professional navy did during hostilities with Iraq. In fact there is a chapter entitled “The Second Front—The Media”, with lines that will ring true to many readers; “During the first few months, print, television and radio reporters all took their turns sailing with the Task Group . . . . But there was a problem with extended coverage. Once a member of the media got aboard a ship and determined that you were going out, drilling holes in the ocean, and no one was shooting at you, and they’d seen a couple of replenishments at sea, nobody wanted to go back again....After the fighting started in January, coverage of the Canadian Task Group’s activities in the [Persian] Arabian Gulf dropped off substantially.” The Persian Excursion has many nice touches, not the least of which is an emphasis on the concerns and decision-making processes of leaders of one small force among many other forces. The Canadian naval force was comprised of the destroyer Athabaskan, the frigate Terra Nova, and the tanker Protecteur. Co-authors are Dusty Miller—in 1990- 91 a commodore, the commander of the U.N. Combat Logistics Force and on-scene commander of the Canadian ships in the Gulf—and Sharon Hobson, a fine correspondent for Jane's Defence Weekly. They capture superbly the Canadian national penchant for fairness—sometimes to a fault—along with the subconscious awarenes that they are cast in the role of a little brother to the United States.

The book is a comprehensive narrative of Canadian naval involvement in Desert Shield and Desert Storm. It assumes that the reader knows little about naval operations in the region. What should be borne in mind is that prior to the war, Canada had had no naval presence in Southwest Asia. The last time Canadian warships had transited the Suez Canal was during the Suez Crisis of 1956, a fact picked up on by the media. The campaign against Iraq also marked the first time since World War II that a joint force headquarters commanded Canadian elements in a joint and combined operation, and with a joint staff in Ottawa. This had the desirable effect of dragging the military out of a post-Cold War primordial broth and moving it toward development of joint operations. The book also recalls the sometimes confusing nature of take- all-comers U.N. naval operations; e.g., different threads on fuel-hose fittings, and national restrictions on each navy about where they could go in the Gulf.

Miller and Hobson trace the progress of what began as a political move to join Coalition operations by sending three ships to the Gulf. The trio were kept together for the most part, a deliberate move so they could be seen making a significant national contribution to the war effort. Increasingly, the tiny task group’s responsibilities and role grew until it was eventually running the multinational combat logistic force formed in January 1991. Stationed in the Central Gulf, the force was responsible for keeping a 500-mile supply route open. It was a task which the Canadian crews were well-suited to perform.

The Canadian group also conducted interdiction operations throughout the “Canada sector.” By the end of hostilities on 28 February 1991, the Canadians had completed 1,877 interceptions and 22 boardings. It was an impressive record. That this all came off so successfully should be attributed to the benefits of NATO-sponsored and other multilateral exercises. Canadian warships have been an integral part of the standing naval force Atlantic (StaNavForLant) and have participated in dozens of NATO exercises over the years, while Canada’s Pacific- based warships have worked just as closely with U.S. assets in the Pacific. The result—and a constant sub-theme of this book—is the close working relationship of the navies in the Gulf, based on professional history and prior personal contact, shown best by the unique secure- communications compatibility Canada enjoyed with both the Americans and British.

The book has a concluding chapter of “Lessons.” The first is: “When you’re needed, you go with what you have.” This comments on the material state of the Navy at the point when Iraq invaded Kuwait, and the lesson drawn here concerns the typically “can-do” attitude and spirit of improvisation that form the central tenets of naval leadership. The Gulf War found the Canadian Navy to be a patchwork quilt. In 1990 there were only 12 operational warships not in long-term maintenance or training. Of these, only two were less than 20 years old (delivery had been delayed of the new Canadian patrol frigates, and also not ready were the four Tribal DDGs with their new Standard SM-2MR air-defense systems). In the space of just two weeks, the three ships appointed were fitted out for war. They received Phalanx, new chaff systems, and army air defense battery Blowpipe, and Javelin short-range missile batteries with army personnel, and the Terra Nova received Block 1C Harpoon. The five CH-124A Sea King helicopters going had to be modernized as well. At least $100 million were spent making the ships and aircraft more combat ready.

A media flap erupted early when all three warships were fitted with 40mm Bofors guns, drawn from storage. The press reported that one mount had come from the Maritime Command museum in Halifax. The authors discount this story. On the other hand, the actual weapons fitted did date from 1943. So when these ships were ready for war, the question was—which war?

Even with these modifications, it was not contemplated that the Canadian warships would operate in the Northern Gulf because of the fear that heavy air battles would take place for which the Canadians—with only limited self-defense systems—were ill-equipped. It is a sad state of affairs when a modem nation’s frontline warships cannot join multilateral operations against a regional power with only a second-class air force in its possession. That the Canadian Navy had been let run to seed materially in preceding years should be laid plainly at the feet of a series of neglectful governments. It also reflects the heavy political nature of coalition operations: if Canadian lives and ships had been lost because they were old and poorly armed, the fallout at home would have been disastrous. So instead, the mission changed and Canada stayed just behind the front lines, while Saddam Hussein cooperated by not firing Silkworms at Canadian warships. From the strictly material point of view, it reinforces the need for all navies to have continuity and overlap in hull and equipment procurement so as not to be caught unaware by events.

There are one or two minor niggling points in an otherwise very good read. The style sometimes mixes on a single page a sharp technical description with a Capra-esque personal anecdote that comes across as overly sweet. Also, perhaps because this is the first book published by the new Canadian Peacekeeping Press, there are oversights like incomplete maps and appendices, a lack of "USN" at the end of a name when referring to American officers, and the use of "kilometers" in a nautical text. Finally, it is slightly disappointing that this book focuses almost exclusively on Canadian operations, when it is freely admitted that they were but a limited part of the overall picture. But, The Persian Excursion is proudly a national history and as such, fulfills entirely what it sets out to do.

Alexander Wooley is a freelance writer living in Canada. He served in the Royal Navy after graduating from the Britannia Royal Naval College, at Dartmouth.

Books of Interest

By Lieutenant Commander Thomas J. Cutler, U.S. Navy (Retired)