Sell It Like It Is

The Coast Guard Reserve doesn’t just supply emergency “surge” manpower. More often a group of constables—those charged with keeping the peace within their districts, though often assigned additional duties—reservists provide local knowledge and cost-effective routine augmentation.

The Coast Guard Reserve and the Department of Defense reserves all provide “surge” manpower for their parent services, but DoD surge needs are quite different from Coast Guard needs, most of which are highly localized and routine. If the Coast Guard does not highlight those differences, it runs the risk that Congress, accustomed to defining reserve manpower requirements based on DoD models, might base future Coast Guard Reserve numbers and funding on the most common DoD surge-requirement model, the involuntary recall.

The present Coast Guard Reserve mission statement focuses exclusively on manpower for surge requirements: “The mission of the Coast Guard Reserve is to provide an organized, quick response, military force in ratings and skills required to supplement the active Coast Guard during surges in operations.” Except for port security units, this statement is inadequate and ignores some of the most important benefits the Reserve offers the Coast Guard and the nation.

About a year ago, the Reserve unit to which I had been attached for 20 years was disbanded, and all reserve personnel were integrated into the active-duty commands we formerly augmented. Since then, we have taken our monthly orders directly from the active-duty commands, which also have direct responsibility for our training, pay, and promotion. We are factored into the duty roster and mission planning of our new commands as a part-time resource at the disposal of the commanding officer, subject only to the restraints imposed by the laws governing allowable pay and scheduling of reserve personnel.

We are not in training awaiting a surge requirement. Whatever training occurs is for a personal qualification code for a specific regular command duty for which reserve augmentation is desired or personal training for advancement in rate. Under this arrangement, reserve personnel are a force multiplier for routine operations. When call-ups are undertaken, no “organized, quick response, military force” shows up—just the active-duty members of the command and the reservists who always are there. Total force for surge requirements essentially is the same as the total force for weekly routine operations.

This is how the overwhelming majority of Coast Guard Reserve personnel—with the exception of port security units—work. Despite what the Coast Guard Reserve mission statement says, the reality of daily operations is that the “surge force” is an integral part-time asset of the active-duty command. A surge event simply means the active-duty command is called on to use its part-time regulars on a temporary full-time basis.

The present mission statement does not address the value of these part-time regulars when there is no surge requirement. Any emphasis on surge requirements and the delivery of a quick-response military force fails to address the daily value of the Coast Guard Reserve in routine operations. For example, a fully augmented active-duty command will use reserve personnel regularly to cover a number of watches during the most coveted liberty timeframe—the weekend. The presence of these reserve watch-standers means better weekend working schedules for many Coast Guard regulars, a major contribution to retention and morale. This improvement in operational tempo comes at a most reasonable cost, as only certain watches are paid for and no additional full-time positions are created. Reserve personnel also bring with them a wide range of civilian skills that can be tapped for special projects. This pool of talent often means not only a cost and time savings over outside contracting but also the difference between getting a job done in a timely manner and waiting indefinitely for funding.

Even if there were no economic benefit there still would be one overwhelming reason for the regular and extensive use of reserve personnel at all levels within local commands: local knowledge. Coast Guard Reserve boat crew and coxswains often are drawn from the ranks of local watermen; at the very least, such crews have the benefit of serving year after year in one location, getting to know the local watermen, vessel traffic, chart errors, and hidden dangers. More senior watch-standers may be familiar with the local marine business community, as well. They often have special insight on who to call and where to find key personnel after hours when environmental emergencies arise. Many reserve personnel have connections to the local fire and police services that can prove useful. Search and rescue, maintenance of aids to navigation, and law enforcement all benefit immeasurably from local knowledge and long-term local institutional memory. If this knowledge were not already in our reserve and auxiliary components, we would have to plan for it.

If a future budget-cutting Congress were to focus on the present mission statement, the Reserve might be reduced to a size only large enough to accommodate surge requirements. Some recent involuntary recalls (see table 1) illustrate the numbers a future Congress might focus on.

A review of our most easily identifiable surge requirements—in the form of involuntary recalls—would support a force of only about 3,000 reservists. Currently, with nearly 8,000 reservists, requests for augmentation are outstripping supply. It is not dramatic national or international surge requirements that drive this; the demand for Coast Guard Reservists derives from ordinary local surge requirements, such as the opening of boating season, periodic increases in hazardous-commodity movements, or regulatory requirements that require additional educational and enforcement efforts. The need is not for an organized military force but for individual, integrated part-time efforts and local knowledge—a constabulary function.

A mission statement that does not address this reality could backfire on us in a future budget fight. A better mission statement might be:

The mission of the Coast Guard Reserve is to provide trained part-time military personnel to provide local knowledge and cost-effective routine augmentation of Coast Guard operational commands and organized quick-response military forces needed to supplement the active Coast Guard during surges in operations.

In my reserve assignment I am not part of an organized quick-response military force any more than all Coast Guard units are. My boss is a regular and my tasking continues with or without surges in operations. I provide a constabulary function to the chief federal maritime law enforcement official in the area, the Coast Guard Captain of the Port. If the thousands of reservists like me are not described in the mission statement, we risk having to explain to an uncomprehending and possibly hostile future Congress why we need 8,000 reservists. It is time to incorporate this reality into our mission statement. Failure to describe it might lead to a failure to fund it.

What Was Lost

Before the nearly complete integration of the Coast Guard Reserve into the command-and-control structure of the regular service, separate reserve units such as USCGRU 08-82551 took great pride in their augmentation activities. At the same time, the unit enjoyed a rich military community life of its own, and unit members of all ranks opposed all reorganization attempts that would have eliminated the unit. There was, however, no real resistance to integration with the regular local command; indeed, integration was seen as a validation of previous augmentation activity.

Since full integration, some recruitment and retention problems have occurred that bring back into focus what was lost by integration. The new challenge to reserve leadership is rekindling that sense of military community among a now scattered constabulary force. Two complementary approaches are suggested: A social order of "Sea Constables," with its own rites and traditions and some social services, might serve as a reserve-specific social cement. The same organization also might serve as the unifying force to bring the local reserve members to the forefront of regular unit life, as the local welcome wagon and chief source of neighborly relocation assistance to newly assigned regulars. The natural tendency of reserve members who serve in the same unit 20 years or longer to establish a strong community can be channeled into the social organization of the regular command, where it can provide a constant and continuing unifying presence.

Master Chief Bollinger is a merchant marine officer, unlimited tonnage master and first class pilot. As a reservist, he augments Marine Safety Office, New Orleans. He is author of the forthcoming primer Guide to the Enduring Principles of Maritime International Law published by Marine Education Textbooks (Houma, LA: 1996).