Comment and Discussion

“The Navy’s Pressure Cooker”

(See T. Philpott, pp. 50-55, May 1996 Proceedings)

Senior Chief Hospital Corpsman Paul H. Sayles, U.S. Naval Reserve—I reviewed Tom Philpott’s time line for career progression several times and noticed that one factor wasn’t represented. What happens if a protracted war or quasi-war breaks out? The time line doesn’t allow for such disruptions.

In his novel. Sunset, Douglas Reeman addressed the issue of career progression in the Royal Navy and Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (RNVR). An RNVR officer said “. . . Everything is mapped out, from the training college to a brass-hat if you’re lucky. I’ve known several like that, bent on personal advancement and totally unprepared for the untimely interruption of war in their ordered world.” The setting was late 1941 in the North Atlantic and in the Royal Navy, but it might also be mid-1996 in the United States Navy.

 

“The New Military Professionals”

(See J.A. Williams, pp. 42-48, May 1996 Proceedings)

Lieutenant Commander Peter J. Sciabarra, U.S. Navy—The Navy is about to make a huge mistake in its effort to save money through privatization. The target is to economize on logistics helicopter services provided mainly by the CH-46 helicopter. The Navy is about to commit to a contract for the K-Max—a single seat, day-VFR-only aircraft with no internal cargo or passenger capabilities. This is absurd. We are not only cutting our current operational capabilities by more than half, but we are also abdicating any kind of contingency capability inherent in battle groups and amphibious ready groups (ARGs). These contingencies, such as logistics, passenger, Med Evac, search-and-rescue (SAR) support in places like Mogadishu, Bangladesh, etc., seem to be the norm, not the exception.

These missions will still be accomplished, however, we will have to scrape together other assets from the battle group/ARG to do these missions.

The bottom line is flying more hours on aircraft designed to do ASW, over-the-horizon targeting, and combat search-and-rescue, and pulling them away from their primary missions while using up precious service-life hours. What do we gain for this trade-off? A replacement aircraft with one-third the operational capabilities which is severely constrained by weather and wind conditions. In short, this privatization effort creates a huge gap in logistic and contingency planning where operational commanders have come to expect substantial capabilities. Privatization makes sense in many areas, but this is clearly not one of them.

 

“Congressional Watch”

(See T. Philpott, pp. 134-136, May 1996 Proceedings)

James L. George, author, U.S. Navy in the 1990s: Alternatives for Action—Tom Philpott was way off-base on his Naval Review article on Congress. The thrust of his piece was the good news from last year’s defense budget authorization. He concluded, “another budget year like the last one would be just fine.” The Navy’s shipbuilding request was increased from the four-a-year of the past few years to five for this year. However, that is still far from being good news. Since ship-life is approximately 30 years, more good news like this will lead to a 150-ship Navy.

 

“About Fighting and Winning Wars”

(See D. Cheney, pp. 32-40, May 1996 Proceedings)

Rear Admiral Jeremy D. Taylor, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Secretary Cheney apparently can’t face up to the irreparable damage he did to Naval Aviation during his disastrous tenure. In his testimony at the U.S. Court of Federal Claims he said he terminated the A-12. . . .“It was not an easy decision to make. ... No one could tell me how much the program was going to cost. . . . After agonizing over it, I made a decision to shut down the program.” (Washington Post, A-21. 11 April 1996) In later testimony Cheney said the Navy terminated the A-12, leading the judge hearing the case to conclude that: “Cheney’s own perception of his role in the termination of the A-12 was somewhat unclear.” In any case, cancellation of the A-12, the future of Naval Aviation, was made without adequate justification.

The A-12 was an idea in 1984 with an aggressive development plan that was to meet an initial operational capability (IOC) in 1994 and deliver on a firm fixed-price development contract of $4.5 billion. When Secretary Cheney cancelled the program it was first because of the additional cost of up to $2 billion. Also, the program would have required as much as two additional years to reach IOC in 1996 instead of 1994 with each A-12 costing about $80 million. Bottom line: A 12-year development program at a cost of less than $7 billion. Compare that with the companion program—the ATF/F-22. The F-22 is already 11 years down the road with a full-rate production decision to be made in 2002, a total of more than 17 years in development. Cost: $10.5 billion and growing. Plan: 442 aircraft costing more than $150 million each in a $70- billion procurement program. Given these facts, how can Cheney and his staff dodge accusations of having one standard for the Air Force and another for the Navy?

In fact, Cheney took a slash-and-bum approach with Naval Aviation from the first day he took the job. His own slides tell the story. The fiscal year (FY) 90 amended budget submission provided Cheney the opportunity to kill both the F-14D and production of the V-22. More than $2 billion of a $10 billion DoD-wide cut was taken from the Aircraft Procurement Navy (APN) account. A reduced top line for APN was established. The V-22 was “bought back” later by Congress, but at significant cost to other Navy programs funded below the reduced top line established by Cheney and his staff.

Cheney followed up with “Major Program Terminations” in FY 92 and the five-year period FY 93-97 that concentrated more than 50% of all DoD “savings” in one small section of the total DoD budget—Naval Aviation. Cheney’s own slide from a press conference on 2 February 1991 showed Naval Aviation absorbing $4.6 billion out of $9.7 billion in proposed cuts in FY 92, and $39.9 billion out of $71.3 billion in FY 93-97. This is 47.4% and 56% of all DoD major program terminations respectively.

These cuts reduced the Navy’s APN account to less than $4 billion per year. To sustain full decks of aircraft for 12 carriers requires no less than $8 billion for APN per year. As a consequence of the deliberate actions taken by Defense Secretary Cheney and his staff in 1990-1992 a reduction in the tactical air inventory of aircraft at the rate of more than 8% per year has already begun. By 2005, the U.S. Navy will be able to outfit only a six-carrier Navy with aircraft that will lack the technology to win in every fight. Furthermore, if the current rate of procurement is sustained at 20-40 aircraft per year, our great country will only be able to fully equip three or four carriers by 2010.

When the President in 2010 faces a crisis akin to those of all of his predecessors since Franklin D. Roosevelt and asks, “Where are the carriers?”, his National Security Advisor will only be able to say: “They have been decommissioned, and we are converting some to arsenal ships, Mr. President. We ran out of carrier aircraft because that was the choice of former naval aviator George Bush and his Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney. But not to worry, Mr. President; we have four mobile offshore bases, two new arsenal ships, and 200 bomb-carrying unmanned aerial vehicles to back up our 20 B-2s.”

The visionaries better start burning the midnight oil in their pursuit of alternatives to a fully funded Aircraft Procurement Navy account. So far they have produced a lineup of duds. Even Cheney didn’t sound too impressed with the visionaries’ alternatives despite the fact that his company is involved in bringing some of the more far-fetched ideas to fruition. Meanwhile, the realists can keep hoping that somebody in Congress or the administration will wake up soon and see and understand the impact of Cheney’s handwriting—a sharply reduced role for carriers by 2005, and the end of carrier aviation in 2015.

 

“Double-Jointed”

(See F.A. Prisley, pp. 12-15, May 1996 Proceedings)

Captain W.D. Sullivan, U.S. Navy, Joint Staff—Although Commander Prisley’s commentary obviously was intended as humor, it sadly misrepresents life on the Joint Staff and may discourage Navy and Marine Corps officers from pursuing an assignment important to both their professional development and their opportunity to advance to the highest levels of leadership.

As a division chief in the Operations Directorate, I can tell you that this assignment has been one of the most educational, rewarding, and challenging of my career. It has given me the opportunity to make a difference in the formulation and execution of national military policy. It also has provided me with insight into the functioning of our government, through the interagency process, at the highest levels.

Life on the Joint Staff varies, depending upon the assignment, but mid-grade officers have the opportunity to influence national military policy decisions, execute those decisions, and then see their efforts translated into troop, ship, and aircraft deployments around the world.

One frenetic Saturday this past March began with a clean sheet of paper and a meeting in General Shalikashvili’s office with the Chairman, Vice Chairman, the Director of the Joint Staff, the J-3 (Operations) and the J-2 (Intelligence). At the end of the day, the George Washington (CVN-73) was steaming across the Mediterranean toward the Suez Canal, the Nimitz (CVN-68) and her battle group were headed through the Strait of Hormuz, and the Independence (CV-62) was moving southward to a position east of Taiwan. A few hundred words crafted at a computer, coordinated with the CinCs and services, briefed to the Chairman, and approved by the Secretary of Defense were able to change the lives of more than 30,000 people and send an important message to the People’s Republic of China—pretty heady stuff. I was the only naval officer in that meeting, and I saw Army and Air Force generals decide to send the carriers. Who says Goldwater- Nichols isn’t working?

That effort featured extraordinary teamwork by a group of Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy mid-grade officers who have never met a challenge they couldn’t handle. Joint Staff duty will expose you to some of the finest, most highly motivated and professional military officers and enlisted personnel you will ever meet. Regardless of the institutional differences among the services, these officers and enlisted from the other branches of the military are just like us. They’re good people, great Americans, and a pleasure to serve alongside.

 

“What Is Info Warfare?”

(See W.E. Rohde, pp. 34-38, February 1996; C. H. Johnson, p. 12, April 1996 Proceedings)

Lieutenant Commander Dan Shanower, U.S. Navy—Commander Rohde’s article is a fine introduction to the slippery, new topic of information warfare (IW). While the subject is usually surrounded by mystery and a barrage of silly phrases—e.g., "paradigm shift” and “revolution in military affairs”—that do little to enlighten, his overview gives the warfare-minded an insight to the limited, yet important, role IW may play. Our naval heritage may make us less prone to embrace strange, yet-to-be-defined ways of doing business, but our friends in other services eagerly create entire commands and doctrine for capabilities that still are on the Navy’s drawing boards. Is the Navy falling behind? Are these new IW technologies offering radical new shifts in the way we fight? Information warfare will certainly offer some new and exciting capabilities, but I believe the impact will be more limited than many think. The need to reorganize and meet the challenge is not as pressing as we may have been led to believe.

Any mention of IW might pull up images of “black” programs that mislead, deceive, or shut down key enemy systems. If such capabilities indeed do exist, they could be potent—but their utility will be limited. The National Command Authorities may even be hesitant to use them. Against low-tech enemies or in limited-warfare environments, they may be irrelevant. This leads to the single most important truism about IW; the United States is the most vulnerable country on earth to this warfare approach. Our military may be able to disrupt the bank accounts of an enemy, or alter his military data bases, but few enemies are as dependent on such systems as the United States. If the enemy decides to respond in kind, he can hire sympathetic “hackers” to throw portions of our financial and consumer sectors into disarray, while simultaneously disturbing the multitude of unclassified computer systems that support military personnel, logistics, weather, and some operational activities. For this reason, the U.S. military’s heaviest investment in IW should be in IW protection—we should recognize the limitations and implications of IW attack.

Some IW attack programs show great promise and may be fielded at the last minute to aid a deployed JTF commander, but it is far too early to reshuffle the U.S. warfighting structure to give IW an overarching role above the J-2 (Intelligence) and J-3 (Operations)—as suggested by senior officers of other services. Target systems analysis and other smart targeting approaches—plus greatly increased abilities to move intelligence between deployed forces and intelligence centers in the rear—have improved the quality and flexibility of intelligence support to operations dramatically. The tactics, techniques, and procedures in place—plus the skill many intelligence and cryptologic personnel show in exploiting the myriad of information sources available—should ensure that the warfighter gets the very best support from course of action formulation to execution. Stronger bonds between the joint task force J-2 and J-3 staffs with a comprehensive, focused assessment of the enemy and our capabilities to destroy him, are goals that are achievable today. While still upstaging each other with new and colorful view graphs, many converts to information warfare are overly optimistic in suggesting that IWs different way of thinking requires a reorganization of our warfighting structures. Any effort that improves the joint task force J-2’s ability to support the J-3 is welcome, but until the nature and scope of information warfare is solidified, it is premature to contemplate substantial reorganization.

 

“Say It in Pilot Talk”

(See J. Singleton, pp. 39-41, February 1996 Proceedings)

 “Hunters From the Sea”

(See M. Wyly and D. Moore, pp. 31-33 December 1995 Proceedings)

Lieutenant Commander John M. Pollin, U.S. Navy—Captain Singleton’s Jaeger aviation concepts correlate with the call by Colonel Wyly and Commander Moore for developing aviation “hunters from the sea.” Both imply a basis for the aviator’s air-to-ground tactics in three fundamental characteristics that support maneuver Warfare ashore: initiative, autonomy, and flexibility. Given maneuver warfare’s fundamental characteristics, aviators and surface warfare officers should work together to make “hunter aviation” and Jaeger aviation tactically suitable in a joint and littoral battle environment.

Naval forces can provide naval aviation the advantage of speed and tempo over enemy ground forces by:

• Exploiting joint tanking capability
• Establishing a joint data link which supports “hunter” tactics
• Training as a team to synchronize surface ship-aviation land attack potential

Joint tanking. In order to maximize airborne firepower and allow initiative and autonomy Jaeger pilots and "hunter” aviators will have to be airborne. Providing the pilot the optimum time and place for attack will require tanking. Even if carrier tanking assets are available, the time needed to tank airborne units individually would reduce our ability to exploit speed and tempo. U.S. Air Force tankers will allow naval forces the opportunity to establish marshaling areas specifically for tanking. Chosen carefully, these areas will not interfere with the defensive combat air patrol arrangement, rather, they will be positioned to effect the best air-to- ground and overwater-to-land geometry for the aviator’s follow-on attack ashore.

Joint data link operations. Although dedicated to battle group air defense today, data links of the future must portray much more for battle-group and land-component commanders. With the advent of joint surveillance/target attack radar system (JSTARS) and its interoperability with Navy/Marine Corps and Air Force surveillance units, the Navy can observe a theater-wide tactical picture, including ground targets.

Jaeger pilots must receive information from that broad, yet highly detailed link while they are airborne and marshaling. This will afford them the opportunity to attack ground targets linked to them, with minimal ship or E-2C/AWACS control and direction. Aviators will have great flexibility to select the most decisive targets. We can answer the questions posed by Captain Singleton, “Can we retrain from strike to maneuver warfare?” and “How do we take the concept of maneuver warfare MiG-sweep and apply it to a combined arms air-to-ground battle, air-to-surface battle, or both?” By creating a joint data link that displays all friendly and enemy units ashore, key terrain features, schemes of maneuver (in the form of classic Army and Marine Corps operation overlays), as well as our present-day symbology. So a reasonable Jeager/"hunter” scenario might be:

• Aircraft establish a joint data link, marshal for fuel conservation, and tank from Air Force units.
• Pilot receives discreet, updated information on enemy target via data link exchange.
• Aircraft vector toward target and handover to a ground maneuver unit for final update.
• Ground controllers conduct fratricide check—clear Jaeger pilot for target kill.
• Attack made—aircraft returns to marshal area for update and further mission tasking.

Training as a team. All three authors assert that proper tactical execution of Jaeger and "hunter” tactics demands that aviators understand the ground forces’ intentions and the anticipated scheme of maneuver on the battlefield. So should tacticians on board cruisers and destroyers which will control tactical aircraft, target enemy surface ships, conduct complex antisubmarine operations, and launch Tomahawks into enemy land masses. The Army teaches its young officers the value of shaping the battlefield. The Navy does not. In training together. Army maneuver units, naval aviators, and surface warfare officers must have a mutual understanding of what the littoral battle field will look like in three dimensions.

A joint school should be created where combat arms Army and Marine Corps officers train our aviators about maneuver warfare on land. Likewise, Air Force officers must participate so that revised tanking tactics and data link integration training can be studied. Finally, surface warfare officers must attend to bring into the discussion how they will shape the maritime battlefield and how through cruise missiles and future enhanced naval bombardment weapons they can affect the ground battle.

In 1934, the Marine Corps created the first true amphibious warfare doctrine that served as the foundation for a new form of warfare. In developing a new curriculum for Jaeger training, we must create a doctrinal foundation for this new style of combined arms air-to-ground combat that suits tomorrow’s battlefield.

 

“A New Direction for Submarines”

(See N. Polmar pp. 121-123, March 1996; W.P. Haeck, pp. 24-26 May 1996 Proceedings)

Ronald O'Rourke, Congressional Research Service—Norman Polmar in part summarized my 7 September 1995 testimony to the Procurement Subcommittee of the House National Security Committee, which was given in my capacity as a naval analyst for the Congressional Research Service. I offer some technical corrections to this part of the column:

• I was not the first witness to testify at the hearing, but rather the fifth. I followed the four non-governmental witnesses and preceded the Navy witnesses.
• My opening statement did not summarize the views of the other non-Navy witnesses. Instead, it briefly described a proposed submarine acquisition strategy developed by the subcommittee, and presented my rough estimate of the additional cost of this proposed strategy, relative to the administration’s baseline submarine acquisition strategy. The subcommittee had previously described its proposal to me and asked me to prepare such a cost estimate. The subcommittee’s proposed strategy differed in some respects from potential strategies presented at the hearing by the non-governmental witnesses.
• I did not testify that the Navy’s current approach to the New Attack Submarine “may not be sufficient to counter Russian fifth—or even fourth-generation—[submarines], especially if [the] Russians improve these designs. . . . ” Another witness may have so testified, but in my opening statement, I stated that “the primary aim of the [subcommittee’s] proposal is to achieve in a relatively short period of time a design for a next-generation submarine that will be more capable than the New Attack Submarine design and thus better able to counter future Russian fourth- and fifth-generation submarines expected to enter service around the same times.”
• Similarly, my testimony did not include a passage stating: “Start a national- priority program to develop a sub design for series production that is more affordable and more capable than the [NSSN],” which would result in a submarine that “will regain U.S. undersea superiority.” Perhaps another witness made that statement, however it was not part of my testimony.
• In reference to the question-and-answer portion of the hearing, which followed the witnesses’ opening presentations, Mr. Polmar states: “The civilian witnesses strongly opposed those and other [submarine related] statements by the two flag officers, demonstrating the wide gulf between opinions in this area.' Some of the non-governmental witnesses did strongly differ with statements made by Navy witnesses. My own remarks, however, were limited to further describing the subcommittee’s proposed strategy and defending my estimate of the additional costs of this strategy.
• Mr. Polmar lists some of the "proposals [that were] put forth by the civilian witnesses” at the hearing. The non-governmental witnesses did make various proposals and suggestions in their testimony. My own testimony, however, did not include any proposals of its own; it only described the subcommittee’s proposed acquisition strategy.

 

“The Topgun Mentality”

(See D. Bringle, pp. 8-10, April 1996; R.G. Pillittere, p. 16, June 1996 Proceedings)

Commander John Noell, US. Navy—I do not believe that Proceedings is the appropriate vehicle for eulogizing or defending the actions of an aviator involved in a mishap, especially since the mishap investigation board had not released its findings at press time. While Commander Bringle’s defense of one of his former junior officers is admirable, it is also immaterial. Most unfortunately, whether Lieutenant Commander Bates was a good or even great officer doesn’t matter anymore. Flathatting continues to cost aviators either their lives or their wings. Perhaps more of us need to remember Grandpaw Pettibone’s sage admission “Jumpin’ Jehoshaphat, what was that young lad thinking?” before we climb into the cockpit.

As for the “Topgun mentality” allegations during a press conference. Commander Bringle missed the point. There is TOPGUN the movie; then there is the Navy Fighter Weapons School. Although I don’t personally pray at the altar of Topgun—I believe they missed ship’s movement on several important issues—I agree that they do turn out professional instructors. But let’s remember that for much of the media, their only knowledge of naval aviation comes from seeing the movie TOPGUN—a movie made with enthusiastic Navy support that prominently featured a fictitious F-14 Tomcat pilot who routinely disregarded safety-of- flight rules for personal gratification. Until we get reporters who are knowledgeable and conversant in military affairs, we shouldn’t act surprised when they assume that Hollywood’s offerings are reality. We in naval aviation need to assume some responsibility for training responsible reporters, capable of asking intelligent questions regarding our profession. Planting airplanes in neighborhoods then acting surprised with the slant of reporting is not the best way of accomplishing that requirement.

 

“The Day It Became the Longest War”

(See C.G. Cooper, pp. 77-80, May 1996 Proceedings)

Charles L Beaman—The conflict in Vietnam became our longest war on 28 July 1965. On that date. President Lyndon Johnson announced that several thousand more American troops would be sent to Vietnam. This was the culmination of a major policy reassessment within the Johnson administration. There were two factions in the debate: The hawks (including the Joint Chiefs of Staff) urged the President to make a major commitment to Vietnam. They also recommended that reserves be called up and wage and price controls be implemented. The doves (including George Ball and Bill Moyers) suggested that the war was unwinnable and that the United States should find some face-saving way out while its commitment was still limited. President Johnson ignored both recommendations. Instead of choosing one of the two clear alternatives, the President decided to follow the advice of McGeorge Bundy and Robert McNamara who suggested that he should take care of immediate troop requests and keep future commitments limited.

Lyndon Johnson made the limited, half-hearted commitment to Vietnam to keep the war from interfering with his domestic agenda. He was afraid that it might detract from his Great Society social programs. Johnson’s mentor had been Franklin D. Roosevelt, who had brought the nation through the Great Depression. Johnson felt that the Great Society programs would eradicate poverty, and that he would be revered just as President Roosevelt had been. The United States would do only what was absolutely necessary to convince the North Vietnamese to halt their aggression. Johnson maintained this policy until he announced his decision not to run for reelection, in March 1968.

As General Cooper pointed out, the President’s policy cost thousands of American lives and made the Vietnam War unwinnable. It is unclear, on the other hand, whether the Joint Chiefs’ recommendations would have won the war. President Richard Nixon responded to the 1972 Easter Offensive by bombing North Vietnam and mining Haiphong Harbor. As a result, the Paris Peace Accords were signed in January 1973. The agreement kept the Thieu government in power in Saigon and allowed us by bring home our prisoners of war. But this was not a victory. The North Vietnamese were allowed to occupy territory they had captured and were permitted to keep their forces in South Vietnam, preparing for a final offensive in April 1975.

On balance, the meeting between President Johnson and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in November 1965 was a waste of time. The President had made up his mind the previous July and had never taken military advice seriously. The Joint Chiefs should have known that Johnson would use the meeting to beat them into submission. While the President failed the nation by pursuing a poorly thought-out policy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff failed the nation by not exercising more courage. Instead of quietly falling into line after their rebuff, the Joint Chiefs should have criticized—publicly—the President’s Vietnam policy. They probably would have been retired forcibly, but such a protest might have triggered a much-needed debate in Congress.

 

“Blue and Gold Can Play for the Surface Force”

(See N. Olmsted, p. 91, April 1996 Proceedings)

Lieutenant Commander Paul C. Grgas, U.S. Navy—Lieutenant Commander Olmsted’s thought provoking article should not be discarded, but I would like to point out other areas that would need to be addressed if this concept is to be pursued further. Blue and Gold crews are already in effect in the mine countermeasures force. Four crew turnovers occurred on USS Patriot (MCM-7) and USS Guardian (MCM-5) between September 1994 and January 1996 while these ship’s were forward deployed to Sasebo, Japan.

A critical area Lieutenant Commander Olmsted did not discuss was the transportation of crews between homeport and the deployed ship. It was hard enough to transport a crew of 83, from Ingleside, Texas to Sasebo, Japan, but one of 300? Deployed ships would have to be at a Navy controlled port, like Sasebo, Yokosuka, Guam or Bahrain in order to effect the swap-out of crews expeditiously. Without the assistance of a local personnel support detachment and other fleet support services, crew turnover would become extremely difficult.

Although the relieving process becomes easier and easier, some bitterness may linger between crews, human nature being what it is. In addition, organizing ship operations and procedures to please each particular crew will take time. Face it—we all operate within the same parameters, but we use different methods to attain our goals.

 

“Russian Naval Aviation Joins the Big Leagues”

(See R.F. Dunn, p. 40, April 1996 Proceedings)

Commander Bob Wilde, U.S. Navy—I don’t wish to contradict Admiral Dunn’s views, but rather, would like to share my first-hand observations of the Kuznetsov. What the Russians have done is significant indeed, but it will be a long time— if at all—that their aircraft carrier can present any type of threat to us.

Several crewmembers and aviators asked us extremely basic questions:

• How do we know where divert fields are?
• Who approves the decision for an aircraft to divert?
• How do we operate at night?
• How can our country afford to pay us so much?
• How do we know what radio frequencies to use?

In addition to those rudimentary questions, I was disturbed by the following:

• Aircraft with bald tires.
• Running rust on the sides of aircraft (If corrosion is visible in prominent areas, what do intricate parts of the aircraft look like?)
• They had only six qualified Su-27 pilots on board. The pilots were shuttled by helo in order to get all the fixed-wing aircraft on board. With that limited number of pilots, any sortie rate would be single cycle only.
• Several pilots stated that they do not fly at night.
• Flight deck safety seemed to be a low priority.
• The ship did not have the capability to make her own water. They replenish fresh water at anchor from supply ships.
• They have not mastered under way replenishment, therefore they would be very vulnerable while replenishing at anchor.

Overall, the Russians were very proud of their accomplishments in deploying an aircraft carrier, but also very humble about their proficiency. During our discussions, it was quite clear that the Russians were like sponges, soaking up everything they could.

In the foreseeable future, the Russians could present a formidable threat for a limited, one-time projection of power but could not sustain any type of campaign. The most significant constraints will be pilot proficiency, logistics, and material condition resulting from insufficient resources.

 

“Who’s Left to Paint?”

(See C. Good, p.48, April 1996 Proceedings)

Commander V.R. Gubbins, Royal Navy— I enjoyed Lieutenant Good’s article, but I must take issue with his statements concerning British frigates. One of the core capabilities of Royal Navy ships is their ability to operate far from their support bases; this capability served us well in the Falklands Conflict, the Gulf War and, more recently, during operations in the Adriatic. It is not something we would give up easily. The Royal Navy’s most machinery surveillance systems—during normal watchkeeping there are only 3 engineering watchkeepers in a l-in-4 routine—there is no evidence that constant watches wear out the crews. Furthermore, the assertion that they need civilian technical representatives to make repairs that “most U.S. small boys can make themselves” is way off the mark. Every Royal Navy ship of frigate size and above carries professional weapons engineer and marine engineer officers, backed up by skilled and semi-skilled technical ratings, who will call for support only in the case of real need. In fact, many of these engineers would say that it is when deployed far from home and left to get on with it that they get the most job satisfaction.

It is true, however, that contractors are used for cleaning on board, both at home and abroad. This allows the sailors to do what they joined the Navy to do—i.e., maintain their equipment, continue their training, and even go ashore and relax. This also makes sound business sense. Sailors resent the constant round of cleaning that is frequently their lot, and we have lost far too many expensively trained sailors because of this aspect of naval life. Deep cleaning is carried out by contractors, leaving the sailors to do maintenance cleaning at sea. As far as painting is concerned. Royal Navy ships are no longer authorized to carry bulk stocks of paint. With the high-quality paint coatings available today, ships should be painted under controlled conditions, and such paint work should last until the next period of controlled painting—with only minor touching up required in the interim.

“Helicopter Rambos—A Fatal Combination”

(See B.V Buzzell, pp. 89-91, April 1996; S. P. Laughlin, pp. 23-24, June 1996 Proceedings)

Lieutenant Commander Murpli Borno, U.S. Navy, H-60 Armed Helo/FLIR Program Manager (PMA-299)—Several points in Captain Buzzell’s article are technically and programmatically inaccurate—the most important of which is the premise that LAMPS aircraft are not suited to perform the mission of short range tactical support. Having made two cruises to the Arabian Gulf during both Desert Storm (Southern Watch, Vigilant Warrior) and the Iran-Iraq War, I would disagree. That was the mission of choice dictated by area commanders even though the aircraft lacked a forward-firing, air- to-surface missile capability. Our aircrews have been required to perform this function without the proper equipment for nearly ten years. With the initial operational capabilities (IOC) of the AGM- 119B Mk2 Mod7 Penguin antiship missile in June 1994, the naval armed helicopter was once again a reality. As a point of note, the current flyaway costs for the SH-60B and Penguin missile are $24 million and $.75 million, respectively.

The AGM-114B/K Hellfire missile is a technically proven, precision-guided weapon with more than 4,000 launches, and a 95% success rate against a variety of targets. The missile has been integrated on AH-1, AH-64, OH-58, and UH-60 aircraft. An Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) study identified the missile as the most cost-effective and operationally suitable missile to counter the projected targets in littoral environments. This does not preclude the need for the Penguin against minelayer and larger targets. The Penguin is not optimally suited for use against littoral targets, and is indiscriminate after seeker activation. Use in high- density shipping environments could be disastrous.

Hellfire provides multi-shot (four) capability, while only a single Penguin can be carried. The environmental factors (temperature, humidity, suspended particulates) that affect forward-looking infrared radar (FLIR)/laser performance (Hellfire sensor system is the AN/AAS-44 FLIR) will also impact Penguin IR seeker performance. While the Penguin does provide increased stand-off capability, Hellfire allows sufficient stand-off to avoid small-arms and shoulder-launched weapon envelopes. Why is it feasible for AH-1/OH-58 aircraft to use Hellfire against such targets, but not H- 60 aircraft? It is interesting to note that the Norwegian government has selected Hellfire as its coastal-defense system, to be operated from a portable tripod mount.

The weaponization of Navy H-60 aircraft incorporates the FLIR, M-299 missile launcher, and the M-240 and GAU- 16 machine guns, all of which are non- developmental items. Current naval helicopter concepts of operation rely heavily on increased tactical applications. Arming them will only enhance survivability.

At present, the Navy has a limited amount of Penguins, which should not be expended against small, inexpensive targets. The current Navy-Marine Corps Hellfire inventory can support projected H-60 requirements, but must be increased in the out years to offset the increase in armed helicopters and to account for missile shelf-life.

The Navy Armed Helicopter Program is a CNO priority-one program, and will significantly enhance future war-fighting capability in the littoral environment. The CinCs have endorsed the imminent need for this requirement, and are enthusiastically awaiting initial deployment of the system in the second quarter of fiscal year 97. It is long overdue, and will complement existing Penguin missile assets greatly.

 

“The U.S. Coast Guard In Review”

(See H.B. Thorsen, pp. 105-109, May 1996 Proceedings)

William V. Gallo, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Southern District of California—Vice Admiral Thorsen’s article reviewed the Coast Guard’s many accomplishments in 1995. However, Admiral Thorsen failed to mention one major success that should not go unnoticed.

In 1995, I had the distinct pleasure and honor to work with the most dedicated and talented group of individuals I have ever known. They were Coast Guardsmen assigned to Law Enforcement Detachment (LEDet) 8-B in Mobile, Alabama. Seven members of this LEDet risked their lives to prevent the smuggling of more than 12 tons of cocaine into the United States. Admiral Thorsen, while devoting only one small paragraph to maritime drug interdiction, did not mention to these brave men or their unit.

On 25 July 1995, seven members of LEDet 8-B embarked on the USS Cape St. George (CG-71) intercepted the Papamanian fishing vessel Nataly 1780 miles west of Peru near the Galapagos Islands. The master consented to the initial boarding and search, and the following day the Panamanian government also gave its consent.

BM2 Jose H. Vizcaino, the boarding officer in charge of the search, along with LT(j.g.) Robert J. Landolfi, BM1 David Schoenfeld, BM2 Ron L. Reeves, BM2 David S. Adcock, BM2 John K. Authement, and MK3 David A. Kinzer, Jr., made several observations that made them suspect that the Nataly /’s crew members really were not engaged in fishing, as the master had stated. After searching the vessel for three full days, BM2 Vizcaino and his team finally hit pay dirt—12 tons of cocaine—the largest maritime seizure of cocaine in our nation’s history.

The Nataly T s crew of ten Colombian nationals erected many obstacles to frustrate the efforts of the Coast Guard, attempting to prevent the detection of its valuable (approximately $144 million wholesale and several times that on the street) cargo. The LEDet’s mission, which was extremely difficult and dangerous even under the best of conditions, was made worse by rough seas.

After the discovery, the Colombians were arrested and removed to the Cape St. George, which took the Nataly I under tow for the initial leg of a 2,400-mile journey to the United States for prosecution. While in transit to the United States, the men of LEDet 8-B stayed on board the Nataly I—risking their lives once again as they passed through Hurricane Flossie.

On 30 April 1996, after three weeks of hearings and trial, a jury found the master and chief engineer guilty of conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute on board a vessel, and possession of cocaine on board a vessel. The rest of the crew was convicted of possession of cocaine on board a vessel.

The men of LEDet 8-B showed their hue grit again while preparing for the hearings and trial. They painstakingly worked for weeks to educate my trial Partner, Assistant U.S. Attorney Gonzalo P. Curiel and me. In fact, it was the men of LEDet 8-B, particularly BM1 Schoenfeld and BM2 Vizcaino, who were constantly pushing Mr. Curiel and me to learn more about what it is that they do. Five of the seven LEDet members were called as witnesses during the trial. Their ability to recall events in great detail, and then articulate their observations in a clear and concise manner was amazing, and had a positive impact on the jury.

As a lieutenant colonel in the Marine Corps Reserve. I never had thought that I would find anyone more disciplined and committed than Marines, but I was proved wrong. It was a genuine pleasure to work with these dedicated men of the U.S. Coast Guard. They have a dangerous and thankless job, but because of their heroic efforts, we are somewhat safer here in the United States.

 

“SSNs Aren’t Enough”

(See P. Murdock, pp. 48-51, February 1996, K. Peppe, p. 32, April 1996 Proceeding)

Vice Admiral John T. Hayward, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Since 1944—when I first heard the late-Rear Admiral William S. “Deak" Parsons in a coffee klatch we had at the Los Alamos Naval Laboratory about the use of a nuclear power plant for a submarine—there have been arguments over the conventional power plant versus the nuclear. I knew the late-Admiral Hyman Rickover quite well and worked with him on the development of the various submarine types—including the Tullibee (SSN-597) and the Thresher (SSN-593)—and all the other ideas about power plants at the time. We went through the liquid metal phase and found out that it was not the answer.

My biggest argument with Admiral Rickover, however, was that I wanted to make warships out of our nuclear submarines. We were still carrying roughly the same weapons load as the World War II submarines. I was never a proponent of substituting conventional-powered submarines for our nuclear ones. As long as the United States remains an “island” nation, we will need long-range high-performance submarines, and that means nuclear power. Today, moreover, we can make real warships out of our submarines, using the advances in technology and weapons range and lethality. No longer are we tied solely to the underwater torpedo and the sinking of ships; we now have precision weapons. The revolution in naval warfare certainly will bring the well-armed nuclear submarine to the forefront. Conventionally, the submarine could play a big role in the projection of power, beyond the realm of Trident nuclear weapons.

Having been very much involved in the antisubmarine warfare (ASW) business, I know that the conventionally powered submarine on battery lying doggo is one of the toughest ASW detections. The subject of littoral warfare that seems so popular these days poses no threat to the future of the nuclear-powered submarine. The basic U.S. requirement for range and performance will not go away. In the early 1950s, we justified our program for nuclear submarines by citing their excellence in ASW. They still have that capability.

In his letter on the subject, the commanding officer of the Atlanta (SSN-712) is correct: The real menace to our nuclear submarine fleet comes from the recent authorization bill passed by Congress, as it reflects politicians ideas about submarines and their design. The bill keeps repeating an oxymoron: Make the new attack submarine both more capable and more affordable than its predecessor! If they can do this, many facts of life have changed.

I qualified as a carrier pilot on the original Langley (CV-1). I saw piston-powered aircraft give way to the jets. My flagship was the nuclear-powered Enterprise (CVAN-65). Then the space age came along, with the ballistic missile and the nuclear submarine. Having been associated with a great many of these programs, plus the nuclear weapons business, all I can say is they were all more capable and less affordable than what they replaced. I am afraid that with Congress doing the designing, the future fleet of nuclear submarines will be neither more capable nor more affordable; we will be lucky to hang onto the capability we have today.

 

“Flag and General Officers”

(See pp. 145-161, May 1996 Proceedings)

Lieutenant Commander Anthony T. Dunn, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Give this old sailor a break. According to the Naval Review issue there are 180 line Admirals, 20 selectees, and 100 Staff Corps Admirals. The Canoe Club has become top heavy. Real sailors know that top-heavy ships turn turtle and sink in rough seas, and today the Navy finds itself in stormy political waters.

The argument that we should have all these high-ranking flag officers because our sister services do, fails to hold water. We are the Navy; we lead. The Navy should lead the way in reduction of grade creep. If during World War II, the Bureaus were led by two stars with four-striper assistants, shouldn’t our present smaller Navy be able to do the same?

If we’re not careful, pretty soon we will have more admirals than ships.

 

“End Sexism”

(See J.L Byron, pp. 27-31, February 1996; C. Bly Chester, A.J. Corbett, pp 12-20 April 1996; J.M van Tol, N. Hogan, pp. 26-29, May 1996 Proceedings)

Lieutenant Commander Egbert De Jong, U.S. Coast Guard—It was encouraging to read an article that shouts “End Sexism.” One would think that all in the Navy and Coast Guard would already be marching in line—but they are not. Sexism and harassment still exist. Not until many more years and careers have gone by will there be a new level of respect found for all our men and women in the service. Unfortunately, I found out first-hand that doing what is right—trying to end sexism at the command level as an executive officer when the commanding officer isn’t on board with the objective—even in post-Tailhook era—can indeed damage one’s career.

 

“Reflections on a Naval Career”

(See L. Di Rita, pp. 8-10, August 1995; D.S. Gernes, A. Vittek, pp. 13-14, September 1995; B. Carleton, P. Swartz, M. White, W. Hannon, W. Porter, pp. 16-21, November 1995; F. Carment, L. Melling Tanner, J.W. Crawford, D.K. Wilson, S. Geissler Bowles, J.D. Alden, J.D. Render, A.M. Smith, J. Miller, Editor’s Note, pp. 14-19, January 1996; R.N. Adrian, T. Fredricks, G.M. Cousins, p. 30, March 1996; D.H. Frahler pp. 25-26 April 1996 Proceedings)

Jose Benedito Gama Dore, Sao Paulo, Brazil, Life Member, U.S. Naval Institute—I thought integrity and character were dwindling qualities of mankind in this world of ours. Not so. Both of them are alive and well and embodied in the words of Lieutenant Commander Lori Melling Tanner where she demonstrates what a fine officer she is and the high values she lives to as an officer of the U.S. Navy. She has my admiration and deepest respect.