Capstone Essay Contest
The post-Cold War era has brought an uncertain future to naval aviation. The threat of war with the Soviet Union is gone, as is the need for a blue-water Navy aimed specifically at taking the fight to the Russians. With new adversaries, force downsizing, changing missions, and project cancellations, a different kind of war is raging among the higher echelons of the air community. They must decide how to appropriate decreasing funds in a way that will validate Navy Air’s existence and help it fill new roles well into the early 21st century. The new focus on littoral warfare requires a diversity of capabilities from naval air which, like the rest of the Navy, is faced with doing more with less. That much is agreed upon, but the proper way to go about it has been the focus of much debate.
Mission: The current carrier air wings, composed of F-14s for long-range fighting, A-6s for long-range attack (F/A-18s serve both these missions at medium ranges), and S-3s for antisubmarine warfare, were designed to defeat their Soviet counterparts.1 With that threat gone, the big blue-water carriers are being forced closer to shore to deal with regional littoral conflicts. The task for Navy planners today is to decide what to do with the carrier’s air assets in this new environment while sustaining the validity of naval air power.
Naval aircraft are losing the deep-strike mission to Tomahawk cruise missiles and Air Force bombers, which are simply better suited for the role.2 This loss is acceptable, however, because carrier aircraft still will be the platform of choice for rapid response close air support, battlefield interdiction (CAS/BAI), and defensive counter-air for the battle group and land forces.3 With these missions assigned, the debate turns to the method by which they will be accomplished.
Options: The controversy generated by the ill-fated A-12 program and the recent cancellation of the A/F-X (a next-generation deep strike concept)4 have left precious few projects on naval aviation’s horizon. The scarcity of new platforms has driven the debate toward improving or finding new uses for the existing inventory. One proposal that gained some attention—but not much momentum—was integrating aircraft carriers with Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs). The concept would balance the naval air complement on board the carrier with the aircraft, vehicles, and troops attached to a MAGTF, thus increasing the carrier’s mission envelope.5 This likely will not be viewed as the ultimate solution, but the importance of coordination and teamwork between the carrier-based aircraft and the MAGTF always is a consideration.
Another proposal attacks the capital ship concept and suggests dispersing aircraft among the battle group on board smaller aviation platforms. This plan involves the eventual development of a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft capable of antisubmarine warfare, antisurface warfare, and antiair warfare, to fill primary aircraft roles. Support of ground forces, antisurface defense, and antiair defense would be provided by one strike- fighter airframe. These two aircraft would be built around short take-off vertical landing (STOVL) technology, the capabilities of which are quickly approaching those of conventional aircraft. STOVL would cancel the need for catapults and arresting gear and reduce wind-over-deck requirements. This would facilitate the dispersion of air assets on board several aviation platforms, thus increasing survivability. These vessels also would be smaller and cheaper than conventional carriers and require less propulsion.6
A third option examines converting the carrier air wings to all strike-fighter aircraft. This would pay great dividends in efficiency, given the lower costs of a single-seat cockpit, the purchasing of one airframe and its parts, and unified training of ground maintenance crews. This also exploits the added utility of multi-mission aircraft. The negative aspects of the proposal are the elimination of long-range attack and intercept capabilities and a lack of the flexibility that comes with operating different types of aircraft. However, it meets the close air support/interdiction missions and is attractively feasible when funds from the canceled A-12 and A/F-X projects are directed toward F/A-18 E/F and advanced STOVL development.
Directions: The Navy appears to be heading toward a slight variation of the all strike-fighter option. As the A-6 Intruder began to be phased out, the Chief of Naval Operations gave his full support to fleet integration of the Hornet E/F and the joint advanced strike technology (JAST) program, while considering ways to enhance the F-14 Tomcat’s capabilities.7
As of May 1994, carrier aircraft faced these developments:8
- The A-6 upgrade program was halted; all Marine A-6Es had been transferred to the Navy; and the last A-6E squadron was slated for decommissioning in September 1997. The elimination of Intruders will greatly reduce the Navy’s all-weather bombing ability and place the responsibility of medium-range bombing with F-14s and F/A-18s.
- F-14 upgrades were continuing along three different paths. The F-14A/B upgrade gave 197 Tomcats modernized avionics for increased survivability; the Block 1 Strike Program gave 210 F-14As, -Bs, and -Ds a precision bombing capability; and F-14Bs were receiving engine upgrades to the GE FI 10. These modernizations have extended the F-14’s service life to the year 2010.
- The F/A-18Cs, -Ds, and -Ns were receiving radar, GPS, voice radio, chaff dispenser, and software upgrades as the E/F was being developed.
- All S-3 squadrons had converted to the S-3B with no new upgrades planned for the aircraft.
- The EA-6B remanufacture program had been canceled, and advanced capability upgrades for the aircraft were being cut back.
- Four new E-2Cs per year were ordered through 1999.
Other than upgrading existing aircraft and procuring the Hornet E/F, the Navy has little to speak of in terms of future developments. The JAST program is underway but is aimed only at generating technology that will create commonality between next-generation Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force strike- fighters; it is not an aircraft development program. The joint Navy-Advanced Research Projects Agency has been doing extensive work with ASTOVL concepts and is scheduled for a first flight in 2000.9
Indications point toward an early 21st century carrier aircraft complement consisting of F/A-18 E/Fs and some upgraded C/Ds. Airborne early warning still will be provided by the E-2C Hawk- eye; the SH-60 or the V-22 will do the search-and-rescue work once handled by SH-2s and -3s. The Tomcat will be decommissioned as of 2010, and with no upgrades planned, the S-3 will be gone by then as well.
The Navy has done itself a profound disservice by failing to leave its aircraft development options open for the future. If the JAST and ASTOVL programs falter and do not produce a suitable next-generation aircraft, naval aviation could be finished. Loss of the CAS/BAI mission to more advanced and capable Air Force aircraft would spell certain doom for aircraft carriers and their air wings.
1 Lt. William Hamblet, USN, “All Strike Fighters for the Fleet,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, February 1993, p. 63.
2 Bill Sweetman, “Naval Air Power for 2000: Time to Change Course,” International Defense Review, September 1995, p. 842.
3 Ibid., p. 842.
4 Floyd D. Kennedy, Jr., “U.S. Naval Aircraft and Weapon Developments,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1994, p. 152.
5 Cdr. Terry C. Pierce, USN, “Not a ‘CVN Gator,’” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 1993, p. 74.
6 Lt. Leo S. Mackay, Jr., USN, “Naval Aviation, Information, and the Future,” Naval War College Review, Spring 1992, p. 7.
7 Vincent P. Grimes, “Future of Naval Aviation is Hornet, JAST,” National Defence, January 1995, p. 10.
8 Kennedy, p. 152.
9 Kennedy, p. 153.
Ensign Langbehn is stationed on the Naval Academy while he awaits flight school at Naval Air Station Pensacola.