After nearly a decade of buildup and revitalization, Naval Special Warfare was ready for Desert Storm—here, a SEAL delivery vehicle launches from its tow sled after being towed by the Kuwaiti patrol boat Instiqial during the Gulf War—but only innovative thinking will ensure its continued war-fighting relevance.
Over the past decade. Naval Special Warfare units have more than doubled in manpower, equipment, and construction infrastructure. This buildup, begun in the early 1980s, was brought on by burgeoning operational requirements of fleet and joint commanders, who recognized the added dimension special operations forces (SOFs) could bring to their theaters. One wonders if frogman founder Draper Kauffman had any inkling of special warfare’s future when he formed the original combat demolition units in 1943.
U.S. Navy Sea-Air-Land (SEAL) teams were established in 1962 by President John F. Kennedy. Their ranks initially were filled by the descendants of Kauffman’s World War II combat demolition units—the frogmen from the underwater demolition teams (UDTs)—and all SEAL candidates were drawn from UDT combat swimmers until the early 1970s. SEAL and UDT primary and secondary roles crossed over at the high-water mark, the essential difference being emphasis: SEALs focused on small-unit patrolling tactics, UDTs on diving and underwater demolitions.
In the mid-1980s, the Chief of Naval Operations, Surface Warfare Division, reorganized the UDTs into SEAL and SEAL delivery vehicle teams, which represented more functional responsibilities. As an immediate result, manpower and equipment lists were upgraded.
Seemingly a cosmetic name change, this transition accounted for the unprecedented growth that followed and dovetailed with the Secretary of Defense’s revitalization guidance. Administrative and operational assignments continued as before, under Naval Special Warfare Group One in Coronado, California, and Naval Special Warfare Group Two in Little Creek, Virginia. The special boat squadrons, which grew out of the Vietnam-era boat support/coastal-riverine squadrons, also operated under Groups One and Two.
Revitalization Guidance
As a result of Operation Desert One, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Thayer signed a memorandum on 3 October 1983 that directed the services to revitalize their special operations forces by the end of fiscal year (FY) 1990. But this memo was not the only factor behind the SEAL buildup. Naval Special Warfare already had two Navy Decision Coordinating Papers in place—one for diving and one for weapons—that facilitated development efforts for a family of items. In addition, the SEALs had just the year before finished a communications master plan, written by the Commander, Naval Telecommunications Command. It addressed man-packed radios and van systems suitable for the support of group and unit/detachment commanders. Naval Special Warfare also had developed an umbrella master plan; the first Naval Special Warfare Master Plan was signed out in August 1982 by Vice Admiral Lee Baggett, Jr.
Nevertheless, Deputy Secretary Thayer’s October guidance went far in supporting SEAL issues during fiscal deliberations. The added clout got the community into its most solid financial position since the Vietnam War (during which SEALs and special boatsmen won three Medals of Honor and were among the most highly decorated units to serve in that conflict). Later, in 1984, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were briefed on service special operations programs. The Naval Special Warfare Master Plan was received enthusiastically—and other services started their own plans.
1986: Congress Speaks
Operation Urgent Fury (Grenada) put special operations forces once again under congressional scrutiny. In essence, the problems encountered in Urgent Fury showed that the revitalization effort still needed attention, especially in communications. This rekindled interest resulted in the establishment of the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCom) and its service components in 1987. Overseas special operations commands were established in the European and Pacific Commands with general/flag officer billets, and an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict was established in the Department of Defense.
The most hotly debated action taken by Congress in the FY-86 appropriations bill was granting the new commander-in-chief (CinC) his own budget. Under the new “Program 11,” SOCom became responsible for its own budget and for validating the operational requirements of service components—a unique responsibility among CinCs.
The FY-87 identification and transfer of funds from the services to SOCom left much to be desired. Its sloppy execution left SOCom with “broken programs” for years, e.g., the Army helicopter program. In fact, the establishment of SOCom never was intended to divorce special operators from their services. Special operations units could not function without the several services. SOCom was designed—and now functions—as a supporting adjunct to every service. Rarely, if ever, has a specific operation been conducted without other-service involvement.
SEAL team and special boat squadron expansions continued throughout the 1980s: new equipment came into service, new teams were formed, and staffs expanded to handle the additional administrative load. Officer staff positions expanded in direct response to the emphasis being placed on special warfare by operational commanders. The Naval Special Warfare officer corps began to mature in terms of assignments, promotions, and career potential.
The Current State of Play
SEAL team organizations began to reflect the increased emphasis in early 1980. Today, the community has six major commands for captains: Naval Special Warfare Groups One and Two, two special boat squadrons, a development group, and the Naval Special Warfare Center. SEAL Teams One, Three, and Five work Pacific and Mid- East regions. Teams Two, Four, and Eight handle Europe, South America, and the Caribbean. Each coast has a dedicated SEAL delivery vehicle team responsible for underwater submersibles—a highly technical endeavor that requires an extremely close relationship with the submarine community. In addition, the first SEAL flag officer was selected in 1984.
The SOF community was ready for Operations Just Cause (Panama) and Desert Storm (Persian Gulf)- Both tested the joint command and its ability to respond to conflict. The speed with which SOCom and its components responded to the tasking from the National Command Authorities was just what Congress had in mind. There were some problems, but no SOF soldier, sailor, or airman went into combat understrength or undersupported.
While in the United States, all SOF units fall under the combatant command of SOCom. When deployed overseas, they report to a geographic commander-in-chief. Naval Special Warfare detachments report to either a geographic Naval Special Warfare unit or a numbered fleet commander. Special boat units work for the numbered fleet commander. During Desert Storm, SEALs were deployed with afloat units and also worked out of Saudi Arabia under the operational control of a Joint Special Operations Task Force.
With the breakup of the Soviet Union, many of the nation’s strategic forces found themselves looking for work. On the Navy staff, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Submarine Warfare (OP-02) pushed to support the burgeoning inshore special operation requirement. New submarines were identified for modifications to carry SOFs (and Marine reconnaissance units). The submarine dry-deck shelters transport and launch teams underwater, far from the target objective. Funding was shared between the Navy and SOCom to realize the conversions—a good example of service cooperation. Submarine services for lock-out/lock-in training, once hard to find, became abundant; even other services found submarine opportunities, participating in “wolf pack” special operations with several submarines. In sum, the current SOCom joint lash-up has performed far beyond everyone’s expectations.
Whither?
After more than a decade of revitalization, how will the force be employed? Will they be peacekeepers, or will they slide into another era of neglect? Future operations for SOFs continue to be debated, especially in the current roles-and-missions climate.
There is a military tendency to try to standardize all experience into doctrine. What needs to be “standardized” is a mind-set that continually seeks out innovative or unconventional ways of getting the job done. Naval Special Warfare—and special operations at large—was founded on the principle of the unconventional approach. Becoming too tightly wound with encasing operating procedures in doctrine, lacking a clear idea of what is to be accomplished, will prove self-defeating. We should not ignore the past, but neither should we discount something just because it fails to fit an established paradigm. For example, getting joint special operations (Army and Air Force) helos on Navy ships in 1984 bordered on blasphemy. But they later went en masse to Haiti on a carrier. SEALs on carriers? SOF SEALs were there in 1992—before Haiti!
An unconventional approach during the Desert Storm campaign was the SEALs’ feint onto a Persian Gulf beach. The operation froze portions of two Iraqi divisions in place. Another earlier example was the use of SEALs in boarding merchant ships before hostilities—the helos closed in; SEALs fast-roped onto the decks. In preparing for boarding, Navy air crews had to learn new tricks—a great example of jointness working. The unconventional approach gave birth to what will become a standard, pre-deployment training maneuver.
In the world of special boats, consideration must be given to the role they will play in the Navy’s new littoral strategy. A possible mismatch occurs in shipbuilding: we have a littoral strategy but a blue-water ship construction account. Accordingly, some unconventional thinking needs to be done and adequate resources need to be applied to the forthcoming recommendations. Combatant craft can do certain jobs better and less expensively than Aegis cruisers. They can get closer to the beach, see more up close and personal, and not put 400 sailors at risk from shore fire—or Haitian sandbars, for that matter. The special boat units need a variety of capable craft with support ships identified. These operational combinations can allow deep-draft ships the freedom to do the jobs for which they were designed.
There is a busy future for Naval Special Warfare. Much remains to be done in both operations and technical developments. The answers to Whither Naval Special Warfare? demand thinking beyond the standard approach to problem solving, getting outside the current operational framework, and giving the commander an innovative approach to a strategic or tactical operational task. This is the role of Naval Special Warfare. Retaining its war-fighting relevance will depend on how well it accomplishes this within the new Navy strategy—or outside it.
Postscript: Leadership
SOFs have expanded with the inclusion of Rangers, thereby permitting non-special forces officers to compete for the top special operations job. Of significance, the Army’s special operations Command structure outranks the other two services: the Army command is a three-star; the Air Force, two; the naval command, one. Similarly, command of the two smaller Joint Special Operations Commands always had been Army or Air Force, but recently have expanded in the Atlantic with a new rear admiral commanding. The two top joint jobs—SOCom and the Joint Special Operations Command (Ft. Bragg)—however, would appear to be out of the reach of Air Commandos and SEALs.
There is a requirement for four Navy SEAL flag officers in the Special Operations constellation of stars: at the Naval Special Warfare Command, at SOCom, and at either one of the operational Special Operation Commands or on the Secretary of Defense or service staffs.
Admiral Worthington was Commander, Naval Special Warfare Command. prior to his retirement in 1992.