The Coast Guard has proved itself a capable player in the joint arena—here, the cutter Chase (WHEC-718) assists U.S. naval forces during Operation Support Democracy off the coast of Haiti. To stay joint, however, it must position itself with a long-term joint strategy and build its future cutters accordingly. Otherwise, these ships will not be able to communicate with or keep up with the Navy’s battle groups.
Joint operations are not new to the Coast Guard. But its traditional missions are becoming spread among an increasingly shrinking military that emphasizes cooperation and jointness. To maintain its position in the military infrastructure, the Coast Guard must look to the future and plan for the long term by devising a strategy that stresses jointness, supported by operational doctrine and tools that maximize its strengths.
Since the early 1990s, the service’s participation in joint operations has covered a wide range of exercises and contingencies. During 1993, in conjunction with the Department of Defense, the Coast Guard spearheaded Able Manner and Able Vigil, the largest migrant rescue operations in history. Coast Guard units were key players in Operation Support Democracy, operating off the coast of Haiti and deploying ashore. Cutters and Coast Guard personnel became standard players in joint exercises, working in the littoral with Navy and Marine Corps units and devising naval coastal warfare tactics. Battle group deployments overseas routinely included Coast Guard participation, including (for the first time) a Coast Guard cutter’s deployment to the Mediterranean and Black Sea at special request of the Commander-in-Chief, Sixth Fleet. Coast Guard law enforcement detachments (LEDets) deployed worldwide in non-traditional roles to the Red Sea and off Yugoslavia. Afloat staffs served as joint liaison and, in some cases, as surface action group (SAG) commanders in joint deployments. Internal Coast Guard operating tactics changed to reflect increased joint participation, most notably with the institution of the commander task unit (CTU) tactic for cutters afloat, integrating command and control between sea and shore. Earlier, during the Gulf War, Coast Guard units conducted port security and harbor defense missions.
Jointness is vital not only in military operations but also in this era of downsizing. The Coast Guard, however, still has a long way to go to make jointness the way to do business and must instill jointness in three major areas:
- The design of its cutter fleet and deployable elements
- The formalization of its operational tactics to reflect jointness
- The elimination of the “Purple Paradigm” that limits it in pursuing jointness
The Cutter Fleet
The Coast Guard is on the verge of a major renovation in its cutter fleet—as illustrated by near completion of the initial phase of the high-endurance cutter (HEC) and medium-endurance cutter (MEC) replacement project. This cutter will comprise the bulk of the fleet until well beyond the year 2000; consequently, we must determine what capabilities are required to attain highest performance in both traditional Coast Guard mission areas and the joint environment. An analysis of the current fleet—specifically, 270-foot Bear (WMEC-901)-class and 378-foot Hamilton (WHEC-715)-class cutters—provides important insight and lessons for the cutter design of the near future.
The Hamilton was the first ship designed with a combined gas turbine/diesel engineering plant, giving her significant advantage in mobility. She also possessed a hull- mounted sonar that allowed her to prosecute submarines in shallow water or serve as a close-in antisubmarine warfare asset for a carrier battle group. Subsequent modifications added the Mk-92 gunfire control system, removed the sonar, installed the joint over-the-horizon tactical system, installed command weapon systems, briefly experimented with the installation of Harpoon (subsequently removed), and on some cutters added Link 11.
The 270-foot WMEC originally was conceived as a medium-range convoy escort vessel that would deploy for very short periods with a minimal crew—relying on an extensive electronics package to perform many formerly manpower-intense functions. The navigation and combat information center system was Coast Guard designed and revolutionized electronic navigation and target tracking. Possessing the Mk-92 gunfire control system and joint over-the-horizon tactical system as well as a detailed communications suite, the cutter demonstrated excellent ability for command and control. Like her larger sister, she cannot link in real time, and slow speed (maximum of 20 knots) made the ship inadequate as a convoy escort vessel or battle group asset. The cutter possesses no organic antisubmarine warfare capability and cannot (because of inherent noise difficulties) support a passive antisubmarine warfare system as originally envisioned.
The design and subsequent operation of the 378- and 270-foot classes provide important lessons for the cutter of the future. Both are proven, versatile Coast Guard assets and account for the bulk of the fleet. But by designing ships that are “half and half’—using both Coast Guard- unique systems and joint systems compatible with the Navy—we force our cutters into a difficult situation: We require them to be fully joint capable while neglecting to give them the tools to become so. The 378-foot class may be able to speed with battle groups, but its lack of sonar requires escort in an antisubmarine-warfare environment, which—despite the rosy predictions following the collapse of the Soviet Union—is just as dangerous as ever as more Third World navies acquire submarines. The command weapon systems point-defense system, while an improvement on self-defense capability, does not make the ship effective in an antiair warfare environment. The 270- foot cutter is an outstanding command-and-control platform, but she cannot keep up with a battle group and has virtually no warfare capability. In both cases, lack of a real-time link is a critical weakness in any joint operation, especially one that requires fast and hard sensor data.
Some opponents argue that the projected operating environment for those ships precludes installation of warfare systems. Operations Able Manner and Able Vigil, for example, involved the rescue of thousands of migrants—scarcely the place for a sonar requirement. But history has proved that the projected operating environment often changes with little warning, and our tools must be able to respond accordingly. The drug war, for example, is now very much a joint operation and shows no indications of being anything else in the future. Even humanitarian evolutions require surveillance and communication; migrant interdiction operations, while low on the threat spectrum, are high in the need for accurate sensor data. So while the Coast Guard may not need bombs and missiles, it most certainly needs the ability to communicate with, and in many cases direct, our DoD counterparts.
Design of the HEC/MEC replacement must take the lessons of the WHEC and WMEC and apply them appropriately if the Coast Guard is to be an effective joint partner. Specifically, the new cutter must incorporate the following:
- Speed: Modern combatants require speed to be effective in a warfare environment, as do cutters operating in traditional Coast Guard missions such as interdiction or search and rescue. As the recent retirement of the cutter Vindicator (WMEC-3) showed, a cutter cannot be effective or multi-mission capable without speed.
- Compatible command-and-control systems: The introduction of joint over-the-horizon tactical systems into the cutter fleet was a major step forward in the Coast Guard’s ability to conduct joint operations. It has taken the joint over-the-horizon tactical system and used it extensively in both joint and traditional mission areas. Nevertheless, such systems are not real time and are limited in many tactical situations. The cutter of the future must be able to see with the same eyes as the fleet. This demands some form of real-time, link capable of expanding its radar horizon. Such a link would be invaluable in all Coast Guard missions, with applications in law enforcement and migrant interdiction as well as joint operations. Link is nothing new, and the Coast Guard needs it.
- Sustainability: Operations Able Manner and Able Vigil demonstrated that cutters must be able to remain on station for extended periods. The 378-foot cutters are capable of prolonged periods of operation (three-month deployments being the norm), but 270-foot cutters are not. They are designed for operational periods of three weeks, but their at-sea times during regular patrols often doubles that.
The cutter of the future must be designed for extended periods at sea, but the Coast Guard also must be careful about the way such a capability is gained. Often, technical or operational means are used to increase sustainability by reducing crew fatigue, but the effectiveness of such measures often are reduced by subsequent reduction in manning, driven by budgetary restrictions. This quickly can negate any benefit gained. As Operation Able Manner demonstrated, the Coast Guard must be ready to respond to any emergency on a national level; decreasing crews is not a reasonable alternative.
The HEC/MEC replacement must consider these areas to be effective in the joint environment. Designing the right tool is only the first step; next, the Coast Guard must determine how to use it.
Coast Guard Joint Doctrine
The Coast Guard has changed its operational structure to accommodate the joint environment. These changes have been effective, but they often are conducted on a situational basis and are of short-term duration. To continue the drive toward jointness, the Coast Guard must formalize these changes in a doctrine that clearly states that this is the way it will be doing business. Given the lessons of recent times, this change can be focused in these areas:
- The commander task unit concept: The commander task unit concept is new to the Coast Guard but has seen considerable success in recent operations. It requires a major cutter to act as a surface action group commander for smaller assets operating offshore. These missions range from fisheries law enforcement to search-and-rescue and counter-drug operations. Yet while the commander task unit organizational design is generally standard for cutters at sea, the methods of employing it vary radically and are highly dependent on the District to which the respective unit is assigned. Commander task units have been used as “offshore groups,” have been made subordinate to District command centers, or made subordinate to inshore groups, depending on the operational area assigned. Such frequent changes generate confusion among all the players as to how to employ commander task units effectively.
There is no “right” way in particular to use commander task units, but the Coast Guard must formalize related doctrine in the form of joint operational tasks, designed along joint lines, to streamline this tactic and eliminate confusion at sea and ashore. A “migrant operational tasks commander task unit,” for example, would detail force composition, communications plans, and tactics so that a CTU could be formed in a moment’s notice to respond to a contingency. Such a document could be included quickly in a joint operational order for contingency operations.
- Dedicated/standard afloat liaison: The Coast Guard currently possesses a number of force elements whose mission is to deploy with DoD or interagency components to provide Coast Guard expertise in joint mission areas. Although this idea is not new, it is becoming more firmly established in the formation of various squadrons and training teams.
For the Coast Guard to maintain its joint effectiveness, these operations should be expanded and the role of deployable staffs formalized on both the area and district level. Assignment of personnel to developing joint operations often is based on personnel availability instead of expertise; expanding deployable staff participation, perhaps including the assignment of a joint qualification code, would formalize Coast Guard participation in many joint operations, while providing for a large cadre of personnel with joint experience.
- Formation of a dedicated overseas logistic infrastructure: The Coast Guard has used its in-country system of support to fulfill requirements of deployed units. For units operating within traditional district boundaries, this system has been fairly effective, but the increased requirement to deploy farther from home waters and the demands of sudden emergencies require that the Coast Guard take a new look at its logistic support system. The creation of a forward operating base at Naval Base Guantanamo (usually formed on an emergency basis only) handled this during Operations Able Manner and Able Vigil.
Establishing dedicated, fulltime forward operating bases with stocks of supplies and parts and effective links to the main logistic supply point in the continental United States would extend the logistics “tail” of cutters and possibly represent significant budgetary savings. If the Coast Guard is to continue long-range deployments in the joint environment, it cannot continue to rely on a logistics tail that stretches back to the continental United States.
Jointness and the Service
Perhaps the most difficult change that the Coast Guard faces if it is to operate in the joint world is the one most difficult to measure; changing its own paradigms. The Coast Guard is and always has been unique, performing missions that no other service (until recently) does, and possessing a multi-mission versatility that astounds its DoD counterparts.
Yet it is the multi-mission capability—the ability to get the job done without help—that projects the Coast Guard’s greatest paradigm: It can operate in a vacuum, independent of the other services. Each new Commandant fills this vacuum, effectively altering the Coast Guard’s perception of joint operations with each new administration. In other words, being joint changes with the tide. The Coast Guard does not look beyond the horizon to consider future operations.
This is best illustrated by recent Coast Guard history. In the mid-1980s under the direction of Commandant Paul Yost, the Coast Guard emphasized the “warfare mission.” The Maritime Defense Zone came into its own as a player in joint operations, and Coast Guard cutters were outfitted with systems that attempted to reflect a deeper involvement in traditional battle group operations. This changed in the 1990s, partially reflecting the altering nature of the threat but mainly the direction of Commandant J. William Kime, who stressed the environmental-protection mission. Much of what had occurred under the Yost administration reversed itself or went away; warfare was no longer “the thing.” This had dramatic long-term effects. Equipment recently installed on cutters was removed, and debate began (that still rages) concerning removing weaponry all together. Coast Guard joint operations status waned. Many personnel trained in joint or warfare areas found themselves either out of a job or struggling to integrate in a new mission area.
The paradigm that the Coast Guard changes its mission emphasis every four years is critically damaging and must be changed. The cutter systems of ten years from now are being designed today, and cannot be based on which way the wind blows with every administration. It takes time and effort to train personnel for operations in the joint world. Abandoning this on relatively short notice leads to confusion and a devastating neutrality in personnel, who are unwilling to commit to a mission area for fear that they will be left out in the cold in the near future. The answer to this dilemma can be found in the example set by other U.S. services. The Army had its Air-Land Battle, the Navy its Maritime Strategy—and publicly promulgated the same. This ensured that everyone, from the junior sailor to the commander-in-chief, knew and understood the direction the service was going. Used in force planning and in the debate surrounding tactical employment, these strategies were so effective that they survived the dissolving of the Soviet threat, effectively being modified to meet new challenges worldwide. The forces and tactics may be different, but the doctrine devised by the overall strategy remained uniquely joint.
To survive and excel in a joint world, the Coast Guard needs a long-term strategy that specifically defines its plan for the next decade in terms of how it will operate and the forces it will need to accomplish that task. A plan that reflects jointness, realistically addresses mission emphasis, and above all, remains consistent throughout its implementation in the long term will accomplish this. The Coast Guard excels at responding to crisis in the short term; now it needs a plan that will guide it for a generation. The Coast Guard excels at putting out fires; now it is time to look at where to build the firehouses. A long-term strategy, designed with joint doctrine, will ensure successful leadership in the maritime world.
Lieutenant Commander Watts is the operations officer for Coast Guard Squadron 42. He previously served on board the cutters Tampa (WMEC- 902) and the Dallas (WHEC-716) as a Maritime Defense Zone fleet exercise planner for Maritime Defense Zone Atlantic, and on board the USS Josephus Daniels (CG-27) as a first lieutenant in an exchange program with the Navy.