One of the lesser-known aspects of the post-World War II security arrangement between the United States and Japan is the extremely close working relationship between the U.S. Navy and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF). Because the United States and Japan have been allies for the past 44 years, this close tie may not seem unusual, but the relationship has blossomed into much more than what the formal treaty arrangement requires. The two navies share information, technology, equipment, supplies, and resources; they work, operate, and train together; and they trust, respect, and depend on each other. How did this successful relationship come into being? How can the two navies continue to maintain this close working relationship?
Despite having fought each other as enemies, the two navies share the traditions of a common historical model—the British Royal Navy. The U.S. Navy officers who came to Japan after the war as part of the occupation forces and the Imperial Japanese Navy officers who put down their arms discovered that they had much in common. The Americans and Japanese all were proud sailors. They spoke a lingua franca. This shared tradition helped ease the tension and start a new and constructive relationship. It continues today to facilitate the communication and cooperation between the two navies.
Through the war in the Pacific, the two navies had developed a sense of mutual respect. For the U.S. Navy, the Imperial Japanese Navy was the first adversary that demanded every bit of its power to crush. The perception that the Japanese war planes and battleships would be unable to launch a successful attack on U.S. ships and bases proved to be wrong and costly. For the Imperial Japanese Navy, too, the U.S. Navy was a formidable and eventually an unbeatable enemy. The perception that the decadent United States would not be able to fight a major war for a protracted period of time also proved to be wrong and costly.
Officers and men of both navies fought brilliantly and gallantly. But for the overwhelming resources of the United States, the two navies were true equals. There was a sense at the end of the war that each performed its duties as professionals. Perhaps partly because of the nature of sea battles, there was a peculiar sense of sportsmanship shared by both sides. They tended not to regard each other as savages or demons. Consequently, there was relatively little hatred or animosity toward each other after the war.
This again helped build a new relationship. Because of this professionalism, naval relations have tended to be free from the rhetoric and dogma that plague the politics between the two countries. They continue to share a pride in their high degree of professionalism.
Postwar Leadership
Those who played a central role in rebuilding the postwar Japanese Navy were no ordinary men. They were first-rate leaders who had a vision for the future. Many were former members of the Treaty Faction of the Imperial Japanese Navy and thus inherited the tradition of Admiral Kato Tomosaburo, the chief Japanese representative to the Washington Naval Conference. In a sense, these officers did not change their fundamental strategic assessment of Japan’s security interests. They strongly believed—before as well as after the war—that Japan’s security depends on the stability of the surrounding region and that it is best preserved by close cooperation between the Japanese Navy and U.S. Navy. Admiral Nomura Kichisaburo, for example—Admiral Kato Tomosaburo’s chief deputy at the Washington Conference—served as ambassador to Washington in 1941 and tried to avoid the outbreak of the war.
The subsequent leadership of the JMSDF kept this tradition and vision. Many JMSDF leaders were young officers of the Imperial Japanese Navy who participated in the war in the Pacific. They sometimes were frustrated by the limited role the new Navy could play, but they nevertheless were determined to keep the morale and readiness of the JMSDF high. When the JMSDF began to play a much greater role in the 1980s and 1990s, it was fully ready to do so, partly because of the quiet but determined resolve of the first generation of the JMSDF leadership. They had by then established a first-rate navy manned by well-trained officers and sailors, a tradition that continues today.
The U.S. Navy officers involved were equally outstanding. They too had a vision for future cooperation, which they saw in the interest of the United States. Despite bitter personal memories of the war. Admiral Arleigh Burke, more than anyone, played a vital role in helping Admiral Nomura and others start a new postwar Japanese navy. As Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Burke continued to believe in the importance of and support the trusted relationship among the U.S. and allied navies.
Burke’s extraordinary goodwill toward the JMSDF cannot be understood without appreciating the friendship that developed between himself and Admiral Nomura. In Admiral Nomura, Admiral Burke found history, tradition, honor, and decency. In the foreword to the JMSDF’s official history, Burke wrote that some of his most gratifying experiences were the discussions on the creation of the new Japanese Navy with men for whom he had come to have the highest esteem and respect. He is said to have stated that he lost one of his best friends when Admiral Nomura passed away.
Such close personal ties have helped establish a trusted and cooperative working relationship. Many JMSDF officers have spent time in the United States as students or attaches and have come to know their counterparts personally. In return, U.S. officers stationed in Yokosuka, Sasebo, and Atsugi have returned home with friendship and shared experiences with their JMSDF counterparts. Often, they find they have similar concerns: frustration with their respective civilian bosses and political leaders, maintaining discipline among sailors, operating with a limited budget and resources, and leaving family behind while at sea.
Strategic and political decisions were made in Washington and Tokyo to establish and maintain this relationship, but without the personal touch it could not have endured the difficult times and been this successful. Civilian policymakers in Washington, D.C., from time to time have thought to reduce U.S. naval presence in Japan, but the uniformed leadership has resisted such ideas and advocated retaining these bases. The admirals have been right in their assessment. Tangible and intangible support from the JMSDF and from the Japanese civilian personnel at these bases have been great assets for the U.S. Navy. Successful home porting of the Midway (CVN-41) and Independence (CN-62) has enabled the United States to prolong the service lives and enhance the capabilities of these aircraft carriers. Most important, these carriers—the only ones ever based outside the United States—have given much needed credibility to U.S. commitment as a stabilizing force in Pacific Asia.
For its part, the JMSDF has borrowed heavily from the U.S. Navy in terms of technologies, weapon systems, equipment, organization, and know-how, making it easier for the two navies to work together. A high degree of interoperability has been achieved through U.S.-licensed or -manufactured equipment adopted and used by the JMSDF. The JMSDF operates 100 P-3C antisubmarine aircraft, four times more than the United States maintains in the Seventh Fleet. The JMSDF surface fleet has three times as many destroyers as the Seventh Fleet. It is the only other navy in the world to have Aegis destroyers, the foremost U.S. Navy antiair-capable surface vessel. These facts are prima facie evidence against the revisionists’ charge that the U.S. tries militarily to “contain” Japan.
Maintaining this Relationship
As time passes, the political climate fluctuates and naval leadership changes hands. Accordingly, the U.S. Navy and JMSDF must keep working to maintain and expand their close ties. The following measures may aid in those efforts:
- Continue and expand personal ties at the leadership level. It is particularly important that the top leadership of the two navies maintain as much personal contact as possible to nurture trust and a sense of mutual reliability. In a future crisis situation, that will be a real asset.
- Continue and expand exchange programs at officer levels. JMSDF officers who have studied at Newport and other U.S. locations have a better grasp of the importance of the relationship between the two navies and the two countries. U.S. Navy officers who have studied in Japan have played a vital role in managing the relationship between the two navies later in their careers.
- Continue and expand shared technologies and weapon systems. Unfortunately, the fallout from the Japanese FSX fighter aircraft greatly set back co-development of technology, and some believe that any future projects are all but impossible because of lingering suspicions and animosities in both countries. Nevertheless, U.S. and Japanese businesses already have significant cooperative arrangements, and the blurring of commercial and defense industries and technologies likely will increase cooperation at the component/subassembly level in the future.
Given Japan’s ongoing study of theater missile defense, the status of U.S. missile development programs, and the logic of a sea-based system using existing Aegis capability, the combined development of an Aegis upper-tier TMD system or other advanced naval missile defense systems seems a worthy goal. The biggest hurdle would be political decisions from both governments; naval leaders no doubt would welcome such a cooperative effort.
- Expose naval officers to broad security issues by assigning them to overseas posts and other ministries/departments and sending them to schools. The quality of top leaders correlates closely to their breadth of experience. Unfortunately, today’s navy is sometimes too specialized and compartmentalized. Compared with their predecessors, JMSDF officers in particular have had more limited experiences and roles in policy matters. To prepare them for a greater and more complex role in the future—including more U.N.-sponsored missions—they should be exposed to policy issues and broad bilateral security issues outside their service.
- Educate younger officers on the history of cooperation. We still tend to talk more about how the two navies fought during the war than about how they have cooperated in the years since. This is perhaps because of the classified nature of much of the relationship, because the press seems to report more bad news than good, and perhaps because the JMSDF leadership is reluctant to be exposed to public scrutiny. Nevertheless, specific instances of such cooperation should be taught and used as lessons for the future while the postwar leaders are still available to talk about them.
- Expand public-relations efforts. Relatively few people outside the circle of policymakers and uniformed officers know the reality of the relationship between the two navies. However, both navies operate in democratic societies; they are strongest and most effective when they receive strong public support. Accordingly, efforts should be made to publicize their close working ties. They should emphasize how they work together, what they can accomplish, and how vital their cooperation is for the security of both nations, as well as for the stability of this part of the world.
Toward a Closer Relationship
The relationship between the U.S. Navy and the JMSDF does not exist in vacuum. It is defined and dictated by the political, strategic, economic, and social relationships between the United States and Japan. The tighter the overall relationship is, the easier it is and will be for the two navies to cooperate more meaningfully and rely on each other. Conversely, the close and trusted relationship that currently exists between the two navies is a stabilizing and exemplary element in the overall bilateral relationship. For these reasons, we need to encourage political leaders in Washington and Tokyo to study navy-to-navy ties and to emulate them in the exercise of political leadership.
U.S. and Japanese naval leaders have every intention to maintain and improve their interactions. However, the two navies, particularly the JMSDF, need greater freedom. Post-Cold War threats to U.S. and Japanese security may not exclusively or overwhelmingly arise in close proximity to Japan. Such threats also are more likely to arise in a multilateral context. If Japan rigidly refuses to deploy defensive forces overseas or to exercise its collective right of self-defense, the effectiveness of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty may be seriously undermined.
For example, when U.S. naval power deterred China from intimidating Taiwan in March 1996, a more meaningful message would have been sent to China if JMSDF escort ships had accompanied or otherwise visibly assisted the Independence battle group. This opportunity for a meaningful joint action did not materialize because of the lack of political will in Japan. Fortunately, however, Japan’s collective self-defense right is under discussion in Japan today.
Political leadership in the United States also needs to recognize and affirm the importance of joint U.S. and Japanese action. One LDP Diet member recently asked, “Is the East Asia Strategy Report really the policy of the U.S. administration, especially the White House?” Former U.S. National Intelligence Officer for East Asia Ezra Vogel has said that the Clinton administration has lessened the trust between the U.S. and Japan unnecessarily. Did the administration consider Japanese participation in the Taiwan crisis? Would it have been willing and able to deal with a feeler from Japan that Japan might have been willing to participate? The answers are not certain.
After World War II, the U.S. Navy and JMSDF transformed an adversarial relationship into a cooperative arrangement that has lasted 45 years. Whether an even closer, more effective, and more meaningful tie will emerge and continue depends on the resolve of the political leadership and the resolve of the general publics of the United States and Japan to share their destiny and more actively contribute to their common goals. That resolve, ultimately, is vital in keeping the Pacific Ocean truly pacific. Given that the Pacific Rim is the economic center of the global economy, that resolve also is extraordinarily important to future world history.
Mr. Agawa, a graduate of Georgetown Law School, works for a Tokyo law firm. Dr. Auer is director of the Center for U.S.-Japan Studies and Cooperation at Vanderbilt University in Nashville.