Two of the main goals of the new fitness report and evaluation system were to control grade inflation and to eliminate peer ranking. The new system accomplishes neither of those goals and, in fact, exacerbates the problems associated with peer ranking.
The new fitness report and evaluation system is designed to facilitate comparison of individual performance against set standards in particular traits. The idea is to eliminate comparison among peers and the ensuing divisiveness of such a system. However, by instituting a control over the number of individuals who can be marked “early promote” or “must promote,” we not only have retained peer comparison, but also have now instituted it among all grades—even junior officer ones where peer comparison was formerly prohibited. Instead of eliminating peer ranking, we have extended it to an even greater number of individuals.
Written guidance on the new fitness report system states that grade inflation will be controlled because commanders—knowing they are limited in the number of “early” and “must” promotion checks—will “naturally” grade more fairly. Nothing in the new instruction, however, requires any control whatsoever on inflation of grades. Commanders are far more likely—knowing they will now be forced by quota to lump some deserving individuals into the “promotable” category—to compensate for that by continuing to give everyone straight “5.0s” in the performance traits. Knowing that some good officers will not be able to get an “early” promote nod because of quota controls, I would be tempted to be more generous in awarding 5.0 grades to ensure that my subordinates remained competitive.
The new system still is vulnerable to inflation, gives no realistic feedback to its participants, and fosters competitiveness among peers at the expense of mission accomplishment.
Having said that, 1 still believe that the new forms are a great improvement over the old ones. Cutting back on superfluous comments and standardizing the writing formats are positive changes. The standard scale provided in the performance traits greatly assists evaluators in making accurate assessments of professional performance. Nevertheless, one simple change would go a long way toward eliminating the problem areas and meeting the goals of controlling grade inflation and eliminating peer ranking: Place a cap, not on the promotion recommendation block, but directly on the performance trait-grades.
The promotion recommendation block can be eliminated entirely. Nowhere in the report will a comparison against peers be made, thus eliminating peer ranking. A control can then be placed directly on the grading system by establishing an enforced “command average.” Just as a matrix denoting the number of allowable “must” and “early” promotes based on the size of the comparison group is now provided in the current instruction, a matrix providing the allowed standard deviation from the enforced “average” could be designed. This matrix would allow a small comparison group (of one or two individuals) greater deviation from the average, but would expect that in increasingly larger groups, the command would come closer to the required average.
If, for example, a command were required to establish an average grade of 4.0, some individuals could be graded 3.0, others could be 5.0. But commanders would be forced, not asked, to examine individuals closely and honestly in order to achieve the correct average. The goal of eliminating grade inflation now has been met.
Why would this system be better? The task force which designed the system admitted that the elimination of peer ranking was desired, but felt that it had to be retained to give promotion boards a tool to weigh competitiveness for promotion. If the Navy-wide average grade is established at 4.0, some officers will fall below the average and some will rise above it. A promotion board has a ready tool to determine who is promotable and who is not. The individual is better served because he or she at least has specific feedback in the areas where improvement is needed—not the standard whitewash designed to cushion the blow of being lumped into the “promotable” category. And nowhere is an individual compared against a peer, but rather—as the Chief of Naval Operations said he wanted— against an established standard. Eliminating peer comparison allows officers to concentrate on ways to upgrade their own professionalism, rather than worry about their neighbors. Once again, mission accomplishment can take precedence over divisive competition.
Finally, such a system would go a long way toward eliminating a problem that we see far too frequently: How to counsel officers regarding failure to select for the next higher grade when they have career histories of straight As—top 1 %—and “early promote” nods? Their failure to select or screen usually comes down to an anonymous briefer’s individual interpretation of written comments. This is no longer the case. Now we can say to an individual, “I am sorry, but you needed a 4.2 to be promoted, and you didn’t get it. You need to improve your mark in leadership.”
A promotion board also could look more closely at specific traits. Maybe the last “crunch” contains a group of officers who all hover near 3.9. Some of these officers get high marks in leadership; others get their high marks in technical knowledge. The board has a new tool for making the tough decisions. What is needed more in this particular community at this particular grade? Perhaps in the unrestricted line community, we would weight leadership more heavily while the military procurement professionals might get the nod for higher marks in technical knowledge. In any event, those tough decisions on those “middle of the pack individuals could be made based on more objective input than just the writeup, where decisions are based more on the reporting senior’s writing ability than on true performance.
Lieutenant Commander Stewart is serving as the director of the Navy’s White House Liaison Office.