He Was Not Expendable
He was a naval officer for 55 years, and he apologized to no one for it. He fought the Japanese in the Philippines, the Germans at Normandy, called Fidel Castro’s bluff at Guantanamo Bay—and resolutely withstood any attempt to compromise the standards he enforced as president of the Navy Board of Inspection and Survey. Vice Admiral John D. Bulkeley, U.S. Navy (Retired), died 6 April 1996 at his home in Silver Spring Maryland, and was buried in Arlington National Cemetery.
“Fall From Glory: The Men Who Sank the U.S. Navy”
(See W. H. Parks, pp. 97-98, April 1996 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral T. A. Brooks, U.S. Navy (Retired), former Director of Naval Intelligence—Colonel Parks’ review is an excellent analysis of a very flawed book designed, it would seem, to seek out anything that can discredit the Navy and its leadership. As Colonel Parks states: ‘There is value in a history of the Navy over the past two decades.” Indeed there is. And if an accurate history is produced, it will show that great things were accomplished by the U.S. Navy in the 1980s, Tailhook and other scandals notwithstanding.
Some of the historic accomplishments of the Navy are attributable to the very people Vistica castigates. The ledger of history as it deals with John Lehman will have entries on both sides. There will be much to be criticized, but there will also be a significant list of accomplishments to be praised. "The evil men do lives after them; the good is oft interred with their bones.”
The ledger as it pertains to Naval Intelligence will provide fascinating entries. In many respects, the 1980s were a golden era for Naval Intelligence. Notwithstanding Vistica’s vicious and totally inaccurate allegations of consistently “lying to Congress” Director of Naval Intelligence Rear Admiral Sumner Shapiro, working closely with Chief of Naval Operations Thomas Hayward and Vice Chiefs of Naval Operations James Watkins and William Small, presided over an intelligence collection and analysis effort which resulted in a total reassessment of how the Soviets would fight a war, what their strengths and weaknesses were, and how their perceptions and prejudices caused them to view us. This enabled Naval Intelligence to stimulate and participate in a total rewrite of U.S. naval strategy and the war plans which governed how we fight a war with the Soviet Union. It also allowed us to plan and conduct meaningful perception management.
The detailed story of the sources, how we exploited them, and how the Navy used the resultant intelligence to create what came to be called “The Maritime Strategy” could be cited as a textbook example of how intelligence should work. It was one of the great intelligence successes of the Cold War. Some day the story will be accurately chronicled. It will validate Colonel Parks’ analysis of Vis- tica’s book as “. . . sensationalist, unscholarly, and inaccurate.” Indeed, it will establish that characterization to be a charitable one.
“The Quest for the Quiet Submarine”
(See N. Polmar, pp. 119-120, October 1995; M. W. Cramer, p. 22, February 1996 Proceedings)
“Newest Akula II Goes on Trial”
(See N. Polmar, p. 22, December 1995 Proceedings)
Gerhardt B. Thamm, former Attack Submarine Analyst at the Naval Intelligence Support Center—Rear Admiral Cramer may be commended for defending the integrity of the Office of Naval Intelligence’s (ONI's) analysis when he writes that it “has never been dictated by the nuclear submarine community. . . .” However, Mr. Polmar has been sniffing around ONI far longer than Admiral Cramer and what he wrote has long been known to us “old timers” at ONI.
- Case #7: It took analysts at the former Naval Intelligence Support Center (NISC), with considerable assistance from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), almost ten years to convince the nuclear submarine community—a.k.a. “the Rick- over People”—that the Soviets were capable of building a titanium submarine that could not only out-dive any U.S. antisubmarine weapon systems, but could out-run any of them as well. During those years the Rickover People prevented the publication of any intelligence analysis— no matter how strong the evidence—of a Soviet class of submarine that was capable of operating to approximately depths of 3,000 feet and of submerged speeds in excess of 42 knots. Only after the CIA graciously signaled that it would publish that analysis no matter what ONI’s position, did NISC rush to publish its Alfa-class SSN study.
- Case #2: As long as the slogan “We have the quietest submarines” suited the Rickover People, no mention of nonacoustic submarine detection systems was ever highlighted. It would have meant that no matter how quiet we were. Admiral Rickover’s submarines were at peril. However, when the nuclear submarine community prepared for a follow- on design to the Los Angeles (SSN-688) class—i.e., the Seawolf (SSN-21)—the search was on for “The Quiet Soviet Submarine.” Although our evidence was inconclusive—i.e., some Soviet submarines came out of overhaul somewhat quieter, some somewhat louder than before the overhaul—it was skewed to serve the nuclear submarine community. I was once pressured by a very senior nuclear submariner to state at a conference that the Victor-III-class SSN was engineered to be quieter than the Victor-I-class SSN. I refused, because the consensus of the NISC acoustic analysts, the NISC photo analysts, and the NISC submarine analysts, as well as CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency analysts, was that the Victor-Ill’s engineering spaces were essentially the same as those of Victor-I’s. The parting shot from the Admiral was, “Well, I don’t believe what you spooks say anyway!” Of course, on that day the commanding officer of NISC—who I should point out typically was a submarine officer—was not a happy sailor, and I became persona non grata with the nuclear submarine community.
“Generation X: One Wardroom’s Perspective”
(See J. Sharpe, C. Ratliff, and K. Peppe, pp. 28- 32, January 1996; E.R. Hebert, p. 19, March; P.M Dabar, R.H. Lewis, pp. 26-28, April 1996 Proceedings)
Commander Chris Nichols, Commanding Officer, USS Curtis Wilbur (DDG-54)— I read with great interest the most recent foray into the world of Generation X, and found it both enlightening and disturbing. It is enlightening to know that these officers can be so far off the mark, yet still claim allegiance to the principles of leadership. It is disturbing to me that their interest was completely devoid of a concern for their people. At all levels, their focus was . .a commitment to one’s vocation ... the security of the United States . . . and . . . this business our profession.” Most appalling though is the complete lack of understanding what the Navy means by equal opportunity (EO).
I put a high premium on the words written by “a junior officer.” It takes a lot of guts to put your thoughts on paper for all the world to see. He should not be faulted for his lack of understanding. He has taken his experience right up to the edge of understanding, but there is no adult leadership to push him over the edge of discovery and help him make the big leap. A sense of duty, purpose and station are important, as well as .. the feeling that no matter where you are in the chain of command, you are making a contribution.” The big problem here is that he applies these lofty ideals only to himself, or more correctly, exclusively to himself. One would have to ask where his Sailors fit in. Do they get the sense of duty, purpose, station, feeling of contribution? If they don’t, where are they supposed to get it? The big leap he hasn’t been allowed to make is the understanding that his people are looking to him for all of those things, and he should take pride in the fact that they look no higher than him for their sense of belonging. If they don’t get it from him, he is discounted and they will look somewhere else. Probably why he feels that. . basic military courtesy often is rendered with resentment . . .” Look in the mirror.
Most distressing among the junior officer’s comments is his apparent view of equal opportunity. To blame loss of tradition on “. . . wholesale destruction of fraternity and authority and their replacement with bogus equality and management,” and then “... emphasis less on authority, discipline, and respect than on managerial-style leadership and equal opportunity” is clear indication that there is a misconception when it comes to the Navy’s equal opportunity program and what is meant by egalitarianism. Somebody needs to explain that EO means that regardless of race, color, creed, religion, gender, and a host of other things, you have the same opportunity to succeed in the Navy as the next person. (I can’t believe I’m actually explaining this.) Most enlightened leaders think this is a good thing. Our JO apparently is implying that EO has somehow led to an undefined egalitarianism. Who is responsible for defining the egalitarianism? Let’s break out the instruction and hold school call.
The same applies to the executive officer’s segment with respect to the guts it takes to put your thoughts on paper for all to see. I applaud him. But he is unimpressed with Generation X and dismisses them as the same old thing. He’s wrong. I too am a baby boomer, with an attention span about as long as the average “I Love Lucy” episode, and the ability to watch the show again and again. The baby boomer mantra, if we have one, is perfectly suited to the life of a naval officer: “Been there; done that. Let’s do it again tomorrow.” Generation X are latchkey kids who have entertained themselves all their lives. They bore easily, and are not apt to repeat the mundane. Once mastered, it’s gone. Their mantra is “Been there; done that.” And that’s it. There is no “Let’s do it again.” I have also met Generation X, and I am impressed. They neither ask for nor need coddling, but they do need direction on refocusing their efforts away from within themselves (where they grew up) and more outside of themselves, toward the rewards of leading men and women. They grew up with a cruel sense of individualism, almost loneliness—that if someone didn’t hack it, they were left behind. The concept of team building is not ingrained (there are few team sports in the Extreme Games), but it is also not lost on Generation X. Now. faced with a seaman who is having trouble with (you fill in the blank with your latest), they can at once be both clueless (“Why is he bringing this problem to me?”) and frustrated. They need help in making the big leap: For true fulfillment, look outside yourself. When they can turn Seaman Problemchild into Petty Officer Trustworthy, and feel the sense of accomplishment that comes from making a difference, then they have made the leap. I have done a lot of neat things during my career, but what I remember most about all my tours is the greatness of my people. Generation X needs to know that.
And finally for the XO, to tell your JOs “Don’t do it for the fun and adventure” is the crudest slap in the face to Generation X. You will never retain JOs if it isn’t fun and adventure. You never would have retained me if it weren’t. But to supplant that with “Do it for the security of the United States” is the biggest mistake. Such lofty ideals should be reserved for 1950s war movies with Audie Murphy. Sailors (including officers) need to do things for ship, shipmate, and self. If you can make Sailors take pride in themselves, then shipmate and ship will follow. I am often struck by the countless acts of heroism performed by Sailors in battle and indeed, in everyday life. Did they do it, often at the cost of their lives, for God and Country? I don’t think so. They did it, and continue to do it, for each other—for the Sailor next to them. The thought of embarrassing themselves in front of their shipmates, the thought of letting their shipmates down, is loathsome to them. Led properly, they won’t let it happen.
If you want emotionless leadership, take your lessons from Mr. Spock and the Starship Enterprise. The commanding officer’s comments about passion are right on the mark. Unfortunately, that’s the only thing I agree with him on. The passion is subsumed “. . . by the bilges, the inspections, the mundane . . .” only if you let it. I have experienced power-hungry, controlling, maniacal “. . . direct, shove-it-down-your-throat” leadership styles and I have only three words for them: No thank you. There is no loss of desire to lead in our Navy, only misdirected or misunderstood leadership. It is not leadership to grab Sailors by the elbow and rub their noses in the bilges and tell them in the most threatening “shove-it-down- your-throat” style to get them clean. It is leadership when you can tell the petty officer in charge of main engine room number two (MER-2) that you want to be able to eat your breakfast off his bilges, and two days later get a note from him inviting you to do so. Proper leadership results in having that petty officer grab you by the elbow and say “Captain, come on down to MER 2, look what I’ve done here.” Can you get clean bilges and top scores on inspections with in-your-face threats? Yes. But you won’t sustain greatness and you will earn resentment. And you will find yourself having to be in their faces more and more often. And having someone . . braced up outside your cabin?” Please.
The loss of sense of fraternity, brotherhood, purpose, and camaraderie in the U.S. Navy cannot be blamed on the Navy and its policies. Nothing in Navy policy has destroyed these essential traditions that make our Navy strong and Navy life so great. If these traditions are missing, there is only one person to blame— the captain, who must bear the full responsibility. It is a terrible responsibility but the rewards that come with it far outweigh the pitfalls. We have made great progress in our Navy, and Generation X represents another challenge that we can take on. But make no mistake—the person at the forefront in the entire U.S. Navy is not the Chief of Naval Operations, and it’s not the Bureau of Personnel—it is the Commanding Officer. Only the Captain will reach Generation X.
“Can-Do Is No Longer Enough”
(See T. G. Waterman, pp. 52-55, December 1995 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral N. T. Saunders, U.S. Coast Guard, Chief, Office of Law Enforcement and Defense Operations—I commend Commander Waterman on his award-winning article. It is thought provoking and timely input for doctrine dialogue ongoing within the Coast Guard. His thesis basically is correct, but I would like to bring Proceedings readers up to date on two initiatives that are in progress.
First, the Coast Guard is in the process of developing a capstone doctrine (CGPubl) and something equivalent to the Navy’s “Forward . . . From the Sea.”
Second, in addition to exploring the question “How much doctrine does the Coast Guard need?”, we have started working with the Joint Warfighting Center and the Naval Doctrine Command to ensure that the Coast Guard is included in Joint doctrine and Navy doctrine when appropriate.
“Filling the Capability Gap”
(See J. Anderson, pp. 34-38, November 1995; R. Mullen, p. 20, February 1996 Proceedings)
Major Les Niblock, U.S. Marine Corps, CH-46 Division Head, Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One—Major Anderson is out of date. Continued introduction of unrestricted rotor heads is eliminating the 22,000-pound restriction on CH-46 (Phrog) maximum gross weight, restoring it to 24,300 pounds—and giving CH-46s a 15-Marine capability. Presently, all CH-46s deploying with Marine expeditionary units (special operations capable) are outfitted with unrestricted rotor heads. Yes, we continue to contend with extensive inspections, but we have regained the capability to carry combat-equipped Marines.
Asserting that the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) commander has “no choice” but to eliminate the helicopter- borne assault as an option is a result of not doing the updated math. Consider an unrestricted CH-46 on a standard day (15° Celsius, sea level):
- 16,500 pounds (basic CH-46 with helicopter emergency floatation system)
- 3,000 pounds (fuel—1+43 [1 hour, 43 minutes] endurance or 172 nautical miles based on ten minutes ground time and 100 knots ground speed)
- 1,100 pounds (crew & miscellaneous)
- 3,600 pounds (15 Marines at 240 pounds each) 24,200-pounds gross weight
Outfitting each deploying unit with unrestricted rotor heads is the interim fix until the dynamic component upgrade (DCU) has completely overhauled the fleet. This program is fully funded and Phase I installations began in February 1996.
All this means that the second part of his first assumption, “airframe integrity will worsen over time,” also is off the mark. CH-46s were originally slated for 10,000 flight hours, a figure recently changed to 12,500 hours—and likely to be extended to 15,000 hours. Does this mean we can go on forever without taking corrosion control seriously? No, but as reflected by the 30,000-hour CH-46s flown by Columbia Helicopters, the airframe is not a problem. Aircraft with DCU fully incorporated will be new, except for a few bullet patches from various wars.
The idea that we are not survivable on the battlefield is ridiculous. Today’s CH-46s are much more survivable and more capable than the ones I began flying in 1983. We’re still slow and have little ability to maneuver vertically, but better tactics and new survivability equipment have kept us ready. What does it take to survive on the battlefield? If we combine equipment, intelligent analysis of the combat situation, and appropriate tactics—and train to use them on every flight—we will be survivable.
The current aircraft survivability equipment suite on the CH-46 has limitations identified in the Mission Needs Statement for Assault Support Aircraft Survivability Enhancements. The shortfalls reflect the nonintegrated nature of the equipment that has been incorporated on the airframe. (See “Helos Deserve Respect—and Survivability Gear,” pp. 74-76, February 1996 Proceedings.) We need a dispensing system integrated with appropriate radar and missile warning systems that can detect, classify, and defeat second- and third-generation infrared and radio-frequency air-to-air and surface-to-air missiles.
To ensure continued viability, we must recover additional payload without giving up any of the hard-won acquisitions—a two-part process. First, we must establish a standardized strip list designed to increase payload, and offer it to deployed units; they can compare it against the actual threat and decide what they can take off the airframe. Second, we must acquire new, lighter equipment to replace older and heavier gear—replacing the ARC-94 high-frequency radio with the ARC-217, for example.
As Major Anderson points out. Marines innovate to overcome obstacles, and the CH-46 community is a prime example. Writing off one asset because another is faster or flies farther is a poor substitute for intelligent mission planning. Everything must be balanced against airframe basic weight and the need to carry 15 Marines and 3,000 pounds of fuel on a standard day. We need a low-calorie, high-protein Phrog diet.
“Whatever Happened To ASW?”
(See T. Brooks p. 13. February 1996 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Randal D. Farley, U.S. Naval Reserve—The de-emphasis of ASW Navy-wide is becoming more and more evident in platform and crew performance in ASW-related training events. Admiral Brooks’ question about what the threat really is hits the problem square on the mark.
The air ASW communities in the Pacific Fleet are drifting without direction or motivation regarding focused ASW. The trend to disregard the blue-water threat has led to at least two communities, carrier-based patrol aircraft (VS) and ASW helicopters (HSL), focusing totally on shallow-water diesel tactics and weapons employment. The helicopters are trying to save their ASW mission altogether, while the land-based patrol community (VP) is struggling to maintain proficiency in the face of a 50% reduction in forces, additional warfare taskings, and the loss of operating bases. This struggle is exacerbated by the fact that the requirement for maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) support to the fleet has not diminished to the degree that the community has been cut. The consequence is that personnel are having more demands placed on their “at home” cycles. The only way the MPA community is able to meet its operational tasking requirements is to have reserve crews augment active duty crews for every fleet exercise. Currently, reserve crews are flying 40% of all MPA missions.
The specter of a return of the Russian submarine force to a imminent threat status is unsettling. Third-generation Russian submarines are in most ways superior to the Los Angeles (SSN-688)-class boats that make up the backbone of the U.S. fleet. Very few air ASW practitioners have ever prosecuted a third-generation Russian nuclear submarine. Outside of the Reserve MPA community, there are very few ASW aviators who have ever been on top of a Russian submarine of any generation. The de-emphasis of ASW, coupled with the passing of time and the promotion/retirement of personnel will leave the U.S. Navy without the requisite abilities and experience to counter, as Admiral Brooks states, “the most significant threat to our ability to execute our missions.”
When standards cannot be met at a level needed to maintain readiness, the standards are lowered. At least two communities have, in effect, “no-fail” mechanisms in their basic ASW qualification guidelines. The lack of flight hours, ordnance, and training opportunities (i.e., real sub time) amplify the deficiencies. 1 wholeheartedly agree with Admiral Brooks that the U.S. Navy needs to “reinvigorate the entire spectrum of ASW capabilities . . .above all, priority, consciousness, and mindshare.”
“A New Direction for Submarines”
(See N. Pol mar, pp.121-123, March 1996 Proceedings)
Lieutenant William P. Haeck, U.S. Naval Reserve (KPMG Peat Marwick, Newport, RI)—In Norman Polmar’s article and in recent congressional hearings on the state of the Navy’s submarine development program, the Navy’s New Attack Submarine (NSSN) has come under increasing attack as a symbol of the Navy’s inability to produce a “saleable” submarine program. The arguments in support of this position essentially dwell on two alleged failures on the part of the U.S. Navy. First, critics point to the Navy’s lack of vision and forehandedness with respect to Russia’s rapidly advancing ASW capabilities. The fact that the Navy does not currently have a platform to counter Russian attack submarine developments makes this a difficult assertion to refute. Second, critics argue that the Navy has shown an increasing inability to develop and produce an affordable submarine capable of living up to its promised potential. The Seawolf (SSN-21) and NSSN are advanced as examples of this failure.
1 do not believe that this second argument holds up under scrutiny. Although the Seawolf and her prohibitive price tag are less-than-flattering examples of the Navy’s submarine development capabilities, the Navy’s NSSN program is an ambitious attempt to alter the status quo and produce an exceptional submarine at an affordable price. To simply label the NSSN as a failure because it does not compare favorably with the Akula and follow-on Soviet SSNs is an injustice. The NSSN never has been designed and or represented as a submarine to match top Soviet blue-water subs. The NSSN has been designed and developed as a joint littoral operations platform for use in support of the Navy’s “Forward . . . From the Sea” strategy. Per congressional mandate, emphasis in the NSSN program has been on affordability.
With this in mind, another look at the NSSN reveals that the submarine’s development and engineering efforts are very much in concert with the type of progress Congress and others are demanding. The following are examples of revolutionary concepts being applied to the NSSN that directly parallel congressional demands:
- Significantly increased reliance upon and incorporation of commercial off- the-shelf (COTS) technology.
- Employment of independent review teams to ensure cooperation and interaction with industry, national laboratories, and academia.
- Use of industry “best-of-practice” methods like integrated product and process design (1PPD) and use of computer-aided design (CAD) systems like Electric Boat’s Katia. In addition, partnerships with industry were developed earlier than during construction of previous platforms.
- Incorporation of acquisition-reform principles (performance specifications, emphasis on commercial standards instead of MilSpecs, reliance on COTS, etc.) as an anchor for all design and development efforts.
- Use of modular construction (i.e., in the mast and combat systems platform) that facilitates the insertion of technology advancements.
- Use of open system architecture (OSA) to facilitate the insertion of COTS and future technology refreshes into the C3I system.
Rear Admiral Robert E. Frick’s briefing in the recent congressional hearings provides a more comprehensive listing of some of the advanced technologies and methodologies that are being incorporated into NSSN development.
The NSSN is an excellent example of how the Navy has improved its efforts to design and develop submarines. The NSSN will be an extremely capable and affordable boat prepared to perform every mission it has been designed for. If Congress is unhappy with the capabilities of the NSSN, it should examine the steps leading to concept development, rather than the implementation of the design.
Finally, it should also be noted that attempts to turn the NSSN into a floating prototype are directly at odds with Congress’s earlier condemnation of the Navy’s incremental improvement of existing systems. If Congress is truly concerned with the Russia’s advancing technology, the answer is to devote further resources to future programs whose exclusive focus is on recapturing open water superiority from the Russians. In the meantime, NSSN development should be continued in order to provide the Navy with a platform that is capable of fulfilling the joint littoral role for which the NSSN was designed.
“End Sexism”
(See J. L. Byron, pp. 27-31, February 1996; C. Bly Chester, A.J. Corbett, pp 12-20, April 1996 Proceedings)
Commander Jan M. van Tol, U.S. Navy— Captain Byron states that he “would be the last to curtail one’s right to speak out.” Yeah, right. Two sentences later, he notes that he would “at some point” consider wrong thoughts to constitute “a challenge to the writer’s judgment, loyalty, and potential” if a writer goes beyond that point. It’s hard to imagine a more chilling formulation with respect to writing on professional matters. I wonder if disagreeing with his comments falls into that category.
One would think that after the fiasco following the publication of controversial commentary last summer when several reports suggested that Proceedings’ editorial staff members were going to be punished or even fired for departing from the party line, that every member of the Naval Institute would have been reminded that the imposition of censorship, whether formal or informal, a priori or ex post, is one of the stupidest things an organization can do to itself. Commandant of the Marine Corps General Charles Krulak recently noted—correctly—that the military today is living in an extremely error-intolerant environment, which militates heavily against risk-taking in one’s career. Were this not bad enough institutionally, those who argue through intellectual intimidation against robust discussion of cutting-edge professional matters further increase the military’s risk of creating an officer corps of sheep.
The specific subject of Captain Byron's essay has the potential to become a case in point. The introduction of large numbers of women into combatant units is one of the most radical innovations ever undertaken by a major military service. Yet a female admiral briefing naval officers assigned to various Office of the Secretary of Defense billets less than two years ago prefaced her remarks on the subject by forthrightly stating that the extraordinary changes in Department of Defense assignment policies with respect to women in combat roles had been "made with very little debate either among the public or in the Congress." Certainly they had not been debated on the only basis that should matter to professional military officers—whether the inclusion of women in combatant units increases (or does not reduce) the combat effectiveness of those units. It is that very lack of such professional debate and the seeming institutional lack of commitment to an open evidentiary process to evaluate the success of the innovation which continue to fuel the unease with which many officers view those changes. When and if the women-in-combat issue comes to be examined retrospectively in the future, one sincerely hopes it will not have become a classic case study of the consequences of failure to debate.
The moment Proceedings requires that a contribution reflect enthusiastic support of whatever favored policy is in effect is the moment that its usefulness is over. More than ever, the Navy needs a forum for robust, even no-holds-barred, professional exchange on the most important issues facing the service. For those who would punish “wrong thinkers,” don’t worry, every article exposes the author to the judgment and criticism of every member of the reading audience—but it should be his/her risk to take, free from blatant censorship. So keep publishing the controversial pieces, Naval Institute. Who knows, it might even increase your membership numbers.
Rear Admiral Ned Hogan, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Having recently completed Philip Howard’s thought-provoking diagnosis of American life in the 1990s The Death of Common Sense, I examined Captain Byron’s essay with some trepidation. And my worst fears were confirmed as to where the post-Tailhook Navy is headed. If a recently retired serving officer and award-winning contributor to the Proceedings could develop such an analysis, damning the naval service in such harsh terms, and come up with such a detailed process to eliminate the perception of sexism, as defined by innuendo and isolated incidents, then we are indeed seeing common sense eradicated from Navy policy debates.
This diminution of the principles of fairness, integrity, loyalty, and service by the current Navy leadership to the gospel of political correctness was recently highlighted by the commentaries of Bob Caldwell in the San Diego Union-Tribune, dealing with the reversal of the recommendation to promote Commander Bob Stumpf to captain—based solely on guilt by association in the Tailhook fiasco. It is this death of common sense, as evidenced by Captain Byron’s essay—which must reflect, at least, in part, the policy leanings of today’s Navy management—and the actions of the Clinton administration, civilian and uniformed, that allow the Tailhook fiasco to fester.
With reference to the specifics of the Byron manifesto, it would take volumes to counter its allegations, analysis, and policy recommendations. The forum does not have the space for such a rebuttal, but 1 offer the following comments to express some of my concerns:
> Captain Byron impugns the motives of all Navy men and women, not in agreement with his doctrine, as being sexist and labels them as “Neanderthals.” In his inductive analysis to support his premise and thesis, he views every interaction between men and women through a very narrowly focused lens and ignores other views that do not see the world through his unisex paradigm. A more balanced view can be seen in Warren Farrell’s The Myth of Male Power.
- Captain Byron, while taking advantage of the Proceedings forum to present his views, wants no discussion of the issues and wants those with a sense of loyalty to tradition, service, principles, and common sense to “get out of the goddam way.” As one who has often been denied the pulpit of the forum to express dissenting views to the politically correct paradigm, I believe there has been no real discussion or debate on the subject, particularly on the issue of placing women in combat, and that current policies have been done by fiat, partially in response to the Tailhook fiasco.
- Captain Byron’s discussion of the relationship between men and women has a priggish quality that ignores the reality of “life its own self.” It promotes unisexism to the detriment of sexuality and the intrinsic differences between men and women. It portrays Navy women as uninterested in fashion and as not wanting to be attractive or appealing to the opposite sex, and he ignores the concerns of the majority of Navy women—the spouses of our sailors.
- Captain Byron, in declaring victory for the pro femina forces and intimating that their sentiments reflect the view of the nation at large, is wrong. There are other views and voices, and the 1994 election indicates that the more liberal and radical feminist views do not reflect the sentiments of all the American people.
- Captain Byron is misleading in his highlighting of “The Law and Women in the Navy” by presenting as law the current Navy policy of placing women in selected combat units. The Congress has eliminated combat exclusion, but it has not mandated that women be placed in harm’s way as combatants; the Navy alone is responsible for that decision.
- Captain Byron fosters the unisex paradigm in an absolute way reminiscent of “thought police” in presenting his manifesto to eliminate sexism in the Navy as outlined in his guidelines for personal behavior and in his program to create change. To promote this type of philosophy anywhere in America fosters the death of common sense—and, I, for one, strongly object.
As a nation, we are in the midst of significant change as heralded by the Toffiers’ third wave and the information revolution. The Navy needs to adapt to the changing times, but it does not need to destroy itself or its traditions or recreate itself in the feminist image. It does not need to cultivate an “-ism” process of any origin to be the best it can be; rather it needs to use common sense in dealing with contentious and persistent issues—the continuing saga of Tailhook being the most pernicious. It’s time to pause and reflect and to make policy decisions based on common sense and fairness, not on appeasing any particular special-interest group.
The Influence of Sea Power Upon. .. Asia
Rear Admiral Michael McDevitt, Commandant of the National War College— As events this past March demonstrated, the U.S. Navy remains the key to stability in East Asia. Speaking on Capitol Hill, but talking to a wider audience. Secretary of Defense William Perry made a remarkably clear and unambiguous strategic statement in reference to the dispatch of two aircraft carrier battle groups to the international waters near Taiwan: “America has the best damned Navy in the world and no one should forget that.” He went on to say that “Beijing should know, and this will remind them ... the premier—the strongest—military power in the Western Pacific is the United States.” This strategic straight talk has deep and lasting significance beyond the military posturing surrounding Taiwan’s presidential elections. Mr. Perry emphasized to audiences at home and abroad that the United States, thanks to its naval power, has the ability to thwart any Chinese use of conventional military power beyond the Eurasian landmass.
Today’s U.S. Navy is stronger, better balanced across all war-fighting areas, and more ready for any eventuality than any other navy in the world. In fact, it is altogether likely that our Navy can deal with the threats of the day better than any other navy in history, except for the one that flew the Stars and Stripes in 1945.
In practical terms, this remarkable capability goes to the heart of Mr. Perry’s other point: The United States is the dominant military power in the Western Pacific. Certainly, the Navy is not the only military force we have in East Asia. We also have Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps units permanently stationed in bases in Japan and Korea. Unlike the Navy, however, these forces are oriented primarily toward the Korean Peninsula and justified primarily by the North Korean threat.
Purists will argue that the other services are inherently mobile in concept. True enough—if enough sea lift and air lift are available to move them to a scene of crisis. In East Asia, the potential area of employment is vast, the availability of lift in the theater limited, and the base structure to support militarily significant air operations southwest of Okinawa—i.e., the Philippines—is no longer available to the United States. The only military power that the President can employ unilaterally in support of U.S. national interests (other than in the vicinity of Japan or Korea) is naval.
And we do have vital national interests throughout Asia. These include stability across the Taiwan Strait, peace in the South China Sea, free access to essential commercial shipping routes through the Indonesian straits, and freedom of navigation throughout all the Western Pacific. We cannot walk away from our friends, our treaty allies, or our own economic future.
When Dr. Perry talks about the premier military power in the Western Pacific, he is really talking about the U.S. Navy. China has a vast army and an old but enormous air force. In classic strategic terms, they are a continental power— a nation with the ability to bring decisive military power against countries with a shared border. They have the ability to swamp any of their neighbors within direct reach, except Russia and India. Reaching across water is a different story. When it comes to bringing conventional military influence to bear in a credible way beyond her immediate neighbors, China always can be trumped by the Seventh Fleet. Anything that China—or for that matter, anyone else in Asia—hopes to do that involves operations on, over, or beneath the seas is done only with the forbearance of the United States.
This gives us enormous leverage in furthering our primary objectives in Asia; a stable political environment, an economic open door, and a level economic playing field for our exports. It has become almost a cliché to assert that the United States is an East Asian power. Given the vast Pacific ocean which separates us from Asia, it is easy to see why this argument is sometimes viewed with skepticism by many in Asia as well as the United States. But ironically, although the ocean separates us, it also is the means by which we have gained and continue to maintain influence throughout the Western Pacific. It is our naval capability that makes us welcome and wanted in the region, opening doors to U.S. trade and jobs. To paraphrase Alfred Thayer Mahan, it is the influence of sea power on Asia that gives us influence and respect in that distant but vital region.
“Support Our (Other) Troops”
(See M. E. McCaffrey, p. 97, March 1996 Proceedings)
Commander Robert C. Whitten, U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—Commander McCaffrey’s plea for closer relations between the armed forces and employers of reservists seems to be largely wishful thinking. Gaining support for large-scale actions like Desert Shield and Desert Storm—which clearly are in the national interest—is at most a minor problem. Indeed, if the call-ups were limited to military operations that enjoy the broad backing of the American people few problems would appear. So-called “peacekeeping” operations are another matter: it is highly unlikely that any of these will generate popular support. Certainly, Bosnia has not. Thus it is unrealistic to ask employers to make major sacrifices for actions that fail the test of such support.
Presently, I am retired and unlikely to engage in a business where I might be asked to survive without my key personnel—and then to reinstate them as if they had never left after the service demobilizes them. If I were to start such a business, one of the first things I would try to ascertain about job applicants would be whether they are reservists. If so, I would be most reluctant to hire them. Of course, if the rules changed so that recalls would be only for Desert Storm-type operations—missions with strong national consensus and support—and not those of the Haiti, Bosnia, Cuba, Somalia variety, etc., I would never think of practicing such discrimination. The sooner our policy makers become aware of that start reality, the better off the country will be.