“Information Warfare in 2015”
(See G. F. Kraus, pp. 42-45, August 1995 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Riki Y. Morikawa, U.S. Naval Reserve—Commander Kraus brings up some interesting points about information warfare; however, many of his concerns are not new to international users of information. From the global financial markets that depend on commercial networks to the corporations, universities, and government agencies that are connected to the Internet, we all must be concerned with attacks by organized groups (or countries) as well as mischievous computer hackers.
Commander Kraus correctly observes that the intent and identity of any would- be information attacker would be ambiguous; therefore, attackers with computer and network skills could lead network cops on an international wild goose chase. If perpetrators cannot be identified, how can we expect to establish their intent or their ties to any government or group?
The author also states that although logistics information systems are cryptologically secure, they remain vulnerable to disruption and the introduction of erroneous data bits (i.e., random errors). I am not familiar with this particular information system, but I do know something about the telecommunication systems provided to U.S. diplomats overseas. Many countries have such a poor communications infrastructure that random errors are introduced into networks continuously; therefore, several technical methods are used to ensure network integrity. First, multiple transmission paths—including leased local and international lines and commercial and government satellites—are used. Second, the X.25 standard, based on packet-switch theory, is employed to detect and retransmit lost or corrupted data. This standard was developed initially by the Department of Defense to ensure the continuation of communications in case of widespread destruction of the communications infrastructure. Combined with sound encryption techniques, these methods have kept the most critical U.S. diplomatic channels open in the most harrowing of circumstances.
Protection of information networks has become a vital to U.S. national security. As such, the Department of Defense should join with intelligence and law-enforcement agencies in order to develop and share technical expertise and hone their protection skills. But, just as information networks now are global in scope, so should be the efforts of the U.S. government to protect them. The problem is an international one, and no one country could possibly hope to police the electronic world alone. Therefore, we must combine forces with our allies to keep a lid on these ever-increasing threats.
".. . We’re tinkering with success here’: An Interview with Admiral Boorda”
(See pp. 30-36, April 1995; G. A. Everding, pp. 18-19, July 1995 Proceedings)
General Ronald R. Fogleman, U.S. Air Force; Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force— Lieutenant Commander Everding claims that I have said “the Navy needs only seven aircraft carriers.” At no time have I made such a statement. I make it a practice not to criticize the force structure of the other services.
“Reflections on a Naval Career”
(See L. Di Rita, pp. 8-10, August 1995 Proceedings)
Commander Deborah S. Gernes, U.S. Navy (Retired), former Commanding Officer, USS Cimarron (AO-177)—In my 20-year Navy career, until now I have never found it necessary to write to Proceedings to protest the publication of an offering.
While I realize and support Proceedings' responsibility to present many sides of issues and opposing points of view, this piece has little to offer but the hysterical rantings of someone longing for what he obviously considers the “good old days”—when he didn’t have to put up with any darn women and minorities, and sure didn't have to deal with ridiculous environmental rules, TQL, or accountability for his actions. This offensive and unprofessional commentary is an insult to every naval officer, and reflects the basest form of fictional hyperbole (read propaganda). □
Commander Albert Vittek, U.S. Navy (Retired)—This commentary offers much food for thought. The first time I read it, I found it humorous, but I thought I probably was missing something. The second time I read it, I recognized the satire, and I knew that there might be strong reactions to it, both pro and con. While many may disagree with Mr. Di Rita’s thoughts, I commend Proceedings for continuing to honor the basic right of freedom of the press and serving as an objective clearinghouse of ideas. As a 33- year life member of the Naval Institute, I admire and respect that our professional society publishes such contributions.
“Learning Jointness”
(See L. B. Wilkerson, pp. 107-108, May 1995 Proceedings)
Captain Patrick L. Denny, U.S. Navy Colonel Wilkerson’s contention that the service colleges could provide a first-rate joint education without the policy guidance and review of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) is flawed. While there is no argument that all service colleges provide outstanding education, none of it would be “joint" without the joint community’s engagement in the learning process.
The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 mandated that professional military schools strengthen their focus on joint matters and develop rigorous standards in order to better prepare officers for joint assignments. Congress also directed the CJCS to: formulate policies for coordinating all military education; and advise and assist the Secretary of Defense in conducting periodic reviews of the curriculum of professional military education (PME) institutions to enhance education and training in joint matters. Between 1987 and 1989, five major PME-related committees and panels made numerous, specific recommendations to improve military education, especially in the area of joint matters. Many of these recommendations, including most of the recommendations made by Congressman Ike Skelton’s (D-MO) panel, were incorporated into military education policy.
Colonel Wilkerson is not alone when he comments that military colleges now are under continuous scrutiny. I have visited every intermediate and senior service college as a working member of the CJCS’s Panel on Joint Professional Military Education or as the team chief on a joint education accreditation visit. Without exception, faculty and staff members bemoan time lost preparing for visits by “interested” parties. This increased level of attention is symptomatic of what is going on nationally in higher education where both government and private donors insist that diminishing funds be spent more wisely. Accreditation is used, rightly or wrongly, as a means of determining the distribution of funds. Similarly, the joint accreditation process is not only a peer review to aid institutional improvement; but also an assurance to Congress that the curriculum and standards for the education in joint matters are in place and functioning.
Colonel Wilkerson’s assertion that the Joint Staff has an “insatiable appetite” for levying requirements on the schools is bogus. The men and women who work in the Joint Staff’s Military Education Division do their best to execute the CJCS’s statutory requirements without unnecessary interference in the schools’ operations. Development and refinement of military education policy is a continuous, collaborative effort coordinated by the Joint Staff with the combatant commands, services, PME schools, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The real “masters of education” the author satirically refers to are the generals and admirals in the military education community. This group meets semiannually under the auspices of the Military Education Coordination Conference (MECC). The MECC addresses execution of the CJCS’s policy guidance, coordinates institutional efforts, and reviews curricula for currency. The CJCS, assisted by the MECC, establishes joint education standards and learning objectives. Schools have total freedom in curriculum development and course presentation.
The author implies that the current emphasis on joint doctrine inhibits quality military education and mixes training with education. Joint doctrine, as the authoritative guidance for employment of the armed forces, is critically linked to joint education. Students at the intermediate and senior colleges must read, understand, apply, analyze, challenge, and, most important, prepare to execute joint doctrine in their follow-on tours.
Colonel Wilkinson thinks that the emphasis on distributed wargaming is a distraction to education and, once again, more aptly covered in training commands. Perhaps the pure strategist can sit in a small seminar room and think great thoughts, but warfighters must learn to work with each other—wargaming gives them that chance. Tools available in today’s classrooms include doctrinal publications, joint electronic libraries, computer networks, and distributed wargaming. Students will use these tools—and learn to appreciate the full potential (and limitations) of information on the battlefield—or fall behind.
The “blessed state of benign neglect in the military education system” is over, at least from the Joint Staff’s perspective. As U.S. military operations become increasingly joint, the emphasis on joint education will keep pace. The coverage of joint matters in PME schools “debilitates” warfighting readiness no more than carrier and amphibious warfare studies at the Naval War College weakened maritime readiness in the 1930s.
“The Joint Warfighting Center Focuses on the Brave New World”
(See B. G. Welch and W. O. Welsh, pp. 109111, May 1995 Proceedings)
Commander George McCaffrey, U.S. Navy, Joint Doctrine Planner, the Joint Staff (J-7)—This article contains numerous errors and misleading statements regarding the development of joint doctrine.
By law, the responsibility for “[d]eveloping doctrine for the joint employment of the armed forces” is assigned to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). To that end, the Joint Doctrine Division of the Joint Staff s Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate (J-7)—in full consultation with the services, combatant commanders, and the rest of the Joint Staff—developed, and the CJCS published, Joint Pub 1-01: Joint Publication System Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Development Program. This document establishes the framework for the development of joint doctrine; a process that is driven by, and responsive to, its principal users: the services, combatant commanders, and the Joint Staff.
Certainly, consensus is a goal in joint- doctrine development, but that does not mean joint doctrine represents the “lowest common denominator.” An idea or product that is the result of an interactive group that discusses a topic fully is likely to reflect quite a high common denominator. Consensus does not demand that every issue raised during deliberations be addressed in the final product; rather, it demands that every issue raised be satisfactorily addressed and, if necessary for the accuracy and completeness of the publication, be included in it.
As one might expect, complete agreement is not possible on every issue. Whenever an agreement cannot be reached at the planner level, it is referred to the services’ deputy operations deputies, operations deputies, or the Joint Chiefs for resolution. Furthermore, there is no requirement for unanimous consent. On the rare occasions when unanimous consent cannot be reached, the CJCS makes the final decision.
Two recently published joint-doctrinal works produced by this vigorous process are Joint Publication 3-01.5: Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile Defense and Joint Publication 3-56.1: Command and Control for Joint Air Operations. Each publication was thoroughly vetted with a great deal of interplay. In order to produce doctrines that were truly joint, some compromises were made. But these compromises were essential to producing what the services demand: real joint doctrine, not a single service’s doctrine with a purple cover on it.
The authors use misleading terms to describe the criteria for selecting a lead agent to produce a doctrinal publication’s first draft. They state, “The current procedure involves the appointment of a service component to be a proponent of a particular joint manual.” The “appointment” process is a little more sophisticated than the authors make it out to be. Whenever a doctrinal void is identified, the Doctrine Division of the Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) is tasked to conduct a front-end analysis of the subject. The JWFC presents its analysis to the biannual Joint Doctrine Working Party which decides if a doctrinal publication or a tactics, techniques, and procedures publication is needed. The joint- doctrine community then determines who should prepare the publication. Often the service having the most expertise—the core competency—in the particular field is chosen to produce the first draft.
The first draft, however, is not written in isolation. The services, combatant commanders, and the Joint Staff have ample opportunity to participate, from the first-draft working groups to the final formal-coordination process. As for the example cited in the article, having the Marine Corps produce the first draft of joint doctrine for amphibious operations makes sense but to suggest that “the other services don’t have a big interest” in this topic is ludicrous. The U.S. Army, for example, has conducted many amphibious operations in the past and retains a keen interest in them.
Contrary to the authors’ suggestion, the services are not the lead agents for all joint-doctrine publications. The lead agent could be a service; just as often, however, the lead agent is a combatant command or one of the Joint Staff’s directorates. For the critical Capstone and Keystone publications—which provide the overarching concepts to which subordinate publications must adhere—the Joint Staff is the lead agent. The sole exception is Joint Publication 3-0; Doctrine for Joint Operations; the U.S. Army is the lead agent for this document, although the CJCS and the Joint Chiefs took an active role in shaping its contents. In fact, the basis for Doctrine for Joint Operations was the CJCS’s November 1992 White Paper Doctrinal Statement of Selected Joint Operational Concepts.
The authors lay blame for some tragic episodes on a flaw or an omission in joint doctrine. The first episode is the battle in Mogadishu, Somalia on 3 October 1993 in which IB U.S. soldiers were killed. That day’s events may have led the Clinton administration to review U.S. policy in Somalia, but the authors establish no linkage, direct or indirect, between the events and joint doctrine.
Blaming the 1983 Beirut tragedy on a flaw or an omission in joint doctrine demonstrates a misunderstanding of how rules of engagement (ROEs) are developed and implemented. ROEs are defined in Joint Publication l-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms as: “Directives issued by competent military authority which delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered.” Joint doctrine is defined as: “Fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces of two or more services in coordinated action toward a common objective.” ROEs are driven by policy, operational, and legal considerations, and necessarily depend on the situation. They are addressed repeatedly in joint doctrine in order to direct the readers’ attention to their significance and underpinning foundations. They are not, however, specifically spelled out for every possible circumstance.
In discussing the newly created JWFC, the authors claim that the purpose of its Doctrine Division is to “... develop joint doctrine, test that doctrine, and finally to provide training to the field on that current and developed joint doctrine.” While it is true that the role of the JWFC’s Doctrine Division will be vital in the development of joint doctrine, their mission statement directs they will “|a]ssist the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, commanders of the unified and specific commands, and Chiefs of the Services in their preparation for joint warfare both in the conceptualization, development, and assessment of current and future joint doctrine.” The defining source for joint doctrine development is—and will continue to be—Joint Publication 1-01: Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States.
Furthermore, the now-deactivated Joint Doctrine Center (JDC) was not a failure because it did not write joint doctrine. The JDC’s original mission was to evaluate joint doctrine in its test-publication phase. Since the practice of using test publications has been discontinued in order to shorten the doctrine development cycle, the JDC was assigned other missions to support the development of joint doctrine—e.g., publication assessment, analysis, and doctrinal support to joint exercises. When the JDC was incorporated into the Joint Warfighting Center, these missions were incorporated along with it.
The CJCS has directed a number of improvements that will make joint doctrine more readable, reduce redundancy between publications, increase awareness of it, and make it readily available. There always will be room for improvement in joint doctrine, and for those responsible for its development to think otherwise would be irresponsible. In the final analysis, the development of joint doctrine is a vigorous process that is responsive to the needs of the services.
“Give the Air Force Back to the Army”
(See J. W. Hammond, p. 50, July 1995 Proceedings)
Major General Kenneth W. Weir, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve (Retired)— Colonel Hammond is one of my favorite Marines but—whoa!—“Give the Air Force Back to the Army?” That may not be the last thing the Marine Corps really wants, but—even if he only wants to put the Air Force in the Department of the Army as a separate service—it is at least a close second.
Marine tactical air is the only justification for the existence of the U.S. Marine Corps. While he was Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Robert H. Barrow directed all Marine Corps general officers—the ground generals and some pseudo-aviator generals—to stop talking about doing away with Marine tactical air. He succinctly pointed out that a Marine Corps without tactical air looks exactly like the U.S. Army—and nobody needs a second Army.
For the same reason, the Marine Corps and its friends cannot advocate that the Army reabsorb the Air Force with all the capability the U.S. Air Force maintains, particularly its tactical air. If it did, the Army would look exactly like the Marine Corps and the United States does not need a second Marine Corps, even though every other country in the world—and the U.S. Army—would give just about anything to have one Marine Corps the caliber of ours.
The U.S. Air Force is very independent and marches to its own jet blast, full burner and big time. Air Force personnel have very few non-Air Force or non-former Air Force friends anywhere in the civilian community, particularly in the other services and especially in industry. And guess what? They don’t really care. At times, it appears the Air Force is at war with everybody. Make no mistake about it, there are some very fine Air Force officers serving our country who are extremely talented, but also politically astute and very shrewd. Most of them are true believers in the Air University’s “Victory Solely Through Air Power” doctrine and apparently have pledged their allegiance thereto first and foremost.
If the Air Force were placed within the Department of the Army, its leaders would never rest until they were the dominant service and the department reverted back to being the Department of the Air Force with a complete combined-arms capability just like Marine Corps already has and knows best how to employ—and the U.S. Army wishes they had. One can readily visualize then the secondary defense role a dominant Department of the Air Force with its own Army would relegate the Navy to. And people thought the “nukes” were bad. . . .
A combined U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force is not in the best interests of the Marine Corps, the Navy, the Army, or the United States of America.
“Last Rites for Military Medicine?”
(See A.M. Smith, pp. 32-36, July 1995 Proceedings)
Captain Todd Fredricks, Medical Corps, West Virginia Army National Guard—I must take exception to Captain Smith’s notion that the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences (USUHS) is the best means of training military physicians. In fact, it should be scuttled— and without delay.
Captain Smith states that the $562,000 spent on each USUHS student is well worth the money. That is absurd. His own references state that the military can acquire a civilian-trained physician through the Health Professionals Scholarship Program (HPSP) for $111,000. The military acquired me and five of my medical school classmates—including one West Point graduate—for nothing; we never received any scholarships. The money saved would more than pay for the Basic Officer Course, the Advanced Officer Course, and the Combat Casualty Care Course (C4) not to mention Flight Surgeon School and perhaps a “Super C4”—in which a military surgeon could attend a two-week, continuous field course including live animal casualties and moulaged humans who demand triage, logistic support, and real surgical treatment. All of this training could be completed easily in one year. Furthermore, civilian-trained military doctors come from varied backgrounds and bring with them a diversity of experience and new ideas. Certainly, this would help military medicine to advance.
Combat medicine and surgery are not complicated. Broken down to their essentials they involve: triage, quick hemorrhage and airway control, aggressive fluid volume replacement and management, early and liberal debridement and amputation, and focused medical therapy aimed at controlling sepsis. Coupled with orderly evacuation, these principles govern the technical practice of combat medicine. Once one learns the principle of military triage, the rest is academic. Certainly one doesn’t need to spend four years learning these tasks. Realistically, peacetime training should amount to four weeks (two in the Basic Officer Course and two at C4); in combat, the learning curve would flatten at about day two of intense conflict and casualty reception.
What Captain Smith vainly tries to illustrate is a practical and cost-effective means of continuously replenishing the military with not just doctors in uniform, but with surgeons. The answer is not in techniques or schooling, but in mind set. There are two types of doctors in the military: field surgeons and hospital surgeons. The former are found at battalion aid stations, forward support medical companies, and special-operations units. These doctors live with the troops, they appreciate fieldcraft and understand combat operations. The latter prefer to operate in the fixed or large facility environment. They tend to be uninterested, if not plainly uncomfortable, in the field environment, know little of combat operations, and openly protest the austerity under which field surgeons often operate.
I often have encountered such physicians. Once, while serving as the surgeon of a National Guard combat engineer battalion, I received a phone call at the aid station from an active-duty physician working at the post troop medical clinic. This doctor could not understand why I chose to remain in the field, in a tent, treating soldiers suffering from dehydration, smashed digits, lacerations, and blunt trauma when I could be treating people in the air-conditioned clinic. I conveyed to him that I was the battalion surgeon and that the battalion was not in garrison, but in the field. Later, the same doctor complained at length about the conditions that he had to endure while supporting soldiers in Haiti. This illustrates the distinction nicely.
The military needs physicians who consider themselves to be soldiers, sailors, and airmen first. But the recognition of the distinct types of people who populate the services’ medical establishments—not the continuation of the USUHS—is the solution. I have seen many enthusiastic Medical Corps officers denied the chance even to attend their Basic Officer Course. Too often, the gun fighters cannot see the need for the docs to go to school. After all, docs don’t really want to be soldiers, they want to play golf, avoid physical training, and, in general, take it easy—right?
If the services become more intelligent in working with their field surgeons—including them in staff walks and meetings, fostering and encouraging military education, and cultivating the doctors who demonstrate a desire to further their understanding of the operational art—their medical needs will be better met.
Captain Richard S. Loveland, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Navy medicine already is dead.
Recently, I went for treatment of a serious skin condition to Bethesda Naval Hospital’s dermatology clinic. I was told that the hospital was not seeing retired personnel any more because it was under extreme pressure to reduce its workload. Those of you still on active duty should face the prospect that the benefits you were told you would get upon retirement—e.g., decent medical treatment— won’t be there when you need them.
“Marketing the Fleet”
(See N. Golightly, pp. 53-56, July 1995 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Tony Parisi, U.S. Navy—I disagree with Commander Golightly’s premise that the Navy must develop a new marketable vision if it “wants to get a big piece of the defense world.” Likening the Navy to his current employer, Ford Motor Company, and other large corporations, he asserts that the Navy “must reassess the demands of the market and be prepared to reinvent [its] product.” Just what is the Navy’s “product”? Commander Golightly ducks this complex issue by admitting that “the Navy is not, strictly speaking, a business.” Nonetheless, he continues to compare the Navy to a hypothetical private enterprise and claims that the Navy’s current message cannot be sold to citizens who now are intensely preoccupied with domestic problems. (It is another argument altogether, but perhaps it is because of the Navy’s product that Americans can be preoccupied with the domestic agenda.)
The Navy can be neither described accurately nor understood fully in the terms of the mysterious macroeconomic forces that make the Dow Jones average rise and fall. If I were forced to describe—in the business vernacular—what, why, and how the Navy functions, I would say that the Navy is some sort of strange nonprofit monopoly that is steeped in tradition, but has a flair for innovation.
Like the American Red Cross and Mothers Against Drunk Driving, the Navy tries to prevent and eradicate problems that threaten all Americans. While the Red Cross and MADD concentrate on fighting disasters and drunk driving, respectively, the Navy focuses on protecting U.S. national interests.
The Navy also is a monopoly in the sense that it alone (for all practical purposes) is the only establishment that can protect U.S. national interests above, beneath, and on the high seas. Unlike the breakup of the old American Telephone and Telegraph, however, dismantling the Navy would not benefit the public in any conceivable way.
The Navy’s new and improved “. . . From the Sea” and “Forward . . . From the Sea” are not—and should never be— based on anything the public thinks it needs now, but on whatever will best provide for the nation’s security well into the 21st century. Perhaps the Navy could use a lesson or two from Madison Avenue on how to convey this message to the American people in an attractive manner. Nevertheless, Commander Golightly’s suggestion that the strategy, roles, and missions of the world’s top naval power are as antiquated as buggy whips is an extreme exaggeration.
“Victory and an Uncertain Future”
(See J. L. Holloway, pp. 50-56, May 1995 Proceedings)
Mike Carlin, Editor, The Big E Mail (the USS Enterprise (CVA[N])/CVN-65) Association)—Admiral James L. “Give ‘Em Hell” Holloway’s article was especially timely, coming as it did soon after the release of former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara’s book, in which he claimed that the Vietnam War was un- winnable.
To Admiral Holloway, I say, “Thank you, sir, for spreading out the map and squaring the weenies away. Thanks, too, for letting them know that all the blood and sacrifice, all the long, lonely days and nights, year upon year, were not wasted. And, most of all, thanks for giving them hell.”
“Taking Maneuver Warfare to Sea”
(See T. Pierce, pp. 74-77, April 1995; H. P. Liske, pp. 19-20, July 1995; G. Cooper, p. 21, August 1995 Proceedings)
William S. Lind—Lieutenant Liske’s thoughtful and well-informed letter was a welcome addition to the maneuver warfare dialogue. However, Robert Leonhard’s distinctions between the German and the Soviet models of maneuver warfare seem to have created confusion.
Leonhard’s depiction of the Soviet model is, on the whole, accurate. But, the German approach to maneuver warfare is more difficult to grasp, since it is not a “model,” as most understand the term. The Germans rejected every sort of model or schema, because they firmly believed in the proposition that everything must be according to the specific situation.
The German military could—and did—make highly detailed plans of operations, when the information to do so was available. They would have been the last people to neglect the benefits of good intelligence. However, in these cases, just as in those where little was known beforehand and improvisation had to rule, they decentralized their command and control through mission orders. They did so by making detailed intelligence available to the commander—usually a relatively junior officer—who actually would conduct the operation. The planning was done at that officer’s level, not in some remote headquarters. And, because action quickly causes the initial situation to change, mission orders were used as well so that initial success could be exploited immediately.
1 would urge caution in assuming that new, high-tech information systems will make centralized planning and control viable. This has been predicted with each new information technology that has come along, and it has yet to happen. The predicted characteristics of the new system—usually advanced by those with axes to grind—are seldom proved in the real world. Computers will not change that. Indeed, the more automated a system is, the less capable it is of dealing with situations unforeseen by its designers. Yet the essence of war—and what is meant by the "independent hostile will of the opponent”—is that the other fellow keeps coming up with things you never thought of. Certainty in war is thus a contradiction in terms.
Lieutenant Liske’s letter offers hope that a real discussion of maneuver warfare for the Navy is now beginning. It’s about time; after all. Lord Nelson was quite good at it.
“Joint from Day One”
(See T. J. Haraden, pp. 37-39, July 1995; D. L. Peck, pp. 15-16, August 1995 Proceedings)
William K. Sharpe, Class of 1950, U.S. Naval Academy—This article hits an all-time low. It is nothing but rubbish. As in the case of pornography, it has no redeeming social value.
Lieutenant Haraden has no understanding whatsoever of the service academies. His article can best be described as asinine. I cannot understand how the Naval Academy tolerated his assignment as an instructor. Lieutenant Haraden’s reasoning is ridiculous. He attempts to fabricate his case with blatantly false facts and erroneous assumptions. No one can even begin to address the future of the service academies—with all their faults—in a little more than two pages.
If anything needs to be abolished, it is the NROTC program. My respect for the officer acquisition process fell when I was first forced to associate with the poorly trained, undisciplined, part-timers from NROTC on a 1947 cruise.
Commander George E. Erickson, Jr., Judge Advocate General’s Corps, U.S. Naval Reserve—The service academies exist to develop junior officers into people who can withstand severe circumstances, exercise honesty and honor, appreciate their responsibility to their nation and their subordinates, and grow into competent senior officers.
Twenty-year-old cadets and midshipmen are not expected to command huge joint force operations which include armies, air wings, and fleets—nor, for that matter, are 34-year-old majors and lieutenant commanders. Such a responsibility is reserved for a select few senior officers who have the necessary education and experience. Joint training is often informally received, but formal training is necessary only for intermediate and senior officers.
Andrew Gigliotti—The current emphasis on joint operations, coupled with the reductions in the U.S. military, makes Lieutenant Haraden’s proposal for a U.S. Defense Academy (USDA) credible.
The increased scrutiny of candidates mandated by the decrease in the size of the entering class for each service would help ensure that absolutely best men and women are chosen. Furthermore, cadets would be able to start building personal and professional partnerships with officers of other services immediately.
Lieutenant Haraden’s proposed system of rotating command positions would ensure that no single service would dominate the Corps of Cadets. While the 1,333 cadets for each service seems logical, perhaps the Navy contingent should be slightly increased to 1,400. The extra slots per year would ensure that a sufficient number of cadets would take Marine Corps commissions.
An intermediary step should added for all cadets at the proposed academy. All applicants should be required to take one year of classes at another institution of higher learning before entering the USDA. During this year, they would take a preset curriculum including, but not limited to, the standard basics—e.g., college algebra, English composition, computer programming, and introductory psychology. Participation in ROTC would be mandatory.
One of the benefits of this step is that prospective applicants could experience “regular” college life while evaluating their desire to become a USDA cadet. I participated in Army ROTC at the University of Texas at Austin before entering West Point. While at the Military Academy, I knew many cadets who were fresh out of high school. Several of them seemed somewhat jealous of what their friends at “real colleges” were experiencing. Thus embittered, some began acting as though the Academy and country owed them for what they were missing—instead of appreciating what an honor their appointment was. The college-year requirement would ensure a much higher level of maturity and commitment in those selected for the USDA.
The experiences and motivations of today’s youth—who are growing up in a much more dynamic society—are vastly different than that of past generations. From my experience at West Point, I know that many an “old grad” would be shocked to learn that a number of the traditions which they consider to be “defining characteristics” of the academy are either mocked or forgotten by the current Corps of Cadets. A joint academy is the next natural step in the evolution of officer accession.
Colonel David A. Smith, U.S. Air Force Reserve (Retired)—Lieutenant Haraden’s article is flawed on several important points.
First, the focus of the Goldwater- Nichols Act is on joint command and joint operations, not on creating one service. The problems encountered with Canada’s establishment of a single service—the Canadian Forces—are evidence of the folly of such a move.
Second, establishing one service academy to “build a cadre of officers trained in joint operations from day one” would create a small, special class of officers, bonded from cadet days, that could—and probably would—operate like the German General Staff, an organization we should not wish to replicate.
Third, Lieutenant Haraden confuses education with training. He wants to “train” officers in jointness. The principal mission of the service academies, however, is education, the development of officers to be creative, innovative, critical thinkers. The service academies’ proper role in joint education is to provide an overview of jointness, including the concept of jointness, an introduction to the other services, and awareness of other services’ capabilities.
Fourth, a recent study of joint education directed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff found that, “[f]irst and foremost . . . officers must have solid foundations in the capabilities, limitations, and operations of the forces of their own Military Services.” Certainly, joint education and training should be a part of an officer’s career. Nevertheless, the major emphasis on jointness should begin at the mid-grade level—after officers have a firm grip on what their specific services require of them.
This article’s major lesson is that the high costs of the service academies make them easy targets for those looking for budgetary savings. For the service academies to survive as we have known them, they must provide an education for future officers that is truly unique and clearly worth the cost.
“The Synergy of Stealth”
(See J. H. Patton, pp. 26-31, July 1995 Proceedings)
Major Paul N. Nash, U.S. Air Force (Retired)—The caption on page 29 says, in part, that “. . . the F-l 17 and the B-2 require neither electronic warfare support nor fighter escort . . .”
It has long been the practice of the military to mislead the technically unsophisticated by claiming fantastic capabilities for weapons that have never been in combat. For example, the B-17 was touted as an invulnerable airborne fortress that could fight its way unescorted through masses of enemy fighters. The Luftwaffe shot down unescorted B-17s in droves. Eventually, B-17s had to be escorted by great numbers of fighters to keep them from being destroyed faster than our factories could turn them out.
Now, it seems that the same sort of claims of invulnerability made for the B-17 are being made for the B-2. These claims are made by a new generation of enthusiasts who seem to be driven more by memories of the television series Star Trek—in which the “Romulan cloaking device” could make spacecraft invisible—than by the lessons of history.
The evidence for these sorts of claims is minuscule. Certainly, no F-l 17s were shot down in the Persian Gulf War. Nevertheless, there is no evidence that their presence in the Persian Gulf War made the slightest difference in the winning of that war. “Smart-bomb” technology was responsible for those remarkable pictures of bombs flying through windows, not stealth technology. Indeed, the claims by some of our allies—reported in Aviation Week & Space Technology—that they were able to track these aircraft on their own radars calls the stealthiness of the F-l 17 into question. Aviation Week & Space Technology also reported at least once that HF- 111 electronic-warfare aircraft accompanied the “Wobblin’ Goblins” on some of their missions.
It may be that the B-2 will be able to perform amazing feats of self-concealment in some future war (although, at present, no one seems to know quite what its mission will be), but now all we have to go on is the word of the people who are trying to sell it. Therefore, it is not unreasonable for the rest of us to view any claims about the B-2’s capabilities with a little intelligent skepticism.
Thanks, Navy
Lieutenant Colonel Donald C. Bowman, U.S. Army (Retired)—From 26 January through 28 February 1968, I was the operations officer for the 3rd Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division. We were heavily engaged during that period with a large force of North Vietnamese Army at La Chu Hamlet outside the City of Hue, Republic of Vietnam. It was a hard and difficult fight against a well-prepared and well-trained enemy.
The superb naval gunfire support we received from U.S. Navy ships substantially aided us in overcoming a determined enemy. More than 5,500 rounds of 5-inch, 6-inch and 8-inch were placed on target—and we loved every minute of it. At the time, I was told that the gunfire was from the USS Canberra (CAG-2) and two destroyers. I recall being told that one of the destroyers set an expenditure record for the most rounds fired in a 24-hour period during the war.
I do not know the accuracy of any of the above beyond what landed on the target, but I would like to find out who did such a superb job shooting for us. 1 also want to offer them a heartfelt “Thank you!” for a job well done.
“The Case for the Diesel-Electric Submarine”
(See J. Lake, p. 63, June 1995; W. J. Holland, p. 16, August 1995 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral Corwin Mendenhall, U.S. Navy (Retired); author of Submarine Diary: The Silent Stalking of Japan (Naval Institute Press, 1995)—There are many very valid reasons why diesel boats should be in the Navy’s mix of combat ships; however, the current submarine leadership has been brainwashed by the Rickover nuclear-only philosophy. Consequently, no one in the Navy now knows—or wants to know—what diesel submarines’ capabilities are.
I attended the International Submarine Convention in Fremantle, Western Australia on 20-24 March 1995. Among the presentations was one made by the Commander, Australian Submarine Squadron: Captain Denis Mole, Royal Australian Navy (RAN).
Captain Mole made a superb presentation about the RAN’s Collins-class submarine program. Later, he conducted a tour of the almost completed submarine base and training station, HMAS Sterling (about 40 miles south of Fremantle) with special attention to the base’s impressive offshore instrumentation facilities.
To an old diesel boat sailors like me, the characteristics of these new Australian boats—their stealthiness, advanced sonar, potent missiles, quiet torpedoes, great maneuverability, continuous submerged endurance, excellent shallow-water capability, near total automation, and overall technological sophistication—were striking. Equally striking is the RAN’s commitment to a strong building program—i.e., six Collins-class boats scheduled with two more in next year’s budget.
The cost of one Collins-class boat is a drop in the bucket compared with the cost of one nuclear submarine. With current budget constraints in the United States, we should be buying a few of them from Australia. Our shipyards have long forgotten the art of building small, cost-effective submarines. Clearly, the Australians are up to the task.
“Ensign 101”
(See J. P. Ransome, pp. 71-72, February 1995 Proceedings)
Chief Warrant Officer W. B. Keefer, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Captain Ransome’s 21st maxim immediately brought back an incident that occurred 20 years ago on a ship on which I was the administrative officer and command legal officer.
Within my administrative division was a master chief with 26 years service. He was a Filipino who desperately wanted to spend his last active-duty tour at Subic Bay. The officer who had written his evaluation before leaving for his assignment at the Bureau of Naval Personnel (BuPers) had graded the master chief one notch down in Leadership, putting a blot on an otherwise perfect service record. The chief used some typewriter “white- out” and moved his score in leadership to the “far right” before mailing it out.
His undoing was that the author of the report had been assigned in the BuPers as the head of the detailing section for the master chief’s rate. He reported the change on the evaluation by letter to our executive officer.
As command legal officer, I was detailed to do the investigation. Immediately, I recognized a conflict of interest. Am I the master chief’s division officer or the command legal officer? I certainly could not act as both.
After a fitful night worrying about this dilemma, 1 met with my executive officer. During our meeting, I stated my problem and asked to be relieved as the command legal officer. My first responsibility was to my men as their division officer. He immediately arose, smiled, shook my hand, and said: “Bernie, you made the right decision. Consider yourself temporarily relieved as our legal officer. I’ll assign someone else.”
I have never regretted that decision. Division officers are not in the business of babying our men. Nevertheless, we need to let them know that we are there for advice when it appears their personal world has crashed around their shoulders.
When the investigation was completed, the master chief admitted his mistake. He said that his common sense had been overwhelmed by family problems and his need to get to Subic Bay. He said further that the competition was tough for assignments to Subic Bay; he knew his record would be compared to all other master chiefs for the assignment and that the one telling notch on his record possibly could keep him from it.
When it was over he received restriction on the ship for four consecutive weekends and two weeks extra duty (he volunteered for this punishment, so there wasn’t any notation in his record). His personal embarrassment was overwhelming, but he toughed it out just like any good sailor. He worked extremely hard for the rest of his tour and he left our ship a much better person and professional sailor. I like to think I had a little something to do with that.
“Making The Navy’s Case in Somalia”
(See K. L. Eichelberger, pp. 126-128, May 1995 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Thomas W. Strother, U.S. Navy; Senior Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer, 2d Air/Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO), U.S. Marine Corps—I enjoyed Captain Eichel- berger’s article concerning the U.S. Navy’s reluctance or inability to place “hot-running” commanders and captains in joint billets—e.g., such as “amphibious planner” on a Joint Task Force staff as the one employed in Somalia. I see a similar problem—albeit on a smaller scale—in filling airborne-qualified surface warfare officer naval gunfire liaison officer (NGLO) billets here at 2d ANGLICO. Although the other services seem to be able to encourage or induce junior officers to take billets in other services units employed in the joint or combined arena, the Navy officers usually sent to the Marine Corps as naval gunfire liaison officers at both ANGLICOs and artillery units are seldom volunteers, for to get away from the “mainstream” surface community is considered to be a “career killer.” So, the NGLOs at ANGLICOs usually are airborne-training volunteers and/or disaffected surface warfare officers who would really like to be SEALs, have fallen out of grace in the SWO community, or both. In Marine artillery battalions, the situation is not nearly as good, for there are fewer volunteers for a nonjump-status NGLO billet!
The Navy probably is not encouraging its junior officers to take this hazardous duty—which actually is joint, but comes with no joint service credit. Part of it is cultural—not many sailors want to serve with a ground-combat element—and part of it is pragmatic—too far away from the “Blue” side of the Navy-Marine Corps team. Thus, when officers are promoted to commander and above, they are probably a bit reluctant to immerse themselves in a joint or “green” environment that they may know nothing about.
In plain language, what ANGLICOs do is go out in the field with infantry units and provide them spotter services for naval gunfire, close air support (and that includes the Navy and the Air Force), and artillery. No unit gets more joint than that! Yet, all too often our NGLOs are closer to the end of their naval careers than the beginning.
Rather than playing “catch as catch can,” the Navy should make these billets much more “career friendly” for “hot-running” surface warfare officers. If the Navy does that, it will have a cadre of young commanders who actually know Marine and Army operations. Then, 15 years from now, the Navy will not be represented on joint staffs by well-intentioned, albeit clueless, officers, but men who have walked many miles in Marines’ and soldiers’ shoes.
“The Military Owes The President(s) More”
(See J. H. Cushman, pp. 8-10, July 1995 Proceedings)
Colonel William V. Kennedy, Army of the United States (Retired)—General Cushman is dead wrong to blame the military leadership for the failure of U.S. policy and strategy in Vietnam.
Understandably, given the intensity of his wartime service, General Cushman’s focus is on operations in Vietnam. But the war was not lost in Vietnam; it was lost in Washington, before General Cushman ever went to Vietnam.
Although bitter foes later in life, Robert S. McNamara and the late Hanson W. Baldwin, the military editor of The New York Times in the early 1960s, agreed on one thing: The decisive event of the war was the overthrow and murder of South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem in November 1963. In the words of correspondent and author Marguerite Higgins, it was that event that “turned a Vietnamese war into an American war” and destroyed the legitimacy of our presence in South Vietnam.
To their credit, Secretary McNamara and U.S. military leaders uniformly opposed the coup against Diem, set in motion by the State Department and approved by President John F. Kennedy. But by the time of Diem’s death, the Kennedy administration, wholeheartedly backed by the U.S. press, had eliminated the sort of military leadership that would have been willing to present the challenge to policy that General Cushman demands.
As a freelance reporter covering the Pentagon in those years, I experienced first hand the refusal of the press to brook any criticism whatsoever of Robert McNamara and his “Whiz Kids.” Thus, when an Army Chief of Staff was fired for warning that we were drifting into a big war in Vietnam, and when Admiral George W. Anderson, the Chief of Naval Operations, was fired because he objected to micromanagement by arrogant, incompetent civilians during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the press cheered.