The Marine Corps has won the battle to replace its CH-46s with MV-22s—and the CH-53Es remain highly capable. Putting four-bladed rotors on AH-1W Cobras and UH-1N Hueys is the next logical step.
One of the most potent and capable weapons in the Marine air-ground team's arsenal—the H-1 light helicopter in its attack and utility versions—is at a crossroads.
With the reduction in Department of Defense funding, emergence of the Department of the Navy strategy "Forward . . . From the Sea," and introduction of tiltrotor technology, the Marine Light Attack Helicopter HMLA) squadron's ability to project warfighting power using the H-1 is in serious jeopardy.
The squadron's tasks—light utility and attack support including command and control, reconnaissance insert, medical evacuation, escort, anti-armor operations, and close-air support—are relevant today, and will remain so. Major General Richard Phillips, U.S. Marine Corps, in his article "Huey-2000: Airborne Command and Control We Can Afford" Rotor Review, Winter 1995, p. 7) examined the importance of the HMLA mission in detail. He concluded that impending Marine assault-support deficiencies and the effects of emerging warfighting concepts will require the complete modernization of the UH-1N if the HMLA mission, tasks, and capabilities are to remain intact during the next century. Modernization alone, however, will not be enough. The follow-on Marine observation and Attack Aircraft WMOA) must become a Marine aviation priority to provide a means to bridge the tactical, operational, and technological gap brought by MV-22 tiltrotor technology and the emerging concept of operational maneuver from the sea.
While the budget debate goes on, the Cobra and the Huey continue their 30-year tradition as workhorses. The HMLA community continues to grow, while maintaining the high operational and personnel tempos required to provide offensive air support and airborne command-and-control capabilities to very forward-deployed Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU[SOC]). In addition, HMLAs—along with F/A-18D squadrons—are picking up the tasks of the recently decommissioned OV-10D Flight Observation Squadrons.
As to the importance of the HMLA mission, consider the following components. As Major General Michael Myatt, U.S. Marine Corps then Commanding General, First Marine Division, told HMLA-367 Marines on 26 September 1992: “I am speaking on behalf of the 22,000 Marines of the 1st Marine Division, many of whom owe the fact that they are here today to the Marines [of] HMLA-367 . . . these Scarface [call sign] warriors . .. have a special place from a 1st Marine Division perspective. . . .when we needed you, you were there. Of those 95 . . . confirmed kills we saw. many were about 300 meters from my [command post], I want you to know how much we appreciate your superb support, which continues today . . . .”
The 13th MEU(SOC) commander, first to land in Somalia during Operation Restore Hope, noted that flying rotary-wing attack aircraft over Somali towns was enough to dry up resistance and stop the fighting. He characterized the H-ls as multipliers that allowed his small force to control a large objective area. The importance of this special relationship within the Marine air-ground team cannot be overstated.
The challenge lies in finding ways to execute the Marine Corps aviation plan to reduce the types of aircraft in the Fleet Marine Forces, while ensuring that rotary-wing aircraft can accomplish the light attack mission in the operational and tactical environment associated with the MV-22’s greater speed, range, and endurance.
Marine Corps rotary-wing funding has not kept pace with that devoted to fixed-wing, and current plans defer replacing the AH-1W, UH-1N, and OV-10 aircraft with a VMOA capability until 2020. The existing VMOA mission-need statement for this follow-on HMLA platform closely parallels HMLA and VMO missions and
tasks. However, the uncertain funding and development of a VMOA capability are further undercut by the long and tenuous funding and development process facing the MV-22 aircraft.
The CH-46 is near the end of its service life expectancy, with no assurance that the MV-22 will be fielded as planned—even though the battle appears to be over. Failure to fund H-1 modernization programs and a VMOA follow-on aircraft will leave the Marine Corps with aircraft incompatible with the MV-22’s operational capabilities—a recipe for disaster on the battlefield.
Obviously, the Marine Corps must determine how to support Marine Air-Ground Task Force operations over the next 20 years with H-ls while fielding MV-22s that are 100 to 150 knots faster and have three times the combat range. Then, the Marine Corps must decide on a follow-on platform.
HMLA squadron evolution provides some insight into the best course of action. In the mid-1980s, Marine aviation reorganized its light helicopter squadrons (HMLs with 24 UH-1N aircraft) and its attack helicopter squadrons (HMAs with 24 AH-IJ aircraft) into light attack squadrons (initially 12 AH-1Js and 12 UH-1Ns). The initial result was increased combat capability and a savings in personnel made possible because the two helicopters shared many common parts and maintenance procedures. Training, commonality, supportability, maintainability, and economy of force were the impetus for this successful move.
Now, however, the AH-1Js have evolved into AH-1Ws that no longer share the same aircraft parts and maintenance procedures. Worse, the HMLAs are experiencing the second- lowest manning level in Marine Corps aviation, while being subjected to more commitments—and absorbing the VMO tasks to boot.
In the near term, the focus must be on modernizing H-1 aircraft to remain combat capable, return lost power-available margins, and incorporate required safety enhancements to keep the fleet going until 2020. The key to this initiative is restoring aircraft commonality and supportability between the H-1 models and modernizing with the night targeting system; integrated weapons system; glass cockpit; and cockpit I and II enhancement programs.
The four-bladed rotor AH-1W (4BW) and four-bladed UH-1N (4BN) programs can help restore commonality; they use the same rotor head, transmission, engines (T-700), and also other parts. This easily is the best option, according to Lieutenant General Harold Blot, Deputy Chief of Staff for Aviation at Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps.
Extending H-l service life to 2020 and increasing performance capabilities provides enough time to establish existing aviation priorities, reorder rotary wing priorities, and include emerging technologies into the VMOA platform. As a minimum, VMOA must have a self-deployment capability—plus greater range, speed, and endurance than the MV-22.
Some argue that the H-l could be replaced by HH-60s, the U.S. Navy’s Strike Rescue aircraft, but these advocates play down the loss of air-to-air, electronic warfare, and night capability, while overstating the efficiencies resulting from a common service-wide logistical support and maintenance training base.
Other options, such as adaptive force packaging, which puts U.S. Army helicopters on Navy ships, are less attractive. The concept worked for limited-duration operations, especially ones that did not involve an assault phase, such as Operations Uphold Democracy (Haiti 1995) and Ernest Will (Persian Gulf 1988), but there are downsides. It blurs service warfighting responsibilities, increases competition for funds, decreases Marine Corps operational maneuver capabilities, and incurs significant aircraft upgrade costs. Making it the rule, rather than the exception, would require numerous multiservice work-arounds; supportability, shipboard compatibility, tactics, unit organization, administrative control, and employment deficiencies.
Army aircraft would require major modifications to add blade folding capability, rotor brakes, electromagnetic radiation protection, and even the most basic corrosion prevention measures. These modifications would cost hundreds of millions of dollars, and the aircraft still would not meet many naval shipboard operation standards.
In contrast, the 4BW/4BN option extends service life, resolves safety deficiencies, reduces life cycle costs, enhances maintenance reliability, and provides an effective HMLA weapon system out to 2020. A March 1995 Operational Analysis of the option with the T-700 Mid-life Upgrade provided encouraging results.
Marines want the H-l common 4BW/4BN and T-700 engine upgrade program, which has the unanimous support of HMLA commanders and the H-1 Operational Advisory Group—wing commanding generals and commanding officers of all units, active and reserve, that have H-1 aircraft, as well as representatives from the Force commanders. In addition, Major General Larry S. Taylor, Commanding General of the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing, has identified it as one of the top aviation priorities for the Total Force’s reserve component.
Modified AH-1Ws will be able to carry current payloads with increased time on station—or carry more weapons at current ranges and time on station. Modified UH-1Ns will gain range—improving responsiveness with reduced sortie requirements. Both aircraft will gain greater agility in lower and faster flight regimes that enhance survivability.
The 4BW/4BN option also offers many significant, though difficult to quantify, aircraft maintenance and support advantages—e.g., decreased parts storage space requirements aboard ship—plus the same economies that led to the HML and HMA reorganization into an HMLA. These indirect benefits include personnel reductions, reduced scheduled depot level maintenance (SDLM) costs, increased airframe and component life cycles, lower support equipment requirements, increased parts commonality efficiencies, air crew training and readiness benefits, and expanded opportunities for military-to-military and contractor co-development of H-1 foreign military program markets—which could increase aircraft capabilities while reducing unit cost.
The upgrades will improve opportunities for rotary-wing aircraft to provide and coordinate close air support at night or to operate as a highly mobile maneuver element, a forward-looking tactical concept in step with the Corps’ long tradition of warfare innovation—dive bombing, amphibious warfare, vertical envelopment, and short takeoff-vertical landing aircraft.
The 4BN/4BW upgrade program provides a cost effective and time-critical solution to the problem created by the introduction of the MV-22, involving mission operational requirements, aircraft performance capabilities, and service-life obsolescence, while supporting Defense Department guidance to buy available technology instead of investing in large development programs.
If Marine Air-Ground Task Forces are going to synchronize assault support on the battlefield, now is the time to modernize the H-l aircraft and to commence VMOA research and development. Only a timely decision will enable Marine Corps aviation to defer VMOA until 2020 and ensure that assault support operations can be executed with dissimilar assault support aircraft technology and capabilities.
Colonel Connolly, an AH-1 pilot, commands Marine Aircraft Group 42 at Naval Air Station Atlanta, Marietta, Georgia. Captain Freund, a UH-1N pilot and designated Weapons and Tactics Instructor, is the Group’s Tactics, Training, and Education Officer.