The U.S. Navy

Manning the (Smaller) Nuclear Fleet

The end of the Cold War has brought drastic reductions in the U.S. Navy’s nuclear-propelled ships, both surface ships and submarines. But these reductions have created an opportu­nity to solve the nuclear personnel problems that have plagued the Navy for more than three decades.

The key indicator of success in the nuclear program has been the rate of junior officer retention. The Navy’s goal is a retention rate of about 38% (starting three years after entry, to keep training attrition from affecting the rate). Retention for nuclear submarine junior officers peaked at 41% in 1990 and is currently 31%; nuclear surface officer retention peaked at 54% in 1989 and is currently 29%.

According to officials at the Bureau of Naval Per­sonnel (BuPers), the nuclear personnel program “got well” at the end of the Cold War.¹ They believe that the turnaround in retention in the late 1980s-1990 oc­curred as a result of the “focused view” of the Navy in the 1980s caused by then-Secretary of the Navy John Lehman’s efforts to build a 600-ship fleet and the pay increases of that period. At the same time, the rapid retirement of strategic missile sub­marines (SSBNs), each manned by two crews, helped the situation.

BuPers officials expect the sub­marine officer retention rate to rise because of the stabilization of sub­marine force levels following the rapid decline in the number of at­tack submarines (SSNs) and SSBNs, the controlled operating tempo for the fleet (i.e., not more than 50% time at sea), the spot promotion au­thority for lieutenants serving as submarine engineer department heads, and the fleet’s generally pos­itive attitude about the future of the Navy. Command opportunity also is being increased in the submarine community, with all Trident strate­gic missile submarines transitioning to commander (O-5) commands rather than captain (O-6) commands by 1999.

In addition, increasing numbers of nuclear officers are serving ashore in joint billets, as well as attending postgraduate and war college-level schools and serving as instructors/company officers at the Naval Academy and in the NROTC. Dur­ing the Cold War era, very few nuclear submariners could hope for such assignments.

The joint billet jobs are especially important because of the requirement that an officer have such an assignment to be eli­gible for promotion to flag rank. Junior submarine officers indicate that they will welcome joint and educational assign­ments because of the promotion opportunities that they open, but the hard-core submarine community is fighting for a permanent deferral of the joint provision of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols defense reorganization act, which will apply to submarine officers beginning on 1 January 1997.² The com­munity wants the deferral of joint duty to stand until an officer is ready for two-star (0-8) assignment.

Some senior officers in the fleet are not as sanguine about the prospects for submarine officers. Rear Admiral Jon M. Barr, Com­mander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, recently declared that “reten­tion is not good” in his command, with “bleak career prospects for ju­nior officers.”³ He attributed the sit­uation to the submarine force “not having a focused mission to justify [why] we do long time at sea.” Barr also sees problems coming in en­listed retention—especially for sonar technicians—because of the high op­erational tempo. There are “more de­mands for submarines in the Pacific than we can possibly fill,” he notes.

The recent decline in nuclear sur­face officer retention, down from a peak of 54% to 29% at the end of fiscal 1994, is said by BuPers officials to have been caused by the decision to decommission all nine nuclear-propelled cruisers by 1999, leaving those officers with no opportunity for command of nuclear ships. Some have had command of conventional surface ships. (Execu­tive officer and commanding officer positions on board the Navy’s nuclear-propelled carriers are the exclusive domain of aviators.) Expanding the opportunities for these officers—who also man the engineering spaces of nuclear-propelled carriers—to serve as department heads, executive officers, and commanding of­ficers of conventional surface combatants is expected to im­prove retention in this category.

Another factor that will affect nuclear surface officers is the admittance of women to the program. In 1979-1981, women were accepted into the enlisted nuclear program. Of that group, two remain on active duty as limited duty officers—one as the executive officer of a floating dry dock and one serving in a submarine tender. (Three senior enlisted women from that group also are on active duty, two on board aircraft carriers and one in a submarine tender.)

The first group of 14 women has been accepted in the nu­clear officer program, with training beginning this summer. As they complete training, they will be assigned to nuclear car­riers, beginning in the fall of 1996. Future accessions will enter nuclear training after their first division officer tours on board conventional ships, where they will pursue surface warfare qualification. (This is the same career progression as their male counterparts.)

Shortly after becoming Chief of Naval Operations in April 1994, Admiral J. M. Boorda said that he expected women even­tually to serve in Trident-class strategic missile submarines. At this time, there is no plan to put women in submarines, pri­marily because of the Department of Defense exemption for duty where the cost to provide adequate privacy for the women would be prohibitive. BuPers has an ongoing study addressing that issue, but as one BuPers officer remarked, women in sub­marines would result in “marginal increases in opportunities” at prohibitive costs.⁴ (See sidebar.)

Meanwhile, the Navy’s goal is to have women account for 10% of enlisted nuclear personnel by 2002. Seventy-five women entered the nuclear surface enlisted program in fiscal year 1994; 145 were recruited by June of 1995 for fiscal year 1995; and the goal is to bring in 250 women per year, about 15% of the recruits coming into the program. The total enlisted nuclear manpower requirement is about 11,000—5,000 in surface ships and 6,000 in submarines and their associated shore billets.

All personnel entering the nuclear program now go to Or­lando for their initial six-month nuclear-power school, then to one of four prototype reactor plants for further training: the S8G and MARF reactor plants at West Milton, New York, and the S5W reactors on inactivated submarines of the Lafayette (SSBN-616) class at Charleston. The Orlando school has been scheduled to move to the submarine base at New London (Groton), Connecticut; however, subsequent base closure stud­ies have indicated a preference for moving the school to Charleston. South Carolina. The availability of the two ex-SSBNs at Charleston and other factors, i.e., proximity to a major airport and military airfield, as well as other naval activities, make Charleston a more logical location.

The long-suffering nuclear community is now seeing a brighter future. The massive fleet reductions and other fac­tors are, according to BuPers, permitting a “scalpel of force shaping” for nuclear personnel rather than wielding an “axe of downsizing.”⁵

1 Interview with RAdm. Albert H. Konetzni, Jr., USN, Bureau of Naval Personnel, Arlington, VA, 2 June 1995.

2 See, for example, Capt. C. H. Griffiths, Jr., USN, "How About a Permanent Waiver?" U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, December 1993, pp. 68-71.

3 RAdm. Jon M. Barr, USN, presentation to Naval Submarine League, Arlington, VA, 6 June 1995.

4 Interview with Capt. Michael Feeley, USN, Bureau of Naval Personnel, Arlington, VA, 2 June 1995.

5 Interview with RAdm. Konetzni.

The Typhoon Solution

“Women in submarines? No problem.” That was the reaction of Academician Sergei Nikitich Kovalev, chief de­signer of the Soviet Yankee, Delta, and Typhoon strategic missile submarines, to Admiral Boorda’s proclamation that women probably would go to sea in U.S. ballistic missile submarines.¹

“Simply buy Typhoon submarines from us: they have two main pressure hulls—one for men and one for women,” explains Kovalev.

Academician Kovalev was “inspired” by the idea of a joint crew of men and women, and for a year he has con­sidered the idea. According to Kovalev:²

• There are living quarters in both hulls of the submarine. Cabins for the commanding and executive officers and de­partment heads are provided in only one of the hulls, however, so female command personnel would have to be accommodated in the men’s hull or upgraded cabins would have to be arranged in the women’s hull.
• The number of bunks in a Typhoon is equal to the num­ber of crew members—approximately 150. Thus, if some bunks in the women’s hull are vacant, some of the men will be left without bunks.
• The Russian Navy's requirements for living quarters have been developed without consideration of women. Con­siderable work would need to be done to upgrade the women’s accommodations, beginning with additional wash­ing and storage facilities, and finishing with more mirrors.
• In view of a strategic missile submarine’s long under­water endurance (the potential underwater endurance of the Typhoon is several months), it is possible—if neces­sary—to accommodate a delivery room for pregnant crew members in the torpedo compartment, in place of spare torpedoes. This could be considered neutral space as it is located forward, between the main pressure hulls.
• The submarine’s control compartment is located amid­ships, between the main pressure hulls. As there are no liv­ing spaces located there, this area could be the principal social area for the crew.

Academician Kovalev is ready to begin detailed discus­sions on this matter with the U.S. Navy’s Bureau of Naval Personnel. But with the cutback in U.S. strategic forces following the end of the Cold War—and for a number of other reasons—it seems highly unlikely that the U.S. Navy would acquire Typhoon-class missile submarines.

1 Discussion with author, Rubin Central Design Bureau, St. Petersburg, 10 May 1994.

2 Fax to author from S. N. Kovalev, 10 May 1995.