Bosnia-Hercegovina declared independence from former Yugoslavia in April 1992, partly to avoid domination by ethnic adversaries. Bosnian Serbs seized more than 70% of the new nation’s territory, besieged the capital city at Sarajevo, and commenced “ethnic cleansing” operations to remove Croats and Muslims from Serb-claimed areas. U.S. officials estimate that armed combat since then has inflicted at least 145,000 civilian casualties, created widespread destruction, and caused two million refugees—the greatest exodus in Europe since World War II. The United Nations Protection Force (UNProFor), selectively assisted by NATO, has somewhat limited human suffering and helped confine the conflict geographically but has been unable to protect U.N.-designated safe areas or maintain a free flow of supplies to the populace—much less promote peace. U.S. combat operations thus far have been confined to occasional close-air support missions, punitive strikes, and sorties to enforce a “no-fly” zone over Bosnia. President Bill Clinton, however, has pledged to provide up to half of all ground troops needed to police a negotiated settlement, should one eventually be achieved, or to protect a withdrawal of the United Nations Protection Force, if that should prove advisable. He also says he will consider the use of unspecified U.S. ground forces to help reposition U.N. forces. Meanwhile, civil war continues.1
Basic Objectives
Military operations by the United Nations as well as U.S. and NATO forces currently strive to achieve three basic objectives while diplomats seek a negotiated settlement acceptable to all concerned:
- Limit violence
- Alleviate civilian misery
- Avoid a wider war
Courses of action able to satisfy all three of those aims simultaneously appear preferable. Alternatives that are incompatible with even one of them appear counterproductive for political, military, and/or economic reasons, no matter how attractive they may otherwise be.
Military Options
Senator Strom Thurmond, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, opened 7 June 1995 hearings on U.S. involvement in Bosnia with the following observation: “The Bosnian crisis confronts us with critical choices, and perhaps none of them are good.” Most U.S. and foreign decision makers publicly concur with that conclusion. Seven military options open to the United Nations, the United States, and NATO in mid-1995 have been selected for assessment.2 No inviting eighth alternative is yet known.
- Police a Negotiated Settlement: A negotiated settlement acceptable to all belligerents appears preferable to any other solution, because it would terminate armed conflict in Bosnia-Hercegovina and foster U.N.-supervised circumstances under which civilian life could return to pre-war conditions. President Clinton has promised to furnish up to 50% of all ground forces in such an event. A mix of perhaps 25,000 active and reserve component forces might provide primarily civil affairs and logistic support. No agreement acceptable to all belligerents, however, seems forthcoming. A “contact group” that includes U.S., Russian, and European Union representatives in July 1994 presented a territorial subdivision that allotted 51% of the country to the Bosnian Muslim-Croat federation and 49% to Bosnian Serbs. The Serbs rejected that proposition, which would have drastically reduced land under their control, left them with scanty natural resources, and denied them access to the sea. No better offer is yet on the table. Substitutes for this option must suffice during the waiting period, which promises to be long.
2—Accept the Status Quo Ante: UNProFor partly achieved all basic objectives from early 1992, when it opened operations, until mid-1995. Violence was sporadic and limited; humanitarian shipments somewhat alleviated civilian suffering; and armed conflict was largely confined to Bosnia-Hercegovina. The most recent crisis erupted in early May 1995, when Bosnian Serbs once again began to shell U.N. “safe areas” and to violate U.N.-designated “weapon exclusion zones.” U.S. aircraft under NATO’s command retaliated on 25 May by attacking ammunition dumps near the Bosnian Serb capital at Pale. Bosnian Serbs, in turn, seized and held nearly 400 U.N. peacekeepers hostage until the last were released on 18 June 1995.
Peaceful resolution of the current crisis and return to the status quo ante seems appealing in certain respects. It could create an atmosphere more conducive to peace negotiations, contain armed conflict, and alleviate human misery. The United States would continue to contribute primarily close-air support, sorties to enforce a “no-fly” zone over Bosnia, and parachute supply drops. This option would perpetuate what U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali calls “mission impossible,” namely peacekeeping in a nation where there is no peace to keep. Yasushi Akashi, his Special Representative in the Balkans, compounded peacekeeping problems on 10 June 1995 when he imposed restrictive rules of engagement that allow U.N. military actions only if Bosnian Serb aggressors agree. Abilities of UNProFor to protect and provide humanitarian assistance to noncombatants in Bosnia-Hercegovina could be much impeded, and combat operations by Bosnian Serbs henceforth will be little inhibited, unless the United Nations relaxes its self-imposed restraint.
3—Withdraw UNProFor from Bosnia: Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 7 June 1995, speculated that inability to accomplish U.N. missions reasonably well at acceptable costs might prompt Britain and France to abandon the U.N. Protection Force and ask NATO to help extract it from Bosnia. Malcolm Rifkind, Britain’s Minister of Defence, two days later told his NATO counterparts that autumn 1995 is a potential departure date if conditions fail to improve. NATO, in anticipation, has prepared withdrawal Plan 40104, to be implemented by a force of about 50,000 if the U.N. Security Council so requests and the North Atlantic Council approves. President Clinton pledges to furnish up to 50% of that force. The United States may furnish strategic lift, intelligence, communications, logistical support, and close-air support. The mission during withdrawal would be to help safeguard the U.N. forces in transit from present positions to holding areas near ports of embarkation.
The entire process could take up to 22 weeks, according to General Shalikashvili, because many isolated units are deployed across the mountainous length and breadth of Bosnia; the land transportation network is primitive in most areas; and adverse weather could cause long delays. Required time and U.N. casualties would mount if any hostile faction seriously opposed the evacuation by conducting ambushes, blowing bridges, and otherwise impeding movement. U.S. ground forces might be required if troops from European members of NATO prove insufficient. This option would fail to limit violence or alleviate civilian misery in Bosnia after withdrawal was complete, and the absence of an ameliorating U.N. influence might encourage local aggressors to widen the war. New waves of refugees probably would wash across Europe.
4—Protect UNProFor in Bosnia: Protection for UNProFor in place, if feasible, would be preferable to withdrawal. Redeployment of many (but not all) widely scattered U.N. peacekeepers to fewer, more defensible sites would simplify security problems. A recently activated Rapid Reaction Force (RRF), configured principally for that purpose, could ride shotgun if disputes about funding can be resolved to the satisfaction of Congress. The RRF contains 10,000 lightly armed personnel (mainly British, French, and Dutch) who rely on armored vehicles and helicopters for mobility. As much as one-third of the RRF, however, may consist primarily of support personnel rather than combat arms. U.S. and NATO air power may bolster, but cannot always substitute for, on-site combat capabilities. U.S. ground forces consequently could be called for assistance in an emergency.
UNProFor, unfortunately, would be less effective, even if safer, after redeployment. “Circled wagons” would be easier to defend, and enemies would find it harder to seize hostages en masse, but no U.N. objective would be easily obtainable. Adversaries would enjoy greater freedom of action in many respects than they do at present, and much of the civilian populace would be worse off. This option could not stand well alone on humanitarian grounds unless it preserves the status quo while peace negotiations proceed.
5—Strengthen Humanitarian Operations: General Shalikashvili, in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, revealed that “throughout the month of May [1995], Bosnian Serb harassment and restrictions of ground convoys grew so severe that only 38% of that month’s scheduled humanitarian aid was able to be delivered to Sarajevo. The Bosnian Serbs used the same tactics to limit humanitarian aid deliveries and UNProFor resupply to other enclaves as well.” Noncombatants, as a direct result, still experience painful shortages, especially food, cooking fuel, and medical supplies. Redeployments of U.N. forces that leave large areas uncovered could make their plight more serious unless U.N. and/or NATO ground forces with U.S. air support conduct decisive combat operations to open essential land and air lines of communication (including the Sarajevo airport, which has been idle since April), then secure and maintain them for continuous use.
The small Rapid Reaction Force, designed to protect UNProFor, seems too thin and lacks enough engineering support to undertake such tasks successfully without substantial augmentation; its mission even then would be daunting. Trucks are confined to a few mountain roads (some are goat trails) and trains to single-track railways that cross mountain walls. Constant maintenance would he required to keep them open, and bottlenecks abound. Saboteurs could pick and choose from hundreds of bridges and tunnels that, if badly damaged or destroyed, would be time-consuming and costly to restore. Any campaign to drive enemy artillery beyond range of U.N. airfields and supply points would likely be lengthy and would change the nature of the conflict. Chances, therefore, seem slim that this option could quell violence and simultaneously achieve humanitarian objectives.
6—Level the Playing Field: U.N. Resolution 713 (September 1991) imposed an arms embargo against all states formed from former Yugoslavia shortly after armed conflict first erupted. Results have frozen a military imbalance in place, because Bosnian Serbs inherited most of the armor, artillery, and other heavy weapons that once served Tito’s armed forces. A sizable body of opinion in Congress advocates unilateral U.S. lifting of the embargo, so the Muslim-led Bosnian government could better defend itself. Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole and Senator Jesse Helms, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, have cosponsored such legislation (S.21/H.R. 1172). The House on 8 June 1995 voted 318 to 99 to terminate U.S. observance of the embargo. The main purpose would be to eliminate any prospects of an early Serb victory and thereby encourage a negotiated settlement.
Unilateral U.S. actions to “level the playing field,” however, might produce fewer positive results than proponents anticipate. U.S. shippers might have to break a blockade if allies who prefer the embargo continued to enforce it. All seaports belong to Croatia, whose cooperation might not be forthcoming. Serb forces overlook all suitable airfields and land routes in Bosnia. The process of delivering heavy arms to Bosnian Muslims despite Serb opposition thus would be risky business. Recipients would require substantial assistance from U.S. training teams until they became proficient.
“What if the [Bosnian Serbs] launched preemptive strikes to gain a military victory on the ground before the arms shipment arrived?”, Defense Secretary Perry asks. “In particular, what if [they] attacked the isolated U.N. protected enclaves in Bosnia,” causing heavy casualties and countless refugees? U.N. peacekeepers, having become less relevant than at present, probably would withdraw to cut losses and costs. Satisfaction of basic U.S. objectives then would await workable solutions to at least two other sticky problems: First, how to inhibit a wider war that could involve Serbia, Albania, Greece, and Turkey in the absence of U.N. peacekeepers. Second, how to restore good relations with Britain, France, Russia, and other associates who would be offended by a perceived U.S. breach of faith.
7—Impose Peace: Decisive operations by U.S. and NATO forces conceivably (but not assuredly) could enforce a cease-fire and perhaps even impose peace in Bosnia quickly. The price, however, could be excessively high when compared with current perceptions of U.S. interests. Defense Secretary Perry asserts that “no responsible military commander believes we [could] change the outcome of the war with an air campaign alone.” Perhaps 200,000 U.S. ground troops in his judgment would be required— an option for which there is little support in Congress or among the American people. The likelihood of a widened war would increase.
Requirements for Compromise
Conditions conducive to Option 1, which could satisfy all U.S. objectives, remain elusive. Cheerless characteristics and poor prospects accompany all other options addressed herein. U.S. decision makers, therefore, are left to select the least undesirable compromise until an eighth option, as yet unidentified, advances.
1 See two Congressional Research Service issue briefs, both updated regularly: Steven J. Woehrel and Julie Kim, Bosnia-Former Yugoslavia: Ongoing Conflict and U.S. Policy. IB91089, 20 June 1995, p. 16.; Steven R. Bowman. Bosnia and Macedonia: U.S. Military Operations, 1B93056. 16 June 1995, p. 14. Military geography, including physical features, the people, and implications, is contained in John M. Collins s Balkan Battlegrounds: U.S. Military Alternatives, Congressional Research Service Report Nr. 92-679S, 2 September 1992, pp. 3-8.
2 Official opinions pertinent to military options are expressed by Secretary of Defense William J. Perry and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John M. Shalikashvili in hearings by the Senate Armed Services Committee, subject: U.S. Involvement in Bosnia, Washington, The Federal News Reuter Transcript Service, 7 June 1995, and in hearings by the House National Security Committee, subject: U.S. Policy in Bosnia, Reuters, 7 June 1995.
Mr. Collins is the Senior Specialist in National Defense at the Congressional Research Service in Washington, D.C. Proceedings published Mr. Collins’s “Options in the Middle East” in October 1990.