“The Quick Strike Submarine”
(See J. N. Giaquinto, L. L. McDonald, J. P. Madden, pp. 41-44, June 1995 Proceedings)
William Christie—As an example of the roles-and-missions hysteria now sweeping the U.S. Navy submarine community, this article was thoroughly enjoyable.
I eagerly await articles arguing for a submarine aircraft carrier (“With just a few low-cost modifications . . Not to mention the Super-Improved Ohio (SSBN-726)-class replacement for the amphibious fleet (“It might necessitate one or two changes in the way Marines are used to doing things, but they’ve always swallowed whatever the Navy dished out.”). New innovations in special Warfare (“Precious manpower can be saved if we run the boats and swim ashore to slit the enemy’s throat.”). And, pf course, the attack submarines as the 'deal platforms for riverine operations (“Simply bolt on a deck gun or two and consider the mission accomplished!”).
Even NASA might not be safe from those who wear dolphins. After all, a few specialized ballistic-missile submarines could easily take over the launching of the Space Shuttle. Cape Canaveral could be closed and enormous savings in infrastructure costs could be realized.
One thing is clear: No one can keep a straight face better than a submariner—and everyone always thought they didn’t have a sense of humor.
“Joint From Day One”
(See T. J. Haraden, pp. 37-39, July 1995 Proceedings)
Captain D. L. Peck, U.S. Navy—Lieutenant Haraden’s recommendations associated with replacing the service academies with one U.S. Defense Academy (USDA) are entirely wrong. Instead, the case for retaining the separate service academies is a strong one. I do not speak as a Naval Academy graduate (NROTC, University of Illinois), but as the former Director of Professional Development at the Naval Academy, having completed my two-and-one-half year tour last month.
Lieutenant Haraden proposes combining the service academies into a smaller, elite U.S. Defense Academy for military professionals who would receive dramatically increased professional and joint training. Adding just 20 to 30 more academic credit hours of professional courses to current service academies’ graduation requirements is not feasible. These additional professional courses would have to come at the expense of other academic courses—i.e., taken from either the core curricula or the academic majors. Such an action effectively eliminate the various majors programs and perhaps even adversely affect accreditation. Adding a fifth year of studies to complete the additional 20-30 credit hours for joint education is not a viable alternative because the costs per student would escalate.
Lieutenant Haraden indicates that professional/joint courses would have priority over academic accreditation standards. While accreditation would be desirable to have, he implies that accreditation would not be required. If such a U.S. Defense Academy were not accredited, I cannot envision the best and brightest young men and women electing to attend such an institution. A strong, accredited academic degree is an important drawing point for attending a service academy. In addition, it is very difficult to be accepted at a graduate school for a master’s or PhD without an accredited undergraduate degree. Would the result be that only officers commissioned through ROTC or other sources could go on to get master’s degrees?
To achieve the significant savings that Lieutenant Haraden alludes to, he recommends that the service academies be combined into one U.S. Defense Academy of 4,000 cadets, all wearing the same uniform. (By the way, when would they receive training on wearing service-specific uniforms?) Currently each of the service academies commissions between 900 and 1,000 new officers each year. Even if the Navy received 1,333 of the 4,000 billets, the USDA would commission only 250 new ensigns and Marine Corps second lieutenants each year compared with more than 900 new officers who are commissioned now at Annapolis. Considering that the Navy Department commissions more than 4,000 new ensigns and second lieutenants each year, the percentage from a USDA each year would be too small to meet the needs of the Navy and the cost-per-midshipmen- graduated would be unacceptably high.
The smaller number of students at a combined academy also would require the current congressional and presidential appointment system to be scaled back dramatically.
Joint education and training are certainly important; nevertheless, professional military officers first and foremost need to understand their own service and warfare area first. It is a building-block approach. Just as we don’t teach algebra and calculus at the same time, young officers need to understand their own service before they can fully appreciate joint training and issues.
Lieutenant Haraden’s data concerning costs are flawed. First, the publicized cost of a Naval Academy graduate comes from measuring the entire bill for operating and maintaining the institution and divides that figure by the number of midshipmen. The publicized cost of a NROTC-commissioned ensign comes from direct costs to the Department of Defense in support of the NROTC student, but does not include many other costs associated with running academic institutions that are federally subsidized by other programs outside the Defense Department. Lieutenant Haraden’s cost figures are further misleading because they address only the cost of producing a new officer; they do not consider the longer-range impact of higher retention and promotion statistics of graduates of the Naval Academy.
The real costs of a commissioning source must include the long-term retention and promotion rates of its officers. While the initial accession costs of NROTC officers are somewhat less, retention statistics indicate that the American taxpayer is getting a significantly better return on the invested dollars from the Naval Academy as an officer accession source. The cost of the commissioning source is only a small part of training a career officer at the ten-year point or beyond. Specifically, accession costs are significantly less than the costs of aviation and nuclear-power training. The higher retention and promotion rates of Naval Academy graduates as opposed to those officers from other commissioning sources, when viewed with the costs of pipeline training, make the U.S. Naval Academy the most cost-effective source of career naval officers.
In summary, Lieutenant Haraden simply fails to recognize the broader, long-term issues associated with his recommended reforms. Such an institution as Lieutenant Haraden’s U.S. Defense Academy would not be in the best interest of any of the armed services nor of the country.
“Nice To Have, But Not Really Required”
(See K. Kochendarfer, pp. 73-74, June 1995 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Sean Patrick Clark, U.S. Navy, Strike Fighter Squadron 94—I admire Ensign Kochendarfer for his insight into the future of naval aviation and the need for the F/A-18E/F Hornet, but I question his opinion that the aircraft would require a weapon systems officer (WSO). After flying more than 1,100 hours in the F/A-18 Hornet, I can state unequivocally that it is the most “user-friendly” aircraft ever built and is an absolute dream to fly.
The F/A-18 was designed and built with ease of flying in mind and, therefore, requires little concentration on basic airmanship. For example, since the flight computers always seek 1-g flight, the pilot does not have to trim the aircraft. Certainly, the Marine Corps has done well with its two-seat F/A-18s, but mainly in the tactical air control (airborne) and forward air control (airborne) roles—both are highly labor-intensive missions. In fact, I would suggest that most Marine Corps aviators would say that “it is nice to have a WSO, but not absolutely required”—something an F-14 or A-6 pilot would never utter.
To figure out how the F/A-18 accomplishes the missions formerly carried out by two crew members, one need only to look at the aircraft’s technology—A F/A-18 pilot can search for airborne targets, sort them out, and engage them rapidly without ever taking his hands off of the stick and throttle. Also, the radar warning receiver suite is state-of-the-art and immediately alerts the pilot of any incoming missiles or antiaircraft artillery. These advances in technology alleviate the need for a second person on board the Hornet. Ironically, Ensign Kochendarfer names technology as one of the reasons for a WSO.
Regardless of the threat, the F/A-18E/F will be the world’s most survivable, most combat- capable, carrier-based strike fighter. It will be the mainstay of U.S. naval aviation well into the next century and probably will become what the F/A-18A/C has been up to this point: the finest carrier aircraft ever built.
“The Case for the Diesel- Electric Submarine”
(See J. Lake, p. 63, June 1995 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral W. J. Holland, Jt., U.S. Navy (Retired)—Rear Admiral Lake alleges diesel-electric submarines are “... in some scenarios better suited than nuclear submarines.” To my knowledge, this claim has never made by a person with any experience in submarine warfare. I challenge Admiral Lake—and others who promote “diesel boats forever”—to annunciate the specific scenario, mission, or task in which they believe that the conventionally powered submarine with its slower speed, lower agility, and poorer stealth characteristics has the advantage.
Admiral Lake also asks: “How well does a large nuclear-powered submarine designed for open-ocean deep water missions fit into a coastal-water scenario?” He and other inexperienced critics suggest that it does not; but those of us who have undertaken such missions can testify that it does very well indeed—and far better than the underpowered, shortlegged diesel boats we once tried to use.
The only category in which the diesel- electric submarine can be superior to the nuclear-powered submarine is initial capital investment. Simply put, the former is cheaper to build. Critics of nuclear- powered submarines ought to stick to that fact and not try to cloak their arguments with specious claims about these boats’ military capabilities.
“The Generals’ War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf”
(SeeR. Weigley, pp. 117-118, March 1995 Proceedings)
Robert Previdi, author of Civilian Control versus Military Rule (Hippocrene Books, 1988)—Before I read this book, I thought the Persian Gulf War was a rousing U.S. success. The main objective of the war, as clearly stated by President Bush, our Arab allies, and the United Nations was to take back Kuwait from Iraq. This goal was achieved in just 100 hours of ground fighting with very few coalition casualties. But Mr. Gordon and General Trainor believe a serious mistake was made by President Bush, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, and General Colin L. Powell: They ended the war too soon.
The authors conclude that if the war would have been allowed to go on for just one more day, the coalition essentially could have destroyed the Iraqi Army, including the elite Republican Guard. The authors assert that “. . . the war looked different in the Euphrates valley than it did at the White House. The closer one got to the battlefield, the more questionable the decision to end the war seemed.” Dr. Weigley agrees; I don’t.
The Gordon-Trainor-Weigley logic sounds good in hindsight but only if we accept as fact that President Bush, Secretary Cheney, and General Powell added to the objective of liberating Kuwait that of destroying Iraq’s army. But they did not and correctly so. When it was clear that the Iraqi Army was being routed, these men agreed that the reputation of the United States would suffer if our forces slaughtered the fleeing Iraqi troops.
According to Dr. Weigley, the prosecution of the Persian Gulf War suffered because of our military forces were insufficiently “joint” in the field. Could this just be a signal that the whole issue of jointness based on the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 should be reevaluated?
In my opinion, the strength of the U.S. military lies in the flexibility that comes from having distinctly different forces with contrasting capabilities. Depending on the problem being faced, sometimes it is best to use the Marines, sometimes the Army and the Air Force, and sometimes a Navy-Marine Corps team.
These forces should be made to work together—which is quite different from “joint.” The question we need answered is at what point in the command structure should our forces be integrated? And does this situation change depending on the military challenge?
Mr. Gordon and General Trainor write, “After the Persian Gulf War, the Pentagon would tout the war as a validation of the post-Vietnam war principle that Washington should establish the broad parameters of the war and leave the details up to the theatre commanders.” Many would summarize the mistakes of the Vietnam War as simply too much control by the civilians in Washington. The mistake in Vietnam was not that decisions were being made in Washington. It was that our civilian leaders had no realistic political plan for winning the war and, therefore, could not make sound strategic decisions.
In contrast, the liberation of Kuwait was the clear political objective of the Persian Gulf War. Consequently, there was a solid basis for making effective strategic decisions. Based on what happened, it was our good fortune that U.S. civilian leadership not only approved the air and ground plans, but also contributed to their formation.
Dr. Weigley writes, “Problems arise when a nation’s chief military man, the representative of armed force, opposes using such force except in extraordinary circumstances.” General Powell understands that you don’t use military force without a clear view of what is achievable and, unless you are attacked, that you either go into an operation with overwhelming strength or do not go in at all. We could have avoided a disaster in Vietnam if our military leaders had grasped these ideas and imparted them forcefully and clearly to their civilian superiors.
As Dr. Weigley correctly hints, the larger and more troubling problem is that, under the Goldwater-Nichols Act, military advice to the President and the Secretary of Defense comes from one man. Would it have been wise during World War II for President Roosevelt to have only one military adviser? And, if so, who should that man have been? Admiral King? Admiral Leahy? General Marshall?
“The U.S. Navy in Review”
(See S. C. Truver, pp. 120-125, May 1995 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Kenneth M. Lankin, Medical Corps, U.S. Navy, Medical Department Head, USS Whidbey Island (LSD-41)—Dr. Truver’s article is a superb summary of what was another busy year for the Navy. I was dismayed, however, at the caption for the top photo on page 122. It claimed to depict a scene from “Navy participation in the Haitian operation . . . interdicting fleeing Haitians ... a motor whale boat from the LSD-41 . . .”
I cannot understand why the effort was not taken to identify the ship in question by both name and hull number: it was the USS Whidbey Island (LSD-41). One could surely understand the difficulty of identifying a patrol boat from an obscure country, but not the lead ship of a major class of U.S. amphibious ships.
Furthermore, I was standing on the stern gate of the Whidbey Island when the photo in question was taken last summer. Therefore, I can assure you it depicts the first boat load of Cubans, not Haitians, transferred to the Whidbey Island during Operation Able Vigil. During that operation, the Whidbey Island received, fed, administered health care to, and transported more than 8,100 Cuban migrants to safe haven at Guantanamo Bay—more than any other ship.
“Where Air Power Fails”
(See S. T. Ganyard, pp. 36-39, January 1995; M. A. Kirtland, pp. 12-14, February 1995; J. S. Clark, H. L. Elman, pp. 19-20, March 1995; R. P. Pellegrini, pp. 28-30, May 1995; E. A. Cohen, p. 14, June 1995 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Colonel Michael A. Kirtland, U.S. Air Force (Retired)—Unfortunately, the authors of the Gulf War Air Power Survey (GWAPS) seem to have become increasingly sensitive about their work— perhaps because of the sometimes severe criticism it has received from both inside and outside the air-power community. But if Dr. Cohen thinks my letter was meant to criticize the GWAPS, he misses the point of my comments. My characterization of GWAPS and its methodology was derived from a seminar on the survey given by a member of the survey team, and from specific questions I asked him at that seminar. Before writing for Proceedings, I verified my memory’s accuracy with numerous other attendees, including some who are considered experts in their own right on air power in the Persian Gulf War. Each agreed with my assessment of what was said. It is surprising and unfortunate that GWAPS members now feel compelled to defend their work at every turn.
The major point of my letter was that "Where Air Power Fails” was far below the normal caliber of articles found in Proceedings and that Major Ganyard’s understanding of air power is shaky at best. He made numerous incorrect and misleading characterizations of the thoughts and writing of air power advocates, including the authors of the current Air Force Manual 1-1. The article appears to be an attempt to promote the very narrow vision of air power’s role as found in Marine Corps policy and doctrine.
If my purpose was not clear, then perhaps my words were not sufficiently well-crafted. Anyone who came away thinking that my comments were intended to criticize anything but that article misinterpreted and misused my words.
“Putting It Through the Right Window”
(See E. Smith, pp. 38-40, June 1995 Proceedings)
Lieutenant William Hamblet, U.S. Navy, Intelligence Officer, SEAL Team Four— Often, I have heard operators chastise the Naval Intelligence community for a lack of leadership. In contrast, Captain Smith’s leadership and forethought should stimulate discussion by both users and producers of intelligence.
For the past few years, the intelligence debate has focused on systems, automation, and sensor-to-shooter issues while largely ignoring analysis, quality of information, and intelligence personnel. As Captain Smith points out, “Most discussions of the revolution in military affairs assume that . . . precise intelligence will be available ... on the information superhighway of the new military.” Certainly, we have been building the information superhighway; less and less emphasis, however, has been put on the quality of information on the highway, and what people and what training will put it there. As the U.S. military moves forward in the realm of information warfare, the old adage “garbage in, garbage out” becomes ever more fitting.
I cannot speak for all military intelligence, but traditionally, Naval Intelligence has seen itself primarily in a supporting role for the Navy’s operational communities. Perhaps the time has come to change how intelligence personnel view themselves. Instead of living within the “support” paradigm, maybe we should begin to see ourselves as intelligence operators. By that I do not mean plunging into “cloak and dagger” work. I mean that as intelligence professionals we must operate the intelligence system as analysts who can make the judgment calls when available information is nebulous; as collection managers who can appropriately task joint task force, theater, and national systems without overloading them; and as system operators who are experts on the Tactical Aircraft Mission Planning System, the Intelligence Data Handling System, and other automated intelligence systems that move information rapidly to and from users in remote locations.
In the future, the U.S. military will fight with fewer forces than we did in the past. Therefore, we will have to fight smarter, operating within our opponents’ observe, orient, decide, and act loops. Whatever you call it, “maneuver warfare” or the “Revolution in Military Affairs,” this style of warfare relies on speed and accuracy. In the intelligence business, automated systems and sensor-to-shooter initiatives will provide part of that speed and accuracy. But the well-trained intelligence professional—who understands the needs of the warfighter, who make the best use of the U.S. intelligence architecture, and who also knows the enemy—will become an increasingly vital part of our warfighting capability.
“Contingency Blues”
(See E. Rosenlof, pp. 53-57, January 1995; W. Tunick, G. Cooper, pp. 13-19, April 1995; W. M. McBride, p. 12, June 1995 Proceedings)
Major John J. McManus, Canadian Forces, Commanding Officer, Helicopter Operational Test and Evaluation Facility, Canadian Forces Base Shearwater—Commander Rosenlof’s article should force everyone involved in antisubmarine warfare to take a hard look at the Third World diesel-electric submarines. His five conclusions were valid for all ASW forces, not just surface ships.
Lieutenant Commander Tunick was perplexed by Commander Rosenlof s failure to mention either the LAMPS helicopter or the SH-60R program. I agree that the surface ship-helicopter team is without doubt the best ASW asset; however, the surface part of the team will not be there in sufficient numbers if Commander Rosenlof s recommendations are not taken for action. If you do not have enough ships to execute the required missions, then the quality of the ASW team ceases to be an issue. Furthermore, if ships are too noisy or not properly defended against torpedoes, those of us flying helicopters will need to find alternate decks for recovery. Finally, the Canadian Forces once had a signed contract for a fleet of EH-101s. Can anyone be completely sure that the SH-60R program will be fully funded?
Lieutenant Commander Cooper found it disconcerting that Commander Rosenlof discounted the ASW helicopter. 1 do not think he discounted any ASW asset. His prime thrust was to maintain ASW assets at high enough force levels to keep ASW surface ships, with their embarked helicopters, on station for sufficient duration. I agree that the SH-60B or any modern ASW ship-based helicopter can respond and get on station on short notice, but the ship must be already in theater and have Worked up for ASW.
The only way to avoid Commander Rosenlof s scenario is to continue to pay attention to surface combatants designed and prepared for ASW. Those of us that fly ASW helicopters off destroyers and frigates depend on that.
“Who Needs the Space Command?”
(See W. J. Toti, pp. 38-41, April 1995; R. S. Dickman, J. L. Byron, pp. 14-17, May 1995 Proceedings)
Steven Lambcikis, Analyst, National Security Research, Inc.—Commander Toti raises some pressing issues about space organization, but does not carry his most challenging argument about command to its logical organizational conclusion.
Two particularly noteworthy points demand a response. He writes that "unified commands exist to command forces, not to control systems.” Absent a force application mission, he contends, U.S. Space Command should be scrapped and satellite “management” returned to the services that depend on them.
This reflects a rather constrained understanding of what constitutes a “space force.” Satellites not only gather and disseminate information. As force-enabling assets, they have been undergirding U.S. military prowess. Whether or not force- application missions in or from space become more fully developed, centralized command of scarce and precious U.S. space assets is imperative. Even with the present organizations, it took more than four months and the concurrence of more than 60 agencies to establish the space- communications architecture for the Persian Gulf War. This is no way to do business in an age when speed, strategic agility, and flexibility are essential.
Moreover, as air power did, space power is evolving; it already has become critical to traditional military operations. Early 20th century defense planners, after all, did not readily accept the growing role of air power, much less an “air force.” Today’s space force is immature and, in many ways, its potential is unrealized. Yet, we cannot deny that new operational concepts are being born and, with them, a new age of warfare in which the contest for space shall be pivotal.
My second point is that space warfare is not, as Commander Toti claims, a "myth.” He disparages the label of the Persian Gulf War as America’s first “space war” and contends that, until there is shooting in space, there is no such animal. Yet, like many others, he ignores a fundamental mission of Space Command; space control. Iraq was hardly an agile space enemy, but U.S. forces still undertook critical political and military space control operations against space-based and ground targets.
Regrettably, Commander Toti’s analysis is strikingly static, seemingly unconcerned as it is with future space threats. Regrettable because the space-control mission promises to become more important as more states turn to satellites to improve their military efficiency and as potential enemies look to undercut U.S. military prowess by assaulting our links to space. If another state is to challenge the United States in the future, it will need to do so in terms of space capabilities. The results of a Naval War College simulation of late spring 1994 are instructive. In that war game, set in 2010, China routed the U.S. Navy’s 7th Fleet using precision-guided cruise missiles.
Commander Toti correctly writes that today’s space organization is problematic, but it is unhelpful to suggest that critical space missions should be given back to the services. Indeed, we should look in the opposite direction. The United States needs a centralized Space Command above all to ensure that all space threats are met; the services, working independently, cannot adequately or efficiently undertake this mission. A new, independent uniformed service should be formed to organize and equip U.S. space forces, draft space-related doctrine, and provide training to warriors who would doggedly support the other services and defend U.S interests in space as we meet the dynamic military challenges of the next century.
“There Are Alternatives to the Third Seawolf”
(See N. Polmar, pp. 121-122, March 1995; K. M. Knipling, p. 22, May 1995; D. P. Cocolin, pp. 22-23, July 1995 Proceedings)
Norman Polmar—I owe an apology to Ms. Knipling and to her colleagues at the Naval Sea Systems Command. My column stated: “Two Seawolf-class submarines now are under construction and will not add significantly to the submarine technology base.”
My original manuscript read:
In this context, it “pays” to build new submarines only to advance our technology base. Two Seawolf-class submarines are under construction and will improve the submarine technology base. A third Seawolf (the SSN-23) will not improve our technology base and there is no need for an additional SSN to meet force level goals.
In making some last-minute changes to the page proofs, I changed “will improve” to “will not add significantly to the submarine-technology base.” The addition of the word “not” was a mistake. I apologize.
The Seawolf certainly is the most advanced submarine that the Naval Sea Systems Command can now build and will enhance our technology base. Indeed, in many respects, the Seawolf is a great submarine. Rather, the issues are: Do we require a third unit? Can we afford a third unit?
True, the third submarine will help to maintain the entire industrial base. But can Ms. Knipling point to any available studies or analysis that have looked objectively at other means of maintaining the submarine industrial base during the “gap” between the second Seawolf and the first New Attack Submarine (NSSN)? The studies publicly cited by the Navy do not. Furthermore, executives at Newport News Shipbuilding—which has built most of the submarines of the Improved Los Angeles (SSN-688) class—have declared that they can produce the NSSN without having to have a third Seawolf to “fill in the gap.”
Also, Ms. Knipling states that only 11 Los Angeles-class submarines will be retired before reaching their 30-year service life. If a force level of 45 attack submarines is reached by 2000, then the force would probably consist of two Seawolfs, two ex-Polaris transport submarines, and 41 Los Angeles-class submarines. One could argue that the force will be larger, possibly 55—the higher number postulated in the Department of Defense’s Bottom-Up Review. However, since the nuclear submarine force has never achieved any of its force-level goals before, there is little rationale for accepting the larger number.
Thus, if one subtracts 21 Los Angeles-class submarines from the class total of 62, and deletes those boats at the rate of 3.5 per year (i.e., 1995 to 2000), retiring them in order of completion; all 21 boats—not just 11 boats—would be retired at between 16 to 19 years of service, significantly short of the 30 or more years of service predicted for them. Of course, fine tuning the list could change the years remaining, but the average years of “unused” but paid-for service life will be about that indicated by Ms. Knipling. Or have Ms. Knipling’s colleagues developed a different approach for the scheduled retirements? If so, it should be of interest to Proceedings readers.
The Seawolf is a great submarine. Nevertheless, the basic questions remain: Does the U.S. Navy need the third unit? Can the United States afford her?
‘“Truth Without Fear’”
(See J. Hoffman, pp. 57-63, May 1995 Proceedings)
Colonel H. Larry Elman, U.S. Air Force Reserve (Retired)—The fight over defense unification was partly a turf fight, partly a battle over whether air power had come of age, and partly a fight over proper government. Major Hoffman says some very wise things on the contradiction between the duties of a good citizen to speak out and the imperatives of military order and discipline; however, he could have gone further on the subject of appropriate dissent by serving officers.
Billy Mitchell was court-martialed over his vocal disagreement with his civilian superiors. Therefore, I always have found it ludicrous that the Air Force—which regards him as its patron saint—should have gone howling so bloodthirstily after the Navy and Marine Corps officers who followed their consciences in 1946-1950.
During the 1947 unification fight. President Harry Truman sought to gag General Edson and other critics of unification. History shows that Truman was wrong to do so. The fight put up by the Navy and the Marines spared the nation from following the British example of turning over naval aviation to the Royal Air Force for most of the interwar years. The Royal Navy finally recovered the Fleet Air Arm in the 1930s, but the long separation of the two had a devastating effect on the development of British carrier aviation. The continued campaign against naval aviation by Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson—culminating in his 1949 cancellation of the United States (CVA-58)—sparked “The Revolt of the Admirals.” Once again, President Truman made the error of gagging flag officers, and once more he won in the short term and lost in the long term.
But while I castigate one of my favorite Presidents for those two gag orders, I applaud two of his others. In 1948 —in the midst of a hotly contested election—President Truman desegregated the U.S. military with the stroke of a pen, effectively silencing military opposition to this innovation. A few years later, he fired two people—Secretary Johnson and General Douglas MacArthur—for improper statements. On both the issues of desegregation and Presidential command authority, history determines that President Truman was right. Yet, in all four cases, the issue is essentially the same: Should officers speak out. The answer is, “When you are right, you are right.” If the issue is not military parochialism but good government or justice or some other long-term issue, officers must speak out. But they first must examine their motives and take care to ensure their messages are read correctly.
Almost 50 years after the fact, is there still a lesson to be drawn from the actions of General Edson and President Truman? Most certainly. When President Clinton refused to keep his promise about allowing gays to serve openly in the U.S. military, it fostered the perception in Congress—and the electorate—that President Clinton could be “rolled” and, therefore, respect for him declined. As one who has been on the receiving end of discrimination for being in an ethnic minority group,
I think President Clinton failed in his duty—and those officers who hounded him and screamed to Congress failed in theirs as well.
Officers always should be willing to stand up for their convictions. However, if they do so, they should follow the model of General Edson: first, by considering their motives; second, by being certain of their stands.
“Taking Maneuver Warfare to Sea”
(See T. C. Pierce, pp. 74-77, April 1995; H. P. Liske, pp. 19-20, July 1995 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Gary Cooper, U.S. Navy—The Navy’s transition to maneuver warfare doctrine is a significant step in the right direction. Unfortunately, most officers from nonamphibious-warfare communities tend to link maneuver warfare and Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS) with the projection of ground forces ashore. As such, most Navy officers will not give the maneuver warfare concepts outlined in Naval Doctrine Publication 1 (NDP-1), Naval Warfare or related articles published in Proceedings, the seriousness they deserve. Maneuver warfare and OMFTS are not new concepts of naval warfighting; neither are they a departure from the conduct of naval operations today.
Movement and maneuver, commander’s intent, tempo, and the other elements of maneuver warfare are—and have been—inherent to naval operations. Because of the physical properties of the maritime environment and the expansiveness of the sea, naval forces cannot “acquire” territory in the same fashion as land forces do. Naval forces can only “control” the sea. As a result, successful sea control focuses on the enemy and critical vulnerabilities, two of the prime tenets of maneuver warfare.
OMFTS is more than using maneuver warfare for amphibious operations. It includes the projection of naval firepower ashore in the form of carrier air strikes, cruise missile strikes, and naval gunfire support as well as electronic and information warfare in the support of land operations. OMFTS is the use of the full range of naval forces—as maneuver elements—to shape land battles “. . . From the Sea.”
Naval Maneuver Warfare and Operational Maneuver From the Sea institutionalize a doctrine inherent to naval warfare that places the Navy on a common conceptional playing field with the other armed services. Naval Maneuver Warfare doctrine creates efficiency in planning and potency in execution of joint operations. It assists in reducing the cultural barriers between the services. It is in the Navy’s best interest to implement maneuver warfare concepts fully, expand maneuver-warfare theory to encompass all naval warfighting specialties, and not focus solely on amphibious warfare.
“Changing Military Retirement”
(See W. Hamblet, pp. 80-81, January 1995; P. A. Randall, p. 24, April 1995 Proceedings)
Captain Paul B. Hendrickson, U.S. Naval Reserve—Congratulations to Lieutenant Hamblet for introducing the idea of a military tax-deferred savings plan (TDSP). It is the first innovative concept in military compensation since the variable housing allowance. His example of the power of compound interest is a superb lesson on the value of consistent saving. As Albert Einstein once said, “I can’t name the seven wonders of the world, but the eighth is compound interest.”
He also illustrates a number of other points that are confronting employees everywhere;
- Pressure in every organization to cut costs
- More emphasis being placed on employee choice in benefits (this does not necessarily mean more or better benefits)
- Closer scrutiny of pension costs, both in the federal sector and private industry.
Military pensions are more lucrative than those in the private sector, but the military person does not have a TDSP or other capital-accumulation benefits. For example, a military pension accrues at 2.5% of base salary per service year; in industry, 1.5% is more common. Consequently, military retirees collect 75% of base pay at 30 years, while their civilian counterparts receive 45%. This means if their salaries were identical, a civilian retiree would receive only 60% of what a military retiree receives. Additionally, most civilian pensions require at least 30 years of service or reaching the age of 60-65 and do not have cost-of-living adjustments.
Such relatively generous benefits might be an irresistible target for budget cutters. Therefore, the simultaneous introduction of a TDSP and gradual reduction in direct pension benefits would help avoid possible draconian reductions of military pensions.
The tax-deferred savings plan is an excellent tool to initiate change in the military retirement system, give the individual more control over the assets, and provide significant portfolio growth opportunities. Employers with TDSPs frequently offer a variety of investment options (six or more, normally) in stocks, bonds, mutual funds, and index funds. The employee can allocate increments of 5% of the designated monies to the various investments. Frequently, the employer provides a quarterly update on the account status and annual projections of account balances to retirement age. Sometimes, the tax-deferred savings plan may be used as collateral for loans; although if the collateral is called the TDSP’s owner probably would be taxed for a premature distribution.
Lieutenant Hamblet indicates that the benefits of individual retirement accounts (IRAs) are not generally available to Navy personnel because of incomes above the tax-deferred benefit limits. Well, yes and no. As members of an organization with a pension plan, people in the U.S. Navy are restricted in the deductibility of an IRA contribution. But, regardless of compensation, anyone can make a nondeductible contribution to an IRA using Form 8606; however, it cannot be deducted on the Form 1040, lines 23a and 23b (spouse). Despite being nondeductible, the contribution to an IRA will grow tax-deferred.
If a sailor is single and has a modified adjusted gross income of less than $25,000, a full IRA deduction may be taken; above $35,000, no deduction may be* taken. If a sailor is married and files income taxes jointly, these limits are $40,000 and $50,000 respectively. Between these limits, the sailor would be permitted a graduated partial deduction of the IRA contribution. IRS Publication 590 has more details.
The TDSP is an innovative concept that could become the solid cornerstone for reforms of the military’s antiquated pay and pension policies. If the Navy takes the initiative, it could preclude potential cuts by Congress and help ensure a sound financial future for its dedicated personnel.
“The Navy Airship: More Ship Than Air”
(See C. E. Myers, pp. 40-42, May 1995 Proceedings)
R- G. Van Treuren, Producer, Naval Airship Association Video History Project— Mr. Myers’s trip in a futuristic fleet airship was respectfully conservative when one appreciates the technological advances in the more than 30 years between the EZ-1C and the proposed YEZ-2A. With a modern avionics suite, the EZ-IC (formerly known as the ZPG-3W) would be capable of many of today’s missions—even though steam locomotives were being manufactured when it was designed. Money the Navy has set aside to study a return to the efficiency of buoyant (fight may be squandered if Mr. Myers’s point is missed. There is strong historical precedent for establishing airships as fleet units rather than stepchildren of naval aviation.
When the Navy admired Zeppelins’ ability to shadow the British fleet with impunity, it built large rigid airships. Captain Don Mackey, who served in both submarines and rigid airships, found their operation to be surprisingly similar. Vice Admiral C. E. Rosendahl tried to get the Navy to accept the airship as a vessel, not a wingless airplane. He wrote in 1947:
[W]e need first reclassify airships . . . as ‘displacement vessels’ whose normal field of operation is the lower reaches of the atmospheric ocean . . . Countless varieties of surface vessels can operate on the surface of the sea without all being herded together under one banner; comparably, there surely is room for two kinds of craft in the atmospheric ocean above the sea.
Fate’s gift of helium was utilized during World War II in what could be considered Coast Guard actions; some antisubmarine commands simply ignored their airships. In its Mediterranean deployment, ZP-14 was used mainly for minesweeping. Later, the ASW airship operating off of escort carriers was accepted by the fleet. Then, with the rotating-crew ZPG-2 and its gasoline-bag refueling method, lighter-than-air aviation became independent of flight-deck support. Experiments were under way to develop a high-speed airship capable of meeting the nuclear submarine threat when the Navy decided to retire its airships, seaplanes, and most anything else that did not fit into its plans for projecting power ashore.
It’s not enough for a new generation to reacquaint themselves with the advantages of LTA. We don’t have to remember the developmental debt modern systems owe the R&D airship. We can imagine what systems gravity’s only known antidote might levitate today. We will never utilize the amazing potential of the modem fleet airships—in fact, they may not built at all—unless we realize the airship is not just a type of big slow airplane, but, as Admiral Rosendahl suggested, a displacement vessel.
“Submarine Engines for the Future”
(See R. M. Adams, pp. 61-65, June 1994; I. D. Spassky and V. P. Semymonov, pp. 24-25, May 1995 Proceedings)
Captain Richards T. Miller, U.S. Navy (Retired)—This article reminded me of work with which I was associated in 1976 and reported in a paper I wrote with Robert E. Thompson and presented to the 1977 Spring meeting of the Society of Naval and Marine Engineers: “Maritime Applications of an Advanced Gas-Cooled Reactor Propulsion System.”
The paper described the results of studies by Westinghouse engineers and scientists, begun in 1972, to determine the feasibility of a lightweight nuclear propulsion system (LWNP) for marine applications. The power plant design concept was based on existing technologies—e.g. the nuclear rocket reactor. It consisted of a gas-cooled nuclear reactor and integrally packaged gas-turbine propulsion system. The selected closed Brayton power cycle used helium at 1700° F and 1,500 psia. The reactor used technologies developed and demonstrated in both the nuclear rocket and the land-based gas- cooled commercial reactor programs. Conceptual designs were presented to demonstrate the feasibility of—and the advantages to be gained by—substituting the LWNP for LM-2500 aircraft gas turbines in a destroyer and FT4A gas turbines in a Euroliner-class container ship.
Further development of the project for naval ship propulsion was discouraged by the Navy Nuclear Reactor Division, and Westinghouse dropped work on it soon after the paper was published.
“How the Egyptian Navy Fought the October War”
(See A. Refaat, pp. 94-96, March 1995 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Brendan IV. Tully, U.S. Naval Reserve—I was considerably surprised by Rear Admiral Refaat’s review of how the Egyptian Navy fought the October War—more commonly known to Americans as the Yom Kippur War.
Early on 6 October 1973, as Israelis observed Yom Kippur—Judaism’s holiest day—five Egyptian Army divisions poured across the Suez Canal. At the same time, the Syrian Army, spearheaded by some 1,500 tanks, attacked Israeli positions in the Golan Heights.
Admiral Refaat correctly notes that planning for the October War incorporated almost seamless cooperation between Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq—something previously unachievable for the Arabs. However, he also claims that “naval activities had a profound strategic effect on the results of the war” and that the Israeli Navy had only “some success” in its prosecution of the naval war against Egypt. A closer review of Israel’s strategic objectives, the facts surrounding naval engagements between Israel and her Arab neighbors, and the final outcome of the Yom Kippur War certainly invites debate.
A basic and long-held assumption of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) is that any war between Israel and Arab countries would be short and fought mainly on the ground and in the air. Not surprisingly then, the Israeli Navy was—and still is—at the bottom of the IDF food chain. However, the Israeli Navy determined by 30 September 1973 that war was imminent and its commander declared a state of emergency on 1 October, considerably ahead of his counterparts. In short, 14 Israeli missile boats squared off against the combined weight of the Egyptian and Syrian navies. The bulk of the fighting took place in the Eastern Mediterranean.
On the night of 6 October, an Israeli- force of five missile boats engaged Syrian naval forces off the Syrian coastal city of Latakia. Within 25 minutes, three Syrian ships were sunk. Two days later, off the Mediterranean coast of Egypt near the cities of Damiak and Balatin, Israeli fast patrol craft sent three Egyptian missile boats to the bottom. By the war’s end, the Egyptian and Syrian navies lost 19 warships, including 10 missile boats. Three Israeli sailors were killed at sea and 24 were wounded without the loss of a single patrol boat. Certainly such figures are evidence of more than “some success” on the part of the Israeli Navy.
Admiral Refaat also states that “the Egyptian naval staff determined that the employment of submarines in [the Mediterranean Sea] would be very effective in hindering maritime traffic.” Whose traffic? Although Egyptian Navy submarines did sink two innocent Greek freighters—one northwest of Alexandria and the other farther west in the Mediterranean—but there is no evidence that they disrupted Israeli merchant shipping in the Mediterranean.
To prevent the transport of oil to the Israeli port city of Eilat, the Egyptian Navy blockaded the Straits of Bab el- Mandeb in the Northern Red Sea. The Israeli Navy immediately imposed a counter-blockade on the Sinai coast in the Gulf of Suez. To make up for the oil lost from this area, Egypt had to buy oil from Saudi Arabia and Libya.
There is no question that both Egyptian and Syrian Navies fought bravely in support of their land forces. But, as the Israelis planned—and probably the Egyptians and Syrians as well—the Yom Kippur War was fought primarily with tanks and aircraft. By the time of the ceasefire on 22 October 1973, the Israeli Army was within artillery range of Damascus and Well on the road to Cairo. Therefore, whether or not “naval activities had a profound strategic effect on the results of the war,” as Admiral Refaat claims, is certainly debatable.
“That Ain’t No Lady”
(See C. D. McKee, p. 100, April 1995 Proceedings)
Jodi Beth Danis—Never having read Proceedings before, I picked up the April 1995 issue to catch a glimpse of life in the U.S. Navy. I was pleased initially to see that the important topic of women’s integration into naval institutions was a focus of the issue. Unfortunately, the inclusion of Mr. McKee’s anecdote was not only ironic in light of this focus, but seriously undermined any claim that your publication was attempting to enhance and explore the status of women in the U.S. Navy.
Mr. McKee’s brief narrative revealed that the sexual objectification of women is still widely accepted in the Navy. In his sketch, he describes an incident in which he “spied a gorgeous lady ‘steaming’ toward our ship.” He wrote: “My friend and I had learned to appreciate the finer qualities of the female of the species.” This statement was followed by several descriptive comments about the passing woman’s “hull,” “seakeeping capabilities,” and “civilian decorative scheme.” The “punchline” of the piece was the realization that the woman was the wife of his division officer. Once Mr. McKee had determined that she “belonged” to another man, he concluded that “she ain’t no lady.” Apparently, the passerby gained an identity as a human being to be respected, rather than as an “appropriate” object of sexual admiration, only through her status as the division officer’s wife.
This description of men ogling a passing woman was inappropriate in a publication attempting to promote respect and equality for women in the Navy. While I realize that ships often are personified as female, analogizing a woman to a ship for purposes of sexual description is quite another, more troublesome, matter. I wonder how male naval personnel can be encouraged to respect the humanity and capabilities of the women they work next to when such contrary views are condoned in a such reputable publication.
Because of Mr. McKee’s brief piece, my glimpse into Navy life through the window of Proceedings was extremely disappointing. Apparently, women in the Navy have a long way to go before they are accorded the respect they deserve as human beings and can exhibit their full potential by being able to undertake their work free from the disadvantaging specter of sexual objectification. □
Editor’s Note: In selecting a title for Mr. McKee’s self-effacing anecdote, the editor assumed the ancient vaudeville punchline—“That’s no lady; that’s my wife!”—to be in the public domain. Evidently, it was not public enough.