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Where Are the Littoral Warfare Fast-Attack Craft?
By Lieutenant Commander K. R. Crawford, U.S. Naval Reserve, Lieutenant M. T. Hatton, U.S. Navy,
and Lieutenant Commander A. W. Melton, U.S. Navy
Designers say she will be capable of 30 knots
Table 1: Fast Attack Craft Flotilla | |
Mother Ship | Fast Attack Craft |
$660M | $70M |
Self Defense | Fast |
Ol | Seaworthy |
600 Crew | 19 Crew |
Support for FAC | 6-8 SSM |
Habitability | 76-mm Gun |
Sustainment | Self Defense |
AAW | Search Radar |
ASW | Variants |
Strategic Strike |
|
Rear Admiral George R. Worthington, U.S. Navy (Retired), has proposed that the U.S. Navy abandon the use of expensive, technologically superior ships in littoral warfare and develop a patrol boat concept for fighting littoral war. [See “Combatant Craft Have A Role in Naval Warfare,” Proceedings, August 1994, pages 24-25.]
He asserts that littoral warfare requires small, cheap combatant craft—and enough of them that commanders will not hesitate to use them. He implies that not every scenario requires the use of a carrier battle force; for smaller regional contingencies, a theater commander should have less costly—but adequate—forces available, which can be augmented as required.
Our assessment shows that he is correct: less-expensive craft offer big payoffs and can be more effectively employed in a littoral environment than high-cost, high-technology capital ships. We evaluated his concept as part of an Operations Research campaign analysis class at the Naval Postgraduate School. Under the guidance of our professor, Captain Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired), we structured our analysis as an imaginary briefing to the Chief of Naval Operations.
Admiral Worthington suggests that the Navy buy a 150-foot, 50-knot fast attack craft, with extended range and a small crew. Lightly armed by current standards, it would have multiple antisurface missiles; a small, capable gun; and significant command, control, communications and intelligence capabilities. Lacking data to allow us to examine his proposal, a craft called the H-3, we proposed a 150-foot craft of 250-300 tons that would have a procurement cost one order of magnitude less than the cheapest Aegis-class ship—you could buy ten of them for the cost of one Arleigh Burke (DDG-51)-class guided-missile destroyer.
These large numbers are appealing, but they are not the whole story; the craft would require support when deployed forward. We used a mother ship capable of supporting a flotilla of as many 15 fast attack craft. Such a vessel proposed in a Naval Surface Warfare Command study cost approximately $660 million; it has a strong self-defense capability, strategic- level communications-intelligence capabilities, a crew large enough to provide support, and enough space for attack-craft crews to bunk on board.
Equipping the attack craft and their mother ship is a prime consideration.
To save money, mother-ship capability could be reduced to bare-bones sustainment and replenishment of the flotilla; alternatively, a tender scheduled for decommissioning could be converted for evaluation. Obviously, the numbers of fast attack craft could be reduced. In the process, planners must avoid the ever- in sea state 5.
present temptation to enhance attack craft capabilities as numbers decrease.
Table 1 shows the features we desired to incorporate in the mother ship and the craft. The number of vertical-short takeoff/landing (VSTOL) aircraft carried by the mother ship should be the same as that carried by a pair of the next-gen-
Table 2: Equal Cost Comparison of Fast Attack Craft Flotillas and a DDG-51 Force | ||||||
Procurement Cost (millions) | Per Ship | Life Cycle Cost | Total Cost | |||
Mother Ship | $660 | $1,650 | $1,650 | |||
FAC X 15 | $ 70 | $ 175 | $2,625 | |||
|
|
| $4,275 | |||
DDG-51 X 2 | $966 | $2,415 | $4,830 | |||
|
|
| ||||
Crew Size | Per Ship | Total Crew | ||||
Mother Ship | 600 | 600 |
| |||
FAC X 15 | 19 | 285 |
| |||
FAC Flotilla |
| 885 | ||||
DDG-51 X 2 | 350 | 700 | ||||
Table 3: 20-Missile Salvo Attack Results |
| |||||
DDG-51 | FAC |
| ||||
1Sunk | 5 Sunk |
| ||||
50% Force reduction | 33% Force reduction |
| ||||
$966 Million loss | $350 Million loss |
| ||||
180-350 casualties | 75 casualties |
| ||||
Table 4: 8-Missile Salvo Attack Results |
| |||||
DDG-51 | FAC |
| ||||
1 Disabled/Sunk | 3 Sunk |
| ||||
50% Force reduction | 20% Force reduction |
| ||||
$966 Million loss | $210 Million loss |
| ||||
-180 casualties | 57 casualties |
| ||||
Table 5: Missions in the Littoral
► Search & Sweep ► Blockade & Inspection
► Inshore Escort of Shipping > Naval Gun Fire
► Intel Collection, Raids, SOF > Search and Rescue
► Inshore ASW > Mark or Trail
► Inshore AAW ► Minesweeping
► Amphibious Ops Support > Mine Laying
eration DDGs: about four in all.
We developed a scenario that required either a small force of Aegis-class capital ships or a fast-attack craft flotilla. The threat was a Third World power with a small but effective force equipped with air-, surface-, and land-launched Exocet- type cruise missiles. The theater was a littoral area measuring 300 X 300 nautical miles, with a harbor entrance suggesting an egress point for the hostile force.
The mission was to establish presence and to be prepared to establish coastal sea control in the event of hostilities. We considered either two DDG-51s or a fast-attack craft (FAC) flotilla of equal cost appropriate for the mission. Table 2, based on 30-year life-cycle costs for all vessels, suggests that one could buy a mother ship and 15 fast attack craft for about the cost of two DDG-51s.
In addition, the Arleigh Burke force typically woule require backup— two DDG-51s for each DDG-5I on station—that the one-of-a-kind fast-attack flotilla would not. Actual, detailed costs are beyond the scope of this abbreviated study; for simplicity, the on-station forces (two DDGs or 15 fast-attack craft) were the only ones considered.
The DDGs, in this scenario, would patrol beyond the range of any shore-based missile sites, using sensors to monitor activity in the area; they would move in only if a threat developed.
The FAC flotilla would stash the mother ship in a safe haven and deploy five craft on 72-hour missions to the hostile power’s 12-mile limit, where they would patrol to provide indications and warning to the rest of the flotilla. An additional five craft would remain on alert at the mother ship, ready to respond as required. The remaining five craft would be in a rest-and-replenishment period at the mother ship.
To make a rudimentary cost-effectiveness comparison of the two forces, we investigated the impact of a 20-missile coordinated attack on each of them. The attack was conducted against either one of the two DDGs or all five fast-attack craft at the 12-mile limit. The rationale was that the hostile forces could conduct a coordinated attack against only one of the DDGs at a time because of the DDGs’ distance from the hostile force bases. It took two hits to put a DDG out of action and three to sink her; one missile hit was assumed sufficient to sink any of the fast attack craft.
Based on historical data, the DDG— while obviously capable of strong selfdefense—still would have to absorb a 20% leakage rate; even after defeating 16 of the attacking missiles—80%—she would take four hits, enough to sink her; the other DDG was untouched.
Giving the fast-attack craft the capability of defeating one missile, and assuming the hostile force launched four missiles at each boat, subjected each of the five craft to three hits, more than enough to sink them. The mother ship and the ten remaining fast-attack craft were untouched.
Critics may argue that Aegis-class ships would do better than this, but as their capability has yet to be tested, we can easily hypothesize an attack large or ingenious enough to force the DDG to take four hits. We wish to point out two things about the results of this stylized attack. First, the losses of lives and treasure are more severe to the DDGs than the flotilla. Second, the flotilla retains a greater capability after the attack than does the DDG force. Table 3 illustrates the losses.
We used the same methodology in hypothesizing a smaller eight-missile salvo attack. This time the DDG absorbed 1.6 missile hits and three of the five fast attack craft were hit once. The attack put one of the two DDGs out of action (or at least significantly reduced her capability), but only three of the five fast attack craft were lost. Table 4 illustrates these losses.
Clearly, the DDG force will have the greater technological advantage and sensor capability and will be able to complete the mission assigned and support a level of conflict up to the transition to a major regional conflict. The DDG loss, however, is proportionately more severe than that suffered by the flotilla, which suggests that the flotilla has a major advantage in staying power for inshore warfare. A single hit on a DDG will affect the force more significantly than a single hit on a fast attack craft. The flotilla’s superior numbers also allow wider coverage.
Warship designers use the term “enclave design” to describe ships with distributed and duplicated capabilities that allow them to “fight hurt.” The fast-attack craft flotilla is an example of the enclave design carried to its logical con- elusion: distribution of the weapons and communications allows surviving craft to continue the fight.
In this scenario, the fast-attack force also should be better suited to the mission because it will be able to control targeting more accurately. Unlike the DDG force, it will have real-time indication and warning and will be better able to sort out the picture as the front-line craft patrol mingled with the fishing and small cargo vessels that make up the heavy traffic along the coastlines of the world.
The flotilla cannot perform all missions intended for Aegis-class ships but all of Table 5’s missions will need to be performed in littoral operations—and many are better suited to a fast-attack flotilla than a brace of Aegis ships.
This is merely a first effort to demonstrate that the Navy should look closely at its strategy for littoral warfare. A theater commander should be able to counter a force without having to risk what amounts to strategic assets. Further study can establish the true trade-offs.
There is likely to be strong opposition to the flotilla concept because of the political realities associated with increasing the overall numbers of ships. Naval officers will recognize that, while small boat flotillas will do very well in littoral environments, they can play no role in blue water against a major naval power.
Buying these craft means that other programs will be canceled or reduced in scope. Ideally, one would like to pursue a mix between technologically superior blue-water ships and aggressive, expendable, and more numerous small craft for littoral operations.
Our numbers are not accurate enough to stake a reputation on—but Admiral Worthington is on the right track. If we were given this task at the Pentagon, we would be delighted to be on the study group that explores this idea more fully.
The authors are students at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.
Resurrecting “Fly Before You Buy”
By Rear Admiral John J. Zerr, U.S. Navy, and Lieutenant Michael Oldenburg, U.S. Navy
The shrinking defense budget, coupled with the nation’s continuing postCold War interests worldwide, have focused attention on acquisition reform. With technology advancing at a rate far surpassing the old 15-20-year cycle required to get a product from the laboratory to the field, the problem is to keep up with the advanced technology now available to our potential adversaries on the open market. The consequences of failing to do so are obvious.
Reform can give us this time and yield savings. The Navy—and all the armed forces—stand to gain by sharing research and development costs with industry, simplifying acquisition and oversight bureaucracy, and reducing overhead and life-cycle costs. Reformed, streamlined acquisition promises to deliver just what we want: a faster and cheaper acquisition cycle.
The services are being asked to do more, but, by 1999, the scheduled defense budget will shrink to less than half that of 1985, according to General John Sha- likashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who believes that “By just getting smaller, we will fail.” Clearly, reform and rapid acquisition are vital to maintaining the capability to influence international events militarily.
We must be cautious, however, as we craft a faster acquisition process. In the past, misunderstanding, distrust, and a differing emphasis on various aspects of cost, schedule, and performance—and between oversight and program management—resulted in a long list of regulations and laws. In the 1970s, these became known collectively as the “Fly Before You Buy” acquisition strategy, which was designed to discipline the process. Acquisition slowed, and early efforts to speed and streamline the process focused on ways to bypass the system.
As recently as early 1994, the “Fly Before You Buy” theory appeared terminally ill, in need of replacement. Two programs that reinforced this notion were the F-14D and the Navy Tactical Command System-Afloat (NTCS[Aj), the Navy’s afloat command, control, communication, and intelligence system. Composed mostly of commercial off-the- shelf computers on a distributed local area network, it provides the afloat fleet commander with information necessary to direct the battle force.
By the time the Operational Test and Evaluation Force had completed its evaluation of the NTCS(A), two versions of system software—the baseline and an upgrade—already had been released to the fleet. As a result, any recommendation regarding fleet introduction was meaningless; the evaluation had taken place too late to enforce any kind of acquisition discipline or even to serve a quality assurance function.
The Navy’s first two F-14D squadrons had returned from their first overseas deployment before all the aircraft’s subsystems had been tested.
The evolutionary acquisition strategy used to field NTCS(A) provided capability improvements faster than the traditional development and testing processes could support. In addition, users wanted to install the latest capabilities before the completion of the traditional development and test cycle. All these factors combined to field the system prior to operational test.
In the case of the F-14D program, the Navy’s purchase of the aircraft is complete, and two squadrons already have completed their first overseas deployment. Yet, to this day, we have not started the phase of testing which should have released the funding for production—because we are awaiting four important subsystems.
Everyone wants to get the best equipment to the fleet as fast as possible, but fielding systems without complete testing poses problems for operators and commanders who live and breathe readiness. The operators depend on the operational testers to generate initial tactical manuals and users’ guides. Generated by the results of disciplined testing on ranges where actual threat conditions are replicated, these manuals are of considerable value. Measurement of system performance on these ranges is also important; the fleet commander needs to know the capability of his systems before the battle starts.
Thus, in the fall of 1993, we were concerned that Navy acquisition practices were becoming undisciplined, and that our standard approach to operational testing was outdated. Consequently, we formed a team to examine our role in the acquisition process and to identify what needed changing—and what did not. There were some obvious questions. Why were systems like the F-14D fielded without undergoing “Fly Before You Buy” operational tests? What value, if any, do operational testing and OPTEVFOR add to the acquisition process? What changes did OPTEVFOR need to impose on its business practices?
We reviewed the old “Fly Before You Buy” acquisition strategy. Defined in a series of Department of Defense and Navy instructions and entangled with many unwritten paradigms, it consists of the following major characteristics;
> “Fly Before You Buy” is a rigid, bureaucratic process put in place because of lack of trust between oversight agencies and program management.
> Requirements, once approved, are viewed as having been chiseled in stone.
> Full-rate production decisions are based on operational evaluation (OPEVAL) results.
> Only limited-rate initial production items can be acquired prior to OPEVAL.
> Test and evaluation events are driven strictly by program forces.
> OPTEVFOR reports served only the purposes of acquisition oversight, not of Navy acquisition quality assurance.
> Approval of program documents is a slow, laborious, serial process.
> Systems are fielded only after proving performance sufficient to pass mature thresholds.
> The “Fly Before You Buy” strategy is naturally adversarial.
A key factor to consider is the importance of the linkage between acquisition, readiness, and the Navy’s strategy statement “Forward . . . From the Sea.” OPTEVFOR believes acquisition plays a crucial role in readiness. The ability to make a near-instantaneous transition from forward presence to combat requires high readiness for our deployed forces. This linkage is especially important in view of the rate that advanced technology is reaching the civil sector and becoming readily available to potential adversaries.
The old acquisition practices, although slow, adequately served readiness because the old process controlled access to technology. Now, with access to technology not so effectively controlled, streamlined acquisition practices are exactly what we need to keep up. By extension, this requires new, matching test and evaluation methods.
To survey industry sources about disciplining their developmental efforts, we visited a UNISYS plant near Detroit, Michigan, and the MacDonnell Aircraft Corporation in St. Louis, Missouri. At UNISYS, quality assurance (QA) and test and evaluation play a vital role keeping the business competitive. Formed as an entity independent of product engineering and manufacturing, the quality assurance function is a vital part of the management process. At MacAir, a definite commitment to quality control and sound management practices was in evidence. Of particular note were the number and visibility of independent QA groups; each major product line program manager and top-level executive leadership had an independent QA team.
Both examples from industry underscored the importance of discipline in the business of developing products and an independent QA team was considered a vital part of the discipline process.
The next question was: Should we devise a new acquisition strategy or should we modify “Fly Before You Buy?” Since funding continues to be the single most important aspect in the life of a program, just as it was with “Fly Before You Buy,” the essential elements of any new discipline measure will naturally gravitate to funding decision points. We recommended the following changes to fix the old strategy:
> Give OPTEVFOR not only an oversight role, as in the past, but make it a player in the continuous improvement cycle of Total Quality Management, as well.
> Establish a less rigid, iterative, more sensible process to establish requirements. For commercial-off-the-shelf/non-devel- opmental item acquisitions, requirements should be established as follows: The parties should agree to the list of test parameters to be measured, then establish thresholds if possible; where thresholds are not possible, goals should be established; and if goals are not possible, results should be tested and compared to existing system performance.
> Maintain early and continuous dialogue between testers, sponsors, developers, and users.
> Test early (including operational testing) to reduce risk and to prove the worth of the product using models, simulators, and hardware-in-the-loop facilities.
> Use OPEVAL as a final proof-of-the- product test, as well as a proof-of-the- process test for software developers.
> Field new systems when they mature to the point where they exceed existing capabilities and are supportable, then expand on system capability with hardware and software upgrades (evolutionary acquisitions).
> Conduct operational testing prior to fielding using sensible thresholds.
> Develop and use software metrics to establish measuring tools for tracking the evolution of a software package.
> Lower costs by conducting more concurrent development and operational testing. Try to do nonintrusive operational testing concurrently with fleet training.
> Speed the approval process of key acquisition documents by using concurrent review and approval, and electronic document transmission.
We have made considerable progress in improving trust and communication between OPTEVFOR and the Systems Commands in the past year. Once so vigorously concerned with the appearance of independence that they would not discuss test procedures, today’s operational test personnel are ready and willing to answer questions. Lack of communication between OPTEVFOR and the Systems Commands had been a major factor contributing to low OPEVAL success rates in the recent past. Improving the program manager’s understanding of how and why we conduct tests is a critical step in improving the acquisition process. Coupled with better communication and trust, sharing information should improve the first-time operational evaluation success rate, contribute to fielding systems faster, without compromising the integrity or independence of OPTEVFOR.
As a by-product of the improved relationship, program managers are inviting earlier OPTEVFOR participation in their programs, which helps identify risks earlier and forces a serious consideration of more concurrent developmental and operational testing. OPTEVFOR in the past resisted this concurrence because it too closely associated developmental testing with program management; concurrence was seen as “contaminating” operational testing to the extent that test results were not independent. The lack of trust and undue concern with preserving appearances often led to duplicating
tests and doubling costs.
Last summer we shared a very successful concurrent developmental and operational test on a new command-and- control system that involved ships firing several missiles at aerial targets. We worked together to plan the test scenarios and the data requirements. One agent collected the data for developmental and operational testing, but we analyzed and evaluated it separately, at a cost much less than that for two independent phases of testing.
We still have much to do. Defining the linkage of acquisition to the readiness of the fleet, improving the requirements setting processes, and deriving better software-intensive system testing methods are some areas needing study. Nevertheless, the progress made in the past year in reimposing discipline on the Navy acquisition process is sufficient to justify the claim that we have resurrected the “Fly Before You Buy” acquisition strategy.
Admiral Zerr commands the Operational Test and Evaluation Force, Norfolk. Virginia. A Test Pilot School graduate, he flew A-4s in combat with VA-55 on the USS Hancock (CVA-19) and later commanded the USS New Orleans (LPH-11) and the USS Constellation (CV-64). Lieutenant Oldenburg, a nuclear submariner with a degree in physics, is the operational test director for submarine communications on the OPTEVFOR staff.
Cruising Forward—Women Underway 1994
By Dr. Jane Pacht Brickman
Captain Nancy Wagner (above left), a U.S. Merchant Marine Academy graduate, is a San Francisco Bay pilot; Ensign Lynn Acheson conns the USS Niagara Falls (AFS-3).
Since the Maritime Administration sponsored the first Women Underway Symposium in 1991 at the California Maritime Academy, it has grown to a three-day forum in which men and women from the academies, the maritime industry, the Navy, and the Coast Guard discuss human relations on campuses and in the profession. The one-day conference, once attended almost exclusively by women students, has expanded to link students of both sexes with professionals in an endeavor to forge consensus around human relations goals for the campuses, industry, and the services.
Last year’s symposium at the U.S.
Merchant Marine Academy, Kings Point, New York, brought together midshipmen and cadets, faculty, staff, and alumni from each of the maritime colleges and the Naval and Coast Guard Academies. Panelists represented a cross-section of the maritime industry and the maritime services. Members of the Oregon and Florida Boards of Pilots attended, as did students and faculty from the Webb Institute of Naval Architecture.
Five panels discussed:
► Career opportunities ashore and at sea
> Getting and keeping a job
> Curricular responses to changing conditions in the maritime field
> Integration of women students on predominantly male campuses
> Establishing a partnership between industry, government, and the academies to make human relations the cornerstone of the environments in which we live and work
A sixth panel, composed of midshipmen and cadets from all the academies, addressed students’ perceptions of the fields they are entering and their reflections on their academy educations. Discussion periods followed each panel. On the last day, midshipmen reporters led workshops that defined the goals that had emerged from each forum.
The symposium’s primary conclusion was that human relations within the maritime industry and the services will improve more rapidly as the academies consistently graduate students committed to a new vision of collaborative leadership. The general conclusion was that the human relations climate on campuses, in the maritime industry, and the military services will change only with unequivocal signals from top leadership that no human relations violations will be tolerated. If students, officers, or staff sense any ambivalence or weakening of commitment, the tone of interpersonal relationships cannot improve.
The Maritime Administrator, Vice Admiral Albert Her- berger, U.S. Navy, Retired, gave the keynote address. Joan Yim, the Deputy Maritime Administrator; Dr. Mary Lyons, President of California Maritime Academy; Rear Admiral Paul Versaw, Superintendent of the Coast Guard Academy; Dr. Peter Mitchell, President of Massachusetts Maritime Academy; Rear Admiral Thomas T. Matteson, Superintendent of the Merchant Marine Academy; Commander Lisa Curtin, U.S. Naval Academy; and a large contingent of Maritime Administration officials also attended. Their presence was not lost on the students.
Conference attendees saw an irrevocable link between the successful integration of women on predominantly male campuses and the development of better human relations. Leadership training divorced from real achievement on campuses will lead to students’ alienation and skepticism; rhetoric severed from reality will make cynics of fledgling leaders. Human relations training, combined with concrete gains toward making the campus environment hospitable for everyone, is the best hope for achieving permanent change in the services and the maritime industry, according to conference participants.
The goals emerging from the two panels addressing women’s integration on campuses and human relations development fell into three broad areas: recruitment, the special needs of women on campuses, and appropriate human relations training.
Participants agreed on the need for more active efforts to recruit female students to create a critical mass of women on campuses. Numbers influence behavior by the dominant and the numerically smaller groups. Attendees noted that skewed gender ratios lead to group behavior—an anomaly in which the whole does not represent the sum of the parts; groups behave in ways that do not reflect the characters of the individuals in them.
Ways to attract more women to the academies remain elusive. Attendees suggested that midshipmen and cadets visit elementary, junior high, and high schools to give greater visibility to the maritime, Naval, and Coast Guard Academies and to encourage under-represented groups to apply. Young women should receive early encouragement to enter non-traditional professions. The group urged support for the efforts of the American Association of University Women to achieve gender equity in the lower grades. Panelists recommended that the academies enlist the support of women’s professional organizations, such as the Society of Women Engineers.
Recruitment, however, does not ensure retention. Efforts to retain women students must be accompanied by the hiring of more women faculty members. In a circular process, the retention of women students is linked to the presence of women faculty—whose retention in part depends on the climate of the entire institution. Panelists also recommended that academies conduct more training for faculty and staff to sensitize them to human relations issues.
The question of special meetings for women caused considerable comment. On the one hand, panelists argued that allwomen meetings reinforced women’s isolation and contributed to perceived divisions between male and female students. Nonetheless, panelists were not convinced that all problems connected to integrating women had been solved on campuses, nor were they sanguine about addressing all issues in mixed-gender groups. They endorsed some special training for women to discuss common concerns and noted that women students must be authorized to respond to negative behavior on campuses.
Most agreed that women students face a certain amount of predictable taunting, including the suggestion that women lack requisite qualifications and are admitted to fill quotas. In military institutions and services, where rank determines status and responsibility, students, junior officers, and non-officer women at sea often feel intimidated in the face of what they consider inappropriate behavior or speech. How to train junior members of the forces to speak out while observing military protocol, panelists concluded, is one important aspect of separate training. To avoid widening rifts among students, panelists suggested off-campus sites for women’s meetings.
A final group of recommendations addressed human relations issues and training. Attendees envisioned human relations work as a vehicle to foster better communication between male and female students. They identified two flaws in early training efforts at the academies and in the services: human relations defined narrowly as sexual harassment and training sessions confined to women. Participants argued that this exclusionary approach contributed to male suspicions—fear of the unknown—and also insulted many men who were genuinely concerned. Perhaps most damaging, it divided women, some of whom believed they had to choose between membership in the corps or allegiance to female identity. In order to demonstrate loyalty to the team, many female students and officers turned their backs on other women.
To be effective, training must be conducted in mixed-gender groups and human relations must be defined broadly to include a panoply of issues involving collaboration among diverse groups. Further, training should take place in small groups with case studies and role playing. It should be student-led when possible; peer-generated programs have special credibility. Those who conduct human relations training should themselves represent diverse backgrounds, including industry.
Too many programs can result in overkill. Students should have some training, know the rules, and be held accountable for their behavior. The academies should establish and publicize grievance procedures. Students must not fear reprisals for initiating investigations of human relations violations. Academies must provide safe avenues to report discrimination and standard procedures for investigating charges. While the privacy of the parties should be maintained, the entire campus should discuss the conflict and its resolution. Attendees agreed that more time and resources must be put into human relations development at the academies and that cultural changes at the academies will alter the climate in the industry and the military.
The evolution of the Women Underway Symposium from an all-women forum to an integrated body was essential in making human relations a key part of leadership training. Yet when some participants called for a change in the conference title (“Women and Men Underway”) to signify the symposium’s new orientation, consensus diminished. Many commented that the group must not move hastily on that front. While men and women should work together to resolve issues of integration and human relations, women will continue to have unique concerns until the job is complete. To pretend otherwise suggests that we ignore current unresolved difficulties.
A delicate balance must be maintained. Leadership training should be the umbrella for the discussion of human relations issues, including sexual harassment. Training must include men and women, because:
► The issues addressed are indeed human issues and not gender specific
> Leadership means leading people of mixed backgrounds and genders
Following the conference, a Humanities Department professor at the Merchant Marine Academy asked his class to write about a value conflict in which an area that had presented a black-and-white dichotomy became less clear-cut as a result of new experience. One student described his formerly firm conviction that women do not belong at federal academies. He identified his traditional background, in which “My father was the breadwinner and my mother was the one who took care of the kids, house, and other business, even though she also worked . . . the philosophy was that you separate the men and women, because they have to be educated in different ways to prepare them for the rest of their lives.”
After listening to a female friend describe the Women Underway sessions, his perceptions began to change. “I came to the realization that while some of the women attending this academy do not belong, there are an equal number of men who do not deserve to be here. This judgment is not based on race or gender, but on the ability to do the job that has been placed before them. The notion that there are some jobs that women can’t do, which had been black-and-white to me not too long ago, had suddenly become a gray area in which an answer could be reached only through time and performance.”
The stakes are high, with students and
officers’ futures dependent on how well they master new skills of leadership. Based on these premises, conferences such as the Women Underway Symposium must be mixed gender. On the other hand, participants clearly adopted a definition of equality as the recognition of difference and rejected an androgynous title. While advocating mutual training needs for men and women, most participants want continued acknowledgement of women’s different experiences as distinct minorities at the academies. Perhaps only when men and women are balanced more evenly in numbers will this disparity of academy life be eliminated. Until then, there must be continued attention to the improvement of student and professional life for women.
Dr. Brickman is Professor of History and Head, Department of Humanities at the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy, Kings Point, New York; from 1983 until 1994—when she assumed duties as Department Head—she had formal collateral duties as women’s advisor. She coordinated last year’s Women Underway Symposium.
Manage by Objectives to Improve Fitness Reports
By Captain David A. Anderson, U.S. Marine Corps
Reporting seniors and Marines can work together to set goals. Here, a captain and a lieutenant discuss the process.
General Walter E. Boomer, then Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, had this to say about the Marine Corps evaluation system: “I will tell you quite frankly, I detest the Marine Corps fitness report. Those who sit on a promotion board love’em. You rank people—1,2,3,4,5 . . . What do you think it does to the superb lieutenant colonel who is ranked 7 of 7? I’ll tell you what it does. It crushes them and they never recover.”
The official Marine Corps order relating to Fitness Reports describes the system in these unambiguous words:
“There is no document maintained in the personnel files at Headquarters Marine Corps more important than the fitness report. It gives us a word picture and evaluation of performance on all our Marines, sergeant and above .... On a personal level, fitness reports are a Marine’s history of career accomplishments [and are] ... the justification for promotion and assignment decisions.”
The evaluation system currently in effect has been in existence for almost four decades. Although relatively minor policy changes have occurred over the years and the form has been modified to aid in automation, the policies and procedures used in the preparation and submission of reports have basically remained constant.
The current report uses a variety of performance-appraisal methods—rating scales, overall ranking, and a written appraisal:
> Rating scales—The reporting senior evaluates the success with which an the individual has carried out his duties; the degree to which the individual exhibits certain desirable qualities ranging from endurance to presence of mind.
► Overall ranking—indicating where the reporting senior ranked the individual in relation to other officers of the same grade.
>• Written appraisal—a concise narrative that provides meaningful insight on the individual.
In addition, the reporting senior must indicate where individuals ranked “Outstanding” ranked within that elite group, e.g., if three individuals were ranked “Outstanding,” was this individual first, second—or third?
Despite its overall effectiveness, the report leads to inflated rankings. The results of a study conducted by Richard M. Steers in 1988 of U.S. businesses assessing appraisal methods revealed that rating and ranking methods had:
> High potential for rating-ranking errors >■ Low acceptability by subordinates >• Low acceptability by superiors
In addition, the method provided little useful information for allocating rewards, counseling, or identifying promotion potentials.
The study would seem to warrant a reevaluation of our ratings and the ranking of outstanding Marines. The report’s high potential for rating errors can be attributed directly to the vagueness of the traits and characteristics evaluated in Section B and the subjectivity of the rating scale used. This snowballed until an “Outstanding” mark became average and anything to its left became something below average.
Recognizing this phenomenon, the Marine Corps in 1985 began requiring reporting seniors to rank all outstanding Marines among themselves, a procedure that lends itself to a tremendous amount of subjectivity and intuition on the part of reporting seniors and reviewing officers. It is difficult at best to rank individuals and their potential for future value of service when the reporting senior must consider different military occupational specialties (MOSs), time in grade, billet assignment, professional experience, differing education, etc.
Dr. W. Edward Deming wrote, in Out of the Crisis, that these methods “leave people bitter, crushed, bruised, battered . .. feeling inferior, some even depressed, unfit for work for weeks after receipt of their appraisal, unable to comprehend why they are inferior.” He went on to say that “ . . . the effects of these are devastating—teamwork is destroyed, rivalry is nurtured. Performance rating builds fear and encourages defection in the ranks of management.”
Although not intended to be a counseling tool, the reality is that the fitness report has developed into one—even though the inflated rankings compromise its usefulness. Furthermore, rating
and ranking is in direct conflict with the Total Quality Leadership (TQL) philosophy adopted by the Department of the Navy.
The written appraisal has four notable deficiencies:
> It is time-consuming.
> Its quality may be influenced by the supervisor’s writing skills in that good writers may simply be able to produce more favorable appraisals.
> It is influenced by the frequency of observation and the professional experience of the reporting senior.
> It tends to be subjective rather than focusing on objective aspects of job performance.
Despite these inherent problems, the fitness report remains an effective tool in evaluating performance. It could benefit, however, from the techniques alluded to in the Users Guide: “How to Write a Fitness Report" (NAVMC 2794) which states, “Performance must be evaluated against missions, tasks, and standards as communicated by the reporting senior to the Marine reported on.” This guidance is amplified by Marine Corps Order P1610.7 Performance Evaluation System which states, “Many billet assignments are not self-explanatory, and Marines do not always work within their military occupational specialty (MOS). All leaders need to ensure that Marines understand their mission and responsibilities; specifically, definition of tasks and standards expected in completing those tasks.” In addition, the Counseling Training Program (NAVMC 2786) states, “A junior’s targets should be mutually established between senior and junior.”
This leads to management by objectives, a philosophy of management first proposed by Peter Drucker in 1954. It seeks to judge the performance of individuals based on their success in achieving the objectives they have established through consultation with their superiors. I am not saying that management by objectives is a cure-all for all the inherent problems of our fitness report; I am suggesting that it can be a useful tool for evaluating performance while reducing subjective appraisals.
The system involves a cycle that begins with setting the organization’s and the individual’s common goals and objectives. Establishment of specific goals for the individual Marine reported on using a broad statement of responsibilities prepared by the reporting senior is a significant feature. The goal statements are accompanied by a detailed account of the actions the individual proposes to take in order to reach the goals; progress is assessed during reviews. (See Figure 1.)
Goals may be changed; individuals periodically make a self-appraisal, substantiating it with factual data wherever possible. The interview—which concludes the cycle—is an examination of the individual’s self-appraisal by the reporting senior and the individual Marine.
There are many advantages: It communicates the commander’s intent; reduces subjective reporting and rat- ing/ranking errors; quantifies accom- plishments-failures, thus providing promotion potential information; diminishes the “halo effect” (the judging of an individual favorably or unfavorably on the basis of one strong or weak point on which the reporting senior places high value; reduces the “recency error” an appraisal largely based on the individual’s most recent performance—good or bad; quantifies performance for awards and the ranking of outstanding Marines; requires periodic appraisal interviews, eliminating fitness report counseling; and requires the setting of individual-established goals; which has been shown to improve individual performance, thereby leading to increased productivity.
Goal setting works because it allows individuals to focus their efforts on important tasks and makes them accountable for completing these tasks. Measurable increases in job performance typically range from 10% to 25%—in some cases they have been higher. Furthermore, goal setting establishes an automatic feedback system, since individuals can evaluate their performance against their goals.
Management by objectives must meet several requirements. First, it must be viewed as a part of a system of managing and appraisal. Second, both the reporting senior and the individual must be willing to work together establish goals and measurable standards for performance. Third, objectives set must be quantifiable and measurable for both the long and short term. Fourth, the expected results must be under the individual’s control. Finally, the reporting senior and the individual must establish realistic, specific times to evaluate progress.
Most Marines would agree that the current appraisal system needs improvement. Management by objectives is a constructive means for providing such improvements. Ultimately, it complements the Marine philosophy of always knowing your objectives and helps reporting seniors carry out the spirit and intent implied in orders addressing Marine performance appraisal.
Captain Anderson is the Operations Officer, 2d Landing Support Battalion, 2d Force Service Support Group at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.
Let’s Expand ’Gator Air Control
By Commander Jeffrey D. Rusinko, U.S. Navy
Navy Tactical Air Control Squadrons on board amphibious assault ships like the USS Saipan (LHA-2) can do a lot more than control helicopters. The Navy should expand their mission.
The tactical air control community has the opportunity to improve Tactical Air Control Squadron (TACRON) support within the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) by expanding responsibilities during air operations and redefining the group’s AntiAir Warfare Commander (AAWC) assignments.
Naval Warfare Publication 22-2, Supporting Arms in Amphibious Operations, makes the TACRON officer-in-charge responsible for:
► Coordinating air planning ► Preparing the air plan included as an annex to the operation plan of the Commander, Amphibious Task Force (CATF) > Controlling all air operations in the amphibious objective area or designated area These responsibilities technically come into play only when an amphibious objective area (AOA) has been activated, but there are many advantages to expanding the scope of these commitments to cover all air operations—including the increasingly frequent littoral evolutions that do not employ a designated AOA.
When carrier battle groups go to sea, they have a well-established Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) protocol and a tactical air control system to support it. The system includes primary, carrier air traffic control, strike, and the various warfare commanders; amphibious ready groups employ a similar system, with the exception of strike. When there is no designated objective area—frequently the case—the ship’s helicopter direction center (HDC) assumes flight following responsibility. The Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) maintains an air operations status board for the amphibious task force commander and monitors the HDC radio net.
This arrangement stretches HDC’s flight-following capabilities to the limit; aircraft beyond the immediate area of the ship become secondary priorities— behind approach and departure control operations.
Whenever the ARG is conducting flight operations, whether in or out of an objective area, we should give the TACRON detachment in the Tactical Air Control Center responsibility similar to that given strike controllers on the carriers. This would free the helicopter direction center to concentrate on approach and departure control within 20 nautical miles of the ship, while airborne aircraft could count on dedicated flight following for the duration of their mission— within radio and radar limits.
The deployed TACRON currently mans three air control/air direction stations and one AAW station. Even with an objective area designated, the manning is adequate to provide strike controller support and still meet all traditional TACC air traffic control commitments.
We tested this non-traditional employment of TACC air controllers with the USS Belleau Wood (LHA-3) ARG and the results were favorable. Because most operations occur outside established objective areas, this arrangement makes much more efficient use of the experienced controllers in the TACC and allows the HDC to concentrate on operations in the congested area around the ship.
TACRON antiair warfare employment within the amphibious ready group also would benefit from some changes. The numbers of AAW-experienced TACRON officers and enlisted personnel are insufficient to man a 24-hqur AAW watch. Two feasible alternatives are available:
► Increase manning by two officers and two sailors—difficult to do in today s austere environment or
> Employ our current AAW element as an AAW augmentation cell—supporting either the flagship AAW organization or the staff tactical watch bill.
If we cannot increase TACRON AAW manning and its associated training significantly, I believe the best alternative is to support the flagship AAW organization in the combat information center and make the ship’s commanding officer AAWC.
Although an amphibious ready group’s AAW capability in the absence of a true AAW platform is limited at best, the ships can still benefit from pooled detection and response resources. The TACRON deploys with a valuable core of AAW manpower, including one AAW experienced officer, at least one air-intercept-qualified controller, and three more operations specialists to operate consoles and keep status boards. This small but valuable experience base could be employed more effectively as an augment team to the ready group’s flagship antiair warfare organization when the CATF is embarked and the flagship commanding officer is acting as Group AAWC.
The commander can take advantage of an existing 24-hour AAW watch team in CIC and also use the TACRON’s senior-level experience to form an effective Group AAW organization. Another option would be to provide CATF with an AAW staff watch similar to the carrier group’s AAW team in the Tactical Flag Command Center (TFCC).
TACRON air control and AAW expertise is a critical part of both the CATF staff mix and the composite air picture in TACC and must be retained. We should increase the TACRON detachment manning and training to support an amphibious ready group AAWC watch bill—or rethink the employment of the experienced people now on board to provide a solid augment to the flagship AAW organization.
Making the best use of limited resources is more important than ever as the Navy gets smaller. Our amphibious forces have assumed a more prominent role in the post-Cold War era and the challenges of employing multi-service helicopter and fixed-wing aircraft have rarely been more important. Our tactical air control units bring valuable expertise to the table. We must make full use of their unique amphibious air control experience in littoral warfare.
Commander Rusinko commands Tactical Air Control Squadron 12, home ported at the Naval Amphibious Base, Coronado, California. A Naval Flight Officer, he most recently served as the Officer-in-Charge of the TACRON-12 detachment deployed on board the Belleau Wood (LHA-3).