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The LCAC’s success in Operation Restore Democracy in Haiti once again demonstrated the Marine Corps’ role in worldwide maneuver warfare and welfare.
U-S. naval participants and planners can look to the amphibious phase of Operation Restore Democracy, off the coast of Cap Haitien, as further proof that littoral regions of the world remain one °i their primary domains—and that the landing craft, air cushion (LCAC), has tnade this projection of power ashore possible over the past decade.
First expressed in 1992 with the publication of . . From the Sea,” the new concept shifted the focus from warfare °n the seas to power projection and to operations in the littorals for both lethal and non-lethal engagements. Naval warfare operations in the Persian Gulf, Somalia, Haiti, and the humanitarian efforts >n Bangladesh and elsewhere demonstrated the flexibility, mobility, and sustainability of the Navy/Marine Corps team, especially relative to amphibious operations in littoral areas.
By 1994, “Forward . . . From the Sea” reaffirmed the concept but made it clear the littoral regions shared the spotlight with traditional naval missions as a primary focus. From an amphibious warfare Point of view, according to Vice Admiral John B. LaPlante, Director for Logis- 'ics, Joint Staff/J-4, “Forward . . . From the Sea” takes the Navy/Marine Corps team firmly in the direction of adopting maneuver warfare as the mode that will be employed in the littorals. Admiral LaPlante, who commanded the amphibious forces in Desert Storm, added:
One of the absolute crown jewels of naval capability is going to be the LCAC. . . . The tactical value is just immense, particularly in a joint campaign. ... If that joint campaign is in a littoral area where the enemy has a flank exposed or some vulnerability, maneuver warfare in its maritime mode will be used to strike and destroy and regroup and strike again.
It will have the effect of tying down all sorts of people the way it was done in the Desert Shield/Desert Storm Operation, and inflicting real damage as a coequal campaign element to the ground campaign. LCAC is what enables this.
Multiple contingencies are also a key concern. At the same time as the Haitian operation, naval task forces with embarked Marines were half a world away, monitoring events promulgated by the regional conflicts in Yugoslavia and the renewed threats in the Persian Gulf. Depending upon the contingency, the forces may engage in major regional conflicts, strategic deterrents, sea control, and strategic sea lift.
In an era of such multiple missions— conducted simultaneously, yet offset by decreases in the force structure and funding for all the services—Haiti is viewed by some as the first test for the joint U.S. force concept called adaptive joint force packages (AJFPs) and developed to address this overall decline. A broad range of force packages that would include different combinations of units from each of the services to meet unique military requirements of overseas commanders are a part of the emerging concept.
Lieutenant General Charles E. Wilhelm, Commanding General, Marine
Corps Combat Development Command, noted:
Adaptive joint force packaging could very conceivably be an element of operational maneuver from the sea in the context it was employed during operations in Haiti. It is important to note that it consisted of two components, the introduction of elements of the 10th Mountain Division from aircraft carriers at Port Au Prince and the landing of a Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force from amphibious ships at Cap Haitien. Adaptive joint force packaging can expand the force deployment and employment options available to joint force commanders.
Army Rangers and paratroopers from the 82nd Airborne Division were also on board the USS America (CV-66) off the coastline of Haiti. But from the viewpoint of the naval participants and strategists, whatever else it has accomplished.
The rocky and debris-laden coastline of Cap Haitien presented a challenge to landing the Marines and their equipment—but the LCAC crews met every mission.
Operation Restore Democracy—like its predecessors around the globe—validates the “Forward . . . From the Sea” concept using amphibious forces that employ the LCAC for power projection ashore. On the beachhead level, interviews with crew members show operations off the coast of Cap Haitien proved the reliability and flexibility of LCACs to put Marines and their equipment rapidly and safely ashore.
Similarly, planners and strategists, such as Admiral LaPlante and General Wilhelm, view Haiti as one more opportunity to test new concepts, validate some old ones, and address lingering problems. Among their concerns is the question: Who will kick in the door? A Haitian assault configuration was planned, because the situation ashore—which turned out to be a permissive environment—was essentially unknown. The answer to this question goes to the heart of a debate between the Army and Marine Corps as to which service is best suited for forcible entry, and which has the level of sustained land combat that might be required in the immediate follow-up phase of a regional crisis. In this debate, Marine Corps expeditionary capabilities contend with contingency capabilities of Army airborne and light infantry forces. Together, however, these alternatives allow a military response to any contingency, regardless of location or circumstances. General Wilhelm commented, “As we look at each contingency ... we have to look at the force best qualified and best capable to carry out a specific mission.”
Internally, naval planners continue to analyze allocation of resources, focusing on the appropriate class, size, and mix; the availability of amphibious assets; and command-and-control problems stemming from the new doctrine. In this sense, Haiti and similar missions serve as ongoing laboratories for naval forces maneuvering forward from the sea.
Contrary to public perception, the amphibious phase of Operation Restore Democracy was no promenade along the beach. In the first instance, the three LCACs from Assault Landing Craft Unit 4 (ACU-4) had to contend with heavy seas during operation rehearsals. During the operation, sea states were more favorable as LCACs maneuvered from the well decks of three different classes of ships—the USS Wasp (LHD-1), the USS Nashville (LPD-13), and the USS Ashland (LSD-48).
“In general, the Caribbean is a pretty tough place to operate because of the swells,” said Captain David C. Rollins, ACU-4’s commanding officer. “There’s a trade-off between sea state and speed, and if you push the limit trying to go as fast as you can in a heavy sea with a heavy load, the result can be bag damage. That was the only materiel problem we had down there, but the crews handled it.”
Topography presented another challenge in that there were no beaches per se on which to land the LCACs at Cap Haitien. Instead, the first wave in encountered coral heads that protruded out of the water at low tide. Conventional craft would have had to deviate around these obstacles, but the LCACs were able to go right over the coral. Boatswain’s Mate Chief Anthony Madden, craftmas- ter of LCAC-37, likened the landing area to a city dump or a raw sewage discharge area. “From coke cans to hypodermic needles to rotten food to tires, you name it, it was there,” said Chief Madden. “We knew it was going to be very nasty, but the craft performed beautifully. We met every mission. We did more in the two-week period down there as far as loading and offloading and carrying Marines and their equipment than an entire detachment could do in a normal six-month deployment.”
All the LCAC crews involved emphasized that the environment was intense, because they had entered Haiti in a combat insertion. This meant an average run to the beachhead took eight to nine minutes, and that the turnaround time to offload and get back to the ship to take on another load was about 21 minutes. “When we hit the beach, there were hundreds and hundreds of people everywhere, and you didn’t know who was going to shoot at you and who was going to shake your hand. That nervousness and tension were there among everyone. We acted accordingly. We armed ourselves and kept a defensive posture while we were unloading the craft,” said Chief Madden.
As General Wilhelm pointed out from his vantage point as an analyst, the amphibious operation off Cap Haitien proved the versatility and adaptability of amphibious forces to multiple environments.
He regards amphibious forces as “the country’s most robust and immediately sustainable forcible-entry capability.” The flip side of this forcible entry or maneuver warfare is what General Wilhelm calls “maneuver welfare.” He considers this versatility one of the great attractions of amphibious forces or naval power projection. “More and more, we’re coming ashore not to take lives, but to save them. . . The same combat systems that enable us to overcome an armed adversary in a littoral region can be used equally effectively to assist a distressed population.”
General Wilhelm, who commanded Marine forces in Somalia during Operation Restore Hope, advised his own troops, “I expect you to strike down a tyrant with your right hand and raise up a starving child with your left.” He further observed that this is a tough job for young men and women in uniform, because it requires “instant judgment, exceptional maturity, and a lot of self reliance.” General Wilhelm continued, “Commanders have to place a tremendous amount of trust in their small unit leaders. And it’s even more critical, because these are high-visibility operations.”
As it had been in Somalia, with the Kurds in northern Iraq, and all the other incidents of humanitarian assistance, General Wilhelm’s admonition proved applicable in Haiti. Boatswain’s Mate Chief James Worley, another LCAC craftmas- ter, summed up the situation for his Navy and Marine comrades: “On the beach, you could see the appreciation of the people, and that made you walk away with a sense of accomplishment. You were out there doing what you were trained to do . . . helping people. I talked with a child; the interpreter kept saying the boy wanted to tell us thanks.”
One of the things the people in Cap Haitien expressed gratitude for was that after two years without electricity, a makeshift joint task force composed of Navy LCACs, Army fuel trucks, and Marine troops restored power to the city’s only plant. Within hours following the LCACs’ arrival, the lights came on in Cap Haitien. “The Army would bring three trucks down, and we would fuel one °f them from our craft [LCAC] with 5,000 gallons. They would take that to the power plant, while we took the other trucks out to the Wasp [to refuel],” said Chief Worley.
In addition to this humanitarian assistance, the amphibious forces solved a tac- ttcal problem for the Army helicopters that tapped into the LCAC pipeline. “We Were the main source of fuel for the Power plant and for the Army air assets ashore until they got used to flying [refueling missions] back to the ship,” the craftmaster added. In addition, the CCACs transported water trucks to the Army troops until their supplies started coming in.
These incidents involving the transport °f fuel, water, and other supplies from the sea point up other advantages of amphibious operations. The Navy-Marine Corps team not only brings immediate sustainment that the Army lacks but also accomplishes this in a less obtrusive man- fer than by swooping in from the sky. In fact, anytime they go to sea, Marine expeditionary forces take up to 30 days of sustainment, as well as one-third of a tactical mobility triad, combining the *-CAC, already fielded, with the V-22 OsPrey and the Advanced Assault Amphibian Vehicle, both in development.
“In the Marine Corps, we are firmly rooted in what we call a concept-based requirement system. We don't procure •terns of equipment in isolation. They must tie back to an overarching concept,” said General Wilhelm. He explained that at the heart of the overarching concept is a maneuver element with the capability to introduce forces both by air and by surface modes.
Whether you’re practicing maneuver warfare or maneuver welfare, or both, you’re able to get more people, more food, whatever your metric is, ashore more rapidly. High sea states may make operations with surface craft unfeasible but may permit the operation of aircraft. By the same token, reduced ceilings and zero visibility may make operations by aircraft less than feasible but will permit surface craft. We can come ashore by surface out of well deck ships or by helicopter off the flight decks. So we look at this range of capabilities.
Adaptability was also emphasized by Admiral LaPlante, “The operation [Haiti] dself had a lot in common with Somalia, but in the way it was planned for execu- hon, there was an option to execute an opposed entry—an airborne assault in the case of the Army, an over-the-beach assault in the case of the Marine Corps. I think the lesson learned in these two operations is that we have to develop the capability to plan and be able to change, to present options at the last minute.” Because Operation Restore Democracy combined ground, air, and surface elements in a joint assault some believe Haiti represents a prototype of the future for maximizing the number of options through splitting responsibilities in an adaptive force package among the various services. Admiral LaPlante also noted that the Army assembled a significant amphibious force of its own around Port Au Prince with two LSVs and a number of LCU-2000s, the next generation up from the landing craft the Navy uses.
“Most were carrying such things as fuel tankers, so that if there was going to be a kicking-in-the door assault, then the LCUs would come in fairly quickly behind ... to provide refueling for the tactical vehicles air dropped in.”
Notwithstanding the fact that the
Boatswain’s Mate Chief Anthony Madden piloted the first LCAC ashore at Cap Haitien. “When we hit the beach,” he said, “there were hundreds of people everywhere.”
largest amphibious operation in history was conducted by soldiers at Normandy, both Admiral LaPlante and General Wilhelm agree that ihe over-the-shore mode with Army ground troops is a last resort. “Establishing the initial lodgement on a beach is clearly and wholly the Marine Corps mission,” said Admiral LaPlante.
Once the beachhead is expanded, then the heavy knockout punch provided by the Army lands and moves inland to wage the decisive battles in the continental campaign, according to General Wilhelm. “The question becomes which force has this [amphibious operations] as a principal mission,” he added.
Both officers stress the need for teamwork between ground and naval forces throughout the assault phase of an operation. For example, the Marines have agreed in writing to provide flanking support, as needed, to Army units maneuvering inland. In turn, the Army has contracted to provide long-range general- support artillery and armor assets beyond those available in the Marine Corps. General Wilhelm cites the Army’s Tiger Brigade, which supported the 1 st Marine Expeditionary Force in the Persian Gulf War, as a classic example of this type of cooperation.
Admiral LaPlante said one of the lessons learned from the earlier conflict in Granada—which he views as the first real wake-up call on joint operations—is the need to become interoperable, that is, “speak each other’s language . . . exercise together and train together.”
“Joint warfare is team warfare. Teams are built during training—not after the game has begun.” General Wilhelm agreed.
General Wilhelm also credits the LCAC for making a major contribution toward operational maneuver from the sea. He noted that in the past, naval power- projection operations were conducted in three phases: (1) from the port or staging area to the objective area, followed by a pause; (2) then from ship to shore to the lodgement or beachhead where forces were built up; (3) and finally the move inland conducting maneuver ashore.
Operational maneuver from the sea eliminates the middle step, so we will make a seamless transformation from maneuver in ships to maneuver ashore ... not to seize a beach, but to seize an objective of operational or strategic significance. That objective can be an enemy force, or it can be a starving population. The only thing that changes is the metrics. On the one hand, how many tanks did you destroy, and on the other, how many lives did you save?
In what he termed expanding the vistas for LCAC, General Wilhelm cited its potential role in mine countermeasures, not as an add-on but an organic capability that would be present with the amphibious task force at the outset. Related to this is the LCAC’s use as a breaching platform to shoot an explosive charge from shallow water to actually clear a path through mine fields.
Beyond that the Navy-Marine Corps team has developed a personnel transport module (PTM), which will carry 180 troops or 54 litter patients, protected from the wind and spray generated by the LCAC’s high speed. General Wilhelm views this as yet another significant capability for a wide range of contingencies. Admiral LaPlante has also given a lot of thought to the LCAC’s role in naval maneuver warfare. He said it became evident to him during Desert Shield that while LCACs were immensely valuable tactical vehicles, they were equally valuable to logistics. “LCACs as logistics vehicles,” he said, “are vastly underappreciated. It will go back and forth to and from the beach all day long, just like the LCU, but it will do it a lot faster.”
In addition, Admiral LaPlante believes that because LKAs and LSTs will have no future replacements to bring causeways and small displacement craft into the assault area, LCACs will eventually be able to pick up that load as a type of causeway substitute system, a way to offload and sustain.
As far as ferrying Army equipment ashore, an LCAC can carry the Abrams main battle tank in its M1A1 configuration with a full combat load under certain environmental conditions. While over-the-shore with the Army remains a last resort, after the Marines have seized the lodgement, LCACs could assist in the Army offload. The problem is that none of the Army ships have wells, so it would be difficult to get the equipment off the Army ship and into the LCAC. Joint Logistics Over The Sea (JLOTS 3) exercises have worked on this problem, according to Admiral LaPlante. It is feasible that the LCAC could fly up on what amounts to a platform made out of barge ferry sections and then come off cushion. The crane on an Army ship can work the LCAC. After loading, the craft goes back up on cushion. This concept must be further tested, however.
Another opportunity for future development is joint training between the Army and Marine Corps in an ongoing amphibious maritime prepositioning forces operation or a combination of the two. The Army and Marine Corps will need to develop doctrine and exercises specific to such joint training.
Admiral LaPlante explained, “There’s been very little talking between the services on how that kind of operation would go. In my view, it’s not a matter of ‘if,’ but ‘when’ we are called upon to do an operation like that. The quicker we get about exercising and writing doctrine and procedures, the better off we’re going to be.”
Military planners and strategists have a foundation to work from in planning for future contingencies. These may include participation in adaptive joint force packages and greater reliance on multiple uses of the LCAC as part of the Marine Corps’ tactical mobility triad strategy, or some new concept. In the first instance, cross training among the services becomes essential. In the second, the Navy-Marine Corps team must streamline its own com- mand-and-control doctrine to remain the force best qualified and best capable in certain locations and circumstances to “kick in the door.”
As General Wilhelm asserted that the principle of unity of command enhances success in maneuver warfare. Whether a Sailor or a Marine commands the Naval Expeditionary Force makes no difference if the purpose is to gain and maintain momentum and to operate within the enemy’s decision cycle. The faster the operation is achieved over the broadest possible front and the more tempo is generated, the greater are the chances of success, with the fewest possible casualties.
General Wilhelm further observed, perhaps summing up the positions of Admiral LaPlante and the amphibious force participants in Haiti as well: “Operational maneuver from the sea is not a proved Navy and Marine Corps doctrine yet. It’s still a concept. We’re still working on it. But to me, that is the next major step forward.”
Colonel Jones, a former Pentagon press aide, is a speech writer and frequent contributor to Proceed-
Smart Move: Putting EP-3Js in the Reserves
By Lieutenant Commander David Locke Hall, U.S. Naval Reserve, and Lieutenant Commander Stephen G. Gosnell, U.S. Naval Reserve
The Navy’s focus is changing from blue water to littoral operations, and from global to regional conflict. At the same time, the Navy is trying to satisfy increasingly diverse requirements with fewer assets, often by shifting missions and assets from active to reserve forces: the Naval Reserve’s EP-3J electronic warfare maritime patrol aircraft is a first-rate example.
Until late in 1993, Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron (VAQ)-33 was an electronic warfare aggressor squadron based at Naval Air Station Key West, Florida. The squadron flew several kinds of aircraft and used the EP-3J, along with some of these, to train carrier battle groups in electronic surveillance measures and electronic countermeasures. The EP-3J’s mission is to simulate electronic warfare threats, including missile and aircraft attacks, and surface and subsurface radar search-and-track; the aircraft flew against transiting carrier battle groups— or in exercises—to force them to operate while contending with radar and communications jamming and simulated aircraft and antiship missile attacks.
VAQ-33 was disestablished on 1 October 1993. (See “Lest We Forget,” Proceedings June 1995, page 88.) In keeping with the theme of shifting active- duty functions to the reserve force, the squadron’s two EP-3J aircraft were transferred to VP-66, a reserve maritime patrol squadron located at NAS Willow Grove, Pennsylvania. Although VP-66 is an East Coast squadron operating under Commander, Reserve Patrol Wings, Atlantic (ComResPatWingLant), the two EP-3Js serve active-duty fleets on both coasts.
The Command and Control Warfare Group (CCWGRU), an active-duty command, tasks the aircraft through ComResPatWingLant. The process to date has yielded a remarkable result: The Navy’s EP-3Js are part of a reserve squadron that receives worldwide tasking from an active duty command.
The EP-3J is a P-3B airframe equipped with electronic simulator, scanner, and jammer pods. The USQ-113 UHF/VHF communications jamming set, which is capable of high speed scanning, monitoring, and jamming of multiple frequency radio bands, is a major component. The EP-3J also carries the following pods:
► APS-80 MOD radar simulator >• ALQ-167 noise/deception jammer >• ALQ-170, AST-6, and AST-4 radar emitter signal simulators >• ALE-43 chaff dispenser.
The aircraft’s APS-80 radar is wired to a VHS video recorder to preserve the radar presentation for debriefing. The ALE-43 chaff pods, designed to clutter radar systems, can be installed quickly on wing-mounted pylons to respond to changing mission requirements.
Of special significance in the aftermath of the 3 July 1988 incident when the USS Vincennes (CG-49) mistakenly shot down an Iranian Airbus is the EP-3J training that concentrates on distinguishing friend from neutral from foe. (See “The Vincennes Incident,” Proceedings
May 1989, pages 72-79; and “Friend or Foe?,” same issue, pages 78-80.) Since the aircraft can carry multiple pods, one aircraft simultaneously can provide threat simulation, communications and radar jamming, and chaff-screening. Battle groups can request EP-3J services as part °f pre-deployment work-ups, fleet exercises, or transits. Once the request has been approved, VP-66 will send an EP-3J and crew to the requesting unit. The only unannounced surprises are those requested for no-notice evaluations.
During the early phases of a fleet exercise, the EP-3J crew will present the shipborne operators with a multitude of simulated air and surface threats. Dur- 'ng the final comprehensive phases of the exercise, the EP-3J crew will intrude in communications networks by misidenti- fying itself as a friendly aircraft in order to vector fighters away from their targets. Such intrusion can cause significant confusion in the absence of strict communication discipline. The EP-3J also jams communications networks and radar in order to undermine the carrier battle group’s command-and control-capability.
Battle group electronic warfare capability increases dramatically with each EP-3J sortie. With an on-station time of six to eight hours, one EP-3J sortie can serve the entire task force and, with its VHS recording capability, provide each ship with real-time debriefing.
As part of the new national strategy, carrier battle groups can be expected to deploy into littoral areas to project power into regional conflict—which represents a significant change from past blue-water deployment patterns and confronts the battle group with different threats.
In littoral areas, the threat is not necessarily as large as was the Soviet threat, but it is nevertheless significant. A Third World dictator might not have the military strength once possessed by the Soviet Union, but he also might have different goals. Defeating the United States militarily might not be within his ability, but it might not be required to achieve his objectives—which might be satisfied by embarrassing the United States. Causing significant battle damage to a member of a carrier battle group might satisfy this limited objective. The 17 May 1987 experience of the USS Stark (FFG-31) is an example. (See “The Stark Report,” Proceedings May 1988, pages 64-67.) It is particularly important for carrier battle groups deployed to hostile littoral areas to be able to identify and defend against even isolated threats. The EP-3Js and their crews play a crucial role in enabling them to do this.
Moreover, the EP-3J is capable of contributing to the electronic defense of a deployed carrier battle group. Radar signal simulators and communications jammers are just as effective in real-world operations as they are in training.
There are of course limitations, foremost of which is that the Navy has only two EP-3Js. Furthermore, the EP-3J is a land-based aircraft, which means that it can contribute to carrier battle group defense only when they are within range ot accessible air bases. Fortunately, the EP-3J’s long legs bring much of the littoral area of the globe within range.
VAQ-33 has disappeared, but the EP-3J mission did not. VP-66, a reserve patrol squadron, continues to satisfy a critical fleet requirement.
Lieutenant Commander Hall is a lawyer with the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. A previous contributor to Proceedings, his reserve billet is air intelligence with VP-66 at NAS Willow Grove, Pennsylvania. Lieutenant Commander Gos- nell, an active-duty Training and Administration of Reserves (TAR) officer and a 1992 Naval War College graduate, is the VP-66 electronic warfare officer-in-charge.
Quadrimarans Offer New Options to Navy
By Commander Hugh Williams, U.S. Coast Guard (Retired)
In the mid-1980s, two French pilots and yachtsmen—mathematician and aerodynamicist Daniel Toilet assisted by Marc Labrucherie, a Russian-trained cosmonaut now chief pilot of Air France—collaborated to design a hull with the following characteristics:
>• Stable, virtually unsinkable hull > Shallow draft to facilitate calls in isolated areas
> Fast and inexpensive to operate >■ Quickly fabricated at an attractive price
The first commercial quadrimaran, built in France, is in service in Martinique after an Atlantic crossing; the 82-foot vessel carries 150 passengers.
A 75-foot quadrimaran demonstrator, under construction in Norfolk, has closely spaced frames.
Incorporating their knowledge of aerodynamics and wing and ground effects, they produced a quadrimaran (four-hulled) design that has the potential to revolutionize high-speed marine transportation. Could this design assist the U.S. Navy as it moves into the 21st Century?
The four hulls are connected by a main deck that functions as an airplane wing. At a speed of 25-30 knots, the lift provided by the main deck begins to raise the hull, thereby reducing the wetted hull surface and corresponding drag. This transition range from simple hydrodynamic to a combination of hydro- and aerodynamic lift continues up to the quadrimaran’s cruising speed of 60 knots.
Depending upon the power/weight ratio, the maximum surface speed capability of such a vessel will range between the basic 60 knot cruising speed up to a velocity where the hull could theoretically become fully airborne—like a seaplane hull—at approximately 120 knots.
Since the designers intended to build this vessel themselves, they looked for simple solutions to every problem. Modularizing the hull components permitted unsophisticated construction techniques that did not require extensive and costly shipyard facilities. Although the design is straightforward, the designers recognized the importance of weight distribution and reduction. At rest and in proper trim, the quadrimaran’s forward draft is zero.
The 60-foot aluminum prototype is powered by four 200 horsepower outboard motors and has achieved a speed of 63 knots. Tests were conducted over four years at test-tank facilities throughout Europe. These were complicated because the facilities could
hydrodynamic forces simultaneously. Sufficient testing was accomplished, however, to obtain major classification-society design approvals and to convince a consortium of French insurers to provide a unique money-back performance guarantee.
Current designs, ranging from 23 to 175 meters (75 to 575 feet), include at least one diesel or gas-turbine engine and a surface-piercing propeller or waterjet in each hull.
The initial prototype and subsequent commercial buildings have verified the design’s advantages. Because of the reduced drag, passengers can be transported faster and more economically; the broad beam’s stabilizing effects the air cushion created in the three hull-tunnel spaces results in smoother travel and greater comfort. The extremely shallow draft allows the vessel to beach, reducing the need for extensive dock facilities. The low wake profde allows the vessel to operate at high speed in restricted areas without causing wake damage to the shore, facilities, or other craft.
In light of the tragic loss of the roll- on/roll-off (Ro-Ro) passenger ferry Estonia in the Baltic Sea in late September 1994, industry experts have concluded that catamarans incorporating an elevated car deck are much safer. A quadrimaran platform is even more reliable because the four hulls are extensively compartmented and the vessel’s beam is broader than that of a catamaran. Quoting from a commentary in one journal, “The permanent solution, for new [Ro-Ro] buildings, is to legislate that all open decks, be built as multihull ships— with two, three, or even four hulls joined together. Such a [vessel] would carry her cargo much higher above sea level as her configuration would give her the reserve of stability to allow this to be done in safety. In fact so huge is the multihull ferry’s reserve of stability that she would not capsize under any circumstances. The multihull ferry is the obvious long term solution: all Ro-Ro ferries should be so built.”
Only the quadrimaran hull form is predetermined—the superstructures can be configured as passenger ferries, container vessels, Ro-Ro carriers, or combinations °f these vessels. One country has been evaluating the design for use as an aircraft carrier.
Considering their characteristics, quadrimarans could be a valuable addition to the Navy’s fleet. Consider the following missions:
^ Supply—High-speed quadrimarans Would streamline the delivery of Navy supplies. Large quadrimarans, configured as container or Ro-Ro vessels, could also provide the rapid strategic deployment
capability.
^ Landing craft—The quadrimarans’ beaching capability makes them ideal landing craft.
^ Antisubmarine warfare—High speed (80+ knots), coupled with shallow draft and stability, suits them as surface platforms for ASW.
^ Mine warfare—Since a 150-foot quad- nmaran’s maximum draft is less than two feet, the vessel could be configured as a minesweeper or a minelayer. Building the hulls of wood or fiberglass would not be difficult.
► Aircraft carriers—Larger quadrimarans, operating at maximum speed, could revolutionize aircraft carrier operations. The wide beam and inherent stability would enhance aircraft launch-and- recovery safety.
>• Special operations—The vessels could be used to deploy and recover SEALs, Marine reconnaissance units, and other special forces in a variety of ways. Considering the vessel’s speed and shallow draft, the possibilities are as diverse as the scenarios in the latest James Bond movie.
> Others—Quadrimarans could serve as platforms for rescue, salvage/diving, fire fighting (using the inner hull engines to drive pumps feeding deck fire monitors would enable the vessels to meet the highest fire-fighting standards), com- mand-and-control, oil-spill response, and as platforms for launching diverse surface weapons.
The quadrimaran’s streamlined shape, low freeboard, and shallow draft make it an ideal candidate for the application of stealth technology. If quadrimarans were used for all of the missions listed above, and the vessels incorporated stealth features, the U.S. Navy would establish new thresholds for effectiveness and efficiency.
One quadrimaran is under construction in Norfolk, Virginia. The 75-foot aluminum version is designed for use as a demonstrator during 1995 throughout North America. Several orders for larger quadrimaran ferries are under negotiation, including one for a 162-foot vessel intended to challenge for the Blue Ribbon awarded to the fastest commercial passenger vessel transit across the North Atlantic.
Is there a quadrimaran in the Navy’s future? If the vessel currently under construction in Virginia performs as anticipated, I believe the Navy will decide to “Come aboard.”
Commander Williams is a consultant for Quadrimaran International. During his 20-year Coast Guard career, he specialized in marine safety and environmental protection.
We’re Kidding Ourselves About Alcohol Abuse
By Lieutenant Commander James V. Asparro, Chaplain Corps, U.S. Navy
Enough is enough. As a chaplain, I have performed far too many funerals and memorial services each year for active-duty sea service members who died >n drunk driving accidents. I have seen People die who haven’t had a drop of alcohol because a drunk driver hit them. I have seen other things die as a result of alcohol abuse—such as marriages and careers. I have seen children abused, wives battered, and babies born with fetal alcohol syndrome. I know adult children of alcoholics who have all of the same dysfunctional characteristics of an alcoholic but who never drink a drop of alcohol. According to the National Council on Alcoholism, “One out of eight adults in America is an alcoholic, as are 10 to 20 percent of all drinkers.”
Alcohol is so much a part of our culture that it is not surprising that the number one cause of death in the military is not due to gallant acts by soldiers and sailors. According to Joseph A. Pursch, M.D., “The number one cause of death for members of the Armed Forces is driving under the influence.” How can we expect young people not to use alcohol when, as far back as 1981 the alcoholic- beverage industry spent more than $ 1 billion on advertising? The message is: “Alcohol equals fun.”
Studies cited by the National Council on Alcoholism show that American children see 100,000 television commercials for beer before reaching age 18, and many take their first drink by age 12. Alcohol is ingrained in our culture. As a result, Stephen Apthorp, who wrote Alcohol and Substance Abuse, offers these facts: One in eight Americans is an alcoholic; 120 million Americans drink; each alcoholic has a damaging effect on three to four other people; excluding cancer, alcohol is the leading killer in the United States.
According to the National Conference on Alcoholism, it is involved in:
> 80% of all fire deaths >■ 65% of all drownings
>■ 60% of all teenage highway fatalities >• 55% of all physical fights in the home >• 55% of all arrests
> 50% of all fatal car accidents . . . and the list goes on
The U.S. Navy has an ethical responsibility to take an active role in preventing alcohol abuse. My research leads me to propose a two-step approach.
First, implement control measures for the short term; these can be done easily and will have and immediate effect. Next, follow with primary prevention programs that emphasize a systems perspective;
these will take time because social norms regarding alcohol must be changed.
Short-term measures:
>• Regulate the supply of alcoholic beverages. The evidence is most extensive and uniform regarding the effects of taxation: taxes drive prices up, which lowers consumption, and improves overall health and safety of drinkers.
Prohibition did not work because it was unenforceable; but military package stores can control the price and availability of alcohol. Even Prohibition had many positive spin offs. In the panel report on Alcohol and Public Policy: Beyond the Shadow of Prohibition, published by the National Academy Press in 1981, editors Mark Moore and Dean Gerstein found that, “. . . the number of prisoners in Connecticut jails charged with drunkenness fell from 7, 314 to 943 in 1920. The nation’s auto death rate decreased 40% .... In its mental disease record, in its crime record, in its drunkenness record, the year 1920 stands without an equal in the recent history of the country.”
According to U.S. Public Health Bureau data, during the Prohibition era the death rate from cirrhosis per 100,000 declined from an average of 13.11 in the pre-Prohibition years (1900 through 1917)
COURTESY OF THE AUTHOR
to an average of 7.27 during Prohibition (1920-1932). By 1965, the cirrhosis death rate had risen to 12.5—a 57% increase after Prohibition.
These facts speak for themselves: the quality of life and the number of lives saved are directly proportional to the availability of alcohol.
► Shape drinking practices. The sea services can get tougher on driving under the influence and other alcohol related offenses. Commanding officers must send the message publicly that alcohol abuse is not okay. Alcohol abuse-related crime must receive the sternest punitive action.
► Reduce environmental risk. Commanding officers can prohibit alcohol companies from sponsoring sporting events, and discourage a focus on alcohol at official social events.
Beer companies are eager to sponsor sporting events on base because it provides a perfect opportunity to legitimize and glamorize their product. Colorful posters or giant blow-up beer bottles displayed prominently at sporting events on base create the perception that the command endorses the liberal use of alcohol—and can inspire people to drink.
Many official functions include wine at the table—but not soft drinks! Commands routinely ask their people not to drink and drive, but encourage drinking by having alcohol companies sponsor events. During Operations Desert Shield- Desert Storm in the Persian Gulf, military personnel were not allowed to drink because of local custom. In a 29 March 1991 Los Angeles Times article, reporter Tracy Wilkinson writes about the positive behavior of military personnel during the Persian Gulf War, when U.S. Central Command reported a drop in courts-martial from 71 per 10,000 troops to 3.5 per 10,000. “The factor keeping the men and women in line that is cited most frequently by most officers is the absence of alcohol in this Muslim country. All alcoholic beverages are strictly prohibited. ‘. . . . I tell you, no-drinking solved a whole lot of problems,’ said Lt. Gen. Peter de la Billiere, commander of the British forces here, echoing sentiments expressed throughout the allied leadership.” (See Figure 1.)
Long-term measures:
► Leadership awareness—Navy and Marine Corps leadership cannot tell subordinates not to abuse alcohol when they are seen drinking too much themselves. For many young Sailors and Marines away from home, their leaders become parental role models. Thomas Harford in his article “Situational Factors in Drinking,” offers this insight: “An important variable, then, in the use of alcohol by youth is the use of alcohol by adults. Teenagers tend to follow adult models in their drinking patterns. Adult drinking patterns in any community are important predictors of teenage drinking patterns in the same community.” I believe that we would not be facing the ugly reality of “Tailhook,” were it not for alcohol abuse.
► Family systems awareness—Virginia Satir points out in her book Conjoint Family Therapy that the family acts to achieve balance in relationships. The marital relationship influences the character of family homeostasis and is the axis around which all other family relationships are formed. A pained marital relationship often produces dysfunctional parenting. In an alcoholic family, the drinking problem affects the homeostasis of the family. All family members will accommodate and adjust to the alcoholic’s behavior. It is not surprising that the problems in an alcoholic family do not end magically when the alcoholic stops drinking. Many observers believe that, if sobriety is to last and the family as a whole to find happiness, major changes have to be made in the family system.
Commanding officers should make every effort to treat alcoholic families, not just the individual. I knew a service member who had such a problem with alcohol that his wife had to pull him off of the lawn many nights because he would pass out on the way in to his house. She often called in sick for him and found excuses to sidestep social events. He was arrested for driving under the influence when he passed out in the middle of an intersection rather than on his lawn. He was ordered to attend an alcohol rehabilitation center but his wife and family did not receive any formal counseling- When he returned, the family was not rehabilitated and continued with rigid rules and roles. He started drinking again, his wife returned to making excuses—and dragging him off of the lawn. If the family system does not change, it is not likely that the alcoholic will stop drinking.
► Denial of death awareness—The media glorify death. Television and movies simulate millions of deaths for the entire family to watch. We see hair-raising car chase scenes where the main characters never die. Violence and death in movies earn box office bonanzas. As a direct result, we determine death never really happens to us; it is make-believe.
When a teenager drinks, the same denial process comes into play. Alcohol is glorified by advertising and peer pressure, and young people think that they are bulletproof. Certain factors in the denial of death are unique to teenagers because of their age, but adults who drink regularly also flirt with death. Our society has a cavalier attitude toward the use of alcohol even in the face of evidence that alcoholism leads to death. According to the Johnson Institute: “Alcoholism, left untreated, leads to death. The most significant characteristics of the disease are that it is primary, progressive, chronic, and fatal.”
Alcohol is a highly addictive drug; if it were discovered today it would be a controlled prescription drug. Alcohol kills; it is not make-believe. Therefore, programs for alcohol abuse prevention must be given top priority.
The sea services’ stringent drug-testing program has decreased significantly the use of drugs. A concerted effort has also been made in the Navy to curb the abuse of tobacco. What makes alcohol a nagging problem, like tobacco, is that it is a legal and a robust part of our economy and culture. Nevertheless, many sea service members are dying from alcohol abuse at this moment. If we take this problem seriously enough, we can do something about it.
Chaplain Asparro is the Command Chaplain at Naval Administrative Unit, Idaho Falls, Idaho. Ordained in the American Baptist Churches, he has served at Naval Air Station, Keflavik, Iceland; Marine Corps Air Station, Tustin, California; and with the First Marine Division, Camp Pendleton, California, and Destroyer Squadron Five, San Diego, California.