The hot summers of 1980 and 1981 witnessed a fierce debate in Congress over the proposal to reactivate the Iowa (BB-61)-class battleships, starting with the USS New Jersey (BB-62). A nucleus of civilians, naval aviators, surface officers, and Marines—with strong support from the Commandant, General Robert Barrow—provided sympathetic congressional leaders the rationale needed to win the argument. The effort was underpinned by the need for all-weather fire support from a warship that could engage successfully protected targets located in the littoral ribbons of the world. The ships’ 16-inch guns were ideal, and the heavily armored ship could tolerate encounters with mines, missiles, or torpedoes. An added attraction was the potential for launching cruise missiles.
Reactivation advocates and Navy leadership believed all along that the battleships could provide the weapons’ developers a 12- to 15-year respite during which they could create new fire-support elements; once the new systems had entered the fleet, the battleships could be retired gracefully. Not surprisingly, as the battleships were being reactivated, the watch changed, and the good intentions evaporated. OpNav appeared to lose interest in associated improvements such as a new family of 16-inch rounds with battlefield-relevant munitions, terminal guidance, extended-range rocket-boosted projectiles, and the use of unmanned aerial vehicles for adjusting naval gunfire against deep targets.
In the wake of post-Desert Storm declining budgets, the inevitable happened: the Navy decided to sacrifice its most survivable combatants in favor of recapitalization, a management theme for fleet modernization for which there is naturally broad support. While advertising its littoral warfare focus with the theme of “. . . From the Sea,” the Navy began to mothball the world’s most formidable coastal fire-support ships, one of which had launched the first warheads into Baghdad during Operation Desert Storm while sailing through hazardous waters. Deactivation was justified under the guise of affordability.
Many who had worked diligently to develop the littoral warfare theme were dismayed—but they remained optimistic that, once settled on course, new Navy leadership would reconsider and reactivate at least two of the four battleships. Dismay turned to shock, however, when the Navy decided to strike the Iowas—turning them into museums. For the sake of the few dollars required to maintain their current status until more effective fire-support systems can be created, the battleships are to be erased prematurely from the fleet. During hearings on Capitol Hill last month, Senator William S. Cohen (R-ME) and Senator John McCain (R-AZ) publicly expressed concern over the Navy’s decision.
Ironically, the cost of depreserving, cannibalizing, demilitarizing, and towing to museum sites will far exceed the $100,000 apiece it costs each year to keep them mothballed while their potential is evaluated fully. We are in effect spending money to reduce the Department of the Navy’s ability to prosecute littoral warfare
Future fire-support alternatives include derivatives of the Army’s Advanced Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) and new-propellant guns that can fire five-inch guided rounds great distances. Such options are worthy of exploration but are not likely to meet all of the fire-support needs of troops in contact. These weapons will be expensive and will not be on line in significant numbers for a decade. Also, none of the combatants from which they might be fired can withstand the punishment that can be dealt out by any Third World adversary. They exhibit low tolerance to Exocet, Sunburn, or Scud missiles; mines or torpedoes; or even strafing by Mirage or MiG fighters. They are not very practical substitutes for warships that have continued to fight after taking direct hits from bombs and other projectiles.
To stir the imagination relative to the potential of the Iowas, consider one of the products of the now-forgotten mid-1980s OpNav Battleship Phase II modernization exercise—the Interdiction-Assault Ship design based on an Iowa-class battleship with her after turret removed. Proposed fire-support and deep-strike weapons included:
- Six 16-inch rifles firing standard 16-inch rounds with new battlefield area munitions, precision-guided 11-inch sabot rounds with 50+ mile range, and rocket-boosted precision-guided rounds with 250+ mile range
- 320-tube vertical launch system (VLS) capable of firing Tomahawks, Standard Missiles (that could be launched using a cooperative engagement capability), ballistic missiles, and the ATACMS
- Flight and hangar decks for various mixes of AV-8Bs, helicopters, MV-22s, SEALs—and 800 Marines for short periods
- Special features: Lowest vulnerability to missile and mines; demonstrated strike coordination capability (by the USS Wisconsin [BB-64] in Desert Storm); logistics spaces and machine shops; and medical facilities and operating rooms
All in all, this is a formidable ship that would produce sea-smart sailors while providing very high visibility and credible presence. The Interdiction Assault ship concept is clearly in step with “Forward . . . From the Sea,” and would be a low-risk program. Meanwhile, the Iowas can serve the nation effectively in their current configuration. In a crisis, there is no substitute for reliable, all-weather firepower.
The Navy should ponder the CNO’s response to those calling for an abrupt change in “Battle Plans for a New Century,” to cope with the projected world of advanced technology: “You have to have a military that can fight either way or you risk being irrelevant in some situations.” Battleships will be relevant for several more decades. The Navy should reverse the decision to strike these ships—spending to eliminate a viable option is neither prudent nor economical.