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Both military and political leaders should understand the limits and influences that each other face. If the Political picture is portrayed and communicated accurately, operators in the field usually appreciate its demands. For a variety of reasons—e.g., figurative distance to the Windward Passage—however, it is a significant challenge for politicians to appreciate fully the burdens on operators.
In the matter of the exodus of Haitians in poorly constructed and grossly overcrowded boats, there were Political pressures which over the years have had a profound impact on Coast Guard operations. Some of these Pressures—which often seem to tug against each other—can lead to policies which give operators a challenge. ^ The need to deter the sailing of Haitian “boat people” and prevent undocumented Haitian migrants from entering the United States illegally versus the characteristically American desire to aid people who are will- lng to take great risks to find a better life.
Large numbers of illegal immigrants can put great stress on the social fabric. Health and welfare are affected and issues of concern range from the impact on the processes of iegal immigration to job displacement to crime to tax burdens to the exploitation of undocumented workers. Furthermore, it appears that with the exception of California, immigration issues are nowhere so volatile politically as in South Florida, where most Haitian migrants seek to go. Nevertheless, Haiti is the poorest nation in the Western Hemisphere, and a remedy for its wretched conditions is not readily available. An agriculture-based economy would seem natural in Haiti, but many factors—e.g., deforestation and soil erosion—prevent one from developing. Furthermore, after the United Nations and Organization of American States imposed economic sanctions on Haiti, the plight of ordinary Haitians became even more dire, a fact that was burned into the minds of the U.S. public by intense news coverage of the situation.
► The need to establish effective policies to control illegal economic migration versus the requirement to process bona fide political refugees.
The moral and legal distinctions between the status of economic migrant and that of political refugee is central to immigration law and policies. These distinctions also seem to be the
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basis of public opinion on immigration, and the perceived rightness or wrongness of making these distinctions motivates public outcry about policies as well as prompting legal challenges to them.
Immigration policymakers must take into account operational practicalities. Whenever extremely large numbers of people are involved or the environment does not lend itself to facile execution of the administrative process—e.g., on the rolling decks of a 210-foot medium-endurance cutter—safety must be a top concern. Care must be taken to ensure policies are safely executable.
An extremely important factor in the Haitian migration issue always has been the perception of U.S. immigration policy by the Haitians themselves. The clearer the distinction between an economic migrant and a political refugee is made by the U.S. government, the greater the likelihood that a Haitian considering making the hazardous journey across the Windward Passage will make a realistic risk-benefit analysis. Therefore, generating accurate, positive perceptions always should be a concern of Policymakers.
Of course, even in cases where migration clearly was spurred by economic factors alone, political circumstances within Haiti—with its leaders cast as murderous thugs and international pariahs—were such that any repatriation was viewed by many as morally unacceptable.
^ The need to promote uniform immigration policies regardless of nationalities versus the need for special requirements for source countries dose to the United States.
It is intuitive that laws and regulations regarding lawful immigration and the prevention of illegal entry or Emigration—and their enforcement—should generally be uniform for all nationalities. While some matters (such as legal quotas) would vary depending on relevant criteria, it seems appropriate to apply procedural aspects—particularly those that operate to exclude people—in a more or less uniform way.
In the past 15 years, the Coast Guard has interdicted migrants from about 40 different countries. Most have come from Haiti, Cuba (special status), the Dominican Republic, and the People’s Republic of China, but there are a great many other countries where conditions are not good and people know that their lives would be improved significantly if they gained entry (legal or illegal) into the United States. This is the “push- pull effect” on immigration: conditions in the source country push people out; the attractiveness of the United States pulls people to it.
In the early 1980s, the “push” in Haiti was an economic situation that, for the vast majority, bordered on the hopeless. Aid efforts could deal with only the most severe symptoms and, typically, only for the short term. Other solutions—e.g., reconstituting the topsoil—either are not technically feasible or would come to fruition only in the long term. Not surprisingly then, many Haitians were willing to risk a hazardous voyage to the United States. The 600-mile trip to Miami was short enough to provide a measure of hope for success. However, because of the deplorable boats used by many, the reality was that absent rescue or extremely good luck most likely they would perish. The extraordinary “push” within Haiti, the recognized “pull” of the United States—tantalizingly close to Haiti— and the inherent dangers of the sea, intensified by unseaworthy craft, combined to create a situation in which thousands of lives were threatened.
This dangerous situation served as an impetus for the 1981 U.S.-Haitian bilateral agreement, under which unique processes were implemented to deal with undocumented Haitian migrants. Under the agreement, the process of repatriating Haitians was less cumbersome and time-consuming than that of economic migrants from other countries. Since the agreement’s implementation, the Coast Guard has enforced its provisions by interdicting illegal economic, undocumented Haitian migrants at sea and, through established procedures, safely repatriating them—usually to Port-au-Prince. The procedures have been modified several times since 1981 and those modifications have ranged from slight to significant. Nevertheless, one thing is clear: the more efficient the process of interdiction and repatriation, the greater the deterrent to unsafe voyages, and, therefore, the greater the number of lives saved.
No one can state accurately the numbers of Haitians who escaped detection by the Coast Guard. The luckiest handful of these made it to the shores of the United States; others arrived in the Bahamas or Cuba or returned to Haiti; the remainder—highly speculative estimates range from 10% to 40% of those who left Haiti undetected—perished at sea. Fortunately, the detection rate—and, thus, the rescue rate—was extremely high.
The correlation between a coherent interdiction/repatriation policy and safety at sea clearly was evident in 1992. The coup that overthrew President Jean Bertrand Aristide intensified the “push” from Haiti. A couple of months after the coup, departures had soared and the decks of Coast Guard cutters were filled with Haitians waiting for the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service to determine their status. The sheer numbers overwhelmed the processes, and the cutters soon became dangerously overcrowded. Making matters worse, many in Haiti perceived that the wave of migration had saturated the Coast Guard’s ability to detect and intercept them, and, therefore, the likelihood of reaching Miami was much higher than normal—and many began preparing to make the voyage.
To stave off a humanitarian crisis at sea, President George Bush issued an Executive Order establishing the policy of direct repatriation: all undocumented migrants would be returned immediately to Haiti, whereupon they could seek to enter the United States legally. It did not take long for the news of this new policy to get around and, with a measure of “pull” significantly reduced, there was a dramatic drop in departures of Haitians—and, undoubtedly, lives were saved. Predictably, this new policy spawned a number of legal actions and media campaigns by groups interested in protecting the migrants’ rights which they alleged were contained in the Constitution, statutes, and regulations. Differences in the handling of Haitian migrant cases were cited as the bases for injunctive relief and other legal remedies. Increases in interdiction statistics tracked almost directly with the news of judicial actions and the filing of lawsuits.
The 1992 Presidential campaign also generated an increase in Haitian
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