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Almost totally dependent on imported food and energy, Singapore relies on unfettered sea lines of communication for its national survival. The small but capable Republic of Singapore Navy—here, its mine countermeasures ship Bedok—keeps this lifeline secure through the twin strategies of deterrence and diplomacy.
Nearly 200 years after Stamford Raffles founded Singapore in 1819, the island republic’s future is still very much intertwined with the sea. In the early days, the establishment of Singapore meant that ships engaged in trade between the Far East and Europe no longer had to cross the southern Indian Ocean and round the Cape of Good Hope. It was much shorter and less hazardous to sail through the Strait of Malacca and the Suez Canal. As more and more merchantmen recognized the utility of this route, Singapore flourished.
It became a vital link in the world marketplace and an intermediate point for long- haul steamers to drop anchor, take on coal and provisions, and provide rest and recreation for their crews.
All this was facilitated by the Royal Navy, which ensured maritime security.
The end of World War II saw the final dismantling of the European empires. This was welcomed by the colonies, but it also brought uncertainty. When British forces withdrew from their military bases east of the Suez in 1971, the full brunt of maintaining security fell to the leaders of a newly independent Singapore; a maritime emphasis was quite natural because, in geography and in economy, Singapore is essentially a maritime nation. The commanders of the fledgling Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN) recognized the historical importance of maritime power in Southeast Asia, but they also were keenly aware of their republic’s unique circumstances. The complex interplay of these circumstances was pivotal in molding the Navy’s structure and evolution.
Small
In many ways, Singapore is unique when it comes to maritime defense and the need for a navy. Geographically, it has a land area of 621 square kilometers and is by far the smallest state in Southeast Asia. It is surrounded—almost engulfed—by West Malaysia to the north and by the even larger Indonesian archipelago to the south. This leaves a tiny strip of water, the Singapore Strait, that can be claimed as Singapore territorial waters. With such a small stretch of water to call its own, the island republic found it extremely difficult to justify anything larger than a coastal force. The RSN in its infancy thus concentrated on operating small, fast patrol boats suited for the vagaries of littoral warfare.
From a demographic perspective, the arguments for a small navy are even stronger. Historically, Singapore was a Malay village—occupied by Malays and governed by them. With the establishment of Singapore as a trading post in the 17th century, however, more traders flocked to this pearl of the Orient, and with them came a growing influx of Chinese migrants. Gradually, the Chinese became the majority race; today, they constitute more than 80% of the population. On gaining independence in 1965, Singapore became the first Southeast Asian nation to have political power vested in the hands of the local Chinese. This predominantly Chinese population placed Singapore in a dilemma: being a Chinese pebble in a Malay ocean, the new republic had to be extremely careful not to tread on the sensitivities of its Malay neighbors. It had to walk the fine line between taking prudent steps to prepare for future challenges and taking actions that could be perceived as threatening to others and thus could stimulate hostile responses.1 This sensitivity inevitably has meant that the size of the armed forces, including the navy, has been constrained.
The sizable Chinese population worked against the development of a large navy from a cultural standpoint as well. Traditionally, serving in the armed forces has been viewed by the Chinese as one of the last professions to be considered by any honorable man. The adage that “no filial son becomes a soldier” aptly sums up the Chinese attitude toward the taking up of arms.
On the whole, the limitations imposed by geography, demography, and culture have translated into a RSN that is small, in a numerical sense.
Big
The Republic of Singapore Navy’s strategy, however, has been to strive for quality to compensate for the lack of numbers. This has been possible because Singapore’s political leaders have acknowledged the importance of maritime defense in the context of national survival. More than 90% of the nation’s trade is seaborne, with the value of imports and exports amounting to three times its gross national product. An almost total dependence on imported food and energy further underscores the importance of the sea lanes as a vital artery. The sea lines of communication would be even more important in the event of conflict. With few natural resources and little strategic depth to fall back on, the country would require all resupplies to be shipped in, and quickly. Maintaining secure lines of communication free from any interference thus would be indispensable to preventing economic dislocation and ensuring the nation’s continued well-being.
The presence of foreign powers in the Southeast Asian region had been a stabilizing influence. The Cold War security system had many flaws but some notable virtues. It worked to constrain actors otherwise capable of destabilizing the regional environment and provided a framework for preventing regional conflicts from escalating beyond a certain threshold to pose a threat to the central balance.2 The post-Cold War era is proving to be a time of strategic uncertainty. One of the more pessimistic scenarios that regional countries must contemplate includes an increasingly less competitive, more isolationist, and more protectionist United States, leaving the mutually suspicious countries of China, Korea, and Japan engaged in an arms race and threatening the stability of the region find the world at large.3
It is this element of uncertainty and flux that in part has fueled the recent perceived arms race. For years, countries in the region lived under the umbrella of one or the other superpower benefactor. Now, with the need to provide for their own defense, the bolstering of long-neglected defenses is understandable.
The Republic of Singapore Navy to a certain extent has been part of this realization, because the major players in the region project their influence mainly through maritime forces. The former Singapore Chief of Navy articulated this perception when he stated that “within Southeast Asia, the exercise of power and influence depends on being able to make use of the seas within Southeast Asia” and that “this is clearly illustrated by the long succession of competing powers who have sought to impose their will on maritime Southeast Asia.”4 To be a significant player in the region, a navy is an integral part of the equation.
Unresolved territorial disputes have caused strained bilateral relations among Southeast Asian nations and have accelerated the development of regional navies. The growing spotlight focused on maritime territorial issues has caused nations to realize more and more the importance of strong navies for showing the flag and generally demonstrating that one has the muscle required for intervention if necessary. Singapore’s dispute with Malaysia over the sovereignty of the small island of Pedra Branca is a case in point. Efforts continue to resolve such conflicts amicably, but the inability to back up territorial claims with the requisite amount of military muscle in no way assists the cause. Given the type of forces in the region and the possible causes of conflict, any confrontation in the Asia- Pacific region is likely to have a maritime dimension. Aggressors will identify the vulnerabilities of their opponents at sea and will conduct their operations accordingly.5
The economic possibilities presented in the region, especially in the South
China Sea, only heighten the importance of maintaining strong navies. This is nowhere better illustrated than in the Spratly Islands, where persistent rumors of large reserves of oil and natural gas constantly spur the neighboring countries to “keep one foot in the door.” Claims to the islets can be reinforced only by a naval presence, something the claimant states have not been slow to recognize. At the same time, the need to protect fishing rights has been a constant thorn in the sides of coastal states in the region, especially in disputes among Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines, where maritime borders are close and not so clearly defined.
Another factor has been the rising concern over the number of maritime security threats emanating from neighboring countries. This is nowhere better illustrated than in the Strait of Malacca, whose huge volume of shipping powers Singapore’s economy. Any threat to shipping in these waters could force the diversion of merchant ships, thus cutting off Singapore’s lifeline. One very real threat comes from the ubiquitous sea robbers (more popularly but incorrectly known as pirates). Modern-day sea robbers, equipped with high-speed craft, can be countered effectively only by a competent and professional navy.
The Navy Today
These imperatives have driven the evolution of the Republic of Singapore Navy from the coastal defense force of the 1970s to the modem fighting force of the 1990s. This has been accomplished through a combination of “small fishes” survival techniques: some small creatures are just not palatable and thus left alone; others attach themselves to bigger ones for their own protection.6 In present-day parlance, these are recognized as the twin strategies of defensive deterrence and diplomacy.
In its deterrent role, the RSN concentrates on defending Singapore against seaborne threats and safeguarding access to and freedom of navigation along the region’s sea lines of communication. Organized into two operational commands—the Fleet Command (looking after naval warfare) and the Coastal Command (concerned with the seaward defense of Singapore)—the RSN is today one of the most modem navies in Southeast Asia. Structured to transit quickly from peace to war, the RSN has developed into a credible deterrent force over the years.
Yet, in keeping with the influences that guided its founding fathers, the Republic of Singapore Navy places great emphasis on its other role of defense diplomacy.
Relations with its relatively huge neighboring countries of Malaysia and Indonesia have not always been cordial. With the memories of the Konfrontasi with Indonesia in the 1960s, and the lingering suspicions remaining from the separation of Singapore from Malaysia in 1965, this is understandable.
The RSN, however, has had more successes in the area of diplomacy than any other service. This is reflected in the fact that almost all bilateral military exercises initiated between countries have begun with the Navy. Most recently, after a period of political tension between Singapore and Malaysia, the RSN was the first to restore military ties, with the resumption of an annual series of sea exercises. There are similar regular bilateral exercises with other Association of Southeast Asian Nations partners. The introduction of combined Indonesian- Singaporean sea patrols is the start of even closer maritime interaction between the two navies. Initiatives are under way to enhance further the relations between regional countries in the maritime sphere. In this respect, the RSN has been instrumental in stabilizing volatile political situations.
Conclusion
Where does the Republic of Singapore Navy go from here? The influences that have helped shape the RSN in the past continue to remain relevant. For these reasons, the RSN will remain a navy comparatively small in size but formidable in capabilities. This has been the cornerstone of the RSN’s evolutionary process, and it will continue to remain so in the foreseeable future.
'David B. H. Denoon, “Alternative Directions for U.S. Strategy in the Changing Pacific Basin," Asia Pacific & the New World Politics (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993), p. 178.
’Amitav Acharya, “Why the Rush in Arms Upgrading in Southeast Asia?” (Paper presented at the Second Asia Pacific Conference on Defence, Singapore, 24 February 1994), p. 4.
’Dr. Yeo Ning Hong, Minister for Defence of Singapore (Address to the Foreign Correspondents Association of Singapore, Singapore, 30 November 1992).
4RAdm. Teo Chee Hean, “Maritime Power in SouthEast Asia,” Journal of the Australian Naval Institute, November 1991, p. 11.
’Commodore Sam Batemen, RAN (Ret.), “Surface Patrol and Protection Considerations” (Paper presented at the Sea Power Conference, London, 6 May 1994), p. 8.
‘Lee Kuan Yew, “South-East Asia in Perspective,” The Mirror (Singapore), vol. 2, no. 26, 27 June 1966, p. 5.
Lieutenant Colonel Goh is head of the Operations Planning Branch, Naval Operations Department, at Headquarters, Republic of Singapore Navy.