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It is a common trend to look at what is happening to navies outside of NATO instead of examining the resources available within NATO membership. As a reversal of this trend, NATO should reconsider the importance of using the various military specialities of its members to their fullest potential.
In reaction to the current movement toward small-scale warfare, many armed forces have changed their goals and tactics, usually resulting in the creation of so-called “quick-reaction forces.” However, such a force does not fit into every military philosophy—just as the former Cold War style of warfare was not as relevant for some nations as for others. NATO should encourage each of its member nations to pursue its own military specialty. The benefits of specialization are enormous. If every country could concentrate on doing what it does best, leaving other duties to its neighbors (except, naturally, self-defense), its armed forces would operate more effectively, and loss of civilian support would be negligible.
The Netherlands is a prime candidate for such specialization. With little more than 15,000,000 inhabitants, the Netherlands is at first glance not a very powerful member of NATO. During the Cold War, its armed forces budget was split at a ratio of 1:1:2 among its navy, air force, and army, giving it enough body to fulfill both its NATO and self-defense tasks. After the Cold War, however, things changed rapidly. Under a socially democratic government, Holland was the first to cash in its part of the peace dividend. Under public demand, the navy and air force personnel numbers had to be reduced from 20,000 to 15,000; the army personnel total was almost cut by half. However, when the Netherlands realized that the end of the Cold War did not mean the end of world aggression, the Dutch armed forces were quick to announce the birth of the Dutch Air Mobile Brigade.
Today, the national defense budget is influenced by the costs of the Dutch quick-reaction force, which also affects the priorities of the Dutch Navy and Air Force—the air force by having to operate Hercules transport planes and the navy by having to build a large amphibious-warfare ship. These are both good examples of how it should not be done, because neither the air force nor the navy has sufficient experience or assets to operate with these units.
The reality, however, is that the Dutch people demand these units for humanitarian and intervention missions, and the Dutch government responds to the will of its people. But unlike the British or the French, the Dutch fail to live up to their responsibilities. At the slightest rumor of military operations for the Dutch soldiers, a storm of protest arises with the demand that not a single soldier get hurt. Naturally, this is impossible and could be why the Dutch intervention force has had such poor results.
The situation is very different for the Royal Netherlands Navy. Public sentiment toward and the capabilities of the navy allow it to participate more actively in joint operations. The Dutch Navy is not very large, but it is equipped with efficient ships, made by domestic yards, capable of extended overseas operations. The Kortenaer-class frigate, for example, almost became the model for the now-abandoned NATO standard frigate project, and the newly built Karel Doorman frigates receive worldwide praise for their balanced design. Possibly the most important contribution from the Dutch shipbuilding industry are the diesel-electric Walrus- and Zwaardvis-class submarines, which are the most advanced conventional submarines afloat today.
The Dutch Navy is capable of carrying out its duties worldwide and has been doing so very effectively since the end of World War II. The Dutch Navy is much larger than one normally expected from such a small country. The frigates, submarines, maritime patrol aircraft, and mine-countermeasure ships of the Royal Netherlands Navy have silently contributed in many worldwide peace operations. Understandably, the operations of two minesweepers attract less attention than do those of a U.S. supercarrier, but all contributions are important to the overall operation.
Unfortunately, the best-known facts about the Dutch Navy concern the sailors’ length of hair, slack discipline, and acceptance of homosexuality. But equally
The Dutch are particularly supportive of the Royal Netherlands Navy, and the success of the Dutch shipbuilding industry proves it. The Karel Doorman-class frigate design has received worldwide praise (here, the Van Speijk [F-828] is launched in March 1994), and the Walrus- class diesel-electric submarines are among the most advanced afloat today (here, the Zeeleeuw [S-803] is launched in 1987).
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Proceedings / March !995
characteristic of the Dutch Navy is their tolerance and quiet professionalism— traits that come from a centuries-old tradition that has made Holland and its navy what they are today. Because of this proud naval heritage, the Dutch people have faith in their navy and are historically aware that naval operations might include loss of life. They are, therefore, more willing to accept naval participation in NATO operations.
Every NATO member has its own speciality within its armed forces, and by using these specialities, NATO can perform United Nations operations more effectively. The Dutch should commit themselves to their navy. That is what they are best at and what they should expand—even at the cost of their other armed forces.
Each NATO member nation should maintain its army, navy, and air force as necessary to fulfill self-defense ogli- gations, but when called upon for other duties, it should contribute only that part of its armed forces that is best suited for the particular operation. To reach this goal, individual NATO member countries should first decide what they are good at and then specialize.
Lieutenant Kooistra has served on the Walrus-class submarine HNLMS Dolfijn (S-808) and is currently studying at the Technical University of Delft.
The Russians Are Here
By Commander Barry Coombs, U.S. Navy, and Commander Les Sim, Royal Navy
One if by land, two if by sea. . .
Paul Revere was worried about the British; his modern counterparts, however, spent most of the 20th century worrying about the Russians—and wondering if three lanterns might mean they were coming “by air.”
Times change. Last May at the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, the Russians joined the British and Americans in a joint peace game—RUKUS 94—that proved yet another step in improving relations with a former adversary.
During the Cold War, discussions with the Russian Navy were limited essentially to a series of bilateral incident-at-sea talks aimed at avoiding dangerous or provocative practices when forces operated near each other. These talks continue, but many new avenues have opened up. Last May’s game evolved from informal discussions initiated in 1988 by the Foundation for International Security (a British think tank) to promote East-West naval contacts. No formal relations existed with the Russian Navy at the time but academic institutions like Brown University in nearby Providence, Rhode Island, proved a good alternative. The Naval War College’s Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Strategic Research Department, established the required interface with the U.S. Navy and has continued to maintain the lead for the series.
The informal talks were limited to naval strategy, doctrine, and operational issues; not until November 1991 did the U.S. Navy authorize flag officers to participate. Still, all proceedings remained unofficial and off-the-record. United States participation since has expanded to include representatives from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Fleet Commanders-in-Chief, and the Naval War College. The Joint Staff (J-8 Political-Military Assessment) also has provided an observer.
During the 1992 Moscow talks, the
United States recommended changing the series to a gaming format—to which all sides agreed. The next meeting was in the United Kingdom and the Maritime Tactical School at HMS Dryad designed an initial gaming session called Triple Trust. The two-day game was designed to familiarize the Russians with gaming meth
ods commonly used by NATO forces and to explore elementary concepts of combined naval operations. The format consisted of discussions of the best way to implement a U.N.-endorsed maritime embargo against a generic nation. Training aids were basic—game pieces representing ships were repositioned on the tactical floor as events dictated. The Russians had never operated with NATO forces and were understandably cautious. Four issues surfaced during the game:
>• Command of forces: All nations were willing to allow limited tactical control of their forces by other nations. Tactical control involved coordination of local operations and procedures with limited directional authority. Geographic sectors were assigned to specific nations who then coordinated all actions within their sectors. Rules of engagement approval and issues with national policy implications were beyond the game’s scope.
> Rules of engagement: All players agreed on the need for definitive rules, but differed on whether the rules should be directive or advisory. The United Kingdom favored more directive rules with specific guidelines; maximum direct coordination with national command authorities was encouraged. Russia and the United States favored a variety of authorized responses to various levels of perceived threat that could be employed by on-scene commanders.
> Communications: Early discussions restricted requirements to simple visual and electronic communications, but it became apparent that more complex systems would be required. Requirements were identified for secure voice nets and data- transfer circuits and use of off-the-shelf commercial equipment was proposed.
> Intelligence: Availability and dissemination of intelligence was discussed only in loose terms for obvious reasons. All sides agreed that means were available to provide tactical intelligence, but were noncommittal on how to review and distribute it.
The 1994 game with the Russians probably was the first to be held on U.S. soil and was sponsored by the Naval War College. RUKUS 94 expanded on the work undertaken in Triple Trust as Marines and naval infantry were represented by officers from the U.S. Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Headquarters Royal Marines, and the Naval Academy at Saint Petersburg. Because the scenario was based on a U.N. operation, the director of the relatively new U.N. Situation Center and two planners from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations played liaison and advisory roles.
Objectives were to:
> Advance mutual understanding in cooperative security concepts
>• Further mutual understanding in standard procedures of operational force employment
> Identify important interoperability issues
> Informally evaluate issues not suitable for more detailed staff talks
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Proceedings / March 1995