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Contents:
Developing a Joint Data Link—12
Do We Really Need A Third Seawolf?—12
Where Air Power Fails—12
Striking Out in the Joint Arena—15
The Navy Got It: Desert Storm’s Wake- Up Call—15
Tailhook: What Happened, Why & What’s To Be Learned—17
The Ghost of “Bomber” Harris—17
December 1994 Cover—17
The Tank Is Dead: But the Cavalry Lives On—18
Bosnia, Tanks, and .. From the Sea”—19
September 1994 Cover—20
Sub Homeport Consolidation Has a Down Side—2/
Anti-Drug Effort Takes New Twist—21 Alone, Unarmed ... and Unavailable—22
Fear, Courage, and Cohesion—24
Reopen the Kimmel Case—25
Trust Us—21
ENTER THE FORUM
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“Develop a Joint Data Link”
(See J. McManus, pp. 64-66, January 1995
Proceedings)
Captain John T. O’Connell, Jr., U.S. Navy, Program Manager, Advanced Tactical Data Links—Let’s set the record straight. Mr. McManus brings up several valid points about the state of joint service data links in general; however, apparently he was not informed about the status of the Link 16 (Tactical Data Information Link [TADIL]-J) message standard. Link 16 currently is being implemented by all services—as well as five other nations and NATO—using the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) and Multifunctional Information Distribution System family of terminals.
JTIDS completed its operational evaluation in August 1994 with the USS Carl Vinson (CVN-70) battle group. The consequent report, published in October 1994 by the Commander Operational Test and Evaluation Force, found JTIDS to be operationally suitable and effective with no deficiencies, and recommended fleet introduction. The Carl Vinson battle group used Link 16 as its tactical data link throughout its deployment. The Link-16 units in the battle group were the Carl Vinson, the air wing’s F-14Ds and E-2Cs, the USS Arkansas (CGN-41), the USS Antietam (CG-54) and the USS Asheville (SSN-758). While there were problems during the early predeployment training, these primarily were combat-systems- wide interface issues and not, as implied by Mr. McManus, related to the JTIDS terminal.
JTIDS and the associated Navy Com- mand-and-ControI Processor (C2P) will continue to be used in the Carl Vinson battle group. Link 16 systems also are operational in the aircraft and ships of the USS Constellation (CV-64) and the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) battle groups and will be installed in most battle groups by 1997. The combination of JTIDS and the C2P provides vastly improved realtime data-ink connectivity and interoperability. The C2P provides two-way data forwarding and translation between Link 11, Link 4A, and Link 16.
In his policy memo of 18 October 1994, Mr. Emmett Paige, Jr.—the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications & Intelligence—recognized that “standardized, interoperable, tactical C3I data links are
essential for effective joint and combined force operations.” The policy memo designates, as the first step, the Link 16 data link as the Department of Defense’s primary tactical data link. We will not see the joint data link issue resolved overnight—nor can JTIDS/TADIL-J solve the issue by itself—but it is an important step. Now, we need to learn how to use these new systems properly. □
“Do We Really Need a Third Seawolf?”
(See J. Brooke, pp. 9-10, December 1994 Proceedings)
Ralph B. Latchaw, Jr.—We need at least three Scmvo//(SSN-21 )-class submarines for the following reasons:
>• We need a critical mass of this particular submarine type so that proper deployment and maintenance can be carried out.
► In view of the large number of advanced submarine designs now being developed elsewhere in the world, we must remain on top of the technological curve.
>■ We must retain our industrial infrastructure, to ensure that we have the means to create superior technology. □
“Where Air Power Fails”
(See S. T. Ganyard, pp. 36-39, January 1995
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Colonel Michael A. Kirtland, U.S. Air Force, Chief, Military Doctrine Research, Airpower Research Institute, Air University—Major Ganyard’s article qualifies as perhaps the worst one Proceedings has published in many years. Major Ganyard choses to ignore the methodology of the Gulf War Air Power Survey in order to support his limited tactical vision of airpower. The authors of that survey intentionally used the most restrictive methods of determining effectiveness and results of strategic attacks in order to avoid being seen as simply writing a pro-airpower report. As a result, for example, where a target was struck from the air and then later by ground systems, no claim of destruction from the air was credited (clearly a shaky assumption at best). The authors have acknowledged that in an effort to avoid overstating their case, they ended up understating it. The
Royal Air Force’s Air Vice Marshal Tony Mason, one of the world’s leading authorities on airpower in war, concludes “air power did secure the primary Coalition objective of its own and Desert Sabre (the ground offensive) was indeed no more than Desert Roundup” (Air Power: A Centennial Appraisal, 1994). As to Major Ganyard’s comments concerning civilian casualties, even the Gulf War Air Power Survey concluded that those estimated were wildly overstated.
Major Ganyard’s hatred of strategic attack and support of a tactical-only approach to airpower as a supporting element of ground forces is typical of the myopic approach of his parent service. Fortunately for him and thousands of other Marines, the nation’s senior military leaders, including Generals Norman Schwarzkopf and Colin Powell, had a much broader perspective. The “forget bombing, follow the ground forces approach" of Major Ganyard’s would have resulted in thousands of unnecessary coalition casualties. Apparently Major Ganyard would have preferred to see Cable Network News footage of dead Marines on Kuwaiti beaches rather than gun camera film of precision air strikes.
Major Ganyard compares apples to oranges by suggesting that the Army Air Forces abandoned Air War Plans Division-1 (AWPD-1) after Pearl Harbor in favor of bombing Tokyo and Osaka. AWPD-1 was the war plan conceived to conduct air operations against Germany. As the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey points out, many of the limitations on strategic bombing in World War II resulted from the continuous diversion of strategic bombing aircraft for tactical missions in support of ground troops. Despite this, the survey concludes that strategic bombing had a significant impact on the outcome of the war. Major Ganyard does a little better in recognizing that in Korea strategic bombing had little effect on the war. But he should recognize it was the entire defense structure of the nation, not just the Air Force, that rationalized away Korea as an anomaly.
Major Ganyard’s contention that “the public’s fascination with and fear of the apocalyptic qualities of atomic weapons” created U.S. defense policy in the 1950s and 1960s is sheer nonsense. President Dwight Eisenhower’s shift to nuclear deterrence was seen as a way to provide national defense against the major perceived enemy without having to commit enormous sums of money and manpower that would be required to match Soviet land power in Europe—a commitment that President Eisenhower realized the nation could not, and would not be willing to, make. The Cold War fixation with nuclear war affected all the services, creating doctrines that assumed that a nation capable of fighting the largest war (nuclear war) was also capable of fighting any lesser conflict. That philosophy cost all the services dearly in Vietnam. But Major Ganyard’s contentions that the Air Force felt strategic bombing would win the Vietnam War and that Linebacker II did so are ludicrous. Rolling Thunder was not a strategic bombing campaign, and never was designed as such. At best, it was an ill-conceived attempt at interdiction by civilians and non-airmen in Washington who believed in the theory of incrementalism—someting that no airpower theorist supports. Linebacker IPs only “winning” was the securing of the chance to get out of a ground war in Asia.
In the finest traditions of the Marine Corps, Major Ganyard attacks the Air Force “obsession" with service independence and the importance of strategic bombing to that independence. This is an interesting comment coming from an officer whose service predicates its very existence on amphibious assault—a technique that has not been used in half a century. General Buster Glosson’s comments, quoted by Major Ganyard, reflect the fact that far too many Air Force generals were passively willing to accept the ground-oriented philosophy of our landlocked brethren. Fortunately, the beliefs of men such as General Glosson and
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Colonel John Warden (who led the design of the Gulf War air operation plan) prevailed over such views. Acting as mere airborne artillery for the ground forces would have caused thousands of unnecessary coalition casualties. The Air Force position presented to the Commission on Roles and Missions is not concerned with service independence, but rather was designed to allow each of the services to provide to the national defense those functions at which it excels, rather than have each service insisting on having a finger in every pie. The nation is best served by the services concentrating on their core competencies.
As a member of the organization which wrote the current Air Force Manual 1-1 (AFM 1-1), I would point out Major Ganyard thoroughly misrepresents what it says. AFM 1-1 is not based on “clinging to the Douhet vision”; because this vision is not shared by AFM 1-1’s authors. Strategic attack neither is a failed myth, nor the sole orientation of U.S. air- power doctrine. □
“Striking Out in the Joint
Arena”
(See C. E. Myers, p. 10, October 1994
Proceedings)
Commander Henry C. Boschen, Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired)—There are missions that the Navy handles quite well, but strategic strikes are not one of them—and never will be. Certainly, Mr. Myers’s statement—that “the United States can generate all required [strategic] striking power without help from forward deployed carriers”—is true. This may seem blasphemous to the aviators who daily risk their lives flying from aircraft carriers, but carrier aviation’s day as a strategic bombing force is over. The Navy must realize this fact and turn its attention to providing close air support for war in the littorals. □
“The Navy Got It: Desert Storm’s Wake-Up Call”
(See T. A. Parker, pp. 33-36, September 1994;
J. Barnett, pp. 14-16, November 1994;
R. J. Turner, pp. 14-19, December 1994 Proceedings)
Commander Maurice Smith, U.S. Navy (Retired), Red Sea Battle Force Representative in the Joint Force Air Component Commander planning cell during the Persian Gulf War—As I read Commander Parker’s article I found myself mostly agreeing, but I was extremely uncomfortable with the fact that he seems to examine the Persian Gulf War from only the Air Force point of view. His arguments are the points the U.S. Air Force highlights; he accepts Air Force strengths as Navy weakness and incorrectly equates the Air Force’s ability to coordinate its assets through the air tasking order with jointness. To learn from the war, the Navy must define the discussion and direct the review from the Navy perspective, not just compare what the Navy accomplished to the announced “successes” of the Air Force.
From the beginning, the Navy and the Air Force approached things differently. The Navy prepared for the long haul, believing that Operation Desert Storm would not execute—at least not in the near future—and that the requirement for a carrier in theater would remain for years. This was only partly incorrect; we still have a requirement for the carrier in theater. The belief that the United States would not execute, however, was a view shared only by Iraq.
Perhaps as a result, 50% of the Navy’s carriers—the Ranger (CV-61), the America (CV-66), and the Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71)—arrived in theater too late to be assigned targets during the preplanned portion of the war (the first three days). The Theodore Roosevelt and the America arrived in theater as Desert Storm began. Instead of making a high-speed transit across the Atlantic to the area of responsibility, the Theodore Roosevelt and the America made a normal transit and “higher authority” had the America’s air wing planning a Mediterranean exercise, Display Determination, instead of preparing for strikes into Iraq.
Commander Parker’s carrier (the Theodore Roosevelt) spent the first days of the war in a high-speed transit from the Suez to the North Arabian Gulf. During the five days it took for the Theodore Roosevelt to make her transit, the Air Force counted her air wing as Navy aircraft in theater. These aircraft were not contributing to the early Navy low sortie and ordance-expenditure numbers that the Air Force used for the news media; these aircraft made it look as if the Navy was not doing much.
Another factor affecting bomb tonnage (the Air Force’s debrief focus) was the fact that during the initial phases of the air offensive, Navy strike aircraft were tasked not with bombing, but with taking on the Iraqi air-defense system. The Air Force was unable to cover the task; the F-4G Wild Weasel was its only aircraft capable of delivering high-speed antiradiation missiles (HARMs), and these aircraft were being phased out of the Air Force inventory. In fact, some had to be retrieved from storage.
In contrast, the Navy had four HARM- capable aircraft: the F/A-18, A-7E, A-6E, and EA-6B. To complement the HARM, only the U.S. Navy had tactical air- launched decoys. Also, important for effective suppression of enemy air defense was the EA-6B, the Navy’s airborne tactical jammer. The Navy, with approximately 15% of the tactical aircraft in theater, had more EA-6B aircraft than the Air Force had EF- 111 aircraft in theater. Throughout the air campaign, but especially during the early portions, the
Because of high-level decisions, three U.S. aircraft carriers—here, one of them, the USS America (CV-66), transits the Suez Canal—“arrived in theater too late to be assigned targets during the preplanned portion of [Desert Storm] ”
U.S. Navy had to provide jammer escort for the U.S. and Royal Air Forces.
Another area where the Air Force paled in comparison to the Navy was sustainability. Air Force units arrived in theater with what they had loaded. The reloads came in a variety ways, but in nearly all cases, there were parts missing. Until October 1990, the Air Force had bombs but no fuzes, fuzes with no bombs, or no reload missiles.
perbly and, therefore, let the Air Force “get to the chalkboard first”
>• The decision by a Navy battle force commander to ignore the air tasking order and treat “his” area as a Navy area of responsibility
> The Navy command-and-control decision that allowed two Iraqi F-l aircraft to fly halfway down the North Arabian
The U.S. Navy did many things superbly ... and many things poorly. The Navy must review the war from its own perspective.
Gulf without being intercepted by U.S. Navy combat air patrols (They were shot down over water by a Royal Saudi Air Force F-l5.)
These decisions must be reviewed to remove that “sour taste,” learn the necessary lessons, and answer “Desert Storm’s wake-up call.” □
The U.S. Navy strike aircraft—the F/A-18, A-7E, and A-6E—also provided more versatility. They were used in multiple roles, day and night. The Air Force F-117, F-15E, and F-111 were night bombers only. Except for those aircraft equipped with the Low-Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared for Night system, F-16s were consigned to daylight missions. The Air Force used its aircraft in this manner by choice, even after the strategic target threat (Iraqi air defenses) had gone away.
The U.S. Navy did many things superbly, many things well, and many things poorly. The Navy must review the war from its own perspective. This focus should include the superb and the good decisions, but it also must acknowledge the reasons and responsibility for the poor decisions that shaped its participation in the Persian Gulf War:
>• The decision that resulted in 50% of the carriers arriving late to the theater
► The decision that kept the component commander (a vice admiral) afloat
► The decision that, just prior to the war, rotated the vice admiral and his one-star representative in Riyadh
► The decision to put a non-aviator one- star in Riyadh
► The postwar failure to understand and emphasize what the U.S. Navy did su
Merrick Carey, President, Alexis de Toc- queville Institution, Arlington, Virginia— Commander Parker’s article contained a reference to the fact that the “nature of defense procurement” has driven up the cost of the C-17 transport. This point deserves further elaboration.
The C-17 is an advanced transport aircraft designed to replace the rapidly aging C-141. It is, in all respects, a considerable improvement over its predecessor. Nevertheless, a more streamlined procurement process could have lowered the aircraft’s cost considerably. Many of the original specifications were not directly relevant to the aircraft’s basic mission. Moreover, the Air Force continued to alter the aircraft’s configuration long after the design should have been finalized.
Even well-intentioned efforts to save money drove up costs. For example, requiring the contractor to use off-the-shelf computer software made it harder to procure compatible systems for the C-17’s various functions. More generally, the government’s excessive oversight and regulation of contractor procedures inflated costs unnecessarily.
In the end, the Air Force got an aircraft that is probably the best military transport ever built. Nonetheless, the cost couid have been less, had the government shown more willingness to trust the contractor’s judgment, rather than involving itself in every detail of the development process. □
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“Tailhook: What Happened,
Why & What’s To Be Learned”
(See W. H. Parks, pp. 89-103, September 1994; N. Hogan, pp. 23-24, November 1994; J. Byron, D. Vander Schaaf, pp. 23-24, December 1994; W. H. Parks, p. 20, January 1995 Proceedings)
Commander David Buss, U.S. Navy— Enough, I say! Captain John Byron’s pointless correspondence provided absolutely no value-added to “learning the lessons” of Tailhook. And, after all, isn’t that the stage that we are in since investigations, lawsuits, and press interest have run their course? Or are those of us in naval aviation destined to forever endure similar finger-pointing diatribes at the expense of moving on? The author’s sweeping and vengeful attack mounted against the leadership of naval aviation has done nothing to heal wounds that the Navy as a whole suffered. Speaking as the executive officer of Attack Squadron-34 and someone who attended Tailhook ’91,1 can tell you that naval aviation has gotten the message and is trying to right itself (at least in my niche). Isn’t that what learning lessons and moving on are all about? But the author’s letter—and this publication’s publishing of it—begs the question: Will we be allowed?
To the editorial staff of Proceedings I say, if in publishing Captain Byron’s letter it was your intention to raise the hackles of naval aviators everywhere and take us to the woodshed yet again, congratulations . . . you did. If it was your intention to provide something new, sorry • . . you missed the mark badly. □
“The Ghost of ‘Bomber’ Harris”
(See N. Hogan, p. 13, December 1994
Proceedings)
Major Michael E. Fischer, U.S. Air Force—In his attempt to denigrate the B-2 and F-22, Rear Admiral Hogan confuses his air power theories, distorts the contribution of air power in World War II and the Persian Gulf War, and misrepresents the employment concepts for these revolutionary new aircraft.
One cannot equate the U.S. doctrine of precision daylight bombing as practiced in World War II with the operational doctrine of the RAF’s Bomber Command. U.S. strategic-bombing theory aimed to destroy the war-making capability of an industrialized enemy by attacking its “industrial web” with a degree of precision made possible by the B-17 equipped with the Nordcn bombsight. “Bomber” Harris sought to destroy Germany’s will to fight by area bombing the German population at night—partly because he subscribed to the air theory of Italy’s Guilio
Douhet, but primarily because of the relative inaccuracy of British bombers. Also, the RAF was unwilling to suffer the losses inherent in daylight missions beyond the range of fighter escort.
The British tactics did not achieve the desired effect on the enemy’s will to fight, but the U.S. effort, relying on a much different mechanism, was a decisive factor in our ultimate victory in Europe. Despite German workarounds to our attacks on their military industries, the U.S. strategic bombing campaign contributed to the attrition of the Luftwaffe pilot corps, destroyed the petroleum production that fueled Germany’s war machine, and paralyzed the German transportation network, causing the ultimate collapse of the German war economy. Equating our current strategic attack doctrine, emphasizing precision attack of the enemy’s command-and-control system, logistics system, and war-making industry, to “Bomber” Harris’s doctrine of area bombing civilians is ludicrous.
Admiral Hogan—like many of our joint brethren—dismisses air power’s impact on the Persian Gulf War. One can debate the efficacy of our strategic attacks on Baghdad, but the key to victory in the war was overwhelming Coalition air power. The combination of massive area bombing and precision strikes against Iraq’s fielded forces and command-and- control system defeated Saddam Hussein’s military strategy and prompted him to begin withdrawing before he lost his entire force in the Kuwaiti theater of operations. Recent analysis of declassified Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) tapes performed by the Air Force’s School of Advanced Air- power Studies appears to confirm this.
When equipped with advanced weapons, the B-2 and multirole derivatives of the F-22 will give us even greater capability to destroy enemy ground forces in tomorrow’s wars. The B-2 will make its greatest contribution during the critical early days of a major regional conflict by launching from the continental United States to decimate the enemy’s invading divisions and buy the precious time needed to deploy a winning joint force from home. In addition, it will have unmatched capability to attack the enemy’s most highly defended strategic targets—including his command-and-control system and his weapons of mass destruction—many of which will lie beyond the range of carrier aviation.
The F-22 will not be the “21st century Spitfire” that Admiral Hogan makes it out to be; it will be a tremendous force multiplier that will allow us to capitalize even further on our investments in stealth and advanced munitions. F-22 squadrons will deploy from home faster than follow-on aircraft carriers, allowing the theater commander to attain air superiority quickly, ensuring freedom of action for the entire joint force. Multirole F-22 derivatives will deliver precision firepower against the enemy’s surface forces, logistics chokepoints, and highly defended strategic targets in concert with other coalition strike aircraft. Its combination of stealth, range, supersonic cruise, and precision- weapons capability will allow the F-22 to strike strategic and tactical targets beyond the range of nonstealth fighters without the large support packages that they require. With the aid of JSTARS, both of these aircraft will give the theater commander unprecedented capability to fix and destroy enemy ground forces long before they close with our own, with minimal risk to U.S. lives. The technology of the B-2 and F-22 will also spin off to the joint attack strike technology program—our next generation of affordable joint strike aircraft.
Admiral Hogan ties the B-2 to the wrong employment doctrine and underestimates the F-22’s multirole potential. Now that we are a smaller, home-based expeditionary force, we need the revolutionary strategic and tactical capabilities of these aircraft more than ever. □
December 1994 Cover
{See December 1994 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander M. J. O’Donnell, U.S. Coast Guard Reserve—As a former chief quartermaster, I was startled by the otherwise dramatic photo of the USCGC Chase (WHEC-718) on the cover of the December issue. Though clearly at an-
PROCEEDINGS
Reopen the kimniel Case Hunting Tanks in Bosnia Designated Liar? Coast Guard Focus
chor, the ship is not displaying the jack at the bow. A small thing in the intense tempo of Haitian operations, perhaps, but "the devil is in the details.” □
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“The Tank Is Dead: But the
Cavalry Lives On”
(See W. V. Kennedy, pp. 50-53, November
1994; D. R. Watson, pp. 16-18, January 1995
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Colonel Donald E. Campbell, U.S. Army—Colonel Kennedy’s article certainly made interesting reading, but the news of the tank’s demise may be premature. Colonel Kennedy might find enlightening a review of the joint publication Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s official report to Congress. It says that VII Corps—that unwieldy, obsolescent, armor-laden anachronism—destroyed 12 or more Iraqi divisions, 1,300 tanks, 1,200 infantry fighting vehicles/armored personnel carriers, 285 artillery tubes, and everything else in its way during the four- day ground campaign. This is roughly the same amount of destruction wrought together by 45 days of air campaigning and by that “other” relatively nonmechanized ground force, the U.S. Marine Corps.
That combined-arms, mechanized, high-operational tempo stuff with good equipment and great troops sure seemed to work. Air cavalry—Army, Marine, or allied—certainly is a vital part of the combined-arms equation. As a former commander of VII Corps once said, “War is like an orchestra; you achieve results through synchronization.” Musicians in concert make great music. U.S. forces employed in concert, in a mix appropriate to the situation, achieve superlative results. This is what we did in the Persian Gulf War; chew the world’s fourth- largest army into hamburger with minimal losses. An awful lot of that chewing was done up close and personal by M1A1 Abrams tanks and M2 Bradley fighting vehicles. In the desert, the maxim, “The best anti-tank weapon is another, preferably better, tank,” still holds true.
As I recall, only one U.S. tanker. Army or Marine, was killed during the Gulf War—and he was outside the protection of his Ml Al. The nine permanent M1A1 battle losses all were caused by friendly fire (read; fire from other Ml A Is). Whenever U.S. armor (Army or Marine) came into contact with Iraqi forces, terrible things happened to the Iraqis; if they didn’t surrender, they were enviscerated. There was no doubt about who won or questions about battle-damage assessment afterward.
Our technological superiority was a key factor in victory, but technology shifts change the relative value of weapon systems under similar conditions. The best illustration of this is a comparison of the 1967 Six-Day War and the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. In the first conflict, air was decisive and armor was supportive.
During the second war, armor saved the Israelis when a technological shift—improved surface-to-air missiles—made their air force ineffective. Today, the Russians are working on technology that would allow their armor to defeat many incoming munitions. If their efforts are successful, the LAW, AT-4, Dragon, TOW, Hellfire, and other slow-moving antiarmor munitions will lose most of their effectiveness. This technology, which soon may be available for sale to potentially hostile Third World countries, cannot defeat fire from high-velocity guns (e.g., 30-mm depleted uranium, 105-mm main gun, 120-mm main gun) and would change battlefield dynamics dramatically in favor of the tank.
Colonel Kennedy contends that there is no need for the Army to maintain an airborne division, because no one has mounted an airborne assault with more than two battalions since World War II. Judging from my experience as a straight- leg soldier at Fort Bragg, we need an airborne division of three brigades to maintain an immediate, ready, forcible-entry capability of one brigade. I also would suggest that our airborne forces form a necessary base from which our Special Forces are drawn. Our elite airborne forces sure have seen a lot of combat since World War II—i.e., in Korea, the Dominican Republic, Vietnam, Grenada, Panama, and Southwest Asia.
The 82d Airborne Division would have been a speed bump for Iraqi armor in August 1990. And the other elite infantry force present, the Marines, would have made that speed bump a little higher. Neither force was or is equipped to handle a large mechanized threat.
The airborne has played a key role in vitally important domestic operations as well, including enforcing federal civil rights laws, suppressing riots, and countless humanitarian missions. After the 1989 hurricane on St. Croix, almost every airborne-qualified military policeman at Fort Bragg was readied for parachute assault (the looters at the other end were well armed), on no notice. They were on the ground in less than 24 hours. They were to land with U.S. Marshals and help them enforce the law if a C-141-capable runway was clear. If no runway was available, they were to jump in alone and restore order. In short, when an island assault just had to be done overnight, the National Command Authority didn’t call out the Navy or Marines; it called the Army airborne.
The Army has been called obsolete many times before. But that same Army always has been there when there was hard fighting to be done. We’ve seen every “big one” since Lexington. Unfortunately, the experts who hypothesize about our service’s obsolescence won’t pay for their mistakes when the next “big one” comes up; our Soldiers or Marines will. □ “Bosnia, Tanks, and . . From
the Sea”’
(See D. E. Moore, pp. 42-45, December 1994
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander John S. Andrews, U.S. Navy—Having just returned from a three-month assignment to the Fifth Allied Tactical Air Force (Com- FiveATAF)—the NATO command that is responsible for conducting Operation Deny Flight—I read Commander Moore’s article with great interest. It makes some valid points and good suggestions, but it is so fraught with inaccuracies and written from such a narrow viewpoint that it warrants rebuttal.
ComFiveATAF originally was tasked with conducting Operation Deny Flight. To accomplish this, a combined air-operations center (CAOC) was created and piggybacked onto the existing command structure. The CAOC has been under the command of Lieutenant General “Bear” Chambers from its inception and is staffed by personnel from FiveATAF, as well as temporarily assigned personnel from various nations and services. Air assets are provided by several nations. During my tour, there were squadrons from France, Italy, Spain, Turkey, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom (the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy), and the United States. The operation was providing 24-hour-a-day combat air patrol (CAP) coverage to prevent unauthorized flights over Bosnia-Herzegovina. In addition, aircraft capable of ground attack were maintained either airborne or on alert, in order to respond to U.N. Protection Force requests for close air support on short notice. Multirole aircraft, such as the F-15E and F/A-18, were directed to carry both air-to-air and air-to- ground ordnance, to increase their response options when airborne. When the requirements for surveillance, reconnaissance. and tanking were added, an average of 100 to 120 sorties were launched on any given day.
The major flaw in Commander Moore’s article is that it does not understand the mission of Deny Flight: peace enforcement and humanitarian relief. The two objectives derived from this mission are:
► Prevent the flight of unauthorized aircraft in the airspace over Bosnia-Herzegovina
► Support U.N. Protection Forces involved in humanitarian relief efforts on the ground
Until this mission changes, there is no way to achieve “victory” and there is no “winning side.” The constraints of the mission allow NATO only to react, and that reaction must be limited and correspond in intensity to the event that precipitated it. Initiating actions are implicit in the concept of getting inside the decision cycle of an opponent. Acting in such a manner is contrary to the stated mission of the operation and forbidden by current rules of engagement.
The author faults the command-and- control system used in Deny Flight; his basic premises being that it was based on a lack of confidence in the air crews and that it was too centralized. Both of these criticisms are baseless.
If the air crews didn’t have General Chambers’s full faith and confidence in their capabilities, they wouldn’t be there. What the author construed as a lack of confidence is in fact a control system that is, by necessity, highly centralized. Deny Flight is not an air campaign against a discernible enemy; units could not be given a commander’s intent statement and then be allowed to proceed autonomously. U.N. Protection Force personnel are dispersed throughout the area and are not equipped with electronic means of identification. Their positions and the lines of confrontation change hourly, and an aircraft cannot identify whether a target is friend or foe without direct communication with personnel on the ground, especially at night.
A military response has to be authorized by both the U.N. and NATO command structures. When it is authorized, General Chambers is responsible for the outcome unless the action is authorized by someone above him in the chain of command. He has to know exactly what type and how many aircraft he has (and will have) available, and, because of the potential for collateral damage, he has to know what weapons they are carrying. It almost goes without saying that he has to have confidence that the weapon will be delivered on target. For him to direct scheduling and weapons configurations is not micromanagement—instead, it is the prudent assumption of command authority that is appropriate for the situation and mission.
The air tasking message (ATM) is to a large degree General Chambers’s vehicle for exercising this control. It is prepared by planning personnel (all military aviators) based on input from the U.N. Protection Force and theater intelligence sources (not the Cable News Network). Each unit that participates in the operation is required to send an aviator representative, and the ATM is given a sanity check by these aviators prior to its submission to General Chambers for ap- 'A RUSSIAN MILITARY TOUR*s
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proval. The ATM normally covers a 24- hour period, but, as was often demonstrated, it could be generated in a much shorter period.
The Galeb shootdown is cited as a demonstration of the failure of the ATM and the paralysis of the command-and- control system. In fact, it is an example of the system working as intended. In this incident, unauthorized aircraft flew into the airspace of Bosnia-Herzegovina and committed violent acts. Approval was given by both the United Nations and NATO for an appropriate military reaction by NATO forces, and several aircraft were shot down. If this was an “unforeseen military requirement,” was it an accident that the appropriate aircraft was airborne with a sufficient weapons load to respond in such a manner? I don’t believe it was.
We in naval aviation will be required to function in numerous scenarios, from peacekeeping to war. We are instruments of policy and our actions are governed and constrained by policy. It is not likely that we will have the luxury of a “red and free” environment, in which the consequences of collateral damage and unintended results can be written off. Policy and mission will dictate command structures and rules of engagement. Our task is to ensure that we absolutely understand both. Then, we must work—not only to maximize the naval contribution—-but also to facilitate the contribution of other components to achieve the best use of all available assets. □
Captain Terry Popravak, U.S. Air Force—Commander Moore certainly registers sound points on the need for flexibility in the application of air power against small, mobile ground forces. Considering the limitations of the air tasking message/air tasking order cycle, there is another option available within existing air warfare command-and-control architecture that would allow a quicker response to small, fleeting targets—the U.S. Air Force Killer Scout. Developed during the Persian Gulf War, the Killer Scout offers an excellent means of conducting visual reconnaissance and enhancing the accurate delivery of ordnance against small, mobile ground targets.
The roots of the Killer Scout go back to the fast forward air controllers employed by the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Marine Corps during the Vietnam War. Jet FACs in F-lOOFs, F-4s, and TA-4s enabled strike aircraft to double the amount of damage normally imposed on a nimble, elusive foe. Need some help getting eyes on good targets? Call out the Killer Scouts! □
September 1994 Cover
Lieutenant Commander John H. Parker, Supply Corps, U.S. Naval Reserve—I looked at the cover illustration of the September 1994 Proceedings—a Naval Aviation Weapons Center F-14 Tomcat dropping two laser-guided bombs—and thought, “So, it’s come to this.”
Why are we taking a 22-year-old airframe—designed as a long-range interceptor—and trying to adapt it to a new mission? Simple, because the Navy needs a medium-range strike/attack aircraft, and it doesn’t have one. Certainly, in its day, the A-6 Intruder was the finest allweather medium-range attack aircraft in the world—as its successes from Vietnam to the Persian Gulf attest. But the Navy recognized that, in today’s threat environment, a subsonic aircraft with a large radar profile and without stealth technology is highly vulnerable. Unfortunately, the development of the new-gen- eration strike aircraft—the A-12 Avenger II—to replace the A-6 was a disaster and eventually canceled by then-Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney.
But even so, Secretary Cheney stated that, “the Navy still needed a next-generation strike aircraft for our aircraft carrier force, and ... the United States still needed to maintain the capability to project power through the use of naval strike forces.” Nevertheless, three years after the cancellation of the A-12, the Navy is still scrambling to find even a partially acceptable substitute for the A-6 Intruder.
The FA-18E/F is fine aircraft, but it is not a one-for-one replacement for the A-6. It has shorter range and combat radius and carries fewer external stores. Trying to fit the F/A-18 into the medium- attack role is like the development of the “Bombcat”: another jury-rigged temporary fix and another step backward.
Leadership has failed those in naval aviation who are responsible for keeping naval strike/attack capabilities viable. The Navy’s lack of a survivable medium-attack aircraft has allowed the U.S. Air Force to assert itself in roles and missions once exclusively provinces of the Navy. In the last ten years, the Air Force has fielded the B-2 bomber, the F-l 17A Night Hawk, and now, the F-22 advanced tactical fighter—all highly capable, state-of- the-art, stealth aircraft. The Navy has relied on short-term fixes and attempts to jury rig, reconfigure, or merely reassign existing airframes and weapon systems.
It’s time for naval aviation to get back on track. The Navy desperately needs a new, stealthy, state-of-the-art, medium- range attack/strike aircraft and needs it soon. We need to keep naval aviation on the cutting edge. Let’s move forward—not backward. □
Looking for San Diego? This may be submariners’ best view if all Pacific Fleet submarines move to Pearl Harbor.
Sub Homeport Consolidation Has a Down Side
Lieutenant Andrew D. Wannamaker, U.S. Navy—To save money, the Navy is considering moving the entire Pacific Fleet attack-submarine force to the Pearl Harbor Submarine Base. Currently, attack submarines are based at Pearl Harbor and the San Diego Submarine Base at Point Loma (with one attack submarine operating out of the Ballistic Missile Submarine Base in Bangor, Washington).
This proposed move may look good on paper, but many factors should be considered before another base is closed for purely budgetary reasons. Decisions regarding base closures seem to indicate that San Diego will the Navy’s “megaport” on the West Coast.
Along with three or four aircraft carriers, other major commands will continue to be based there—e.g., Commander Third Fleet, Commander Naval Surface Forces Pacific, Commander Naval Air Forces Pacific, and Commander Training Command Pacific. For many years, the submarine force was truly the “silent service,” having little interaction with the rest of the Navy. Recently, though, it has been integrated in a wide-variety of warfare areas. Removing all submarine force presence from San Diego may not serve this integration effort well.
High on the list of Admiral Jeremy M. Boorda’s priorities has been an analysis of current and future operations tempo (OpTempo) and personnel tempo (Pers Tempo) levels, including deployments and “local” operations. At the present, most Pacific Fleet battle-group and amphibious-ready-group ships and staffs are stationed in San Diego, along with the inport training centers—i.e., the Fleet Combat Training Center and the Tactical Training Group Pacific—that support these task groups. Because of this, predeployment training takes place either in San Diego or in the waters off Southern California. If the policy of deploying two attack submarines with each battle group continues and Pacific Fleet submarines are based in Hawaii, then, in order to participate in the battle group’s predeployment training, they will spend more time out of home port before leaving on a standard six-month deployment. This would lead to higher OpTempo and PersTempo for submarine crews.
Because attack submarines can perform a wide variety of missions, those in San Diego are involved in a variety of other training tasks and interoperability testing in San Diego. Just a few recent examples include working with SEALs, Marine Force Reconnaissance units, and Explosive Ordnance Disposal units, test launches of submarine-launched missiles, and testing of new communications equipment. Because these exercises require extensive planning and coordination—and because Southern California has a large concentration of commands involved in them—submarines will be required in the future.
The bottom line is military readiness. There may be ways to use San Diego’s existing infrastructure that reduce costs and still allow for an attack-submarine presence on the West Coast. The Navy must realize that serious strategic consequences might stem from moving all Pacific attack submarines to a single port. Although budgetary constraints and the New World Order are factors in the development of the future structure of the U.S. military, the Navy’s purpose, as well as historical lessons learned from past wars, must not be forgotten. □ “Trust Us”
(See R. E. Norris, pp. 58-59, November 1994
Proceedings)
Chief Yeoman Charles K. Scott, Jr., U.S. Coast Guard (Retired)—For several years I have read with interest the arguments regarding integrating women into combat units, both pro and con. Some of the arguments put forth against integration may be valid in the minds of the presenters, but as this is the last quarter of the 20th century, I cannot but wonder where these leaders are coming from. In the civilian world, there are many places where women are succeeding in all-male domains and some are doing very well. It didn’t come easy, but then what does?
The U.S. Coast Guard has been gender integrated in all phases of its operations since about 1973. The only restriction was that the unit be able to provide separate toilets, showers, and berthing facilities. When I retired in 1985, about the only units this kept women from serving in were the 82-foot cutters.
I was assigned to the USCGC Glacier (WAGB-4) when the first women came on board. There were 2 officers and 18 enlisted personnel. There were problems, but none that could not be worked out. The executive officer talked to the wardroom, the chief’s mess, and the first- class mess about treatment and work assignments. Basically, he said, you would not expect a 98-pound male sailor to walk off with a 200-pound anvil, so don’t expect it from the women. Otherwise, treat them as you would any sailor.
Second, the captain put out a ship’s instruction for all hands that covered romances, relationships, etc. Basically, it said, if you do, do it away from the ship. If you get caught on board, you will be disciplined! And he was a man of his word. Many of the wives were worried, but if a problem is developing in a marriage, it is not always exacerbated by the presence of female crew members.
Commander Norris basically stated that the time is now, the women are here, there’s no turning back, so let’s get on with it. There always will be problems, but a good command structure using good common sense will be able to work through them. □
“Anti-Drug Effort Takes New Twist”
(See V. Thomas, p. 25, November 1994 Proceedings)
Captain Marion H. Eppes, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Captain Thomas rightly emphasizes the importance of the mission assigned to Rear Admiral Andrew A. Granuzzo’s command and suggests some of the problems connected with it. Undoubtedly, one of the most demanding is the monitoring of the international air and surface traffic within the area of responsibility of Joint Interagency Task Force (East) area because it requires almost continuous surface and air surveillance.
The essential surface ships and airborne backup for this task are in short supply and, even if available, would be prohibitively expensive to operate on a round-the-clock basis. So what to do?
Interestingly, Admiral Granuzzo has personal experience in lighter-than-air aviation. It is an ironic coincidence that modern airborne early warning airships could be immensely helpful in providing effective—and economical—surveillance—in the Joint Interagency Task Force (East) area. □
“Alone, Unarmed . . . and
Unavailable”
(See G. Leygraaf, pp. 37-39, September 1994;
R. E. Moses, p. 25, January 1995 Proceedings)
Lieutenant William A. Lind, U.S. Navy— Commander Leygraaf bemoans the lack of—and lack of interest in—tactical reconnaissance (TacRecce). In reality, the Navy has at its disposal one of the finest, most reliable TacRecce platforms— the Tactical Airborne Reconnaissance System (TARPS)-capable F-14. Commander Leygraaf touts the Advanced Tactical Airborne Reconnaissance System (ATARS) as the only future for carrier- based reconnaisance. Nothing could be farther from the truth.
The TARPS/F-14 combination was conceived as an interim measure, between the RF-8 and an undetermined, more permanent successor. In the ensuing years, TARPS has shown its worth time and again. In recent activities such as Operations Deny Flight, enforcing the no-fly zone in the Adriatic; Southern Watch, enforcing the Iraqi no-fly zone in the Gulf; and Vigilant Warrior, the October 1994 operation against Saddam Hussein, TARPS F-14s have formed the tip of the spear. Their tasking has been of utmost importance to the battle group, NATO, and U.N. commanders. TARPS tasking has become so important to high- level leaders for the big picture that true tactical recce (for target study, strike planning, etc.) has suffered.
With interchangeable photographic and infrared sensors, TARPS is uniquely suited not only for the needs outlined in Commander Moore’s article (“Bosnia, Tanks, and ‘. . . From the Sea,’” pp. 4245, December 1994 Proceedings) but also for the wider-ranging missions dictated in current theaters of operation. The postulation of an ATARS-capable F/A-18 to replace the Tomcat in the TacRecce role is both a waste of funds and a step backward in capability.
The composition of the carrier air wing varies in the number of Tomcats on board. In any case, roughly one third of the F-14s will be TARPS-capable. These aircraft have minor additional TARPS internal hardware. During recent operations in Bosnia and Iraq, Fighter Squadron (VF)-143 TARPS tasking usually included two or three missions a day, each covering 4 to 12 targets. It was quickly discovered that the F/A-18s were unable to provide TARPS escort because of higher-than-anticipated fuel consumption while making high-speed passes at lower altitudes through threat envelopes.
Realizing its limitations as a reconnaissance escort, how will the Hornet fare as the primary platform? Installation of ATARS requires removal of the M-61 20-mm cannon, eliminating an effective weapon. It is unclear whether other systems will suffer. What impact will ATARS have on the F/A-18’s limited range and weapons loadout?
In Operations Southern Watch and Vigilant Warrior, the carrier operated 80 to 140 miles from the Iraqi border. TARPS missions to central Iraq could extend more than 600 miles, requiring passes through a variety of threat envelopes. Fuel consumption and performance degradation incurred by the TARPS pod was minimal. Realizing the Hornet’s reliance on tanker support, it is clear that an F/A-18-ATARS system imposes a whole new array of problems for a commander in need of reconnaissance.
A TARPS-equipped Tomcat relinquishes little in the way of range or offensive punch. A typical loadout on a TARPS mission included two Sparrow and two Sidewinder air-to-air missiles— the same loadout called for in coun- terair/strike missions over Bosnia and Iraq. TARPS missions through specific threat envelopes could see the aircraft configured with the ALQ-167 tactical contingency pod and/or the expanded chaff adaptor, which increases the Tomcat’s expendable loadout threefold. The Hornet can carry the ALQ-167, but it rarely does because of its already limited loadout and fuel problems. The Hornet
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cannot carry the expanded chaff adaptor. The inability to fly at higher airspeeds through the threat, a greatly reduced maneuverability from a two-or three-drop- tank configuration (standard for any carrier-based F/A-18), and identical radar-warning receivers on both aircraft all show the TARPS F-14 as the platform with the increased chance of survival.
TARPS has a decade and a half of use, yet its results still are astonishing. Within ten minutes of aircraft recovery, photos are produced; they are scanned and transmitted within a half hour. Image resolution is such that mortar-sized targets are identified from film taken at altitudes well above small-arms and light- antiaircraft-artillery range. It is a highly reliable system; VF-143 boasted a 100% success rate for photographing targets not obscured by clouds.
Compared to ATARS and other systems, TARPS is the leader in capability. The TARPS KS-153B oblique camera rivals ATARS—and the electro-optic long- range oblique-photography system—in standoff range. Imagery from the RF-4C and various NATO reconnaissance assets in the Bosnian theater were clearly inferior to those produced by TARPS. TARPS also has a larger film capacity than most other systems.
ATARS has the capability of mounting electro-optical and infrared scanners, neither requiring film. Digitizing data opens up many possibilities, including a real-time capability using the aircraft’s data-link system to transmit imagery. Although not considered in Commander Leygraaf’s article, TARPS has these capabilities, as well.
Two years ago, Naval Air Warfare Center Warminster, in conjunction with VF-143, tested two systems that could revolutionize tactical reconnaissance. The first was a video system boresighted to the KS-153, called the TARPS video-aiming system. With this system, the radar intercept officer could view the area being imaged through cockpit displays, and instantly determine mission success. He also could give a real-time tactical assessment. With recent strides in digital technology and the Tomcat digital upgrade, the capability of sending this imagery real time could be just around the corner. The second system was an upgraded digital AAD-5 infrared scanner, which produces videotape imagery of exceptional quality. The real-time applications are similar to the video system. Both received high marks from the fleet air crews testing them. Nevertheless, the current status of these programs is unclear.
Two other reconnaissance options have been tested in the F-14. One is the tactical airborne data camera system, a handheld camera operated by the radar intercept officer and tied directly to cockpit displays and the data link. Moderately successful use by VF-102 and VF-103 revealed problems with imaging through the canopy as well as long data transmission times. Another is a forward-looking-infrared-like system to replace the KS-87 in the nose of the pod.
The door is open to improve an already outstanding system, which calls the need for ATARS further into doubt. Additional concerns include the high level of institutional knowledge present in the fighter community and having a two-seat aircraft to reduce the intense navigational, lookout, and defensive workloads when executing reconnaissance in a hostile area.
The Tomcat—in the fighter strike role—will be a fixture on carrier decks well into the 21st century. Funding for upgrades seem more and more difficult to procure, despite its recognized capabilities and the future needs of the carrier air wing. Enhancing TARPS capabilities is an easy way to maintain this crucial platform. Currently, the capability of the F-14 TARPS aircraft fits the carrier TacRecce bill readily. The F/A-18-ATARS option is an unproved system hampered by inherent platform limitations. Why spend money to develop a system that yields an overall capability that is inferior to what we have now? Why spend the additional dollars to bring ATARS into fleet use when we already have a more capable system that is easily and quickly upgraded? □ “Fear, Courage, and Cohesion”
(See A. M. Smith, pp. 65-69, November 1994 Proceedings)
Jack D. Hydrick—This article contained some historically incorrect information— i.e., that the 2d Armored Division served in Italy during World War II. There is no record of the 2d Armored Division being in Italy during the war. □
“Reopen the Kimmel Case”
(See M. Gannon, pp. 51-56, December 1994; E. P. Calouro, p. 15, January 1995 Proceedings)
Professor Ronald H. Spector, The George Washington University—Some people have felt compelled over the last 50 years to continue the convoluted and futile debate about who was to blame for Pearl Harbor. Admiral Husband E. Kimmel’s partisans and apologists repeatedly have argued that he not only was blameless in his actions and decisions but that he also has been made a scapegoat for the errors and incompetence of others.
In the earlier years of the controversy, it usually was President Franklin Roosevelt and his close advisors who were charged with deliberately exposing the fleet to destruction and failing to warn Kimmel about the Japanese attack, of which they are assumed to have had advance knowledge through reading the Japanese code. More recently, the culprits have been identified as incompetent and arrogant naval officers in Washington, most notably Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, who failed to pass on vital information to Kimmel and then conspired to pass the blame to the Hawaii commander. More recently still, the villain has been identified as none other than Winston Churchill.
In Professor Gannon’s contribution to this crusade, the real culprits finally have been identified: the late Gordon Prange and myself. Leaving aside the charges against Prange, Gannon suggests that, in 1988,1 forwarded to the Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary of the Navy material that made Admiral Kimmel look like “something of a dolt,” and this was all that stood between Kimmel and the vindication he deserved.
As Gannon points out, “in history nothing substitutes for examining the actual documents.” Such an examination would show that what was sent to the Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary at their request was a summary of what historians, including Prange, have said about Pearl Harbor. It also contained my personal views as expressed in a book review and in my book, Eagle Against the Sun. That book contains the following passages:
These subsequent investigations, while they did not exonerate Kimmel and Short, demonstrated that Washington officials also shared some responsibility for the defeat. For example, the War Department had been informed by General Short at the end of November 1941 that he had alerted his forces “to prevent sabotage”—yet the department failed to warn him that it wished him to be prepared for other possible dangers as well.
Kimmel and Short lacked the capability to decipher and read Japanese diplomatic code as American intelligence analysts were doing in Washington; they would later claim that the War and Navy Departments failed to pass on to them a number of important intercepts that would have alerted them to the threat their commands faced. Most notably, the Navy Department failed to pass on to Kimmel an intercepted message of September 1941 from Tokyo to the Japanese consul at Honolulu, ordering him to divide the waters of Pearl Harbor into five sub-areas. He was to report regularly on the number, type, and movements of ships in these areas. Colonel Rufus Bratton, head of the Far East Section of Army Intelligence, considered the message significant, for it indicated that “the Japanese were showing unusual interest in the port at Honolulu.” High-level officials in the army and navy, however, saw no im-
ln the case of Pearl Harbor, not only was Kimmel surprised, but his forces also were so unready as to be unable to react in a timely and effective manner.
portance in the message; it was passed on by Naval Intelligence in a routine manner to the Asiatic Fleet—but not to Hawaii. Neither this message nor any other single piece of information would have offered clear warning of an attack on Pearl Harbor, and there is no way of knowing what Hawaiian commanders might have done had they received such information.
Meanwhile, in Hawaii, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel was completing plans for the relief of Wake. Kimmel had long regarded Wake as a valuable lure to draw the Japanese fleet for battle. Even with most of his battleships out of action, Kimmel believed that a portion of the Japanese fleet could be ambushed at Wake. The Admiral committed all three of his aircraft carriers, Lexington, Saratoga, and Enterprise, to the operation. A task force built around the Saratoga was to make the actual relief attempt, while the Lexington and Enterprise task forces carried out diversionary raids and stood by in support.
It is hard to quarrel with Samuel Eliot Morison’s observation that “the failure to relieve Wake resulted from poor seamanship and a want of decisive action.” Yet there is no doubt that Washington also played a large
role in the debacle. Admiral Kimmel bore a measure of responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster, so relieving him of his post could certainly be justified. But, the decision of the President and Navy Secretary to remove him even before the arrival of Admiral Nimitz, and to appoint Pye as a sort of interim commander, was surely ill-advised. Kimmel’s removal sealed the fate of Wake.
I leave it to the reader to decide whether the above makes Admiral Kimmel look like “something of a dolt.” Does all this mean that Kimmel ought to be posthumously rewarded with a promotion? No. In an aside, Gannon mentions that there are a few other “alleged omissions or negligence for which Kimmel or General Short or both have been blamed.” These matters, which Gannon apparently felt were too unimportant to address, include the total unreadiness of Kimmel’s and Short’s commands on 7 December, their failure to coordinate and integrate their defense efforts, and their failure to establish an effective command, control, and communications system.
It was not simply that Kimmel and Short were surprised; that happens frequently in war, and the general or admiral who suffers defeat as a result is often relieved—or worse. In the case of Pearl Harbor, not only was Kimmel surprised, but his forces also were so unready as to be unable to react in a timely and effective manner. The Japanese were surprised at least twice during the naval campaigns in the Solomons and still managed to inflict heavier losses on their opponents. Similarly, Admiral Sprague’s carriers and destroyers at Leyte Gulf were totally surprised by a far stronger force of Japanese battleships and cruisers, but reacted brilliantly—so well that the Japanese Admiral was persuaded to break off the attack.
Admiral Trost would like to see the case reopened. It has never been closed. Historians and other interested parties have and will continue to debate the issues surrounding Pearl Harbor. Despite their rhetoric, what Gannon and Kimmel’s partisans really desire is closure of the debate. They want an official government endorsement of their particular interpretation of the historical record. This is to be accomplished by Kimmel’s posthumous promotion. Using the same logic, we ought to demote posthumously those flag officers who are now out of favor with historians—such as MacArthur or Mark Clark—and promote those whose reputations have grown. Let the debate about Pearl Harbor continue, but let this grotesque demand for government endorsement of one historical interpretation, as in Orwell’s 1984, be set at rest. □