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Faced with lean budgets—and the prospect of even leaner ones—the U.S. military is closing many facilities and cutting back on personnel. To avoid becoming a hollow force, however, the Pentagon may have to make some serious changes that go to the heart of its operation.
The international business marketplace has changed drastically in the past few years. For U.S. business, this period has been especially unsettling. Many "'ell-established corporations have been rocked to their and have lost both money and marketshare a rapid rate. In their book Reengineering the Corporci- on, Michael Hammer and James Champy explained phenomenon:
The ironic truth is that American companies are now performing so badly precisely because they used to per-
form so well ... . because the world in which they operate has changed beyond their limits to adjust or evolve. The principles on which they are organized were superbly suited to the conditions of an earlier era.1
To stay competitive in this new environment, some U.S. corporations have slashed personnel and closed facilities; others merely have modified old procedures. However, some corporations have adopted the approach of “reengineering.” Messrs. Hammer and Champy define it as: “the fundamental rethinking and radical redesign of
business processes to achieve dramatic improvements in contemporary measures of performances.” It is a process that starts from the future and works backward, unconstrained by existing methods, people, or structure. In essence, corporations ask themselves: “If we were a new company, how would we structure ourselves and run the business?”
The international security landscape also has changed drastically in past few years, perhaps even more than the business world. As General Colin Powell observed:
The old international order of the Cold War . . . had form, substance, ideology . . . [but] that focus is now blurred. The form and substance are disappearing before our eyes, vanishing in a whirlwind of change.2
U.S. NAVY
jointness can increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the U.S. military. One way is to begin to look for totally new approaches that resemble some of the radical changes spawned by reengineering efforts in corporate America.
The process that demands dramatic improvement is the one that supplies unified combatant commanders with combat-ready forces jointly trained and structured to meet each supported commander’s requirements. This process might be improved best by implementing sweeping changes in two most important areas related to joint combat readiness: force structure and funding structure.
Reengineering Force Structure
Domestically, the U.S. military is faced with lean fiscal times and a shifting attitude toward national defense. Between 1986 and 1996, the defense budget will have decreased in real terms by almost 40%. For the first time in about 50 years, national security is not a top priority for most Americans. Therefore, just as private businesses have had to adjust themselves to a new global environment, so too must the U.S. military.
The U.S. military started down the road of change in 1986 with the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The success of U.S. arms in the Persian Gulf War was in part the result of an increased ability of U.S. armed services to fight together, because of this law. Such battlefield success of joint initiatives becomes an incentive to examine other ways that
Many corporations that reengineered changed their organizational structures in order to focus on their primary missions better. They have spent the last decade decentralizing authority, flattening hierarchies, focusing on quality, and adapting to changing environments. That is how Taco Bell went from being a small regional company that in 1983 was becoming smaller by the day to a national restaurant chain with $3 billion in sales in 1993.
The military already has altered its structure in part by implementing the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the Bottom- Up Review, but there may be additional ways to align structures so that they reflect better the way the United States will maintain forward presence and will fight in the future.
Combat Forces Structure-. In today’s joint environment, a single service seldom performs an entire operation by itself. Joint Task Forces (JTFs) have proved their worth in many operations—e.g., JTF 120’s conduct of the Haitian embargo—and, therefore, will be the operational structures of the future.
Thus, in reengineering the process of providing jointly trained forces to supported commanders, perhaps all U.S. military forces in the continental United States should
I be permanently organized into four standing JTFs. The 'ndividual services still would be responsible for maintaining the overall readiness of their specific units, but the JTFs would train and be forward-deployed (or stand alert ■n the United States) as units. For a given period of time— I say, six months—each joint task force would be the national response force, ready to move to a crisis area on short notice.
Such a reorganization would enable our military struc- ■ ture to meet the demands of future conflicts. For instance, in a Persian Gulf War scenario, the JTF on alert would be | sent to the theater immediately. Because it trained as a Joint unit, it would be combat ready upon arrival. The | other JTFs could attain quickly the required state of readiness for deployment.
All joint task forces would train to common doctrine and procedures; if a situation called for the commitment of more than one JTF, integration could be accomplished I quickly. Furthermore, if there is no need for a full JTF, components of one JTF could | be deployed as a smaller joint I force.
_ All operating forces would
" be organized in a similar f manner—the way they will
i fight. There would be fewer
5 levels of command, because
most fleet, corps, and wing staffs could be consolidated into a JTF staff. Resources, thus, could be used more • efficiently.
1 Unified Command Structure: If ready forces can train
' more effectively and efficiently under a JTF structure, then perhaps the unified combatant commands to which JTFs
I report should be restructured.
The Bottom-up Review established a strategy that structures our armed forces to fight two near-simultaneous major regional conflicts. Perhaps, as force levels and I resources continue to decrease, the Cold War structure I could be reduced from six regional combatant commanders to two—East and West—with a third commander in | charge of forces in the United States and their training and deployment. At a time when fewer forces will be J called upon more frequently to respond more rapidly, command relationships must be as uncluttered as possible.
| Under the current system of six regional commanders,
' units must train under six different command-and-control structures. If the number of potential commanders is reduced to two, training can be simplified even further. By maintaining only one headquarters in Europe and another in the Pacific, the United States can maintain its . influence overseas, improve its relations with its Allies,
[ and simplify the process of training and deploying forces stationed in the United States.
Joint Staff Funding Authority: As a result of the Gold- water-Nichols Act, the Joint Staff has gained considerable influence over the control of operations, but it still acts primarily to support the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of | Staff (CJCS)—and not as a general staff. The individual I services still generate their own budgets and programs, while the Joint Staff and Office of the Secretary of Defense focus on relatively few major high-cost areas.
Considering the fiscal constraints the U.S. military now faces, perhaps it is appropriate now to consider broadening the powers of the Joint Staff to supervise programs in certain major warfare areas—e.g., strike warfare or air defense. The Joint Staff is ideally suited to take on the job of coordinating the individual services’ contributions to these warfare areas. Furthermore, in such projects, the Joint Staff should retain authority over requirements, budget preparation, and acquisition.
Basing Structure: As the number of U. S. military bases around the world drops, consolidating two or more services at the remaining bases becomes more of an imperative. Sharing base facilities will ease interservice cooperation and provide more opportunities for cost-effective joint training, an advantage already demonstrated in the colocation of Pope Air Force Base and Fort Bragg in North Carolina. This option is especially attractive for air bases and stations—e.g., locating Navy tactical aviation
squadrons alongside Air Force squadrons—where it allows for better blending of training resources.
Joint Training Structure: Providing trained forces for combat commanders requires only a single joint command, responsible for all joint training. Such a command—the U. S. Atlantic Command (USACom)—is already in place for most forces that are based in the Continental United States. It has the potential to provide significant cost-effective advantages, not only in joint training but also in synchronizing all training in critical areas. For instance, there are numerous service-specific exercises in place, but only a few manage to bring together all the players and systems that could contribute. USACom can perform this training mission and others like it.
Reengineering Funding Structures
If reengineering is to achieve a radical improvement in the way joint forces are trained, maintained, and deployed, then the programming and budgeting process should be reviewed to see if it can be made as joint as the operational command structure has become.
Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Accounts: Under the current accounting system, a service’s O&M account is a large group of funds designated for maintenance, training, and operations. Consequently, if O&M accounts are underfunded at the beginning—or if unprogrammed contingency operations must be performed—then funds are usually taken from maintenance or training. For instance, in order to pay the costs of Somalia, Forces Command has had to cut O&M accounts of forces in the United States.
Shrinking force levels and resources combined with an increasing number of commitments overseas means that more and more funds are diverted from training and maintenance requirements to fund current operations—resulting in decreased overall readiness levels. If this trend continues, the U.S. military very well may become again the hollow force it was in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
For the first time in 50 years, national security is not a top priority for most Americans.
The O&M accounts could be broken down into separate operations, maintenance, and training accounts and, perhaps, control of part of the operations funds could be given to unified combatant commanders. Joint-training funding could become a separate heading in the services’ budgets, with the requirement that unified commanders must approve of any use of those funds for purposes other than joint training.
Given an established number of forces, it should be relatively easy to determine the annual funding needed to maintain and train them. These funds in the seperate maintenance and training accounts would ensure readiness and prevent a hollow force. However, if that is not enough to meet operational requirements, the Pentagon should go back to Congress for more funds—and not take resources away from maintenance or training.
Unified Combatant Commander Financial Accountability: Another area for examination is the imbalance between the services—which own resources but do not conduct operations—and the unified commanders, who conduct operations but have no resources. Under the current system, combatant commanders have no formal financial accountability beyond staff budgets. There is some good in this arrangement because when deciding on the force structure for a given operation—especially in combat situations—cost should not be a major factor in the commander’s decision.
However, in other scenarios—e.g., peacekeeping or routine forward presence operations—there might be advantages in providing a unified combatant commander with direct funding for an operation. If the funds needed exceed the amount provided, the commander could request more money from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense and, thus, the funds would not be taken automatically from the training and maintenance of other forces. Cost effectiveness can never be achieved if those who task resources are not also responsible for setting priorities for resource allocation.
Acquisition Reform: As defense resources decrease over the coming years, funding for service acquisition will become increasingly strained. Perhaps here is an opportunity to establish new procedures that would approach acquisition from a joint—instead of service—perspective. Given that JTFs are operational structure of the future, the creation of joint acquisition task forces that would focus on major warfare areas or high-cost systems also should be considered.
The recent Bottom-up Review approached several acquisition issues—e.g., fighter aircraft—from a truly joint perspective. Using the joint project management approach discussed earlier, this approach can be applied even in more programs. Rather than be forced to choose among competing service ideas for, say, a ballistic missile defense system, it could be designed from the start by a joint acquisition task force with people from all of the services aided by Department of Defense experts. If put in place for a wide variety of programs, the amount of service-
specific equipment would be reduced to a common-sense level and more efficient joint logistic support soon would follow.
Financial Management Systems: By some estimates, there are at least 142 different financial accounting systems in the Department of Defense. That number needs to reduced to some manageable level; something which the Defense Finance and Accounting System (DFAS) Office is attempting to do. With declining resources, there is an urgent need to develop a common system that will allow for better control and visibility of funding. Therefore, the DFAS should receive some form of joint support in its consolidation mission.
Why Change? _____________
John Steinbeck wrote, “It is the nature of man as he grows older to protest against change, particularly change for the better.” IBM is a good institutional example of
this. Growing too comfortable after many years of success, IBM failed to recognize changes in the marketplace-— and lost heavily. We in the military need to heed that example by continuously looking for new structures and new ways of doing business. To assume that the last cuts have been made in defense spending would be a tragic mistake. We must look constantly for better ways to provide our combatant commanders with forces that are trained and ready to fight on a joint battlefield—even as defense dollars dwindle. Adhering to old ways that were effective in the days of fat budgets may lead to failure in the future. General John Shalikashvili highlighted this point in his recent testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee in February 1994:
We in the Armed Forces are . . . going to have to search for innovative ways to make our force more efficient, better trained, and more effective. We cannot and will not allow any sacred cows or gold watches to get in our way ... or to block our imagination.
While we still are able to use the capital investments of previous decades, we need to experiment with reengineering the way we train, maintain our forces, and develop weapon systems. The future may be uncertain, but the best way to predict it is to create it.
'Michael Hammer and James Champy, Reengineering the Corporation (New York: HarperCollins Publishers Inc., 1993), pp. 10-11.
:Gen. Colin C. Powell, USA. “Base Force: Living with Success”, Defense 92, Jan- uary-February 1992. p. 4.
'Hammer and Champy, p. 32.
Captain Fraser is the commanding officer of the USS Cape St. George (CG-71). His previous assignments have included command of the USS O’Brien (DD-975) and as the Director of Program Planning on the staff of the Commander, U.S. Atlantic Command.