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The current defense environment of force restructuring, reduced budgets, and joint task forces requires that close air support (CAS) tactics, techniques, and procedures become joint. Presently, however, each service brings a different doctrinal perspective to the CAS arena, which prevents the effective and efficient joint employment of air assets in support of the ground commander.
> The Air Force. The Air Force perspective suggests that close air support, though important, rarely creates campaign-level effects. Because it functions at the tactical level of warfare, CAS does not necessarily fit into the Air Force view of air power influencing the overall
pending on the actual requirements. If air assets in theater are limited, their ineffective employment can hinder attainment of the overall campaign objectives.
In addition, the Army historically has viewed attack helicopters as a maneuver element and normally will not use rotary-wing assets to provide fire support. But attack helicopters, as demonstrated in Desert Storm, can provide effective support to ground forces, and this concept must be institutional
war.1 When used, it
should be massed to concentrate power and create opportunities and planned to reduce risk.3 This reliance on advance planning, as illustrated by the air
tasking order, does not allow for the often urgent and rapid sortie response needed during CAS. The planned phase-out of the A-10 prior to the Gulf War highlights the Air Force’s lack of commitment to CAS as a major role or mission.
► The Army. The Army by doctrine depends on the Air Force for fixed- wing close air support. In practice, the Army component commander will demand that a certain percentage of the joint force air component commander’s (JFACC’s) apportionment guidance be set aside for CAS. Setting aside a predetermined percentage of sorties for CAS could lead to the under- or overuse of available air assets, de
I’here is much debate about the platforms that are best for close air support, but few deny that all hands need better training. Navy and Air Force pilots all must operate under the same rules.
ized into Army doctrine.
> The Navy. In most future scenarios, the Navy will be the first force on station. As it did in Desert Storm, the carrier battle group most likely will provide the initial close air support sorties. Constraints on deck cycle time and sortie generation rates, however, limit the Navy’s ability to provide CAS. During a sustained conflict, fully deployed land-based aircraft will provide the majority of air power— if forward bases are available.
In addition, close air support historically has not been a high priority for carrier air wings. In the past, naval doctrine has placed greater emphasis on deep strikes
and power projection. The recent focus on littoral warfare has resulted in a greater concentration on close air support for carrier battle groups, but the integration of the amphibious ready groups and carrier battle group into a naval expeditionary force still is in the early stages of development.
► The Marine Corps. A major reason for Marine Corps aviation is to provide support to the ground force commander. Close air support is an integral part of the Marine
air-ground task force and is viewed as just one of many factors in the combined-arms attack.3 Because Marine Corps aviation is so strongly linked to the overall scheme of maneuver warfare, there is often a reluctance to release excess sorties to the JFACC for integration into the overall air campaign.
In some circles of the Marine Corps there is a belief that the majority of CAS sorties will originate from an expeditionary air field (EAF), but a review of the Pacific campaign during World War U suggests that the establishment of a true EAF is beyond the logistical capabilities of current amphibious forces.4 The rapid deployment of air assets to support ground forces during the Gulf War was possible because of the Coalition’s access to ports and air bases. The Marines cannot rely solely on the ability to operate from a readily available EAF. The doctrinal view of allowing only Marine Corps air assets to support Marine ground forces, as demonstrated during Desert Storm, must be changed to ensure that the joint task force commander’s objectives are met in an efficient manner.
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l|ent and effective close air support 0 the ground commander, the joint *ask force commander must have J|r forces that can operate across 'ervice boundaries. To develop a lfuly joint CAS system, in addition to doctrinal changes, the services teust address training, command and control, and equipment.5 ^ Training. Each service must ensure that forward air controllers, air Crew, planners, and coordinators are using the same CAS tactics, techniques, and procedures—and lhat they are training to them, ^raining at the basic, intermediate, and advanced stages of the workup cycle must be joint. Service component training at the basic level should ensure that the tactical air control party, sortie requesting and approving authority, and air crew Procedures are identical in nature.
To implement this standardization, the Navy’s Pacific and Atlantic Landing Force Training Commands could become the central provider of CAS training. Participation in a combined-arms exercise at Twenty nine Palms or an air Warrior exercise would validate joint CAS procedures at the unit level. Service-sponsored training— such as the Navy’s Fleet-Ex series, Army National Training Center exercises, and the Air Force Flag series exercises—provides a vehicle to integrate service components on a larger scale. Exercises such as Ocean Venture and Tandem Thrust provide a method to implement and refine close air support at the joint task force level.
V Command and Control. The planning, requesting, and mission approval processes for close air support need to be streamlined. The air tasking order (ATO) must be a
real-time, flexible, document for CAS to be effective. The ATO and targeting process should define sortie divert parameters and indicate those targets that once selected, must be hit. It also would identify sorties that, if required, could be diverted to CAS.6 The goal is to have ATO planning and execution at the operational level of warfare, and a com- mand-and-control system that allows for effective sortie flow at the tactical level.
Airspace control procedures also must be standardized. The current “command and control systems and associated terminology vary greatly across service and [unified command] lines. These procedural differences, spread throughout the command-and-control system, magnify doctrinal differences and contribute to misunderstanding about service commitments to and effectiveness of CAS.”7 For example, at the terminal control phase, there are fundamental differences in oversight and control authority: naval forces rely on officer control, the Army and Air Force use enlisted personnel. The joint task force commander must be able to construct a standardized airspace control system that meets the needs of the components and ensures that overall campaign objectives are met. The airspace system must be flexible enough to allow for the insertion of close air support sorties when needed. Standardized airspace structure and command-and-control procedures must be developed using the proven points of the current service component systems.
► Equipment. Communications, weapons, and avionics equipment related to close air support should stress service interoperability. Acquisition programs must focus on joint systems compatible with all CAS agencies—controller through aircraft. Joint implementation and introduction of new technologies will result in an improved,
standardized CAS system.
Operator inputs must be taken into consideration. Procurement programs must stress multi-use technology, joint service cooperation, and streamlining.
The post-Desert Storm shift in weapons procurement focus to precision-guided munitions also may limit the availability of suitable close air support ordnance. Multiple racks of lightweight weapons can provide increased CAS flexibility as opposed to heavy, general purpose, and precision-guided munitions. Development should not be limited to high-cost smart systems.
As the armed forces enter the next century, they must work together to develop a.close air support system that is truly joint. The Marine Corps recently was designated as the lead service to develop joint tactics, techniques, and procedures for CAS. This effort must go beyond developing a close air support publication; a truly joint system cannot be achieved until each service makes doctrinal changes toward CAS.
'This perspective is suggested by Air Force Manual 1-1, Volume 1, and remarks delivered by Maj. Tory Ward, USMC, Air Support Conference, Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center (MCAGCC) Twentynine Palms, California, 11 January 1994.
:Ibid.
'See Fleet Marine Force Manual 5-41 for a detailed discussion of Marine Corps close air support doctrine.
4T. D. Nevitt, The Military History of World War //; E. B. Potter, Nimitz (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1976); E. B. Potter & C. W. Nimitz, Seapower (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1960); and D. Ward, “Navy Places Odd Bet on Seventh LHD,” Navy Times, 21 March 1994, p.
16.
These three topics have been the focus of numerous close air support working groups sponsored by various Marine Corps and Navy commands, most recently during the Air Support Conference hosted by CG MCAGCC Twentynine Palms, BGen. R. H. Sutton, 11-12 January 1994.
The targeting process and divert parameters outlined suggested by remarks delivered by Col. J. L. Whitlow, USMC. Air Support Conference MCAGCC Twentynine Palms, California, 11 January 1994.
7Gen. Colin L. Powell, USA (Ret.), Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States (Washington: Department of Defense, 1993), p. iii-17.
Lieutenant Commander Faletti is an A-6E bom- bardier/navigator currently serving on the staff, Commander, Third Fleet. During Operation Desert Storm, he Hew 50 combat missions while attached to VA-155.