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The U.S. Navy relearned the quiet effectiveness of naval mines and the need for modem, effective mine countermeasures during the Persian Gulf War. Besides frustrating potential U.S. amphibious landings, mines were the only Iraqi weapons to damage U.S. warships. Consequently, the Navy began to revitalize its mine countermeasures forces through well-conceived planning and increased funding support. The Navy has not, however, given the same attention to its dwindling mining capabilities.
This point was emphasized by
Edward Zdankiewicz, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Mine and Undersea Warfare), during a September 1993 briefing to a National Security Industrial Association Mine Warfare Conference. Many people, he noted, improperly equate the term “mine warfare” only with mine countermeasures. Given the high leverage that offensive and
defensive mining provides, Mr. Zdankiewicz commented, it is surprising that there are no mine development programs ongoing in the U.S. Navy.
This should not be surprising. The mine’s versatility and effectiveness have been its own downfall. Submarines, aircraft, and surface ships all can lay mines, and one of the great ironies of U.S. mine warfare is that mine development has never been championed by any one of the principal warfare communities. Of the money appropriated to mining programs—which represents less
than 1% of the Navy’s total obligated authority—offensive mine programs receive less than 10% of mine warfare funding, and less than 2% is invested in mine research and development.
The U.S. Navy also faces a shortage of mine-delivery platforms. Aircraft and submarines have been the Navy’s delivery platforms of choice
for several decades, and their numbers provided sufficient mine-delivery capacity for most contingencies. Looking at future force structure, however, it is apparent the near-term loss of mine-delivery platforms will be substantial:
► The A-6E, the Navy’s primary mine-delivery aircraft, will be gone from the active inventory by the end of fiscal year 1997. Its current replacement, the F/A-18, can carry less than half of the A-6’s payload of some types of mines.
► Both the Permit (SSN-594) and Sturgeon (SSN-637) classes of nuclear attack submarines are being retired. Los Angeles (SSN-688)-class submarines will be retired ahead of schedule, reducing the attack submarine fleet to between 45 and 55 ships by the end of the century.
(Only the later Los Angeles- class units can carry mines.) ► The Bottom-Up Review limited the total number of Air Force bombers to 184. Air Force budget cuts may further reduce the operational inventory of mine-capable bombers to 100 or fewer. Only the B-52 is currently certified in a minelaying role.
Mine research and development programs need the same consistent focus of effort found in other warfare areas—and at least coequal to the attention mine countermeasures gets, if only periodically.
History is replete with examples of mining’s cyclic but influential role in naval warfare. The benefits of a vigorous mining capability go beyond the ability just to sink ships. Mines present a threat to a much broader range of targets than any other type of naval weapon and can affect maritime operations across the full range of conflict. The psychological threat of a mine is often all that is needed. The North
Focus^ almost exclusively on m,ne countermeasures, the U.S. Navy is allowing its minin capabilities to dwindle. Little funding, no ongoing mine development programs, and a potential shortage of mine-delivery platforms-this S-3A Viking is armed with a Mk 52 mine—may cripple any future mining campaign before it begins.
mine barrage of 1918 and Oper- at'on Starvation, the mining of the Japanese home islands in 1945, are last two examples of how the large- scale use of mines can constrain an enemy’s operational choices and Weaken him.
An offensive mining campaign , c_an be used by itself or in conjunc- hon with other actions as a strategic [ °ption for national decision makers.
■ Offensive mining was conducted along the coast and in the harbors of North Vietnam—rather than a naval blockade—to pressure the Hanoi I regime to negotiate an end to the war in Vietnam. The decision was 1 based, in part, on the recognition of lbe high leverage but low confronta- tlonal risk the action would have.1
The Iraqi Navy’s use of mines ; during the Gulf War s a case in Point. There was never a question of ‘he Iraqi Navy mounting a credible ‘hreat against U.S. Navy battle I forces in the Persian Gulf. Yet, by I c°nducting a well-planned—although poorly executed—mining op- cation, the Iraqis successfully leveraged their mine capability into a strategic advantage. Not only did they effectively protect their seacard flank from planned amphibi- °us assaults, they also won a public relations victory of sorts by damag- *ng two U.S. Navy combatants.2
To a much lesser degree, the U.S. Navy also used offensive mining during the war, hoping to isolate Iraqi naval vessels—predominantly fast patrol craft—from their bases in Iraq and to prevent others from leaving. A single mining mission was conducted at the mouth of the Khawr Az-Zubayr River, a choke- Point through which most of the Iraqi Navy would have to pass on its way to the Gulf. The strike involved a total of 18 carrier aircraft, with four A-6Es laying 42 Mk 36 Urines (six others failed to release from an aircraft) at the cost of one A-6E.3 Although none of the Iraqi naval vessels destroyed or damaged during the war could be directly credited to U.S. mines, the U.S. mining effort may have complemented the destruction of the Iraqi Navy by carrier aircraft and helicopters from surface combatants. Offensive mining was not critical to the Navy’s success in Operation
Desert Storm, but this may not be the case in the future.
Reduction in numbers of ships, aircraft, and submarines, regardless of their individual capabilities, means that the fleet will be stretched by the requirements of fighting two nearly simultaneous major conflicts. A new approach to establishing bat- tlespace dominance may be needed, and a modern mining capability can provide part of the solution. Mines not only interfere with naval operations, they also constrain the movements of an enemy’s merchant shipping and influence his allies’ calculation of risk.
The characteristics of an effective mining campaign will differ from situation to situation. In each case, military and political constraints will determine which delivery platforms are used, suggesting that the Navy needs to maintain a multifaceted mine-delivery capability. Aircraft organic to naval expeditionary forces cannot be relied upon as the only means of establishing battle- space dominance in every conflict. During the Gulf War, numerous airfields were available in-theater, but that may not be the case in future operations, meaning that carrier- based aircraft may be required to support all of the missions that land- based aircraft conducted during Desert Storm. This could jeopardize our ability to carry out traditional missions such as antisurface warfare. Mining, if effectively integrated into an overall antisurface warfare plan, will allow strike aircraft to concentrate on projecting power ashore.
Beyond consciously integrating existing mining assets into their operational plans, expeditionary warfare planners should press for the development of improved mines and mine-delivery systems. The current U.S. mine inventory may appear adequate, but close analysis proves otherwise and points to where nearterm mine development and funding should be directed.4 The operational limitations of our current inventory and the new emphasis on littoral regions of the world require procurement of the newest models of target detection devices (TDDs, the mine’s firing mechanisms) and development of a new generation of mines.
Specifically:
► Acquisition of the programmable Mk 71 TDD. The Quickstrike and older Destructor series of mines are adaptations of the plentiful Mk 80 series of aircraft bombs. Current target detection devices limit the Navy’s ability to engage the full range of targets anticipated in future conflicts. Designed to counter a much broader range of targets than current TDDs, the Mk 71 TDD would enhance the Quickstrike mine family’s flexibility in expeditionary operations.
► Addressing the mining void in the medium-depth range. The Mk 56 moored antisubmarine warfare mine is nearing obsolescence. Designed in the late 1950s to counter high-speed, deep-diving submarines and, to a lesser extent, surface combatants, the Mk 56’s capability against today’s quiet diesel-electric submarine threat is limited. Large numbers of Mk 56s would be required to establish effective mine fields. Still, it is the only medium-depth antisubmarine mine currently in the U.S. inventory. Deep-water approaches to expeditionary operating areas could be controlled by using an upgraded Mk 60 Captor (encapsulated torpedo) mine. Like the Mk 56, the Mk 60 was designed to counter earlier generations of Soviet nuclear submarines.
► A follow-on to the Mk 67 submarine-launched mobile mine (SLMM). The 1950s technology of the Mk 67 SLMM—the U.S. Navy’s only shallow-water bottom mine capable of being planted covertly by submarines—is rapidly approaching obsolescence. Essentially a modified Mk 37 torpedo with a TDD, it can be carried in limited numbers on board nuclear-powered attack submarines, but its loadout directly affects that of other tube-fired weapons. A Mk 67 follow-on, using readily available technology, would have greater range, increased accuracy, and be more maneuverable than its predecessor.
Along with the upgrading of its mine inventory, the Navy also needs to develop methods of efficiently delivering modem mines in large numbers. Because mine field effectiveness can be magnified through timely and accurate placement, plan-
ners need to identify mine platforms capable of precisely delivering large numbers of mines. Today the only high volume mine-delivery platform in our inventory is the Air Force’s B-52H bomber. As the Air Force downsizes, the B-52 force will get smaller. Moreover, dependence on another service to deliver naval mines may be perilous, at best.5
Drawing on U.S. experience developing mines from the Mk 80 series of aircraft bombs, new systems for air and surface forces should continue to be compatible. Similar considerations should be made in the design of future submarine- launched mine-delivery systems. Submarine mine-delivery systems cannot impact normal weapons load- outs or submarine performance characteristics. Jettisonable systems, similar to the mine “saddles” used by European submarine forces, may be one attractive option.
Both existing and future Navy platforms must emphasize the mine- delivery mission. Given the reduced emphasis on the open-ocean antisubmarine warfare mission, mining capabilities of P-3C and S-3B air
craft must be emphasized. The submarine force is giving mine countermeasures high priority in the new attack submarine, but little is mentioned of a mine-delivery capability.6 Future advanced-technology surface combatants, using low-observable and twin-hull technologies could provide a surface mine-delivery platform with significantly reduced vulnerability to detection in littoral waters. The Cyclone (PC-1)- class high-speed, shallow-water operating profile also may be amenable to the mine-delivery mission, especially in the context of “lesser” regional conflicts.
A reduced naval force structure and a naval doctrine that emphasizes littoral operations should provide the impetus for the Navy to invest in the high-leverage payoff that only these “weapons that wait” can offer. The investment must be balanced, equally supporting integration of naval mining into overall doctrine and continued investment into research and development of naval mines and mine-delivery systems. The U.S. Navy, faced with these realities, must renew its investment in
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naval mining—or continue to be a I second-class mine warfare force.
'Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little Brown & Company, 1979), p. 1179.
’Iraqi mines ranged from the most modern bottom influence mines available to crudely manufactured indigenous variants of traditional moored contact mines that could be laid by any type of surface vessel and by most aircraft, including helicopters. Ultimately- Coalition forces in the northern Persian Gulf cleared about 1,300 mines, 1,167 of which Iraq admitted to having laid. Several mines were probably left over from the Iran-Iraq War.
’Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, April 1992, pp. 193-194.
*U.S. Navy Mine Warfare Plan, 1994 ed., pp. 3, 66-72- 5Adm. Chester Nimitz learned this lesson in 1944-45- when his persistent plea for Army Air Force B-29s to conduct mining of Japanese home waters finally succeeded in December 1944 when General H. H- Arnold authorized General Curtis LeMay’s 21st Bomber Command to commence mining operations ia late March 1945—three months later than the date desired by the Navy. Nimitz’s success came about only after LeMay became commander of me 21st Bomber Command and supported Nimitz’s plan. John S- Chilstrom, “A Test for Joint Ops: USAAF Bombing Doctrine and the Aerial Minelaying Mission,” Power History, Spring 1993, pp. 35-43.
6“U.S. Navy Promotes Subs in Mine Warfare Role,’ Defense News, 11-17 April 1994, pp. 3, 26.
Mr. Keller is an analyst with the Center for Security Strategies and Operations, TECH- MATICS, Inc. A career naval officer, he held a variety of ship and staff assignments. He is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy and the Naval Postgraduate School.