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The Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missile is the U.S. Navy’s big stick—able to deliver a precise blow to the enemy with no risk to crews.
Ours is a profession of arms. We aim either to win or to deter war with weapons. Throughout history, weapons have changed—sometimes significantly enough to revolutionize the ways we have fought. To continue to serve our vocation, we need to recognize trends and respond to transitions emerging from the conflict with Iraq. One of the most important and dramatic U.S. weapons employed during the Gulf War was the Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missile, which returned to prominence in 1993 through stunning strikes against heavily defended, strategic targets. An analysis of the combat lessons learned, misconstrued, or overlooked illustrates changing concepts with regard to sea-launched cruise missiles, and reveals a trend in weaponry during an epochal change in U.S. defense affairs.
Prior to Desert Storm, many critics expressed doubts about conventional land-attack missiles, questioning both capabilities and cost-effectiveness. These issues were underscored by anxiety over arms-control complications.1 There was an understandable reluctance by the planners to depend on this new weapon—untested in war and understood by few of them.2 In addition, manned warplane advocates had their weapons of choice and, therefore, were hesitant to use cruise missiles.
The sea launches of Tomahawks in January 1991— which initiated Desert Storm—discredited the doubters and tultilled the promises of cruise missile proponents. Only Tomahawks and F-l 17s with laser-guided bombs were stealthy enough to attack the heavily defended, vital targets in Baghdad, which was considered to have air defenses more formidable than those of any Eastern European target at the height of the Cold War, and seven times as dense as Hanoi’s during the full-scale U.S. air offensive (Linebacker) in 1972.5 The F- 117s and Tomahawks were used together in quick, direct, effective blows at the enemy’s vitals from the outset of the war: the F-l 17s
at night in good weather and the Tomahawks during both day and night in both fair and foul weather. Both proved highly survivabie.4 As for the stealth aircraft, it should be noted that they could be spotted easily in daytime and were thus best for night attacks in the absence of moonlight.
The following was an example of Tomahawk’s foul- weather advantage. Iraqis prepared a remotely controlled MiG-21 airplane for a chemical-warfare attack on the coalition forces. The MiG was in a hangar at the Rasheed air- I field on the southeastern outskirts of Baghdad. Six Tomahawk missiles were aimed at the hangar after three days of bad weather precluded attacks by airplanes, including F-117A stealth fighters. The Tomahawks scored five hits on the hangar, and it was destroyed.5
The combined efforts of these weapons decided the military engagement within the first ten minutes of the war. All electrical power, telephones, television, and radio were shut down that first night. The lights went out in Baghdad and did not come on again until well after the ceasefire. Within the first hour of action, the potent Iraqi integrated air-defense network collapsed, and with that, the Coalition air forces gained air superiority and the promise of victory with low loss of life. Two-thirds of the weapons aimed at Baghdad during the first day of operations were Tomahawks. In all, 282 Tomahawks were launched successfully in Desert Storm, most in the first critical days.”
After the Gulf War, the Navy reported that Tomahawks “. . .hit their targets with pin-point accuracy, contributing to the early neutralization of Iraqi air defenses and reducing the risks for American [and Coalition] aircrews.’’7 This emphasis on Tomahawks’ role in suppressing enemy air defenses was echoed in other writings, which noted that Tomahawks could reduce aircraft attrition, leaving enough manned aircraft to destroy the primary targets.8 This concept, however, is incomplete, because it overlooks the strategic value of Tomahawk.
The House Armed Services Committee, chaired by Les Aspin, concluded that in broad terms, air power was the decisive factor in the Gulf War victory. The committee then listed two key features responsible for that victory: U.S. weapons accuracy and aircraft survivability. Precise weapon delivery was demonstrated by the destruction of approximately 50 military targets in Baghdad without sig-
nificantly harming the other 500,000 buildings and structures in the city.9 Advanced electronics, precision guidance, and stealth technology were responsible for this success rate, and two weapon systems combined these characteristics effectively—the Tomahawk and the F- 117 stealth fighter-bomber.10
Since the war, Air Force and naval aviators have extolled the accomplishments of tactical aviation in an effort to grab a larger portion of the declining defense budget. In that quest, both the Air Force and Navy have used the F-l 17’s record to justify stealthy, deep-strike airplanes, such as the B-2 bomber and the A-12 and AX attack aircraft. At the same time, they largely have ignored or undervalued the role of Tomahawk. In spite of this, B-2 production was curtailed drastically, and the A-12 and AX programs were canceled, primarily because of cost. Meanwhile, those who sug
Criticisms that treat the Tomahawk as a “relatively small payload” and analyze it as if it dropped only a 1,000-pound bomb impart three specious images:11
► Tomahawk is not a single-missile type like HARM but a family with different warheads. There have been at least eight Tomahawk variants produced: four attack land targets with non-nuclear warheads, including two with unitary warheads; one with submunitions; and one that releases carbon-fiber spools, effectively disabling the Iraqi electrical system.12
► The unitary-warhead version used essentially delivered about 2,600 pounds of ordnance on target—not 1,000 pounds. The effect of a 2,000-pound accurate, general-
purpose bomb can be attained by doubling the high-explosive content but at the expense of some target-penetration capability.
► The Tomahawk launch platforms are ships and submarines. The comparison, therefore, should not be between
Tomahawk cruise missiles are launched from ships or submarines and fly low at high speeds along paths preprogrammed into on-board computers. The missile uses terrain to mask itself from radar detection. During Desert Storm Tomahawks flew to their targets—including the Iraqi Samarra Chemical Weapons Facility outside Baghdad, shown at right obliterated by a precision strike during’the first days of Desert Storm—using navigation updates from a terrain contour matching system. An improved version of the missile is capable of receiving guidance cues and final course adjustments from orbiting satellites.
gested cruise missiles as substitutes for manned aircraft were bombarded with criticisms: some valid; many erroneous; most aimed at Tomahawk.
The Tomahawks used against Iraq in 1991—and again in 1993—had limitations that have since been identified for correction. These modifications include shortening mission-preparation time to improve responsiveness and flexibility, and upgrading the Tomahawk family (Block III) with global positioning system (GPS) capability to improve flight-route flexibility. The accuracy of GPS will be sufficient for many targets—meaning that Tomahawks now can be launched with minimum planning time. Range also has been increased to about 1,000 nautical miles. But since Block III engineering began years before the Gulf War, even better versions are needed in response to combat experience. Congress appropriated funds in 1993 to develop another member of the Tomahawk family, with second-to-none accuracy, hard-target capability, and inflight target selection and damage assessment.
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bombs and Tomahawks but between bombers and cruisers, which can carry up to 122 Tomahawks. A carrier battle group could include six or more cruisers and destroyers with a nominal load of 300 to more than 600 Tomahawks.
After combat success—and mindful of the approved correction of shortcomings in development—Tomahawk detractors are left only with one major objection: cost. The concept that Tomahawks are an expensive alternative to bombs is widespread among defense “experts” and the media, who state that the cost of a Tomahawk strike would buy a lot of bombs, approximately ten times as many laser-guided bombs as the number of Tomahawks expended.13 They are correct. Conventional air power employing reusable delivery systems and bombs is considerably cheaper than Tomahawks. But these delivery systems are also very expensive.
Aircraft currently in the inventory cost around $50 million, stealth fighter-attack planes cost more than $100 million, and the B-2 bomber costs about one billion dollars.14 The loss of one such aircraft would cost at least as much, possibly many times more than an entire Tomahawk strike. In addition, other costs are involved with conventional air power; it is neither a small nor inexpensive undertaking to launch F-l 17s on a conventional air strike. Airplanes require additional support—e.g., aerial refueling, airborne early warning and control, and often electronic countermeasures and suppression of enemy air defenses. Such an armada involves a considerable investment
as well as substantial operating costs. Therefore, while the Monetary balance sheet may favor manned aircraft so long 1 as there are no aircraft losses, the loss of even one aircraft—be it to enemy action or mechanical causes—tips 'he cost scale in favor of Tomahawks. Finally, such a loss would have severe repercussions stemming from the heath or capture of the crew.
By early 1992, Tomahawk was seen as a supporting Weapon to make the way safer for warplanes, not as a heep-strike weapon. Respected experts said that the Weapon had little value in a conventional war and sug- 8ested that emphasis be given to stealth attack planes, which, with precision-guided munitions, would be more cost-effective and accurate.13 * 15 Some questioned Tomahawk’s survivability and reliability even after combat- demonstrated success.'6
Two years after the Gulf War, Tomahawks proved themSelves in a punitive air strike in the same locale. While 'he U.S. government was changing from Republican to democratic administrations, Iraq failed to comply with d-N. resolutions. As Inauguration Day 1993 approached, 'hese provocations grew with a number of incidents betWeen Coalition and Iraqi aircraft.
General Colin Powell presented to President Bush a Plan for a two-day air and cruise missile attack against Ifaq. Mr. Bush chose part of the plan: warplane strikes on
13 January 1993 against eight radar and missile sites in
southern Iraq.17 The air attacks achieved marginal success,
hitting only 16 of 33 aiming points. These disappointing
results again revealed the limitation of aircraft forced to
operate above 10,000 feet to avoid ground fire, when cloud
cover can prevent the use of laser-guided weapons. The
air strike did not change Saddam Hussein’s restrictions on
the U.N. inspection team. In reaction, President Bush ordered a Tomahawk cruise-missile attack on the Zaa- faraniyah nuclear-fabrication facility, a high-value and highly symbolic target near Baghdad.
On 17 January, the U.S. Navy launched 45 Tomahawks from four U.S. ships in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf. Unlike the experience during the Gult War, U.S. reconnaissance and ground surveys gave an unambiguous battle damage assessment. All seven targeted buildings were hit, with four destroyed, two severely damaged, and one moderately damaged. The record of 37 hits out of 45 missiles confirmed the weapon’s Gulf War record.
The Tomahawk attack would have been regarded as a resounding success except for the 45th missile, which, apparently hit by Iraqi antiaircraft fire, crashed into the A1 Rasheed Hotel and killed two civilians. Two points need to be made about this incident:
► The warhead did not explode. Damage and death were caused by the kinetic energy of the missile and the explosion and fire from its residual fuel, which emphasizes that the total warhead effect should be considered.
> The missiles were exposed to ground defenses, because they flew along the same routes over Baghdad as in the Gulf War, which highlights the need for the additional navigational flexibility provided by GPS.18 In any case, both U.N. and U.S. leaders achieved their desired goal
when the Iraqis agreed to permit U.N. inspection without interference.19
Allegations of an Iraqi assassination attempt against former President Bush challenged the new U.S. Administration and led to a second punitive Tomahawk strike in June 1993, this time against an intelligence headquarters in Baghdad. Tomahawks were picked again for their effectiveness while posing no risk to Americans. There was, however, a significant difference between the January and June attacks: No U.S. carriers were near the launch scene, because of a new strategy of interrupting aircraft carrier coverage in areas of tension—forcing decision makers to rely on cruise missiles. Accordingly, “Where are the Tomahawk ships?” has been added to the lexicon of crisis management.
One ship in the Persian Gulf and another in the Red Sea launched 23 Tomahawk (Block 11 without GPS) missiles, 16 of which hit their targets. Three missiles impacted in a residential area outside their targeted compound, killing nine civilians and wounding 12 others. This 70% success rate was somewhat lower than the 82% achieved in January, but the target was hit accurately with limited collateral damage.20
The two 1993 Tomahawk attacks reveal that minimizing risk to U.S. lives is the real issue. The foremost concern of the decision makers was to be sure Saddam Hussein had no American captives or bodies to display on Cable News Network television. Therefore, destroying an important facility without risk to aircrews made U.S. capabilities clear. The Tomahawk is not only a potent military weapon, it is one that can be used with fewer restraints—with no risk to crews and minimal risk to nearby civilians—than conventional air strikes. Toma-
hawks have increased the deterrent value of the U.S. military, because they are much more likely to be used.
The Iraqi strikes revealed that the weapon works as advertised. More important, the Battle of Baghdad demonstrated that the Tomahawk is much more than a defense-suppression weapon. It can deliver a precise blow to the enemy under the most adverse circumstances, through extensive defenses, with little risk to nearby civilians and no risk to the attacker. This is the promise that air power advocates have made repeatedly from the beginning of the century but never have been able to produce. To paraphrase Billy Mitchell, the Tomahawk can go straight to
and destroy the enemy’s vital centers.21 In brief,
Tomahawk is an example of a new style of information-dependent weapons that advanced (third wave) nations will increasingly employ.22
The 1993 strikes also indicate that the Tomahawk can substitute adequately for manned conventional or stealth aircraft. In marked contrast to the earlier actions against Lebanon in 1983 and Libya in 1986,
Tomahawk launches do not require cooperation from other nations.
The United States has many platforms capable of launching distant and accurate Tomahawk strikes, from both submarines and surface ships. This year, there are 3,790 vertical- launch missile cells in the
surface fleet, with 6,764 potential Tomahawk missile launchers by the year 2000.23 Submarines are the most stealthy and permit the greatest opportunity for surprise but are limited in the number of Tomahawks they carry- 12 with vertical-launch systems and 12 to 20 more for torpedo-tube launch. Surface ships offer other advantages aside from the capacity to carry large numbers of Tomahawks and will continue to serve as forward-presence
damage.25 Because of its success and the cost of new airframe development, the Tomahawk family of missiles will be with the fleet for the foreseeable future. Increasing efforts have started to improve guidance accuracy and reliability still further for a Block IV Tomahawk. Nonetheless, the full significance of Tomahawks has yet to be realized; its potential has been only partially fulfilled. For example, a Tomahawk variant could be developed to carry Sensor Fuzed Weapons (SFW)—now in production—10 help halt an invading armored force.26 Thirty Tomahawks can provide the SFW lethality of one B-2. The role of Tomahawks with SFW would be to put the first ordnance on armored vehicles
On the production line, a Tomahawk’s tail section is prepared for mounting to the cruise missile aft body.
forces.
In addition, Tomahawks constitute a key part of carrier battle group air power. Airplanes will no longer be the first to attack defended targets. Future air operations could combine conventional Tomahawks launched from submarines and ships, joined with standoff weapons launched from airplanes as part of an integrated strike capability. In a strategic sense, naval aviation and these ships at sea will provide decision-makers with the capability to stand off—without endangering U.S. aircrews—and conduct precision strikes against hundreds of targets.24
The Department of Defense’s concern over civilian casualties has pushed missile and doctrine improvement to new standards, to ensure accuracy with minimal collateral
during the early critical hours of an invasion, before weapons launched from bombers reach the enemy^ If defenses were intense, however, or daylight attacks became necessary, more Tomahawks with SFW would be appropriate, with their effective low-altitude delivery. In contrast, airplane attrition could be too great. New thinking and effort will be required for the development of doctrine, tactics, and joint exercises- In his acclaimed history, The United States Navy, Captain Edward Beach concluded, “There is a psychology in the affairs of men that wants always to preserve things in the mold to which they have become accustomed—which is why some men resist innovation even though they themselves may boast of their participation in earlier changes.”27 Are we grabbing or suppressing the change? We can save much time and money by recognizing the inevitable. Have we responded to transitions as manifested in the conflict with Iraq?
The changes resulting from the Tomahawk missile’s combat experience include the following broad implications:
► Complex, stand-off weapons can work dependably whether launched from air or sea. Conflict vindicated the investment in high-technology weapons programs.
► Tomahawk’s accomplishments also showed that lower cost, non-stealth aircraft could successfully attack air defenses with stand-off missiles—a fact overlooked by most critics.
► The inadequacy of Desert Storm air-launched weapons for all-weather, day-and-night strikes was embarrassingly evident.
>■ Desert Storm revealed the need for a spectrum of Tomahawk payloads including hard-target killers and invasion- halting sub-munitions.
>• Weapons effectiveness analysis and planning must be
unproved to reduce the number of precision-guided • Weapons per target and, therefore, cost.
1 ^ The trend toward precision-guided, stand-off capability requires radical thinking about doctrine, tactics, and logistics.
Nevertheless, the trend to stand-off weapons has been absent from hot spots such as Bosnia—not because of a dearth of technology, but our failure to see the trend. New challenges can be met if we put our money and our minds toward the task. The Gulf War Air Power Survey concluded, “The ingredients for a transformation of war oiay well have become visible in the Gulf War, but if a fevolution is to occur, someone will have to make it.”29
Richard K. Betts, Cruise Missiles: Technology, Strategy, Politics (Washington, The Brookings Institution, 1981), pp. 533-40; Christopher Duquette, “Ban the sLCM” (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 1990), p. 34.
Aspin and William Dickinson, Defense for a New Era: Lessons of the Per- sJan Gulf War (Washington, DC, 30 March 1992), p. 19.
U-S. Department of the Air Force, Reaching Globally, Reaching Powerfully: The United States Air Force in the Gulf War (Washington, DC, September 1991), P- 5.
Borman Friedman, Desert Victory: The War for Kuwait, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1991), p. 339. The survivability rate was 98% to 99%.
Tomahawks Destroyed Chemical-carrying Unmanned Iraqi MiG-21,” Aerospace Uaily, 16 September 1991, p. 424, quoting Captain Lyle G. Bien, U.S. Navy, at lhe September 1991 Tailhook Association convention. Bien was a member of the Coalition staff during the conflict.
No single reference noted that most weapons launched at Baghdad were Tomahawks. Seven B-52s launched 35 conventional air-launched cruise missiles at eight high-value targets in northern Iraq but none in Baghdad. These missiles had Ter- C°m and GPS but no DSMAC so were not as accurate as Tomahawks or LGBs. hi-S. Department of the Air Force, Reaching Globally, Reaching Powerfully: The United States Air Force in the Gulf War (Washington, DC, September 1991), pp. ^2-23; U.S. Air Force fact sheet, “F-l 17s and Electronic Combat Support During lhe Gulf War,” Fax date 20 November 1991; Michael Rip, “How NavStar Became Indispensable,” Air Force Magazine, November 1993, p. 48; U.S. Air Force News Release #90*001, 16 January 1992; U.S. Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: Final Report to Congress, called the “Title V Report” (Washington, DC, April 1992), pp. 157, T-201; Thomas A. Keaney, Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf ^or Air Power Survey [GWAPS], Summary Report (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), pp. 117-19, 224-25; James Winnefeld, et al, A League of Airmen (Santa Monica: RAND, 1994), p. 122. The authors state that 85% of Baghdad’s electrical power was cut by the end of the third day.
U.S. Department of Navy, The United States Navy in Desert Shield/Desert Storm (Washington, DC, 15 May 1991), pp. vi, 47.
"For example, Steve Froggett, ‘Tomahawk in the Desert,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1992, p. 72; William J. Luti, “Voices From the Central Blue,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, December 1992, p. 37.
Charles E. Myers, Jr., “Time to Fold’em,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, July 1991, p. 39. He saw a larger role for Tomahawk.
"Les Aspin and William Dickinson, Defense for a New Era: Lessons of the Persian Gulf War, pp. vii, 17-19.
"Ashton Carter, William Perry, and John Steinbruner, A New Concept Cooperate Security (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute, 1992), p. 29.
‘'David Ochmanek and John Bordeaux, “The Lion’s Share of Power Projection,”
Air Force, June 1993, p. 39; Time Books Staff, Desert Storm (New York: Time Warner Publishing, 1991), p. 169; Richard Hallion, Storm Over Iraq (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992), p. 250; Thomas A. Keaney, Eliot A. Cohen, GWAPS, Vol. IV, pp. 77, 249.
13David Fulghum, “Secret Carbon-Fiber Warheads Blinded Iraqi Air Defenses,” Aviation Week, 27 April 1992, p. 18; Norman Polmar, “Going Downtown the Safe Way,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, August 1992, p. 105.
I4U.S. Department of Defense, Procurement Programs (P-1), Department of Defense Budget for Fiscal Year 1994, p. N-ll.
15General Robert Russ quoted in Defense News, 8 February 1993, p. 6. l6William Perry quoted in Aerospace Daily, 3 February 1992.
'Time Books Staff, Desert Storm, p. 169.
'"Rowan Scarborough, “Bush rejected advice for wider Iraq strike,” Washington Times, 21 January 1993, p. A-l.
‘‘'David Fulghum, “Pentagon Criticizes Air Strike on Iraq” and “Clashes with Iraq Continue after Week of Heavy Air Strikes,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, 25 January 1993, pp. 38, 47; Michael Gordon, “Targets in the South,” New York Times, 19 January 1993, pp. 1, 8; Eric Schmitt, “Path of U.S. Missiles Brings Debate About Their Ability,” New York Times, 19 January 1993, p. 8.
20R. Jeffrey Smith and Nora Boustany, “U.S. Jets Interrupt Cease-Fire in Iraq,” Washington Post, 22 January 1993, p. A-27.
2lDavid Fulghum, “Low Tomahawk Kill Rate Under Study,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, 5 July 1993, pp. 25-26; Norman Kempster and Melissa Healy, “Strike A Success,” Los Angeles Times, 28 June 1993, p. A-l; John Lancaster and Barton Gellman, “U.S. Calls Baghdad Raid a Qualified Success,” Washington Post, 28 June 1993, p. A-l.
"William Mitchell, Skyways: A Book on Modern Aeronautics (Philadelphia: Lip- pincott, 1930), p. 255.
23Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1993), p. 114.
:jReported by U.S. Navy Staff (N865F), 1 August 1994.
25Vice Admiral William A. Owens, interviewed by Vincent C. Thomas, Jr., Sea Power, March 1993.
2h“Slatkin Requests Cost Assessment of Increases to TLAM Accuracy,” Inside the Navy, 25 October 1993, p. 3.
27U.S. Department of Defense Briefing, “Fighting and Winning Future Major Regional Conflicts” (Washington, DC: Under Secretary of Defense [Policy], Strategy, Requirements, and Resources, May 1993); Christopher Bowie, et al., The New Calculus (Santa Monica, RAND, 1993), pp. 51-62.
2*Edward L. Beach, The United States Navy: 200 Years (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1986), p. 488.
2Thomas A. Keaney, Eliot A. Cohen, GWAPS, Summary Report, p. 251.
Admiral Locke worked on early Harpoon development, led the Tomahawk program for a decade, and directed the Joint Cruise Missiles Project before retiring in 1982. He is writing a history and analysis of modern U.S. sea-, air-, and ground-launched cruise missiles that will be published by the Naval Institute Press.
Mr. Werrell is a Professor of History at Radford with degrees from the U.S. Air Force Academy and Duke University. Besides teaching and lecturing at a number of Air Force, Army, and Canadian military schools, he has published numerous articles on strategic bombing in World War II and Vietnam that have appeared in both academic and military journals. He has authored four books, one of which is the Evolution of the Cruise Missile, and just completed a manuscript on the bombing of Japan during World War II.