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The breakup of the Soviet Union and the end of the 45-year Cold War, the realities of the defense budget, rapidly advancing technologies, and the Navy and Marine Corps’ efforts to develop a strategy and doctrine to deal with the contemporary world all demand a new look at the way the Navy designs and acquires its surface warships. . . From the Sea,” Force 2001, and the Bottom-Up Review spell out clearly the requirements for the future Navy: lean and mean.
The “new direction” of the naval service calls for joint and expeditionary operations in the littoral regions of the World. The surface warfare community faces new challenges, because our ships will be operating closer to future enemies in complex and crowded conflict environments—and will be operating much more closely with the other services and the military forces of our allies and coalition partners. Our established concepts of operations also are being challenged by new weapons entering the fleet—especially the Tomahawk land-attack cruise missile and the upgraded Standard Missile (SM-2) for theater ballistic missile defense.
Under such circumstances, “business as usual” will doom any Navy undertaking. Only by innovative approaches and actions—taking into account the myriad institutional, operational, financial, and ecological factors that affect every program—and by strong leadership will the Navy succeed in preserving a fleet capable of operating in the dangerous world of the 21st century.
Based on the Aegis program’s heritage of engineering and acquisition excellence; guided by the philosophy of “build a little, test a little, and learn a lot”; and in consonance with the fundamental objective to produce and maintain war-ready ships for the U.S. Navy, today’s surface- warfare efforts for the future fleet fall into three areas: process, advanced technology, and ecumenical outreach.
Process
Surface-warfare proponents have established and seek to preserve a “total ship” approach in the design and acquisition of the Navy’s surface warships. This approach took shape well before the Ticonderoga (CG-47) joined the fleet in 1983. It has continued through three baseline Upgrades of Aegis cruisers, and it shapes the Navy’s program for the Arleigh Burke (DDG-51)-class destroyers. It has proved to be innovative and successful, and it will continue to mold the Navy’s ongoing efforts to define the requirements and technology road map for the design and acquisition of future surface warships.
Perhaps the single most important function of a modern military acquisition program is to ensure that the system for which it is responsible is properly designed and acquired in the most efficient manner possible. Successful program management therefore requires strong design authority, which has become highly important because today’s complex systems require extensive optimization to achieve the required high levels of performance. Optimization is the heart of modem combat system design, and the process by which it is obtained— skilled systems engineering—is critical to ensuring a successful design. Only a truly integrated program can follow each successive iteration of the optimization process in detail adequate to guarantee that design decisions will remain consistent.
In the Navy’s ship-design community, the traditional process acknowledged weapons and sensors largely as pieces of equipment to be carried that had to be accommodated in terms of space, weight, power, and the like. Usually, the combat system elements were designed separately from the ship and often from one another. The ship typically was designed by committee, with a wide variety of Navy organizations participating. The committee process determined key attributes, selected a suitable weapons suite, established the arrangement of the ship, and determined the hull, mechanical, and electrical (HM&E) characteristics. Once the overall design was complete, the various committee members went on to other things, leaving production and acquisition to others.
Meanwhile, other organizations in the Navy’s technical establishment were producing or acquiring the weapons and sensors, also selected by committee. These were delivered to the shipbuilder as individual pieces of equipment, which the yard installed by following the Navy’s plans and specifications.
This process worked reasonably well so long as hull performance—speed, endurance, and passive survivability—remained the significant combat variable and shipboard weaponry remained comparatively simple and laborintensive. Following World War II, however, the significant increase in expected air threats—especially advanced aircraft-delivered weapons and cruise missiles— diminished the importance of hull performance: the fastest and most maneuverable surface ship became little more than a stationary target for supersonic aircraft and guided weapons. Survival and success in combat came to depend instead on the precise coordination of increasingly auto
mated sensors and weapon systems.
Throughout the 1960s, the Navy experimented with sev- §' eral approaches to ship and combat system design and ac- ' 31 quisition, but the deep systemic deficiencies that stemmed te from fragmented design responsibilities never were re- Cl solved. They persisted into the early 1970s, culminating ® in the nuclear cruiser California (CGN-36) entering the fleet with her air-defense system largely inoperable.
By the 1970s, the manipulation and flow of digital data j a had become the lifeblood of all advanced combat systems, d Established in 1969, the Aegis program centered on a multifunction radar and was responsible for the air-defense ■ 1 subsystems internal to the ship. Although the Aegis pro- e gram did not receive authority or responsibility for de- j 1 veloping a new missile or launcher, it became far more ! £ involved than its predecessors in designing the overall ar- j s chitecture of the various data pro- ! cessing and display systems. Asa I 1 means to ensure a coherent design ' process, the Navy in 1974 made the Aegis Program Office responsible for developing the . ship’s combat system. This unprecedented decision was a logi- i cal response to the growing complexity of combat-systems integration and the rapidly evolving threats. In 1977, the Navy created . the Aegis Shipbuilding Project j to have responsibility and authority for the introduction of the Ticonderoga-class Aegis cruisers | and later the Arleigh Burke-class Aegis destroyers.
Following the 1991 Major Warship Review, the Navy undertook an assessment of the minimum i war-fighting requirements for fu- I ture combatants in regional conflicts. The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (ACNO) for Surface Warfare in October 1991 directed the Destroyer Variant (DDV) Study to address these needs within the context of a rapidly changing international political-military environment and tightening domestic fiscal constraints. The result of this effort was the definition of the Flight IIA Arleigh Burke destroyer, whose funds first were approved in fiscal year 1994. The Flight IIA design will incorporate littoral-warfare capabilities that are particularly well-suited to the new direction of the Navy and Marine Corps.
More important, however, is that the integrated systems ' engineering process was carried forward in the DDV Study. An integrated team of Navy uniformed and civilian personnel from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, systems commands, laboratories, and the fleet have worked closely with industry in a “total ship” study to determine the characteristics of the Flight IIA Arleigh Burkes.
This process continues to influence surface warfare’s efforts to define the future fleet. In April 1992, the ACNO
I1 ragmented design responsibilities persisted in Navy warship design throughout the 1960s and 1970s culminating in the California (CGN-36) entering the fleet in the early 1970s with her air-defense system largely inoperable. An integrated, “total ship” approach to design and acquisition helps alleviate such missteps.
f°r Surface Warfare in essence reconvened the DDV Study 8r°up as the 21st Century Destroyer Study (DD-21), with an expanded charter to examine particularly promising technologies that should mature around the turn of the century, and to determine the feasibility of incorporating those technologies into a “robust hull.’’ The sole products °f the effort were to be a “destroyer-technology road map” highlighting the optimum phasing of new technologies and a mission needs statement for the new warship.
It was clear that a study of this scope required the broadest participation possible from the Navy’s technical and op- national communities. To ensure that the DD-21 Study group had the most accurate
and integrated data and information from the material establishment, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition directed the Aegis Program to act as the technical and acquisition point of contact. The ACNO for Surface Warfare created a flag/se- n>or executive service-level steering board to guide these efforts, recognizing that success depended upon broad support from the materiel community.
Ultimately renamed the 21st Century Surface Combatant (SC-21) Study, this project involved more than 100 People from the operating forces, OpNav and systems commands, and Navy and Defense Department laboratories, With significant input from the U.S. shipbuilding, weapons, and electronics industries. In its Technology Road Map, SC-21 identified more than 40 advanced-technology demonstrations that hold promise for the SC-21 design. The mission needs statement laid out the top-level requirements for a warship to begin construction around 2003, with a fleet introduction planned for about 2010.
The Aegis program has built upon the efforts of both the DDV and SC-21 studies in a subsequent undertaking to define characteristics and determine the design of the 2003 surface warship. There are two aspects to this study: ^ A 21st century technology assessment, which extends and expands the Technology Road Map produced by the SC-21 Study. It will refine the projections and assessments °f critical technologies that need to be developed and Put in place for a lead-ship construction award in 2003, lo result in a ship delivered around 2010.
^ The 2003 Surface Combatant Study conducted at the Naval Surface Weapons Center, Dahlgren, which, in tern, has two facets that underscore its total ship approach: a 2003 combat system study run from the Weapons Center and an HM&E design effort conducted by the Naval Sea Systems Command (NavSea). Both elements already have been totally integrated at the working-group level, With the overall consolidated combat system and HM&E study being directed from Dahlgren and reporting directly to the Aegis program.
The purpose of the 2003 Study is to identify, evaluate, and recommend warfare concepts, requirements, and combat systems based upon the existing mission needs statement and to develop a totally integrated ship design for the future surface combatant. Linked within a top-down study approach, the results of the combat systems study—
Optimization is the heart of modern combat system design, and the process by which it is obtained— skilled systems engineering—is critical to ensuring a successful design.
which recommended high-payoff combat systems and architectures—will be consolidated with the HM&E effort to provide the foundation for the subsequent detail and contract design for the next-generation surface combatant. The team includes key people from the OpNav staff, the Navy materiel and operational communities, and Navy laboratories, with the NavSea HM&E effort working hand-in-glove with the combat-systems design teams.
The overall guidance for the 2003 Study stipulates that future ship designs must be flexible for multimission operations and that new technologies and future upgrades to keep pace with the threat will be affordable. These future ships must also be survivable, capable of going into harm’s way and fighting and winning while hurt. The 2003 total system design approach thus focuses on:
> Physical element modularity
> Functional sharing of equipment
> Open and distributed combat and HM&E systems designs
> Shipwide resource management
> Increased automation of combat, engineering, and navigation functions
>• Totally integrated, robust shipwide information management systems using fiber optic technologies
> Automated and minimized maintenance and administrative functions
>• Embedded readiness and training capability The explicit emphasis on multimission capability is important. Each ship we build must be able to carry out diverse missions and tasks, including those of the future that we can only dimly perceive in 1994. Single-mission ships have no place in the Navy of the 21st century. This emphasis, in turn, mandates a process that will ensure that advanced technologies and systems will be in place to support future warship design, construction, and operations.
Advanced Technology
Leading-edge technologies are the lifeblood of modern weapon systems and will be important enabling elements in meeting the challenges of littoral warfare. This has been a principle in the various future surface warship studies conducted recently and is a fundamental aspect of the 2003 Surface Combatant Study. In naval operations close to land—with the identification of friendly, neutral, and adversary aircraft, surface ships, and submarines made much more complex and difficult by the sheer numbers of tracks, clutter, and adverse acoustic environments—there is a compelling need for what some surface warriors are calling real-time, multispectral situational awareness to ensure battlespace dominance. This is particularly true in the defense against air threats, especially antiship cruise missiles and theater ballistic missiles.
While the Aegis weapon system on board the Ticon- deroga-class cruisers and Arleigh Burke-class destroyers is the world’s best naval area antiair warfare system, the
need for fine-tuning and focusing Aegis for operations in the confined littoral areas of the world, where Third World and even terrorist-type threats can pose significant difficulties, is apparent. For instance, the surface warfare community has concluded from assessments of the air threats in littoral conflicts that the surface force must put in place and sustain a well-funded program for the next-generation radar systems, as well as improvements to existing radars.
AEGIS TRAINING CENTER (E. FURJES)
The Aegis Training Center at Dahlgren introduced computer-aided technology into the schoolhouse—reducing costs and producing better-trained people.
These assessments and programs have identified the improvements needed in the areas of dramatically compressed reaction times, enhanced performance in clutter and nearland environments, and detection and tracking of low-observable (stealthy) targets—especially in localized, high- level, electronic-countermeasures situations. An important element for the future is the next-generation Aegis phased- array radar, the SPY-ID(V). This new system and upgrades to the existing variants of the SPY-1 radars will ensure our having the most capable naval surface force in the first decades of the next century. But surface warfare cannot rest on these achievements because the threat continues to improve.
A critical requirement is for systems that will enable noncooperative target identification using a variety of ship and off-board systems, including the SARTIS/SLQ-20 just now coming into the fleet. Linked to auto-ID and central- IFF systems and the sensor-fusion elements of the Aegis
weapon system, these provide accurate, real-time identi- j fication of airborne threats, sorting out friendly and neu- i tral aircraft, and are important enhancements to current i and future Aegis warships, as well as to other Navy sur- i face combatants.
Additionally, the surface warfare community has in place—and also planned for the future—several distributed computing projects that will further enhance new warships’ abilities to meet the threat. Processing-capacity requirements will continue to increase, so we are investigating distributed-computing approaches and systems that will depend much less on Navy standard computers. Early indications are that the architecture promises virtually unlimited processing capacity, ease of future functional growth, and enhanced availability and survivability. As much as possible, these continuing investigations will focus on commercial off-the-shelf technology to reduce costs- The effort has three thrusts:
► Future generation computer systems and combat systems engineering requirements
> Demonstrations of three Aegis combat system functions (correlation and tracking, identification, and air engagement control) and their integration in advanced computing systems
>• An assessment of the application of emerging technologies developed by the Advanced Research Programs Agency to the Aegis weapon system
Recognizing such needs, the Aegis program has established a close relationship with the new Program Executive Office for Theater Air Defense (PEO-TAD). This will ensure that initiatives pursued there—particularly in the areas of battle management and command and control, cooperative engagement, ship self-defense, and theater missile defense—are well understood throughout the Aegis technical community. Similarly, the special requirements that operations in concert with Aegis warships might impose on these and other air-defense systems are being communicated throughout the PEO-TAD organization.
A relatively new aspect of what “. . . From the Sea’ calls the “mastery of the littoral” is theater ballistic missile defense (TBMD). This is driving some far-reaching planning for the Navy’s surface and expeditionary forces, with the Navy and Marine Corps carefully examining naval capabilities that could contribute to theater missile defense, essentially as an extension of traditional Navy concepts of layered air defenses. The still-evolving idea of a seamless sea-based theater ballistic missile defense that extends well over land focuses on modifications to the phased-array radars and weapons control systems on board Aegis combatants, the linking of defense built upon realtime networking of sensors and fire-control systems, and the Navy’s improved Standard Missile—the SM-2 Block IVA upgrade.
The Navy’s TBMD efforts are being carried out under the new Program Executive Office for Theater Air Defense, linking sea-based TBMD initiatives to important ship self-defense, battle management, and cooperative engagement programs, as well as to the Aegis program. The PEO-TAD and Aegis program also are working closely with the reorganized Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. BMDO is pursuing programs aimed at a full-spectrum en-
gagement of weapons of mass destruction. The command- and-control links to national sensors must be well-conceived within an overarching operational architecture, if the Navy’s area and theater-wide TBMD systems are to satisfy the stressing requirements thrust upon them.
The strategic agility provided by a sea-based system, the planned improvements to the Standard Missile, and the rapid and innovative positioning of Aegis ships could result in about 60% of the World’s population centers being protected from the sea.
The Navy program, which is relying upon a proven systems- engineering approach, will produce a flexible, multimission, total theater air-defense system that could be acquired at the Margin for about 10% of the existing Aegis antiair warfare investment.
The Navy’s future is also tied to the skills and training °f its men and women—a consideration that Force 2001 also explicitly recognized. Aegis therefore has spearheaded an effort closely affiliated with other Navy and joint/DoD ‘nitiatives for interactive electronic technical manuals OETMs) and has established what some are calling the Navy’s classroom of the future.
The Aegis Training Center at Dahlgren has shepherded an initiative to develop a classroom of the future for surface warfare crew training by introducing computer-aided technology into the schoolhouse. Such a facility was established at the Aegis Training Support Group and was Used to instruct the communicators for the first four Aegis warships to receive the Navy’s IETMs using CD- ^OM media—in this case for the Aegis Radio Commu- uications System (RCS). By marrying technical manuals With instructional materials, and putting all such training Materials into the IETM/CD-ROM architecture, preliminary assessments indicate that costs can be reduced by about $4,000 per student and as many as three days elim- •nated from just the RCS training curriculum, while producing better-trained people.
In addition to expediting training and reducing school- house costs, the Navy expects substantial cost savings from the initial production and life-cycle maintenance of c°re Aegis weapon system technical manual documentation in the IETM format. A detailed 1991 cost analysis showed that the Navy could save $3.12 million per Aegis destroyer if the documentation were produced in the IETM format, a cost-avoidance measure that could be multiplied throughout the fleet.
Ecumenical Outreach
We must continue to look beyond our own communities for innovative ways to solve problems—both old and uew. For example, the Aegis program in 1990-1991 sponsored an internal study of emerging post-Cold War strategies, policies, and concepts of naval operations that covered, among other topics, the need to consider links and data-sharing requirements for cooperative operations With Marine Corps air command and control systems and Hawk surface-to-air missile batteries and extending Aegis
antiair coverage well over land, including defense against theater ballistic missiles. This proved to be a first step in reaching out to the Marine Corps and the Army to discuss the implications of working together in the littoral warfare environment: both supporting the Marine Corps’ concepts of over-the-horizon assault and operational maneuver warfare from the sea and supporting ground operations inland.
Similarly, the 2003 Surface Combatant Study seeks the widest participation possible. Surface warfare has fostered an outreach effort to ensure that the needs of the operating forces are known and has extended its liaison efforts to key Marine Corps, Army, Air Force, and civilian activities. One such effort, which links the 2003 Study with the Advanced Research Program Agency’s HIPER-D initiative, offers significant promise for a totally integrated warship—the autonomic ship—and is a good example of the comprehensive nature of our efforts to define the future course for surface combatant design and operation. HIPER-D, which stands for high- performance distributed computing, will capitalize on advances in computational and communications technologies to derive a true common, shipwide architecture for combat systems, engineering, maintenance, and administrative functions. The goal is to reduce life-cycle costs while enhancing ship operations across all areas. Another example is the cooperative working group with the new attack submarine design effort, which has already provided clear insights into alternative ways of achieving a total ship architecture for surface warships.
We continue to work very closely with the Marine Corps and the Army to identify technical, operational, and procedural issues and solutions to common air-defense problems, in an ecumenical spirit that has embraced the Air Force and military forces of our allies, as well. Aegis ships are now participating in developmental and operational testing of the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) with Navy E-2C Hawkeye airborne early warning aircraft and F-14 Tomcat fighters, Air Force, and other service players. A fully integrated Link 16/JTIDS system will be incorporated in the Flight II Arleigh Burkes, in fiscal years 1996-97.
In another effort, the Aegis program has been meeting with service component air-defense units to understand more completely and resolve interservice integration issues in littoral campaigns. The goal is to provide information on the identification and battle management systems that Aegis ships contribute to the joint air-defense operations/joint engagement zone initiative, to enable the real-time, multispectral situational awareness necessary for future operations. The fundamental concern here relates to the merging of Navy surface-to-air missile systems and concepts of operations with those of the other services and sharing airspace with fighter aircraft.
Recognizing the command, organizational, doctrinal, tactical, and engineering challenges inherent in joint air- defense operations, surface warfare has supported crossfertilization meetings with Army (Patriot and CORPS SAM), Marine Corps (air command and control system,
Leading-edge technologies are the lifeblood of modern weapon systems and will be important enabling elements in meeting the challenges of littoral warfare.
Space Com
tions, including an Aegis/Patriot operations manual and a fleet exercise that included joint surface-to-air missik operations supported by Navy E-2C aircraft. We will continue to work with the Joint Combat Identification Office to ensure effective and efficient sharing of data. Still, much more needs to be done if the naval service is to be truly joint in future operations.
Toward a 21st Century Force
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE ORGANIZATION
Surface warfare has supported cross fertilization in joint missile defense with the Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force, with the goal of optimizing Aegis ships’ interoperability.
tactical air operations center, Hawk), and Air Force (airborne warning and control system) activities, with the goal of optimizing Aegis ships’ interoperability with the other systems. This already has resulted in proposed engineering and procedural solutions for Aegis/Patriot opera-
The Navy’s surface warships will remain at the cutting edge of technology and design, manned by people whose skills, dedication, and training are second to none. Our future surface warships will incorporate technologies and capabilities to carry out future missions that are only contemplated today. It would be foolish in the extreme to design and acquire any warship that cannot defeat the threats that will be arrayed against it.
The Navy must take all steps necessary to guarantee that naval surface forces will be expeditionary, capable of both joint and allied operations across the full range of U.S. involvement in the world. The surface warfare community is dedicated to ensuring that the Navy’s surface warships will remain an affordable, credible, and highly effective force . . . from the sea. The process, advanced technologies, and ecumenical outreach are key elements of success in this quest.
Admiral Huchting is the Direct Reporting Manager, Aegis Program.
It’s a Living
A few years ago, there was great debate within the Royal Australian Naval Reserve as to whether the “R” which had been worn in the curl (in the same manner as the RNR) should be retained or—as asign of integration with the Royal Australian Navy—removed. The R was the final uniform distinction between reserve and regular naval officers, and its removal was not greeted with universal joy among either the regular or reserve officers then serving.
When the time came at Sydney Port Division for the informal “walkaround” by Flag Officer Commanding Naval Support Command, the issue was a topic for conversation in almost every quarter. The admiral, chatting to a group of reserve officers, asked one very crusty lieutenant commander, “And what do you think? Do you think we should keep the ‘R’ in the curl or not?
“Well, sir,” replied the officer, “I’m firmly in favor of it being retained. After all, we are reserves, not permanent officers, and I like the distinction.”
Responded the admiral, genuinely interested, “So you feel there should be a clear and recognizable distinction between reserve and permanent officers?”
“Oh yes, sir,” the lieutenant commander replied, “I would hate for anybody to think this was all I could do for a living.”
Lieutenant Commander A. S. Brown, RANR