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Proceedings: In his 18 August 1994 memo, Deputy Secretary of Defense John Deutch singled out several Navy and Marine Corps programs that might have to be canceled, stretched, or otherwise readdressed: the Medium Lift helicopter Replacement; DDG-51; New Attack Submarine; Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle; JPATS [Joint Primary Aircraft Training System]; PGMs lPrecision Guided Munitions], Some of these seemed to be linchpins of the soiled “Force 2001. ” What are the implications for the Naval Services? Admiral Boorda: They’re bigger than Just those programs. What we’re seeing is a budget size that does not support all the things we saw as necessary when We did a recapitalization plan—when we said we were going to make the Navy smaller in response to . . . From the Sea and in response to what we saw in the Bottom Up Review. We are going to make the Navy smaller, and we’re going to do it quickly. This will free up money to do the things we must be able to do, even with a smaller Navy. But in meeting the demands of today and of the future, we’re seeing now that the budget Probably won’t support all of those large items we projected in our future.
Clearly, if we talk only about these Programs, I can make a great case for the V-22 and we’re going to. I can make a superb case for three DDG-51s a year, for the new attack submarine, and for everything else you mentioned.
The real questions, however, are: “What are the bedrock requirements—not only for today’s readiness but for future readiness?” and “How much money is available and how do we spend it best?” Another real issue here is whether our fiscal strategy is the right one, given the amount of money allocated. And that’s Why we probably need to look at the Bottom Up Review again. These are the gut issues of the moment.
Proceedings: Further complicating the issue of declining budgets is the fact that we have units steaming off Haiti and Cuba—and in the Adriatic Sea and
the Persian Gulf—right now. We 're also setting up a refugee camp for 30,000 to 45,000 people at our Guantanamo Bay naval base ....
Admiral Boorda: It’s 35,000 today. . . . Proceedings: None of this was programmed. How are we going to recover any of these funds—or are we going to have to take them out of hide?
Admiral Boorda: This is the topic of the day. I discussed it with Admiral Macke [Commander-in-Chief, Pacific] right after
U.S. NAVY
On 1 September, Proceedings Editors John Miller and Fred Rainbow interviewed Admiral J.M. Boorda, Chief of Naval Operations and President of the U.S. Naval Institute, in his office.
he took command. I’ve been talking to Admiral Mauz [Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet] daily, including late last night. I’m sure we’ll talk about it again today. I’ve had additional discussions with Secretary of the Navy Dalton and Deputy Secretary of Defense Deutch in the past 24 hours on this vital subject. Basically, there is always some flexibility in the O&M [Operations and Maintenance] part of the budget to deal with the unforeseen. But nothing’s ever free. If you’re going to spend money on X, you’ve got to spend less money on Y—
or something else. You have to find something to shortchange. This gets more and more onerous as the expense rises.
By the end of September, we will have spent 94 million unprogrammed dollars this year—just on Haiti and Cuba. This is particularly hard when the bill comes due near the end of the fiscal year, when you’ve spent almost all your money and you have few funds left to move around. So you are driven to painful stop-gap solutions—such as cutting flight hours and slowing down exercises and training. If you do that long enough and often enough, you hurt readiness.
If this is truly the world of the future, we are going to need a better way to recover—in real time—the costs of unforeseen peace-keeping, peace-making, and humanitarian operations. Then we can continue to do our normal business. Let me be clear about this: There is some training value in these operations short of war. So to say that they are worth nothing in training and readiness is not true. But you have hit upon a real problem, one that is particularly difficult at this time of year—because there’s no flexibility left in shifting funds when you’re in the last month of the fiscal year.
Proceedings: Tied into that, you said early in your tour that you were going to try to maintain a real commitment to R&D [Research and Development], at 8-10% of total funding. With all this other stuff crashing down, will that have to be pulled back?
Admiral Boorda: It’s not easy to trade R&D money for O&M money. R&D money comes through a different authorization by the Congress, so while you might be able to raid one account to fix another, that’s not easily done, particularly this close to the end of the fiscal year. With respect to R&D money itself, I think we’ve done a good job in the 1995 budget and in the 1996 POM [Program Objectives Memorandum] to date. But the POM is just a plan. Nobody can tell for sure how it’s going to turn out in the end. We’ve tried hard to keep a proper amount of R&D money so we
don’t foreclose our own future. I’m comfortable that we are staying true to what I said four months ago—that it is important to continue to invest in the future. Of all the services, we are the ones who have best met the OSD programming guidance for science and technology. We didn’t do that because somebody held a big club over our head; we did it because we thought it was the right thing to do. Clearly, if we keep getting operational requirements that are bigger than our budget, we’ll have to look at everything for reductions—but we would try to make those reductions in a balanced way.
Proceedings: As a former Chief of Naval Personnel, you 've probably applauded SecDef William Perry’s request for the $30 billion for military pay, but that’s a large amount. Do you think that actually will be forthcoming as extra money, or might we have to cut back in other areas to fund the pay raise?
Admiral Boorda: Secretary Dalton and I both enthusiastically support a full pay raise. There’s no catch-up money in there; this is just maintaining status quo.
You couldn’t be a responsible military leader and not support it.
“Where will the money come from?” is the big question. Will it be added to the top line of defense? Or will we have to find it inside the funds we already have available (which already are being reduced)? The latter answer may well be yes. If so, that’s the time we have to say people really are more important—more important than anything else—and we will have to find the money and show we’re committed to them. Realistically, this is something that ought to be considered by OMB [the Office of Management and Budget]. It is a cost of doing business in the military to pay your people properly and perhaps there ought to be an increase in the top line. Obviously, I think there should be.
Proceedings: What has changed in current naval operations since the publication of.. . From the Sea? How will Forward . . . From the Sea change the focus on littoral waifare and operational maneuver from the sea?
Admiral Boorda: I have signed off on the latest draft of Forward . . . From the Sea, and I’m comfortable with it. There will be some minor changes as the Commandant and I bounce it back and forth and the Secretary gets it for consideration, but it is a very good draft at this point. The thrust will not change. Forward . . . From the Sea will not be a
major course change for the Navy. It will stay on the general course set a couple of years ago, but we now have specific examples of what we have done and those specific examples have their lessons learned.
Forward . . . From the Sea is not a strategy shift but a recognition of what’s been happening in the world. In planning, we have to think beyond the two mid-intensity conflicts to a lot of lesser regional contingencies we have to deal with: the Bosnias, Haitis, Somalias, Rwandas, and the Cuban refugees, and underlying all that is the Korean situation that loomed this summer. So we’ve seen just about every type of contingency covered in . . . From the Sea. Now, it’s time to press on and start asking about what we’ve learned. That’s what Forward . . . From the Sea should begin to do for us. How specific do you want to be in a document like Forward. . . From the Seal Do you want to be highly specific or just a little specific? I don’t know yet what way we’ll go on that.
If you look at our track record since we published . . . From the Sea, larger amounts of money are going to the kinds of warfare we talked about conducting. There is a verbal commitment and a written commitment and there is also a financial commitment in the way we have submitted our budgets and POMs. The V-22 tilt-rotor aircraft and the advanced amphibious assault vehicle are good ex- • amples of this. Those are very expensive programs in a declining budget and both the Commandant of the Marine Corps and I support them—and the Secretary of the Navy also supports them. In Forward . . . From the Sea, you will see an emphasis on the tactics of naval operations near land and over land. That’s what the discussion of theater ballistic missile defense [TBMD] is all about, that’s what Navy and Marine Corps commitment to TBMD is all about. We know if we’re going to get a lodgment on the beach and that’s what it takes to get an enabling force ashore, probably the only theater ballistic missile defense in that region for a while is going to come from the sea. So that kind of program is directly related to . . . From the Sea. That’s not open- ocean operations—it’s near- and overland operations.
Proceedings: Do you see any change in the relationship between the Navy and the Marine Corps?
Admiral Boorda: I think we’re drawing closer. If I sat here and tried to say that everything’s perfect and that we have complete agreement on every subject, everybody would know I was blowing smoke. But the Commandant and I do talk a lot and our budget process is becoming more closely integrated than it used to be. The way we get from discussion to POM to budget is now worked much more closely together. For example, the theater ballistic missile defense requirement for our services was signed „ by both the Commandant and me. It’s a | capability that will go only in surface combatants—not in amphibious ships-— and yet the Commandant felt as strongly about it as I did. That’s a pretty good indicator. At the same time, you’ve heard me supporting the V-22. Those are steps in the right direction. Total Quality Leadership says that you must have continuous improvement; we are meeting the continuous-improvement goal- We’re doing better as a team, and I expect we’ll continue to do better every year.
Proceedings: It’s been about 18 months since the Doctrine Command stood up in Norfolk. How would you characterize their initial efforts, in terms of NDP-l? ; What kind of marching orders will they be getting after they complete the Capstone series of naval doctrine publications?
Admiral Boorda: They have some pretty specific marching orders from me. The first effort is really just an introductory publication. Rear Admiral Fred Lewis is now getting into the meat of the project.
I’m pleased with NDP-1. Now he’s received the guidance—much of which he helped write—to move on, and now it is time for more specificity. Let me give you an example: I would like us to produce the kind of doctrine that you can look at as a joint task force commander or a fleet or unified commander-in-chief, and see how the Navy and Marine Corps . team will operate, in general terms. I would also like to see doctrine—and some exists—that says, I am the captain of an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer and ' this is how I fit in and this is what I do and this is how I operate. I would also like doctrine to tell me how to conduct antiair warfare over land to cover a Marine landing force while they get their airfields established ashore. That’s the kind of specificity I want—and I just gave you three gradations of it. We’re not finished until we get all that in writing—so Rear . . . continued on page 53
• . . people really are more important—more important than anything else—and we will have to find the money and show we're committed to them.
We
bm- Admiral Lewis’s job is now to work sure ^°Wn that line. A lot of doctrine already 0f but it’s his job now to pull it to
° Sether in a coherent way that tracks with ■ ■ • From the Sea or Forward . . . From 3 foe Sea. That’s not something you do in
• 15 minutes, and there is no rush to do this
w°rk quickly. I would much rather have h'm do it correctly, tying it in with joint " Warfare wherever it makes sense. His wjll "'ork has to tie in with the joint warfare ech- linking because there may be a time _e0. "'hen we’re doing an amphibious land- and that's all Navy and Marine Corps— Our ^Ut ^as to trans'tl°n t0 j°int warfare and our forces will have to be able to play rpo a joint role. Writing documents to ac- airy c°mplish that is a tough job, but we have em- a game plan to do that. I expect to keep ie to refining the game plan as we continue the Putting out the doctrinal publications.
ntee Proceedings: In an earlier interview, e of ?°u exPressed an intent to put women » of ln combatants where the required ' foipboard conversions for privacy were . feasible. In pursuing a similar policy, ace the Royal Navy recently found itself ;hiy running out of seagoing women, after ced the costly conversions had been com- ;nts dieted for them. Does the Navy anticipate similar difficulties in maintaining
_ Q pipeline and a rotational base for its
j Seagoing officers, petty officers, and
Junior enlisted?
Admiral Boorda: I don’t think we know lhe answer yet. You described what I Want to do correctly. When the law ehanged, and no longer prohibited women from serving, then it became very clear that wherever women can serve—where Privacy can be provided, both for males and females—then we have to move in that direction, and I want to do that. This enables us to make fuller use of all the talent we have in the Navy. Now, we have an all-volunteer force and the answer to your question lies in that. How toany women—and how many men, for that matter—will want to go to sea is the hig unanswered question. We have a lot °f experience with men going to sea so I think we can estimate those numbers Well. How women will respond to this •Opportunity to go to sea is something We’ll have to wait and see. We will convert only as quickly as we have enough Women to do it. We made a commitment to do this correctly and that means putting Women officers, women chief petty officers, and women petty officers on ships, as well as non-rated women. This is necessary to deal with the social issues and the integration of the crew in a logical Way. We will match the rate of ship
board integration to the number of people available. I don’t think we’ll end up with the same problem as the Royal Navy, but whether it will limit our ability to integrate all the ships in the Navy is going to depend on how many women volunteer to join the Navy. Once women are in the Navy, going to sea is not a volunteer option—going to sea is the result of a set of orders.
Proceedings: The Secretary of the Navy has recently made a statement about attempting to achieve diversity in the officer corps to reflect the national makeup through “creative recruiting and marketing techniques. ” We ’re under the impression that recruiting commands have pretty well pulled almost every creative trick out of the bag, and were wondering what some of the new techniques might be.
Admiral Boorda: I signed off on another one yesterday. First of all, we set our officer-accession goals based on the number of college and university graduates every year. If the African-American percentage of graduates last year, for example, was 6%—which it was—then our goal for new African-American commissions was 6%. We convinced ourselves that our rationale was sound, and that we would get our market share of college graduates. We reached that goal and were happy about it. Then we took a second look, and said, “Wait a minute—don’t we affect in some measure what that market looks like?” We access people into the Naval Academy out of high school, so in fact we control the output of the Naval Academy somewhat—it’s the same with NROTC programs. Why should we be content with the national average of college graduates, when maybe we can get a larger share of that 6%. Maybe we can even turn that 6% into 7%.
Well, we looked at it and we found that about 12% of the youth who are at the eligible age to come into the military are African-Americans (for clarity, I’m just using one minority here). What if we made our official goal 12%? How would we double our market share from colleges? What we need to do is make a larger input to the colleges with Navy and Marine Corps programs. That means we have to compete better with other scholarship programs, with industry and with the universities themselves. How do we compete better? If we can identify the youngsters we want—both majority and minority—those with high SAT scores, leadership in high-school activities, and relatively high class standing (top 10-
20%), those are the youngsters we want. One of the things that we can do better is recruit them quicker by giving them the scholarships sooner. We can make it less painful than having to submit several forms and wait a long time to see if they’re accepted. So we came up with a new way of doing that. We need to allow our recruiters—once they see that the student meets all the academic, leadership, and physical requirements—to be able to offer a scholarship, or at least a conditional scholarship in real time. They should be able to talk to mom and dad and the youngster and say, “If you want to come with us, and you really do meet all these requirements, here’s the paper. Please sign, and we’ll sign. It’s not binding on you, but it’s binding on us. We’ll do the detailed paper work later.”
We have established a program and I signed the order yesterday to start this procedure this school year. I think it’s going to produce an increased number of minority officers, and I think we’ll do better with the majority youngsters as well, by saying up front and early, “If you qualify, and you want a scholarship, you’ve got one.” For the real high scorer—the blue chipper—it’s an instant process. We also have express processing—seven days, no waiting—for most everybody else who has really high scores. This is a program where we’re going to get instant feedback. By December, I’ll be able to tell you, after hearing from the Recruiting Command, whether or not this is working.
Proceedings: With regard to gays in the military—and in light of the Federal Appeals Court ruling on 31 August that the Navy cannot discharge Petty Officer Meinhold solely for announcing that he is a homosexual—how does the individual command apply the “don’t ask, don’t tell" policy?
Admiral Boorda: I talked to the Judge Advocate General this morning about this particular case. The JAG and the Justice Department are still looking hard at this case and this ruling, so with that as a caveat, let me tell you what I do know right now—or what I think I know— about this case. First, the court was careful to limit this to Meinhold only, and make no general application. Second, it appears right now that we are discussing the old policy, not the new policy. Meinhold was processed under the old homosexuality policy which differs from the one we have today. What we need to know is how this ruling may relate to the new policy. That takes a good bit of legal work, and it’s a bit early for me to be
able to say to commanding officers exactly what it means to them. More to follow—I think this will become clearer after the JAG and Justice Department complete their analysis of the case.
Proceedings: In the apparent aftermath of the Tailhook incident, we've seen two recent instances of senior naval officers in oversight positions being accused of mishandling sexual-harassment cases. Will your recently issued guidelines on investigations help preclude such problems?
Admiral Boorda: The requirements for legal case processing weren’t aimed specifically at senior officers, but were simply a reflection on my part—which happens to coincide with what the Army is doing—that these cases do not get better over time. They are emotional—for both the person being accused and the person doing the accusing—and they have the potential to be divisive within the command. The more quickly they’re handled, the better off everybody is: the Navy, the command, and the people themselves. If the person doing the accusing is correct and the alleged act or acts really took place, then that person has been hurt and deserves appropriate remedy. If that action didn’t take place, if it is not true, then the accused is being hurt and deserves appropriate remedy. Either way, these cases are best handled quickly. Now, swift justice obviously depends upon how complex the case is, how serious it is, how formal an investigative process is involved, and what the final resolution may be. A general court- martial, for instance, takes a long time; a nonpunitive letter or a dismissal might take a lot less. It’s hard to talk in generalities about things that quickly become quite specific. But it is easy to generalize enough to say the faster the better— provided you’re just and you keep things moving. The second thing those guidelines put out was that the people most involved, the accused and the accuser, will be kept informed. If you look back on many cases, you find that some of our difficulties come from people simply not being informed about things that were being done. Things are so emotional for the accused and the accuser that they need to know what’s going on at all times, so they can continue on with their lives while awaiting a decision. Keeping people informed is highly important and the guidelines require that.
Would these guidelines help preclude senior officer problems? I hadn’t thought about it in that way at all, but I think the answer is probably “yes.” If you resolve things quickly and correctly at a lower level, there is probably less need for a senior officer’s involvement. Let’s go right
to Admiral Stan Arthur and Admiral Hank Mauz. Neither of these gentlemen did anything wrong; each of them did everything right. In the case of Hank Mauz, whose retirement nomination is still before the Senate, he simply didn’t do anything wrong. He felt, and I agree, that he made the resolution of the case better and he used the case itself to teach people how to do a better job. He is a very dedicated officer who’s had a great career. He will prevail. In the case of Stan Arthur, his nomination was being held up because he made a decision that was, in my opinion and in SecNav’s opinion, a good decision. Our problem, quite honestly, was we couldn’t get his confirmation through the Senate in time to have a timely relief at the U.S. Pacific Command. Stan understood that, and it turned out, as evidenced by the long time Admiral Mauz’s confirmation is taking, that it is pretty clear we were talking about a very long time. There is no question that Admiral Arthur did no wrong. He did what he was asked to do. He had a case presented to him; he made a judgment; and it was a sound judgment. He stands by it, and we stand by it. We just couldn’t get the issue resolved in time. Now, if you wonder about whether we could have gotten it through in time, Admiral Arthur’s nomination and Admiral Mauz’s were up on the Hill about the same time. Admiral Mauz’s still isn’t done and his is less complicated. We keep extending him month by month. He’s in command, and we have the Atlantic Fleet covered. He’s doing a fantastic job with respect to Cuba and Haiti. He can stay as long as he needs to until the confirmation is complete.
ProceedingstWhat are the true lessons learned from Tailhook, and how are they being applied throughout the Navy?
Admiral Boorda: If I say that we’ve learned all the lessons from Tailhook and we need to stop talking about it, that will alienate a lot of people. If I say that we have a lot of lessons to learn from Tailhook and we really ought to worry about it, that also will alienate a lot of people. My aim is not to alienate people, particularly hard-working dedicated Navy people, but instead, to encourage them, motivate them, and let them learn from the past without dwelling on it constantly. I don’t use the word “Tailhook” much any more; in fact, I don’t use it at all unless I get asked about it. I know we had a real problem in our Navy—I don’t think many people doubt or deny that. There’s been a lot of fallout from it, much of which has been very constructive. We have much better ways of dealing with sexual harassment now, and I know there’s a widespread awareness that the
things that happened at Tailhook ’91 are simply not acceptable and won’t be tol-, ; erated in our Navy today. I don’t think anybody can doubt that. You’ll never ge* p 100% agreement about the handling of every individual case in Tailhook. Those arguments probably will go on for a long time. If I focus too much on the past, >• takes my eye off the ball I’m trying to hit today—which is making a better Navy now. As for the lessons for me as the CNO, they’re fairly clear: You don’t ig' nore warning signals; when things are moving in the wrong direction, you don t ignore it, you do something about it; you take care of your people by not letting them get into trouble in the first place. You stay alert and react properly to sys- . temic problems and you deal with individual cases as quickly and fairly as you can. I’ve oversimplified this, but I hope you get my point.
Proceedings: All the service academies are coming under increasing pressure as the money gets tighter. There’s talk from time to time about consolidation.
Do you see a day coming where that might be a serious issue?
Admiral Boorda: Let me say right at the start, in answering this question, that I really do think that joint war fighting and | joint staffs and joint task forces are the way to go. But let me add a great big HOWEVER—all caps, underlined, exclamation point, HOWEVER!—-jointness j is built on strong individual services working together, each bringing what they do best to the table. The idea that you make it all plain vanilla by taking very junior people and having them be joint from the first day is not the way to go. You need a strong Navy and a strong Army and a strong Air Force and a strong Marine Corps for openers. The joint staffs and the joint commanders then bring those together through systems and doctrine and training and culture for great joint war-fighting capability—that’s what we’re after. The idea that after four challenging years a midshipman throws his or her hat up in the air and says, “I’m an ensign in the United States Navy of second lieutenant in the Marine Corps- I’m proud to be in this service, and 1 understand its traditions and its values and I feel special because I’m a Navy or Marine Corps officer”—that’s something we really want. That will strengthen us in joint war fighting, not weaken us.
Proceedings: At the Naval Academy, of course, Admiral Larson has returned as Superintendent to shore up some of the instruction in ethics, integrity, and individual honor. Has there been any thought or discussion given to some sort of universal code that would apply
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forward... From the Sea is the follow-on to... From the Sea, and it is where jhe Navy operates—here, the USS Connelly (DD-979) under way off the coast of Haiti. For 1994, the U.S. Navy has spent $94 million, all unprogrammed, on Haitian and Cuban operations.
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n°t just to the Academy midshipmen something that would carry through >nto the fleet and the Pentagon and everywhere else—a Navy-wide approach to the problem?
Admiral Boorda: The honor system at the Naval Academy is unique. It is run by the brigade, with officer supervision. I have not thought about making it Navy- ^tde, nor do I think I would for very t°ng, because it is unique to that institu- ti°n. On the other hand, I wrote a letter to all officer candidates—not just Naval Academy midshipmen—that leaned heav- dy on honor, courage, and commitment, which are the entire Navy’s core values. The Academy is trying to instill these through the honor system, and I really think we are closer together than it might aPpear. The ideas of honor, courage, and c°mrnitment are service-wide core values, ar>d they apply equally to the young Sailor °r Marine standing the mid-watch as they do to midshipmen at the Naval Academy.
Proceedings: In recent discussion on 'he pages of Proceedings, the Naval Services have been cast as the force of choice in forward-presence operations. An Air Force officer has responded in a recent letter, asking “Where was the Navy in Rwanda?" What’s the Navy’s response to that?
Admiral Boorda: That’s a little silly, isn’t it? There are missions that the Air Force is going to do and there are missions that the Navy is going to do and there are missions that we’re going to do together. Actually, the Navy had prepositioning ships off the coast of Africa to triake equipment available, and we happened to have a really good medical unit Horn Europe that went to Rwanda because they have special knowledge of the kinds °f diseases that were being encountered
and the ability to research solutions to the epidemics they were fighting. The Air Force built an air bridge all the way from the United States to Rwanda and I’m proud of them. The Navy can’t do that and we shouldn’t do that—we’d be duplicating what they do. We shouldn’t be taking pot shots at each other as the roles- and-missions debate begins. It isn’t helpful. Let me tell you what I think a win is for the Navy and Marine Corps in roles and missions: That is when we get assigned the missions, roles, and functions that make sense for a Navy to do—with as little duplication with others as possible but with as much duplication as needed—so that we can do what we’re supposed to do. I also hope the Air Force gets assigned missions that make sense for it, and the Army for it. Getting more is not automatically better and getting less is not worse; getting the right missions for each service is the winning formula. We will participate in the process in a straightforward and open way.
Proceedings: The need to do more with less should produce a climate that is ripe for innovation and fresh thinking. How do you see the role of the Naval Institute’s forum in fostering and encouraging that innovation?
Admiral Boorda: If someone has a really good idea—or if someone can start a discussion that yields a good idea from a clash of viewpoints in a forum such as Proceedings—then that’s exactly what we need to do. We need as many ways to get good ideas out on the table as we can find, and Proceedings provides one of those. We certainly need innovation; we cannot afford to do anything today except in the most efficient way. We don’t have enough money to do everything we’re supposed to do now. To the
extent that the Naval Institute and Proceedings can maintain an open forum of ideas—in seminars or in writing—we are doubly blessed, as members of the Navy and the Naval Institute. There can never be too many fresh ideas or too much solid thinking or too many ways to express innovative thought.
Proceedings: The final question in all our interviews is this one: “What question have we failed to ask you that you would particularly like to answer?”— and we ask you not only to phrase the question but to answer it, as well.
Admiral Boorda: Let me say that I hope this is going to be the first of many appearances in Proceedings, so I won’t feel as if I have to say everything today. All in all, I’d like to talk about the overarching issues that are interesting to members, and also about specifics—and I think we did that pretty well today. Later on, we ought to talk about the Bottom Up Review; we ought to talk about the role of the Navy; and how I see the role of a superpower when we’re the only superpower left. We should discuss whether we should structure budgets to requirements or whether we should shape requirements in terms of affordability. Obviously, I like the former better than the latter. I would like to use this forum to just be able to sit and talk about issues that are important to Naval Institute members, so they can think about them. I don’t want to create a debating society about everything I think, because I plan on being open and sometimes my ideas will change as I acquire more information. Earlier, you asked me a good question about readiness. Today, I have an end- of-fiscal-year perspective of readiness because I’m trying to figure out how the Navy gets through the month of September. If you ask me that same question in December, when we’re still in the first quarter of the next fiscal year—when the money looks a little better and hopefully things are going better—you might get a different kind of answer from me. I want to feel free in these discussions to be able to give you the answer of the day and just be honest, because somewhere out there reading this publication is someone who’s going to be sitting in my chair someday—who needs to see the agony and the maturation I go through as I deal with each issue. So maybe I’ll answer a question in a way that causes him or her to say, “Hmmm—he doesn’t pretend that he knows everything; he’s just working through the problems and I can watch him through these Q’s and A’s in Proceedings and see how someone works with these problems for four years and maybe manages to win more than a few.”
I hope this serves that purpose.