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Don’t be fooled by the naysayers; the U.S. Navy’s mine countermeasures operations in the Gulf—here, the minesweeper Impervious (MSO-449) and the amphibious assault ship New Orleans (LPH-11)—were excellent.
Some “experts” simply cannot let go of the myth that the U.S. Navy lags behind all other navies in its ability to conduct effective and efficient mine countermeasure (MCM) operations. However satisfying and comforting this perception must be to the Navy’s critics, the myth must be debunked: our Desert Shield mine countermeasure operations, while certainly made more difficult by a lack of timely intelligence about the threat, less than explicit command-and-control relationships, and sometimes imperfect integration, were nonetheless excellent. In most cases, our units performed as well as— perhaps better than—those of other Coalition members.
Mine Warfare in Desert Storm
In some cases, Coalition units refused to enter mine danger areas until U.S. airborne mine countermeasures helicopters had conducted precursor sweeps. Since then, the Navy has put in place a well-structured and comprehensive Mine Warfare Plan to sustain the momentum.
This is not to say that the U.S. Navy has its mine countermeasures “problem” solved. Much work remains to be done to ensure that we will maintain the world’s best mine force, today and in the future. But perhaps some of that task is no more than to get the word out about what Was accomplished during the Gulf War and in the three years since.'
The U.S. fleet that contributed to the defeat of Saddam Hussein ultimately numbered more than 160 ships, the largest naval force deployed since World War II. Among this impressive fleet was a small, albeit critically important, contingent of U.S. mine countermeasures forces: >■ Five MCM surface ships
>• Six MCM helicopters flying from the USS Tripoli (LPH-10)—and later from the New Orleans—as well as from the shore
> Twenty-nine detachments of explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel
The likely need for U.S. MCM assets in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm was clear from the outset, given the extensive use of mines by both sides during the eight-year Iran-Iraq War and the Navy’s experiences during Operation Earnest Will. MCM helicopters from Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadron 14 (HM-14) were ready to deploy to the Persian Gulf on 4 August 1990, pending the President’s mobilization order, but because of strategic airlift priorities, did not leave Norfolk Naval Air Station until 4 October. Once in theater, however, HM-14 was flying minesweeping training operations beginning on 11 October. The Navy’s mine countermeasures ships—the Avenger (MCM-1), Adroit (MSO-509), Impervious (MSO-449), and Leader (MSO-490>—arrived at Bahrain on 3 October. After completing in-theater training and preliminary surveys, the ships were ready to commence mine-hunting and sweeping operations; that order came on 16 February 1991.
EOD detachments began to deploy to the Persian Gulf in mid-August 1990 and immediately began in-theater training with Coalition MCM forces. EOD MCM operations in the northern Gulf actually began on 12 February 1991, and when the ground war ended on 27 February, channel clearance operations began the same day.
As the Gulf conflict unfolded, two U.S. warships—the Tripoli, which had embarked the helicopters from HM- 14, and the Aegis cruiser Princeton (CG-59)—suffered mine strikes, driving home the danger of mines and the need for effective intelligence and mine countermeasures.2 Because of a lack of focused intelligence on the mine threat, the extent and sophistication of Iraq’s mine-laying efforts remained unknown until after the Iraqi surrender in late February, when Iraqi charts showing the location and types of mines were found. Initial U.S. intelligence estimates indicated possible areas of Iraqi mining along the southern Kuwaiti coast, while later intelligence estimates showed more detail about possible mine danger areas farther out in the Gulf, along shipping channels. Significantly, our intelligence showed no established fields—only a drifting mine threat—elsewhere in the northern Persian Gulf.
Nonetheless, it is clear from the post-war analysis of the Iraqi minefields and beach obstructions in Kuwait that there indeed was a significant threat to the planned U.S. amphibious operation into Kuwait. As a recent report by the Center for Naval Analyses makes clear, the Navy for a variety of reasons—especially the desire to ensure that conflict with Iraq did not kick off too early—did not do much to locate the mines, despite evolving plans for an
HMS LEDBURY DURING THE GULF WAR / ROYAL NAVY
Table 1: Country | Multinational Coalition MCM Forces Mine Countermeasures Systems |
Belgium | 3 Tripartite mine-hunter ships 1 MCM support ship |
France | 2 Tripartite mine-hunter ships |
Germany | 2 Troika MCM systems (2 ships/6 boats) |
Italy | 4 Lerici-class mine-hunter ships |
Japan | 2 Hatsushima mine-hunter ships 2 Awashima mine-hunter ships 1 MCM support ship |
Netherlands | 3 Tripartite mine-hunter ships |
United Kingdotr | 5 Hunt-class mine-hunter ships 1 MCM support ship |
United States | 2 Avenger-class MCM ships 3 MSO minesweeper/hunter ships 6 MH-53E AMCM helicopters 2 Self-propelled acoustic-magnetic sweep (SAM) systems 1 MCM support ship (the Tripoli/New Orleans) |
amphibious assault near Ash Shuaybah.3 Still, the original plan for the U.S. and U.K. MCM forces was to clear an approach channel and staging area of more than 200 square nautical miles, a task that was estimated to take about 40 days and which would have required complete
Table 2: Multinational Coalition Mine Counts | |||
Percentage of All Mines Swept/Hunted/Neutralized | |||
Country | % | Country | % |
Belgium.. | ..... 26% | Japan .......... | . . . . 2% |
France ... | ..... 19% | Netherlands | . . . . 4% |
Germany .... | ..... 9% | United Kingdom .. | . . . 18% |
Italy........ | ..... 7% | United States .... | . . . 15% |
battlespace dominance of the MCM operations area.
The presence of mines and the actual extent of the threat had a chilling effect on operational plans after the Tripoli and Princeton mine strikes indicated that the Iraqi mines were in areas we did not expect. Mines clearly were a factor in the decision in mid-February to change the assault objective to Faylakah Island and later to reject completely the amphibious assault option. Ironically, most of the areas that the Navy intended to clear in advance of the planned assaults proved to be mine-free in post-conflict analysis.
One critical issue that was clearly evident during Operation Desert Shield was the role of established rules of engagement, which frustrated the Navy’s ability to prevent the mines from being put in the water in the first place. Such offensive MCM operations were not permitted, despite the recommendations of the commander of the U.S- naval forces in the Gulf, Vice Admiral Stanley R. Arthur. In December 1990, Admiral Arthur requested that the Navy be allowed to catch the mine-layers in the act, but the multinational command was concerned that actions against the suspected Iraqi mine-laying ships would precipitate hostilities before the Coalition buildup was completed.4
This restriction proved to be shortsighted, especially so because the mines were laid in international waters. In the future, naval commanders should have the flexibility, on a case-by-case basis, to reassess such rules of engagement to permit offensive MCM operations when the need arises, especially in international waters. As the Navy’s unclassified report on the Gulf War made clear: “Because of the difficulty of locating and neutralizing mines, we cannot always afford to give the minelayer free rein.”5
Following the cease-fire, the Coalition’s MCM priorities became more “humanitarian”:
>■ Open normal commercial shipping channels and ports
► Sweep known minefields
► Complete area clearance of the Kuwaiti coast and the northern Gulf
For these operations, U.S. and British forces were joined by MCM assets of six other countries (Table 1).
Typical U.S. mine countermeasures operations comprised precursor influence sweeps by MH-53E helicopters prior to the MCM ships entering a mine danger area. (Two allies’ MCM forces refused to work mine danger areas until the MCM helos had gone in first.) Later, the helicopters used their AQS-14 airborne mine-hunting sonars and were credited with finding several bottom mines. U.S. MCM forces accounted for a total of 14% of all mines swept or hunted in all areas; 85% of these were destroyed by surface EOD forces, 14% were swept or hunted by MCM helicopters, and the remainder were claimed by
1
^Rtesy of the author
Tiger II (UH-1H) helicopters. U.S., U.K., and Australian EOD divers also destroyed all known contact mines that had washed ashore—some 6% of all mines. U.S., U.K., and other countries’ “mine counts”—on a percentage basis—are shown in Table 2.
The final mine tally based upon extensive mine-hunt- 'ng and clearance operations of U.S. and Coalition MCM forces through the summer and early fall 1991 is shown *n Table 3. Excluding the three mines “swept” by the Tripoli and Princeton, the approximately 1,300 mines were comprised of the following types:
Table 3: Operation Desert Storm Iraqi Minefield Tally | |||||
|
|
| MDA-6 |
|
|
Field 1 |
| Field 2 |
| Field 3 |
|
Moored: | 9% | Moored: | 9% | Moored: | 11% |
Bottom: | 3% | Bottom: | 3% | Bottom: | 3% |
Total: | 12% | Total: | 12% | Total: | 14% |
|
|
| MDA-7 |
|
|
Field 4 |
| Field 5 |
| Field 6 |
|
Moored: | 11% | Moored: | 8% | Moored: | 9% |
Bottom: | 3% | Bottom: | 3% | Bottom: | 1% |
Total: | 14% | Total: | 11% | Total: | 9% |
MDA-8 |
| MDA-9 |
|
|
|
Line 8 |
| Line 7 |
|
|
|
Moored: | 0% | Moored: | 0% |
|
|
Bottom: | 2% | Bottom: | 5% |
|
|
Total: | 2% | Total: | 5% |
|
|
| MDA-10 |
| Mine Totals: | ||
Line 9 |
| Line 10 |
| Moored: | 58% |
Moored: | 1% | Moored: | 0% | Floating | 11% |
Bottom: | 0% | Bottom: | 2% | Bottom: | 24% |
Total: | 1% | Total: | 2% | Beached: | 6% |
|
|
|
| ~1,300 Mines All Types | |
Note: Columns | may not total because of rounding. | SOURCE: U.S. NAVY |
► LUGM-145 50%
>• MYAM 7%
^ Moored (unknown) 1% ^ Manta 5%
KMD-500 3%
Beached/Floating 18% Bottom (unknown) 16%
s > >
Much attention has been directed to the wide disparities among “mine counts” of the U.S. mine forces and those of other countries in the Gulf War. Only the U.S. and British mine-countermeasures forces, for example, exploited mines explicitly to determine the types of weapons and technologies employed. This exploitation task relies on mine-hunting and render-safe operations, lengthy and dangerous processes that yield significant intelligence rewards. In addition, U.S. MCM forces had clearing shipping lanes, channels, and ports as their top priority; the other MCM forces, especially after mid-April 1991, tended to focus solely on area mine-clearance operations. For example, one country’s mine-countermeasures force, upon locating a mine line, would deliberately hunt along the line, destroying mines as quickly as safe operations permitted, even though such MCM operations did not support the priority of ensuring safe transit of ships through channels and into ports. Such data were subsequently incorporated into various commercial presentations for Gulf states and other countries interested
.1
|
in acquiring modem MCM ships and systems.
A critical point to keep in mind is that these mine counts in themselves are neither an accurate nor sufficient measure of actual MCM effectiveness—and may indeed be deceptive. Much depends upon the actual numbers of mines in areas assigned for clearance and the objectives and priorities of the MCM forces. A more desirable and justifiable measure than a simple mine count, then, is the degree of confidence that an area swept or hunted is indeed mine-free or that the mine-threat level in the assigned area has been decreased sufficiently to permit normal ship movements and operations.
Using this measure, U.S. MCM operations fully satisfied all objectives established for them. That is, our primary post-cease-fire MCM objectives were to clear to a specific level of confidence mines from normal shipping channels and ports; sweep known minefields based upon Iraqi naval charts; and complete area clearance of the Kuwaiti coast and northern Persian Gulf. By all accounts, the U.S. MCM forces met these operational goals and objectives completely.
Lessons Relearned
Well before the inception of “. . . From the Sea” and the Bottom-Up Review, in early 1991 the Navy began a comprehensive assessment of the emerging requirements for effective mine warfare forces in the post-Cold War era. In January 1992, after a thorough analysis of the lessons of the Persian Gulf War and other post-World War II mine crises, the Chief of Naval Operations approved a far-reaching plan to revitalize the nation’s mine warfare forces.
As the Navy’s 1992 Mine Warfare Plan acknowledges, the “force-multiplier” aspect of mines and the concomitant critical need for capable mine countermeasures forces were two of the lessons relearned in Operations Desert
Clearing the Way
By Commander David C. Resing, U.S. Navy
t
(
An ammunition dump is on fire in the capital of a country friendly to the United States. As explosions rock the ground, unexploded munitions litter the area, including the U.S. Embassy compound. A small team of Navy explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) technicians is dispatched from a nearby carrier battle group to render safe the hazardous ordnance in the embassy compound and to provide initial assistance to the host nation in bringing this disaster under control.
The approaches to a major foreign port are reported to have been mined by a neighboring country. Although the United States has strong economic and political interests in the region, there are few U.S. forces in the area. The mining must be verified before a national response can be formulated. An EOD mine countermeasures detachment is deployed rapidly to the region. Its mission is to work with the host nation to determine if mining has occurred and, if so, to recover and exploit a mine for intelligence purposes.
Because of the potential impact mining of these waters would have on international shipping, time is a critical factor.
In a third scenario, a U.S. warship sailing peacefully in international waters has been attacked by a hostile aircraft. Two air-to-surface
missiles have struck the ship. One has exploded, causing extensive damage to the ship and the missiles and torpedoes in her magazines.
The second missile has failed to explode, and its warhead is lodged in a berthing compartment. The ship is badly damaged, but still afloat. Before she can be taken in port for repairs, the weapons in her magazines—which have been damaged by fire, water, and shock—and the
unexploded missile must be disarmed and rendered safe. A Navy EOD detachment is dispatched to neutralize the explosive hazards, so further efforts to save the ship can proceed.
These are not war-game scenar- 1 ios. The first incident described the < Navy’s response in 1987 to a situation in Karachi, Pakistan; the second < recalled our assistance to Kuwait in ] 1987, after Iran mined the approaches to Kuwait City; and the third was the response to the Iraqi attack on the USS Stark (FFG-31).
The common element in all of these incidents—and many others, as well—was the presence of Navy EOD. Indeed, Navy EOD has long supported naval operations, both at sea and ashore.
Created by necessity in World War II, EOD forces have acted as the Navy’s elite “bomb squad” for more than 50 years. Whenever incidents involving unexploded ordnance have threatened operations, forces, lives, or property, highly skilled EOD people have responded. A demanding year of initial training— focusing on diving and ordnance ranging from conventional weapons to nuclear weapons to improvised terrorist devices—prepares Navy EOD personnel to han- die any situation involving hazardous and unexploded ordnance, wherever it may be found. As the Navy responds to changing national security imperatives and the emerg- I. ing concept of joint expeditionary warfare in littoral regions, EOD will lead the way.
As naval forces move from the sea into the littorals, Navy explosive ordnance disposal detachments—here, an EOD team member cuts through to a heavily mined beach in Kuwait—will be among those enabling elements clearing the way.
Shield and Desert Storm. The U.S. Navy’s experiences in 1990-1991 identified several critical areas that already have been addressed to ensure the success of future joint expeditionary warfare operations in the littorals:6 ► Iraqi forces were not prevented from laying mines. In future mine crises, preconflict rules of engagement need to address the need for offensive mine countermeasures.
>■ Coalition forces did not know the location or composition of the mine threat. In future conflicts, adequate intelligence data must be made available to operational planners in a timely manner.
y We must possess the organic MCM assets to support fully our naval forces, without a compelling need to rely upon our allies.
The recognized value of EOD j suPport has increased with the refocusing of naval activity in the littorals. We have and will continue to confront a great variety and diversity of threats, from former Soviet First World weapons to those that ure indigenously manufactured by Third World countries. Unexploded ordnance—whether it be an unexPloded missile or bomb embedded to a ship, mines and booby traps impeding advance or maneuver, or munitions left littering an area and endangering troops and civilians—can have an adverse affect on operations. The British learned a hard lesson about the value of having EOD trained and integrated into their forces during the Falklands Conflict, "'hen HMS Antelope blew up and sunk after a British Army EOD technician tried to disarm an unexPloded bomb on board the ship.
Over the last ten years, U.S. Navy EOD operations have removed or neutralized explosive hazards to Navy and Marine Corps operations °n numerous occasions:
^ During the 1980-88 Persian Gulf tanker war between Iran and Iraq, there were several occasions of Navy EOD being tasked to render safe and recover unexploded bombs and missiles that had struck neutral foreign-flag tankers.
^ During Desert Storm, EOD personnel were dispersed throughout the Northern Persian Gulf to counter the mine threat. As moored or float- tog mines were sighted, two-man EOD teams were taken by helicopter to jump in on the mines, attach explosive charges, and swim away to be recovered by the waiting helicopter before the mines exploded.
^ In the aftermath of Desert Storm, an EOD team from the Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) battle group flew into northern Iraq as part of Operation Provide Comfort, to remove explosive hazards threatening
Kurdish refugees and U.S. relief efforts. Operating in locations without support and uncomfortably close to Iraqi soldiers, this five-man Navy- Marine team disposed of more than 34 tons of hazardous ordnance.
>■ After Desert Storm, Navy EOD teams were instrumental in clearing the approaches to and the port of Kuwait City. EOD mine countermeasures detachments worked with integrated air and surface forces to clear bottom and moored mines from the Northern Gulf.
>- Throughout 1993, EOD forces supported joint operations in Somalia, conducting routine ordnance disposal and clearing hazards around the port of Mogadishu, to open resupply routes.
Naval forces continue to refine their roles in the littorals, and Navy EOD has kept pace, refocusing on organizational relationships. Under the old way of operating, EOD deployed on board aircraft carriers—to support flight-deck operations involving fuzed ordnance; ammunition ships supporting ordnance movements; and selected amphibious ships when AV-8B Harriers were embarked. Before this, EOD was largely unknown to the battle group or amphibious task group commander and not routinely included in exercises or fully integrated into group operations. As naval forces moved into the littorals and the threat presented by unexploded ordnance became more pronounced, a new organizational relationship that fully integrated EOD into training and day-to-day operations was required.
Today, there are two EOD mobile detachments assigned as task elements to each carrier battle group. One detachment is located on the carrier, with the officer in charge dual-hatted with a task unit designator. In addition to leading his detachment, he functions as an advisor to the battle group commander,
making operational assignments to the EOD task elements assigned under him. The second EOD detachment, also designated as a task element, most often is located on the logistics support ships, with embarked helicopter detachments providing mobility. These two detachments provide traditional support to carrier flight-deck operations and also respond rapidly as detachments or two- or three-man elements.
Within the amphibious ready group, the EOD detachment is assigned to the Commander, Amphibious Task Force, with the EOD officer in charge also performing as an EOD advisor. This detachment integrates with embarked Marine and special-operations forces as well as providing basic EOD support to the ready group. This organizational relationship allows the detachments to be assigned to their respective operational commander from the beginning of the deployment work-up cycle and included in all phases of planning and exercises.
Navy EOD forces are now deployed as an active and integral part of the Navy’s expeditionary force. Working with other warfare elements, they provide EOD expertise for visit, board, and search operations; noncombat evacuations; and humanitarian assistance; as well as supporting amphibious and mine- warfare operations. They give the operational commander a vital and flexible capability to support an ever-increasing assortment of operational scenarios. As naval forces move from the sea into the littorals, Navy EOD will be among those enabling elements clearing the way.
Commander Resing is deputy program manager for Surface Mine Countermeasures Systems at Program Executive Office for Mine Warfare at Arlington, Virginia. He was commanding officer of EOD Mobile Unit 2 during Operation Desert Storm.
^ Suitable airborne and surface MCM platforms are essential and should be configured to include command-and- control, logistics/maintenance, and EOD diver support facilities.
^ MCM requirements must be included early in planning for future amphibious assaults. The very shallow water/surf zone/craft landing zone’s mine threat and physical obsta
cles can be a “show stopper,” and much needs to be done to provide an improved capability in this area.
> Navy MCM in all water depths must continue to be emphasized.
► The tactical value of mines must continue to be addressed.in U.S. planning for future regional conflicts that involve naval forces.
Table 4: Blue Harrier 93 NATO MCM Performance
U.S. Airborne Mine Countermeasures Performance Tactic Mine Type Predicted Actual
__________________ Clearance Clearance
Exploratory Precursor | Bottom | 65% | 79% |
Sweep | Moored | 59% | 89% |
> Eight NATO navies' MCM groups participated > More than 250 exercise mines planted > Only U.S. MCM group cleared 100%
► A good understanding of mine warfare—mining as well
as mine countermeasures requirements and operations
is essential at all levels of the U.S. command structure
The first edition of the Navy’s Mine Warfare Plan explicitly identified areas of greatest urgency that were the focus of mine warfare efforts during the past two years Indeed, several key actions have been taken to meet these compelling requirements:
► On 2 January 1992, the Commander, Mine Warfare Command, assumed operational and administrative control of the surface mine countermeasures ships and operational control of explosive ordnance disposal MCM detachments.
► On 1 April 1992, the Commander, Mine Warfare Command, assumed operational control of the mine countermeasures helicopter squadrons and set in motion plans for integrated MCM unit, group, and fleet exercises.
► Two major 1992 exercises—Ocean Venture and Tandem Thrust—laid the groundwork for integrating MCM operations into future fleet carrier battle group and amphibious task force exercises and predeployment workups. During 1993, the mine force participated in numerous U.S. and multinational exercises, the most prominent being Blue Harrier with NATO MCM forces in the spring. The exercise culminated in the U.S. MCM task group finishing with a clean sweep of its assigned area, plus two practice mines from a previous exercise and the disposal of three World War II mines.
Particularly critical are the contributions of the MCM he
licopters when integrated with surface forces. As Admiral Klaus Rehder, Commander, Baltic Approaches, stated at the conclusion of Blue Harrier: “AMCM has added a new dimension to the conventional SMCM and is extremely valuable in the precursor and mechanical minesweeping role. . . . From an alliance point of view, it would hurt less if you decide to reduce SMCM rather than AMCM- We would otherwise lose a full dimension of operational capabilities which only the U.S. Navy can provide.”
These exercises also reinforced the new tactical concepts of a deployable mine warfare commander and integrated i mine countermeasure operations within I the mine force. So far, the results have I validated the revised command and training structures and allowed the Navy and Marine Corps to create new and innova- ^ tive tactics.
► The Chief of Naval Operations reor- ! ganized the Navy headquarters staff in j the summer and fall of 1992, establish- j ing a Director, Expeditionary Warfare (N85), in the new N8 organization (the 1 Deputy CNO for Resources, Warfare Re- l quirements, and Assessment), with the Expeditionary Warfare Directorate having cognizance over the Navy’s mine, amphibious, explosive ordnance disposal, and special-warfare forces. At this time, the Navy also established the Program Executive Office for Mine Warfare—reporting directly to the Assistant Sec- I retary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Ac- I quisition—with acquisition responsibility and management accountability for mine, airborne, and surface MCM systems, EOD, naval special warfare MCM, and magnetic silencing programs.
► The Secretary of the Navy reorganized the former of
fice of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for An- , tisubmarine Warfare Programs as the Deputy Assistant 1 Secretary of the Navy for Mine and Undersea Warfare, clearly indicating a sea change in our appreciation of the importance of mine warfare. 1
► Working closely with the Marine Corps Combat Development Command at Quantico, the Navy identified innovative concepts of MCM operations in the amphibious | objective area to support expeditionary operations in the littorals. These continue to be fleshed out, with tactics and | systems being addressed in a comprehensive framework involving Navy, Marine Corps, and joint forces. (See 1 Figure 1.)
► The Navy also has sharpened the focus and increased the funding of warfare research, development, test, and evaluation programs to implement the concepts of operations, with an increasing emphasis on solving the problems of the very shallow water to craft-landing zone area of operations.
► The Navy supported two comprehensive assessments of mine countermeasures requirements, technologies, and capabilities. The first was the independent Mine Countermeasures Technology Study conducted by the Naval Studies Board of the National Academy of Sciences. The second was a Mine Warfare Plan Study conducted by the Warfare Analysis Laboratory of the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory. Each independent study identified current capabilities and future directions for the Navy’s MCM forces and has proved to be important in guiding the Navy’s mine warfare priorities.
Thus, within a relatively short period, the Navy has restructured its mine warfare organizations and programs to reflect the changing strategic realities of the new national security and military strategies.
Quo Vadis MCM?
Myths and misperceptions cut both ways. We can lull ourselves into thinking that we are the Paul Bunyans of the mine countermeasures world—bigger than life and capable of superhuman exploits. Any sober assessment of the last three years must conclude that we are very good and getting better. But the threat is not standing still: mines continue to proliferate throughout regional navies; these Weapons are becoming even more sophisticated and deadly; and their widespread availability enables future adversaries to attack our “. . . From the Sea” strategy directly. However, unless we debunk the myths surround
ing the Navy’s mine countermeasures forces and provide the real facts, poor judgments and decisions may be forced on the Navy that will haunt us for years to come—as has been the case so often in the past.
‘This discussion is based upon the unclassified Mine Warfare Plan: Meeting the Challenges of an Uncertain World (Department of the Navy, 29 January 1992). :For a summary discussion of the Princeton mine-strike, see Scott C. Truver, “Lessons for the Princeton Incident,” International Defense Review, 7/1991, pp. 740-741. On the damage suffered by the Tripoli, see Captain G. B. McEwen, Commanding Officer, USS Tripoli, “Comment and Discussion,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, September 1991, pp. 17-18; and “A Rude Awakening,” Fathom, Sep- tember/October 1991, pp. 2-3. The Tripoli struck a LUGM-145 “cheeseburger” contact mine, causing about $4 million in damage, although she continued to operate for another six days. The Princeton actuated an Italian Manta anti-invasion bottom mine in about 60 feet of water, causing about $22 million in damage to the ship and weapons (a second nearby Manta may have been detonated by the first explosion, but caused no additional damage); after being relieved by another Aegis cruiser about 30 hours after the mine-strike, the Princeton underwent repairs that kept her out of the rest of the conflict.
3H. Dwight Lyons, et alia, The Mine Threat: Show Stoppers or Speed Bumps'? (Alexandria, VA: CNA Occasional Paper, July 1993), pp. 6-8.
““Fleet Commander Recommended December Hits on Iraqi Minelayers,” Navy Times, 27 May 1991, pp. 4, 6.
5The U.S. Navy in “Desert Shield"/“Desert Storm” (Department of the Navy, May 1991), pp. ix-x.
6See also Adm. Frank B. Kelso II, USN, “Building Blocks of Naval Power,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November 1992, pp. 39-44.
Dr. Truver is the director of the Center for Security Strategies and Operations, TECHMATICS, Inc., Arlington, VA. He is the co-author of the 1991 revised and updated Naval Institute Press book, Weapons that Wait: Mine Warfare in the U.S. Navy.